



Henry Cooper.

James College. 1935.

L. H. Jeffery, cc £3.50

Cambridge.

March 1948.





# A COMMENTARY ON HERODOTUS

WITH INTRODUCTION AND APPENDIXES

BY

W. W. HOW

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF MERTON COLLEGE

AND

J. WELLS

WARDEN OF WADHAM COLLEGE, 1913-1927

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II (BOOKS V-IX)

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

OXFORD  
UNIVERSITY PRESS  
LONDON: AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4  
EDINBURGH GLASGOW LEIPZIG  
COPENHAGEN NEW YORK TORONTO  
MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN BOMBAY  
CALCUTTA MADRAS SHANGHAI  
HUMPHREY MILFORD  
PUBLISHER TO THE  
UNIVERSITY

*First printed 1912*  
*Corrected impression 1928*

# CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

	PAGE
COMMENTARY ON BOOKS V-IX . . . . .	I
APPENDIXES XVI-XXIII	
XVI. Herodotus on Tyranny . . . . .	338
XVII. Sparta under King Cleomenes (520-490 B.C.) .	347
XVIII. Marathon . . . . .	353
XIX. Numbers of the Armies and Fleets (480-479 B.C.)	363
XX. The Campaign of 480 B.C. . . . .	369
XXI. Salamis . . . . .	378
XXII. The Campaigns of 479 B.C. . . . .	387
XXIII. Arms, Tactics, and Strategy in the Persian War	397
ADDITIONAL NOTES . . . . .	415
INDEX (to both volumes) . . . . .	418

## MAPS IN VOLUME II

MARATHON . . . . .	<i>To face p.</i>	109
*THERMOPYLAE . . . . .	,,	205
SALAMIS . . . . .	,,	249
*PLATAEA . . . . .		<i>at end</i>

\* Based on the plans in *The Great Persian War*, by permission of Dr. G. B. Grundy and Mr. John Murray.



# LIST OF PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES WITH ABBREVIATED TITLES

[N.B.—The works most frequently used have been quoted simply by their authors' names; in other cases the titles have been abbreviated, as given in this list.]

- ABBOTT, E. Herodotus V, VI. 1893.  
 BÄHR, I. C. F. Herodotus. 4 vols. 2nd edit., 1856–61.  
 BALL, C. J. Light from the East.  
 BARTH, H. Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des Mittelmeeres. 1849. W.  
 BELOCH, J. Griechische Geschichte, vol. i. 1893.  
 Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt. Bevölkerung or B.  
 BERGER, H. Erdkunde der Griechen. 2nd edit., 1903.  
 BERGK. Poetae Lyrici Graeci. 3rd edit. or 4th. P. L. G.  
 BLAKESLEY, J. W. Herodotus. 2 vols.  
 BOECKH, A. Kleine Schriften. Kl. Sch.  
 Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener. 3rd edit., 1886.  
 BURY, J. B. Greek History. 2 vols. (the smaller edition in one vol. is quoted by page only).  
 Ancient Greek Historians. A. G. H.  
 BUSOLT, G. Griechische Geschichte. 2nd edit., 1893 and later.  
 DITTENBERGER. Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum. 2nd edit.  
 DUNCKER, M. History of Antiquity, translated by E. Abbott. 6 vols. (vol. vii in the German original).  
 FARNELL, L. R. Cults of Greek States. 5 vols., 1907, 1909. G. C.  
 FRAZER, J. G. Pausanias. 6 vols., 1898.  
 (Sometimes 'P.' or 'Paus.')
- Golden Bough (usually 2nd edit.). G. B.  
 FREEMAN. History of Sicily. S. or Sicily.  
 GARDNER, E. A. Ancient Athens. Athens.  
 Handbook of Greek Sculpture. G. S.  
 GARDNER, P. New Chapters on Greek History. 1892. N. C. G. H.  
 GILBERT. Greek Constitutional Antiquities. 1895  
 (vol. ii in the German original). G. C. A. or Gr. St.

## LIST OF PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES

- GOODWIN. Greek Moods and Tenses. 2nd edit.  
 GROTE, G. A History of Greece. 12 vols., 1869.  
 GRUNDY, G. B. Great Persian War.  
     Thucydides. 1911. Thuc.  
 HAMILTON, W. J. Asia Minor.  
 HARRISON, Miss J. Mythology and Monuments of  
     Ancient Athens. Athens, or Myth. and Mon.  
     Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. Prolegomena  
 HASTINGS, J. Dictionary of the Bible. 4 vols. Dict. Bib. or D. B.  
 HAUVETTE, A. Hérodote historien des guerres médiques.  
 HEAD, B. V. Historia Numorum. 2nd edit. 1911. H. N.  
 HICKS, E. L. A Manual of Greek Inscriptions, by  
     E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill. 2nd edit.<sup>1</sup> Hicks.  
 HILL, G. F. Historical Greek Coins. 1906. G. C. or H. G. C.  
     Handbook of Greek and Roman Coins. 1899. G. and R. C.  
 HERMANN. Handbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten.  
 HOGARTH, D. G. Accidents of an Antiquary's Life.  
     1910. A. A. L.  
     Authority and Archaeology. 1899. A. and A.  
     Excavations at Ephesus. 1908. Ephesus or E.  
     Ionia and the East. 1909. I. and E.  
 HOLM. History of Greece, vols. i and ii. 1895.  
     Geschichte Siciliens. G. S.  
 KIEPERT, H. Formae Orbis Antiqui. (New edition.)  
 KING and HALL. Egypt and Western Asia in the Light  
     of Recent Discoveries. 1907.  
 KRÜGER, K. W. Herodotus.  
 LASSEN, C. Indische Alterthumskunde. 1847 seq. I. A.  
 LEAKE, W. M. Asia Minor. A. M.  
     Northern Greece. N. G.  
 MACAN, R. W. Herodotus IV-VI. 1895.  
     Herodotus VII-IX. 1908.  
 MAHAFFY, J. P. Greek Literature. 2 vols. Gk. Lit.  
     Social Life in Greece. S. L.  
 MARCO POLO. Yule's edition, edited by Cordier. 2  
     vols., 1903.  
 MASPERO, G. Histoire ancienne de l'Orient. 3 vols.,  
     1895. (The abridged form of this book in one  
     volume (6th edit., 1904) is quoted by page only.)  
     Causeries. Caus. or C.  
 MEYER, E. Geschichte des Alterthums (vol. i, 2nd  
     edit.<sup>1</sup>). 4 vols.  
     Forschungen zur alten Geschichte. F.  
 MÜLLENHOFF. Deutsche Alterthumskunde. 3 vols. D. A.  
 MURE, W. History of Greek Literature. 5 vols., 1859.

<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise stated.



## LIST OF PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES

- MURRAY, A. S. History of Greek Sculpture. 1880. G. S.  
 MYRES, J. L. Anthropology and the Classics. A. and C.  
 NISSEN. Italische Landeskunde.  
 PERROT ET CHIPIEZ. Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquité.  
 PRÁŠEK, J. Geschichte der Meder und Perser. 1906.  
 PRELLER. Griechische Mythologie. 4th edit.  
 RAMSAY, W. M. Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia. C. and B.  
     Historical Geography of Asia Minor. 1890. H. G. or A. M.  
 RAWLINSON, G. Herodotus. 4 vols. 3rd edit. 1875.  
 RECLUS. Géographie Universelle.  
 ROBERTS, E. S. Greek Epigraphy, vol. i. Gk. Epig.  
 ROHLFS, G. Kufra. 1881. K.  
 ST. MARTIN, V. Le Nord de l'Afrique dans l'Antiquité.  
 SMITH, W. ROBERTSON. Religion of the Semites.  
     2nd edit. Rel. Sel.  
     Kinship in Ancient Arabia. 2nd edit. Kinship.  
 STEIN, H. Herodotus.  
 TORR, C. Ancient Ships. A. S.  
 TOZER, H. F. History of Ancient Geography. 1897. A. G.  
     Islands of the Aegean. I. Aeg.  
 TYLOR, E. B. Primitive Culture. 2 vols. 4th edit. P. C.  
     Early History of Mankind. E. H. M.  
 WESTERMARCK. History of Human Marriage. 3rd edit.  
     1901.  
 WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF. Aristoteles und Athen. A. und A.  
     Philologische Untersuchungen. Phil. U.  
 WINCKLER, H. Altorientalische Forschungen. 2 vols. A. F.

(Where a book has been used only once or twice, the title has been usually given either in full or at least with sufficient fullness for the reference to be traced. Cf. also i. 155, 302, and the first or last paragraphs of the Appendixes, for books used on special parts of H.'s work.)

### *Additional Authorities*

- BUSOLT, G. Griechische Staatskunde. 2 vols. and  
     index, 1920-6. Griech. Staats.  
 CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY. C. A. H.  
 GARDNER, P. A History of Ancient Coinage,  
     700-300 B. C. 1918. Hist. Coin.  
 JACOBY, F. Pauly-Wissowa, VIII. Supplemt.-Bd., 379 f. Jacoby.

# LIST OF PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS

Cf. also i. 155 and 302.

- A. E. G.     *Annuaire des Études Grecques.*  
 B. C. H.     *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.*  
 B. I.        *Behistun Inscription.*  
 B. M. G.     *British Museum Guide.*  
               *Assyrian Antiquities. 1908.*  
               *Egyptian Collections. 1909.*  
 B. P. W.     *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift.*  
 B. S. A.     *British School of Athens, Annual of.*  
 C. C.        *Cyrus Cylinder.*  
 C. I. A.     *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum.*  
 C. I. G.     *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. Boeckh, &c.*  
               4 vols.  
 C. R. (or Cl. R.). *Classical Review.*  
 D. of A.     *Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities.*  
               3rd edit.  
 E. B.        *Encyclopaedia Britannica. 11th edit. (unless otherwise*  
               *indicated, e. g. thus, E. B.<sup>9</sup>).*  
 Enc. Bib.   *Encyclopaedia Biblica.*  
 E. H. R.     *English Historical Review.*  
 F. H. G.     *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum. 4 vols., ed. C.*  
               *Muller. 1885.*  
 G. G. M.     *Geographici Graeci Minores. 2 vols., ed. C. Muller. 1853.*  
 G. J.        *Geographical Journal.*  
 I. G. A.     *Inscriptiones Graecae Antiquissimae. ed. Röhl, 1882.*  
 J. H. S.     *Journal of Hellenic Studies.*  
 J. of P.     *Journal of Philology.*  
 J. R. A. S.   *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society.*  
 J. R. G. S.   *Journal of Royal Geographical Society (v. s. for Geo-*  
 (or R. G. S.) *graphical Journal).*  
 L. and S.    *Liddell and Scott, Greek Lexicon. 8th edit.*  
 M. A. I.     *Mittheilungen des Deutschen Archaeologischen Instituts*  
               *(Athenische Abtheilung).*  
 P. G.        *Paroemiographi Graeci. 2 vols., ed. Leutsch and*  
               *Schneidewin. 1839.*  
 P. L. G.     *Poetae Lyrici Graeci. 3 vols., ed. Bergk, 3rd or 4th edit.*  
               1878.  
 P. W.        *Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopaedie (new edit. now*  
               *appearing).*  
 Q. R.        *Quarterly Review.*  
 R. E.        *Revue Égyptologique.*  
 R. E. G.     *Revue des Études Grecques.*  
 R. M. (or Rhein. Mus.) *Rheinisches Museum.*  
 R. P.<sup>1</sup>       *Records of the Past (First Series).*  
 R. P.<sup>2</sup>       "       "       " *(Second Series).*  
 S. B. E.     *Sacred Books of the East.*  
 T. S. B. A.   *Transactions of the Society for Biblical Archaeology.*  
 W. K. P.     *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie.*

## BOOK V

**I-16** *The Persians under Megabazus conquer Thrace. Digressions on the customs and deities of the Thracians (3-8), the lands beyond the Danube (9, 10), on Darius and the Paeonians (11-13), and on the dwellings on Lake Prasias (16).* The account of primitive customs makes this section, like the more detailed ones on Scythia and Libya, of the greatest interest to anthropologists.

**I 1** After the excursus on Cyrene and Libya (iv. 145 f.) H. takes up again the narrative of Persian conquest in Europe from iv. 144.

Ἑλλησποντίων: in the wide sense; cf. iv. 38 n.

**2** Paeonian tribes had once occupied the hill country from the Illyrian mountains to Rhodope, and the valleys of the Axios and Strymon, though it is curious to find them as far east as Perinthus. They were early driven from their homes by Macedonians in the West and Thracians in the East, retaining in H.'s time only the rough upper valleys of the Axios and Strymon (Thuc. ii. 96), and some tracts of land lower down the latter stream; cf. 13-15 and vii. 20. 2 n.

The Paeonian dogs were celebrated fighters, Pollux v. 46, 47. For the horses cf. Mimnermus, fr. 17 Παίονας ἄνδρας ἄγων ἵνα τε κλειτὸν γένος ἵππων.

**3** ἐπαιώνιζον. The Paeon here is a cry of triumph for the victory in the triple duel, thanking the god for his aid. The refrain ἢ Παίων sounded to the enemy like 'come Paeon', thus fulfilling the oracle, which bade them attack if called by name.

Perinthus was a Samian colony founded about 600 B. C., Busolt i. 470. This disaster is clearly placed by H. some time before the Persian conquest.

**2 2** διὰ τῆς Θρηίκης: i. e. from East to West along the south coast (ch. 10). Darius had already conquered, at least temporarily, the tribes northward along the Euxine as far as the Ister (iv. 93, 118).

**3 1** μέγιστον. This undue enlargement of Thrace arises from H.'s misconception of the Danube's course (iv. 99). For Thucydides' variant statements cf. iv. 81. 1 n.

**2** οὐνόματα... πολλά. H. names nineteen tribes: the Bessi (vii. 111), Bisaltae (viii. 116; cf. vii. 115), Bistones (vii. 110), Brygi (vi. 45), Cicones (vii. 110, &c.), Crestonaei (v. 3, &c), Crobyzi (iv. 49), Dersaei (vii. 110), Dolonci (vi. 34 f.), Edoni (vii. 110, &c.), Getae (iv. 93 f.), Nipsaei (iv. 93), Odomanti (vii. 112), Odryae (iv. 92), Paeti, Sapaei, Satrae (vii. 110), Scyrmidae (iv. 93), and Trausi (v. 3). Hecataeus supplies ten additional names and Thucydides

(ii. 96) three. Strabo, who says there were only twenty-two tribes in all (331, fr. 47), gives five fresh names, while Pliny (H. N. iv. 43 f.) adds at least twenty to the list.

**Τραυσῶν.** The Trausi are placed by Livy (xxxviii. 41) round Tempyra (between the Hebrus and Lake Ismaris), and are thought to be connected with the river *Τραῦδος* (vii. 109) which flows into the lagoon Bistonis (Bähr).

**Κρηστωναίων** (*Γρηστωνία* Thuc. ii. 99, *Γρηστώνες* Steph. Byz.): the inhabitants of Crestonice, a district round the source of the *Ἐχέιδωρος* between the Axios and the Strymon (vii. 124, 127). They belonged to the Thracian race, and during the Persian war were under the same king as the Bisaltæ (viii. 116). In the Peloponnesian war part of the tribe lived near Mount Athos (Thuc. iv. 109). Their northern neighbours here may be the Maedi (ch. 9 n.). On the city Creston cf. i. 57 n.

4 This Trausic custom, like Suttee (ch. 5), evidently rests on the faith in a better life beyond the grave, held also by the Getae (iv. 95), and embodied in the Thracian cult of Dionysus (Rohde, *Psyche*, ii. 1). This belief is primitive and widespread (H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, ch. 13, 14; Tylor, *P. C.* ch. 12, 13), while the pessimistic view of the present life (cf. *Soph. Oed. Col.* 1225; *Theogn.* 425) is in accord with one side of Hellenic sentiment (Butcher, *Gr. G.* 154 f.), and with H.'s own oft-repeated opinion (cf. *Introd.* § 36). Euripides turns this custom to account, whether he learned it from the work of H. (Stein) or at the Macedonian court (Blakesley). Cresphontes, *Fr.* 452 Ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιούμενους, Τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὃς ἔρχεται κακά, Τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον Χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

5 A Thracian slave in Menander (ap. Strabo, p. 297) says Γαμέι γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδὲ εἰς, εἰ μὴ δέκ' ἢ ἑνδεκα γυναῖκας δώδεκά τ' ἢ πλείους τινές.

**Suttee** (cf. *Tusc. Disp.* v. 27. 78), like the Scyth custom (iv. 71 n.), is based on the belief that the soul requires in another world what it has enjoyed in this. It was widely prevalent among Teutonic and Slavonic races as well as in India (*Diodor.* xix. 33, 34; cf. *M. Polo*, *Bk. III*, ch. 17, ii. 341; *Westermarck*, *H. of M.* p. 125 f.).

6 **ἐπ' ἐξαγωγή:** for exportation abroad (cf. vii. 156. 2 *ad fin.*) like the Circassians.

Many races are comparatively indifferent to juvenile unchastity, and only impose strict conduct on women after marriage. Cf. i. 93. 4 n., *Peschel*, *Races of Man*, p. 220 f., but *per contra*, *Westermarck*, *op. cit.* p. 61 f.

For marriage by purchase cf. the speech of the Thracian chief Seuthes, *Xen. Anab.* vii. 2. 37 σοὶ δέ, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, καὶ θυγατέρα δώσω καὶ εἴ τις σοὶ ἔστι θυγάτηρ ὠνήσομαι Θρακίῳ νόμῳ, and *Peschel*, *op. cit.* p. 227 f.; *Westermarck*, *op. cit.* ch. 17.

2 **Tattooing** was the Greek the branding of a slave (cf. vii. 233 n.), though traces of it are thought by Tsountas to be indicated on

a limestone head found at Mycenae (C. R. xi. 461). It was, however, an honour among the Thracians (Cic. de Offic. ii. 7. 25; Dio Chrys. p. 233), Illyrians (Strabo 315), the Agathyrsi (Mela ii. 10), and the Mosynoeci (Xen. Anab. v. 4. 32). It is widely used, sometimes as a tribal or totem mark (Frazer, Totemism, i. 28, iv. 197 f.), sometimes as a means of decoration (Westermarck, *op. cit.* p. 168).

For the similar feeling among the Germans cf. Tac. Germ. 14 'Nec arare terram aut expectare annum tam facile persuaseris quam vocare hostem et vulnera mereri'. Cf. also ii. 167.

- 7 The identifications of foreign with Greek or Roman deities, common in classical authors, are usually misleading. In the cases, however, of Ares and Dionysus we have other evidence of their Thracian extraction. Ares, the half-barbarian war-spirit, holds a secondary position in Hellas. Though his cult was very ancient in several places (e. g. Thebes) he was generally thought to have come from Thrace, whence his worship was derived in prehistoric times (Roscher, *s. v.*, Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 642). Dionysus, though the name is probably Greek, had an oracle among the Bessi (vii. 111 n.). His strange cult, prominent features in which are his connexion with the under-world, the orgiastic ecstasy, &c., had no great hold on Greece in the Homeric age, and only won its way to a slow and gradual recognition by becoming Hellenized and humanized. The true home of Dionysus was in Southern Thrace between the Axius and the Hebrus, where he had many local names, e. g. Sabazius. His cult was closely related to the Cybele cult of the kindred Phrygians (Rohde, Psyche, ii. 1; Ramsay on Μήν, C. and B. i. 105; and in general, Farnell, G. C. v. 85 f.).

Artemis (cf. iv. 33) is probably Bendis, worshipped even at Athens (Plat. Rep. i. 1. 327 A; Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 11), or the kindred Edonian war-goddess Cotys or Cotytto (Strabo, p. 470). Both may be connected with the great Mother of Asia Minor, a goddess of fertility of whom the Ephesian Artemis is a form; cf. Append. I and Farnell, G. C. ii. 473 f., 587 f.

Hermes appears to have been the chief of the Cabiri (Roscher, Myth. Lex. 2360); with his cult compare the Gallic (Caesar, B. G. vi. 17; Rhys, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 5-20 and ch. iv) and German (Tac. Germ. 9) worship of Mercurius. The latter, Odin, would seem to be like Hermes a wind god, and this may be true also of the Thracian deity. It seems improbable that the Thracians were content with so small a pantheon. Indeed, even according to H., some of them worshipped the Cabiri (ii. 51 n.) and others Salmoxis (iv. 95 n.).

- 8 εὐωχέονται. Such funeral feasts are found among the Scyths (iv. 73) and in Homer (Il. xxiii. 29, xxiv *ad fin.*). They must be distinguished from merely commemorative festivals, such as the Roman Parentalia, and from the more savage custom of feeding on the dead, for which cf. iv. 26 n.

θάπτουσι, like ταφαί, refers to all the sepulchral rites detailed later.

γῆ κρύψαντες defines and explains ἄλλως, 'in another way, namely by'.

μονομαχίης, 'in which the greatest prizes are given, the competitors being matched in pairs' (Macan) (the implied contrast being with the Greek games in which the prizes were small (viii. 26), and more than two competed at once (v. 22)) rather than 'the greatest prizes are given for single combat as is reasonable' (Abbott; cf. viii. 111).

- 9 1 ἀπειρος: there is no known northern limit. Similarly nothing is known of the country north of Scythia (iv. 16).

Σιγύννας. Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 320) places Σίγυννοι near the island of Peuce in the lower Danube, but Strabo (520), while agreeing closely with H. otherwise, describes Σίγυννοι among the peoples of the Caucasus: Σίγυννοι δὲ τὰλλα μὲν περσίζουσιν, ἱππαρίοις δὲ χρῶνται μικροῖς δάσεσιν, ἅπερ ἱππότην ὀχεῖν μὲν οὐ δύναται τέθριππα δὲ ζευγνύουσιν.

Μηδικῇ, as described i. 135; iii. 84; v. 49; vii. 61. Myres interprets this of the trousers (ἀναξυρίδες), which struck Greeks most in Persian dress, just as the 'braccae' of the Gauls did Latin writers (Anthropological Essays in honour of E. B. Tylor, p. 259).

- 2 For the ponies cf. Strabo, *sup.* Similar dwarf horses, 'ginni,' were a regular article of export among the Ligurians (cf. Strabo 202), and can be traced in the region as far back as the fourth century (Arist. Hist. Animal. vi. 24. 1; de Gen. An. ii. 8. 24).

Ἑνετῶν. Eneti, i.e. Veneti, were settled round Padua in the plain between the Adige and the Timavo, and were considered by H. Illyrian (i. 196).

ἐν τῷ Ἀδρίῳ, 'on the Adriatic' (cf. i. 163; iv. 33), is added to distinguish them not from the Gallic Veneti (Caes. B. G. ii. 34 f.), who were unknown to Herodotus, but from Homer's Paphlagonian Eneti (Il. ii. 852). In Strabo's time the Adriatic Eneti were regarded as a Cisalpine offshoot of the Breton Veneti or as colonists of their Paphlagonian namesakes (Strabo 61, 195, &c.).

- 3 Μήδων ἄποικοι. Myres (*op. cit.* p. 260) holds that time will not allow of this Median origin, and suggests a confusion with the Μαῖδοι (Thuc. ii. 98, &c.), a Thracian tribe which apparently moved from the middle Strymon to the upper Axios.

Λίγυες. These Ligurians (cf. vii. 165) are described so as to distinguish them from the Asiatic Ligyes (vii. 72). They once held the coastland as far as the Rhone, but later either submitted to Massilia and the other Greek colonies on the coast or retired up the river valleys and into the Maritime Alps.

In the Sigynnae, who trade as pedlars, Myres sees Sequani trading in iron, and especially in iron spears of the gaesum type (*op. cit.* p. 261 f.).



δόρατα. Cf. Arist. Poet. 21 τὸ σίγνον Κυπρίοις μὲν κύριον, ἡμῖν δὲ γλῶττα. Later on the word *σίγνονα* and its variants become fairly common. From the scholium on Plato, p. 384, *σίγνυνος δ' ἐστὶ ξυστόν δόρυ, παρ' Ἡροδότῃ δὲ τὸ ὀλοσίδηρον ἀκόντιον*, Myres (*op. cit.* p. 272 f.) is able to identify Sigynnae in this sense with some 'long cylindrical spits' from Tamassos in Cyprus. He would also connect Sigynnae in both senses with the iron-using culture of Hallstatt.

IO μέλισσαι. Perhaps this refers to the gnats and mosquitos which infest Roumania. For Herodotus' physical speculations cf. iv. 29 n.

II 1 Darius would hardly have crossed by the Hellespont (cf. iv. 143; v. 26 n.), instead of returning as he came by the Bosphorus, if Miltiades, tyrant of the Chersonese, has shown himself disloyal, by his conduct at the bridge over the Danube (iv. 137 f.; cf. vi. 40 n.).

2 τὴν Ἡδωνῶν (sc. χάρην): cf. cc. 124, 126. The district lay between Lake Cercinitis and Mount Pangaeum, and was rich in timber, gold, and silver (Thuc. iv. 108). After the death of Aristagoras the new city fell into the hands of the Edonians, who still held it in 424 B. C. (Thuc. iv. 107). It cannot therefore be identical with Amphipolis (cf. vii. 114), though it was in the same district. The foundation of the Athenian colony confirms the wisdom of Histiaeus' choice. Strategically it lay at the junction of the only practicable roads from the Nestus to the Strymon (15 n.) and thus commanded the only land route along the northern Aegean, where later ran the great Via Egnatia as well as the route up the Strymon.

Coes (cf. iv. 97) was only general of Mitylene in the Scythian expedition. The city still retained, after its submission in the days of Cambyses, the moderate government established by Pittacus (Ar. Pol., p. 1285, 1274 b 18).

12 1 ἀνασπάστους. For such transplantations cf. iii. 93 n. No doubt the Paeonians were deported because they were too dangerous to be left in their native homes.

2 προκατιζόμενον: sitting to give judgement, a genuinely oriental habit; cf. i. 14. 97. Nicolaus Damascenus (fr. 71) tells of Alyattes, king of Lydia, and a man from 'Thracian' Mysia and his wife, a story so similar in all its details that E. Meyer (F. i. 168 n.) suspects the variations from H. are due to the carelessness of the excerptor, Constantine Porphyry. (F. H. G. iii. 413). It is, however, more probable that an older Lydian tale was tacked on to Darius erroneously.

13 2 πεπολισμένη: usually of single cities; cf. ch. 52. 6, iv. 108. 1; here (= οἰκισμένη) of a country full of cities; cf. Strabo 364.

For the supposed Teucrian and Mysian migration to Europe cf. vii. 20 n.

τούτου, 'this' (i. e. that Darius might ask the question).

15 There were two roads from Abdera and the mouth of the Nestus to the Strymon: (1) the main road near the coast south of Mount Pangaeum through Pieria (cf. vii. 121 n.); (2) the mountain road

through the passes of the Sapaei (near Philippi), which led north of Mount Pangaeum down the valley of the Angites past the Doberes (vii. 113).

- 3 Σιριοπαῖνες : named after their capital, Siris (viii. 115) (the modern Seres), near the east bank of the Strymon, just above Lake Cercinitis (now Terkino), into which the Strymon expands above Amphipolis. The Paeoplae are on the Strymon north of the Angites and Siris (vii. 113).

- 16 I Δόβηρας . . . Ὀδομάντους. Probably spurious. The combination of geographical and ethnographical boundaries is possible (cf. Strabo 440 τὴν περὶ Πίνδον καὶ Ἀθαμᾶνας καὶ Δόλοπας), but of the three tribes named only one, the Odomanti, in the hills some way north of Mount Pangaeum, and east of the Strymon (vii. 112 ; Thuc. ii. 101), is Thracian, while the other two, the Doberes, just north of Mount Pangaeum (vii. 113), and the Agrians, near the source of the Strymon (Thuc. ii. 96), are themselves Paeonian. How then can Paeonians be said to dwell near them?

Lake Prasias is identified by Kiepert (Map xvi, p. 4) with the little lake of Butkova, rather than with that of Doïran, mainly because it lies near the middle Strymon, and possibly lay on the old course of the river. Hence wood could be brought down the river from Mount Orbelus (§ 2), whereas that would be impossible to Lake Doïran. The identification, also, suits better the tribes named (ch. 15) and Mount Dysorus (ch. 17).

ᾧδε must be taken with κατοικημένους ; Abicht transposes κατοικημένους and ἐξαιρέειν.

- 2 Orbelus : the southern offshoots of Mount Scomius between the Strymon and the Nestus.
- 3 καταπακτῆς : neither the form, which should be καταπηκτῆς, nor the sense, 'fast closed,' are satisfactory. Read καταρρακτῆς (Reiske) (cf. Livy xxvii. 28 *cataracta*), or κατεπακτῆς (Stein), 'closing downwards,' i.e. a trap-door ; cf. Pollux x. 25.
- 4 Cf. Athenaeus 345 ε οἶδα δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ Μόσσυνον τῆς Θράκης βούς οἱ ἰχθῦς ἐσθίουσι παραβαλλομένους αὐτοῖς ἐς τὰς φάτνας, a notice made more interesting by the fact that μόσσυνος means 'a house built on piles' ; cf. Xen. Anab. v. 4. 26.

This is the earliest known description of lake dwellings. The settlement here may be a survival of a primitive civilization, like that which existed on the shores of the lakes on both sides the Alps, where many remains of pile dwellings and other relics of the Stone and Bronze ages have been discovered (cf. O. Keller, *Lake Dwellings*, and the able summary in Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times*, ch. v, also 'The Glastonbury Lake Village'). They were specially adapted for purposes of defence, and are still so used in Borneo, New Guinea, and Dahomey. For the fishing cf. Rawlinson, and for Thracian polygamy, ch. 5 n. Herodotus seems to imply in the word ἐπειρήθη that Megabazus failed in his attempt to capture these

inaccessible dwellings. We may compare the escape of Venice when the Huns sacked Aquileia A. D. 452.

17-22 *The story of the Persian embassy to Amyntas. Murder of the envoys by Alexander.* The story is hard to believe (Macan). Not only are similar stories told of other persons; Messenians and Laconians (Paus. iv. 4. 3.), Athenians and Megarians (Plut. Sol. 8; Polyaen. i. 20), and (later) of the Theban exiles and the Polemarchs (Xen. Hell. v. 4. 4-6; but cf. § 7); but the subsequent conduct of Alexander is inconsistent with this patriotic beginning. He makes terms with Persia (ch. 21) and remains a Persian vassal (Bks. VIII, IX). This story seems designed to prove the patriotism of Alexander, the faithful friend of Athens (cf. viii. 136 n.; ix. 44); H.'s partiality for the Macedonian kings (cf. ch. 22, viii. 137) leads him to accept the tradition, learnt either in Macedon (cf. Introd. § 4) or at Athens.

17 2 Μακεδονίης. H. exaggerates the nearness of Lake Prasias to the Macedon of Amyntas, i. e. the district between the Axios and the Haliacmon (Μακεδονίς, vii. 127 n.). Amyntas (circ. 540-498 B. C.; cf. viii. 139), and for a time his son and successor Alexander, were petty princes content to submit to Persian suzerainty. But later (ὕστερον τούτων), after the defeat of Xerxes and Mardonius (480-79 B. C.), Alexander extended his kingdom east of the Axios, over Mygdonia and Bisaltia, till it reached the Strymon (Thuc. ii. 99). He then acquired the rich mine here mentioned, probably just east of Mount Dysorus. Southward of this, in Bisaltia, gold and silver were plentiful (cf. 11 n.; vi. 46; vii. 112; ix. 75). Hence he adopted the Bisaltian type and standard of coinage, merely substituting his own name for that of the tribe (Head, H. N. 199 f.).

ὑπερβάντα : a word like ἕξει must be supplied from ἔστι . . . σύντομος. Abicht emends ὑπερβάντι.

18 2 διαπίνοντες. Both Macedonians (cf. Theopompus, ap. Polyb. viii. 11, and Arrian, Anab. iv. 8. 2) and Persians (cf. i. 133; Aelian, Var. Hist. xii. 1) were hard drinkers.

νόμος. Repugnant as is the suggestion to Greek sentiment (cf. Isaeus iii. 14) it is even more opposed to Oriental custom; cf. Plut. Mor. 613 τοὺς Πέρσας ὀρθῶς φασι μὴ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἀλλὰ ταῖς παλλάκεσι συμμεθύσκεσθαι.

4 ἀλγηδόνας . . . ὀφθαλμῶν. This strange expression may be an Orientalism: it is used by Alexander the Great of Persian ladies (Plut. Alex. 21).

20 4 Ἕλλην. Alexander is always made to assert his Hellenic lineage; cf. ch. 22, ix. 45.

ὑπαρχος. The word implies that Macedon is a fief under the Persian crown.

21 2 Βουβάρη : dative after δοὺς ταῦτα. Bubares, who had a son Amyntas by this marriage (viii. 136), must surely be the same as

Bubares, son of Megabazus (vii. 22), one of the overseers of the Athos canal. Since Alexander, not Amyntas, gives Gygaea in marriage, he must in the meantime have succeeded to the throne. But this took place circ. 498 B. C., so that οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον must not be pressed. Alexander was doubtless anxious to gain influence at the Persian court. It seems more likely that the marriage of his sister to a Persian grandee, which cast a slur on his phil-Hellenism, caused the invention of the tale that he murdered the envoys, than that the murder of the envoys was really hushed up by the marriage.

- 22 I "Ἕλληνας . . . εἶναι. Herodotus, who exaggerates the phil-Hellenism (vii. 173; viii. 143; ix. 44 f.) of Alexander, twice over insists on his Hellenic lineage (viii. 137), yet his proofs are weak: (1) a family legend, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι (cf. viii. 137 f.); (2) the verdict of the judges at Olympia, probably based on the legend.

ἐπιστάμενος. H. may have satisfied himself by inquiry at the Macedonian court, if he visited it (cf. Suidas, Introd. §§ 1, 4), but his 'knowledge' is not different in kind from 'opinion', certainty being attainable in his view, not only by the evidence of his own eyes or other testimony but by inference and combinations (cf. Macan, i, Introd. civ).

διέποντες . . . Ἑλλήνων: i.e. the Ἑλληνοδίκαι, as most edd. read with A B C P. These presidents and judges at the Olympic games were citizens of Elis (ii. 160). Their number varied with that of the Elean tribes (Paus. v. 9. 5, with Frazer *ad loc.*).

- 2 καταβάντος, 'entering the lists'; cf. Soph. Trach. 505; Plato, Laws 834 E.

Ἀργεῖος: a descendant of Temenus, the Heraclid conqueror of Argos (viii. 137). Thucydides accepts this genealogy (ii. 99, v. 80), as do most later authors, with variations (viii. 137 n.), though Demosthenes vehemently protests (Phil. iii. 31).

στάδιον: cognate accusative, the foot-race being a form of ἀγών; cf. Xen. Anab. iv. 8. 27; Plat. Laws 833 A.

συνεξέπιπτε: not 'was drawn in the first pair', as competitors ran in heats of four, not in pairs (Paus. vi. 13. 2), but 'ran equal with the first', i.e. ran a dead heat; cf. Plut. Mor. 1045 D ὑποθέμενος δύοδρομεῖς ὁμοῦ συνεκίπτειν ἀλλήλοις. The word, properly used of votes or opinions (i. 206. 3; viii. 49. 2), is transferred here to the competitor voted upon, as in viii. 123. 2 to the voters. Since Alexander's name does not appear on the list of victors, we must either suppose he was beaten in the deciding heat, or that Herodotus here too (cf. 17 n.) is giving us an inaccurate Macedonian version of the story, such athletic traditions being proverbially untrustworthy.

- 23-27 Darius takes Histiaeus with him to Susa. Otanes' conquests.

- 23 I δωρεάν must be left out or altered to χάρην, and put before μισθόν.  
2 No doubt Histiaeus, and Aristagoras after him (ch. 124 f.), hoped to

turn the great natural advantages of the district (ch. 11 n.) to good account. But the idea of a great Graeco-barbarian power in Thrace strong enough to be a danger to the Persian empire is strange.

οἰκῆω: either 'within your own land' (cf. Thuc. i. 118), or better, 'of your own making.'

24 4 σύσσιτος = ὁμόσιτος (vii. 119. 3), and ὁμοτράπεζος (iii. 132), Xen. Anab. i. 8. 25. This was a great honour at the Persian, as at other Eastern courts (2 Sam. ix. 7, 11; 1 Kings ii. 7). For the king's benefactors cf. viii. 85 n.

25 1 Ἀρταφρένα. The MSS. vary here and elsewhere (vi. 94; vii. 74), but this form is confirmed by Aesch. Pers. 21, 776, and C. I. A. i. 64 [Τισ]σαφρένην, and represents the Persian ending *-frana* (cf. iii. 70 nn.) more correctly than the later form Ἀρταφέρνης.

The mutual relations of the Persian officials in Asia Minor are obscure (cf. App. VI; Abbott, H. v, vi, Exc. i).

(1) Though Herodotus divides Asia Minor west of the Halys into *three* satrapies—the Ionic, the Lydian, and the Phrygian (iii. 90, 127), we hear of only *two* capitals—Sardis (Çparda, cf. iii. 120) and Dascylium, as in Thucydides. Again, Thucydides clearly recognizes only two principal satraps—Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, Tamos, governor of Ionia, being a mere lieutenant of the latter (Thuc. viii. 31, 87). Similarly, in Herodotus, Oroetes, Satrap of Sardis (iii. 120), resides at Magnesia in the Ionic satrapy (iii. 122), and after slaying the satrap of Dascylium, holds all three satrapies (iii. 126, 127). Further, had he not from the first ruled Ionia, why should he have been taunted with the independence of Samos? (iii. 120). It would seem then that the Ionic satrapy, though distinct for financial purposes, was governed from Sardis.

(2) The generals seem at this time to have been quite distinct from the satraps. In the Ionic revolt the *three* generals are said to have districts (νομοί, v. 102), and divide the revolted towns among themselves (v. 116). Nevertheless Daurises moves from the Hellespont to Caria (v. 117), while Hymaees takes his place on the Hellespont (v. 122), and Otanes joins Artaphrenes in attacking Ionia and Aeolis (v. 123). Thus Otanes (never styled governor) would seem to have been a purely military official (vii. 135), successor to Megabazus in the generalship (v. 26), while Artaphrenes is throughout satrap of Sardis (v. 25) with supreme authority (v. 30), especially in matters of finance (vi. 42). Indeed, it is implied (v. 30, 32) that his authority is superior to that of the general; cf. Meyer, iii. § 43. Lastly, Mardonius (vi. 43) would seem to have had a special commission from the king with fuller powers, as had the younger Cyrus (Xen. Hell. i. 4. 3).

δικαστῶν. For the king's judges cf. iii. 14. 5, 31. 3 nn.; and for a similar offence, viii. 194.

σπαδίξας = ἐκδέιπας, 'after flaying him.' If so, it repeats ἀπέδειρε,



as ἐντανύσας ἐνέτεινε below. Stein suggests 'after tanning', σπάδιξ being the *bark* of the maple.

ἐνέτεινε, 'stretched them to make the seat'; cf. II. v. 727, and for τόνοι, ix. 118.

Flaying was an Assyrian practice (Layard) adopted by the Persians so freely that flaying alive (Diodor. xv. 10; cf. Plut. Artax. 17) became known in late times as the Persian punishment.

- 26 I Βυζαντίους. Since Otanes has to reduce Byzantium and Chalcedon, it is clear they had revolted against Darius (cf. 27) after the disaster in Scythia, whither the Byzantines had followed him (iv. 138). This is confirmed by the fact that Darius, who had crossed to Europe over the Bosphorus (iv. 85), returned by the Hellespont (v. 11 n.). Perinthus may perhaps be added to the rebels (cf. v. 1).

Antandrus and Lamponium were Lesbian colonies north of the gulf of Adramyttium. Apparently they had shaken off the yoke of Mytilene, but were now reconquered and remained later subject; cf. Thuc. iii. 50, iv. 52.

Lemnos and Imbros were now first conquered by the Persians with the aid of Coes. For their conquest by Miltiades cf. vi. 137 n., and for Pelasgians there Appendix XV, 1 and 6.

- 27 The text is plainly faulty. Most editors follow Valckenaer in marking a lacuna after τελευτᾷ. Stein more ingeniously suggests that the words τοῖς μὲν λιποστρατίης κτλ. originally followed ch. 26, with which they are connected both in sense and grammar (cf. vi. 122); the author then added οἱ μὲν δὲ Λήμνιοι . . . τελευτᾷ as a marginal note (cf. ix. 83); finally, when these got thrust into the text, the gloss αἰτίη . . . κατεστρέφετο was inserted to mend the damaged construction. But this betrays its origin by its inadequacy. In any case it is clear that the last lines of this chapter must be connected with ch. 26. Lycaretus had hoped to succeed his brother Maeandrius at Samos (iii. 143), but the Persians had set up Syloson (iii. 144), whose son was now tyrant there (iv. 138).

- 28-38 *Causes and outbreak of the Ionic revolt. Naxos and Miletus* (28, 29). *The expedition to Naxos and the consequences of its failure* (30-4). *Aristagoras, urged on by Histiaeus, revolts, puts down the tyrants in Ionia, and goes to Sparta for aid* (35-8).

- 28 I ἄνεσις, 'afterwards there was a respite from evil for no long time.' H. apparently was ignorant of the length of this brief interval of peace. His vagueness on the point makes the chronology of the reign of Darius in general, and of the Scythian expedition in particular, uncertain.

τὸ δεύτερον. The first occasion would seem to be rather the conquest under Cyrus (i. 161 f.; cf. vi. 32) than the recent operations, which did not affect Ionia.

κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον. Herodotus clearly makes the acme of Milesian prosperity fall in the days of Histiaeus, and synchronize



with the prosperity of Naxos (circ. 510 B. C.). The Eusebian list, as given by Jerome, dates her thalassocracy 748–730 B. C. in the supposed era of colonization (cf. Busolt, i. 465 f.), but Myres would transfer it to 604–586 B. C. (J. H. S. xxvi. 110–15), the days of the great tyrant Thrasybulus, Periander's friend and ally (i. 20, v. 92), whose sea-power and greatness H. recognizes. Thrasybulus may have owed his power in part to an uprising of the poor subject Carians, known as Gergithes (Athenaeus, p. 524 a, b), against the dominant Hellenic immigrants. The 'two generations' of faction represent the interval between the two tyrannies, when Miletus and the other Ionic cities made little resistance to Croesus. Yet Miletus would seem to have been fairly prosperous in the days of Cyrus (i. 141).

κατήρτισαν : to set right that which is out of order, Lat. *reconcinnare*; cf. 106. 5. The essence of the alleged re-settlement is the re-arrangement of office, just as in that of Demonax at Cyrene (iv. 161) it is the re-arrangement of the tribal divisions. There, too, the arbitration is between parties; for arbitration between cities cf. v. 95; vi. 108; vii. 145, 154. Some see in this re-settlement the establishment of a moderate oligarchy of yeomen farmers; but is not the story a political parable inserted here for some unknown reason?

29 I ἀνεστηκνίη = ἀναστάτω εἰσὶν, 'in the general desolation of the country', not 'the upland parts of the country' (Krüger), which is inconsistent with πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν (*sup.*).

2 κατέβησαν : like κατέρχεσθαι, used of approaching the city from the country, since the cities generally lay near the sea; cf. i. 114. 4, 138. 1; Hom. Od. xi. 188, xv. 505.

ἀλίην : used by Herodotus of Thebes (79. 2), Sparta (vii. 134. 2), and Persia (i. 125. 2). On inscriptions it is found in the Doric West, e. g. Corcyra, Sicily, and Magna Graecia (cf. Gilbert, Gr. S. ii. 309 n. 1). The official term in Ionia was probably ἀγορά; cf. vi. 11. 1 (Macan).

30 I τῶν παχέων. The men of substance; so of Chalcidian Hippobotae (77. 2), and of oligarchs at Aegina (vi. 91. 1), and at Megara in Sicily (vii. 156. 2); cf. also Aristoph. Pax 639.

2 For similar unnatural alliances between an oligarchy and a tyrant cf. Hippias and Sparta (cc. 63, 90, and Thuc. ii. 33). The Milesian oligarchy had been friendly to Paros, the rival of Naxos (ch. 29).

4 ὀκτακισχιλίην. A force of 8000 hoplites, as large as that of Sparta (vii. 234), is rightly regarded by Beloch (B. p. 181) as impossible for a rocky island with no large town, unless it includes the contingents of all the Cyclades dependent on Naxos (31. 2).

5 ἐπιθαλασσίων. There is some exaggeration, perhaps dramatic, in τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ . . . πάντων, but probably Artaphrenes was supreme in Western Asia Minor (25 n.). The Persian rule only extended to the islands adjacent to the coast, e. g. Samos.

31 I Naxos, though small in comparison with Euboea or Cyprus, is

the largest of the Cyclades, 19 miles by 15. It was celebrated for its wine (cf. the wine-cup on its coins, Head, H. N. 488; Hill, G. and R. C. 167), and still produces good corn, oil, wine, and fruit; cf. Bent, Cyclades (ch. xiv); Tozer, Islands of the Aegean, ch. iv. Yet it only sent four ships to Salamis (viii. 46. 3), and never paid more than  $6\frac{2}{3}$  talents as tribute to Athens, while its neighbour Paros paid  $16\frac{1}{2}$  talents.

- 2 ἀγχοῦ: quite 100 miles from Miletus, but well placed half way between Ionia and Greece.

τὰς ἐκ ταύτης ἡρτημένας: implies political as well as geographical connexion. The Cyclades, the summits of a submerged mountain chain, are divided by but narrow channels of water. This Naxian hegemony may possibly have been established by Lygdamis (i. 64) with the aid of Pisistratus and Polycrates (cf. App. xvi); Myres would, however, connect the thalassocracy of Naxos (515–505 B.C.) with the prosperous (ch. 28) commercial oligarchy established after the fall of the tyrant (J. H. S. xxvi. 98).

- 3 Cyprus, already subject to Persia (iii. 19. 3, 91. 1), is about thrice as large as Euboea. Naturally for an important foreign expedition the king's approval was required, but cf. iv. 167 n.

- 32 For the genealogy of the Achaemenid royal house of Persia cf. Appendix IV, § 3. Megabates was satrap of Phrygia when Pausanias, after the capture of Byzantium, entered into treasonable relations with Xerxes (Thuc. i. 128). But, according to Thucydides, the lady to whose hand Pausanias aspired, was the daughter, not of Megabates, but of the king himself. Again, Megabates was replaced by Artabazus to further the conduct of the negotiations. Herodotus is repeating a doubtful oral tradition, while Thucydides based his narrative on Pausanias' own letter, irrefutable evidence, if genuine. Again, Thucydides has not the faintest doubt of Pausanias' guilt, whereas Herodotus, who elsewhere (ix. 76, 78, 88 n.) emphasizes the nobler traits in his character, and minimizes his pride and luxury (viii. 3, ix. 82 n.), evidently regards him as less black than he was painted. On the other hand, to Themistocles (cf. viii. 4 n., Introd. § 31) Herodotus is less favourable than Thucydides.

- 33 The wars in Ionia and Greece, from the expedition against Naxos to the battle of Marathon, fall within a period of ten years, 499–490 B.C. The chronology which suits H.'s narrative best is Stein's from whom Abbott (Exc. xiii) varies only as to the first years.

499. Spring. Expedition to Naxos. Four months' siege (v. 31–4). Autumn. Revolt of Aristagoras. Deposition of the tyrants (v. 36–8).

Winter. Aristagoras seeks help at Sparta and Athens (v. 38, 97).

498. Burning of Sardis. Battle of Ephesus (v. 99–102). Defection of Athens (v. 103).

Spread of the revolt to Byzantium, Caria, and Cyprus.

497. Persian successes in Cyprus and Asia Minor (v. 108-123).  
 Flight and death of Aristagoras (v. 124-6; Thuc. iv. 102).  
 Histiaeus comes down from Susa (v. 107, 108, vi. 1).  
 496. Battle of Lade. Siege of Miletus begins (vi. 6f.).  
 495. Second year of the siege.  
 494. Fall of Miletus (vi. 18 f.). Subjugation of Caria.  
 493. Death of Histiaeus (vi. 28-30). Reduction of the islands (vi. 31-3). The ordinances of Artaphrenes (vi. 42).  
 492. Mardonius' expedition and disaster off Mount Athos (vi. 43-5).  
 491. Subjugation of Thasos. Preparations for another invasion.  
 The sending of the heralds (vi. 46, 48 f.).  
 490. The expedition of Datis, and the battle of Marathon (vi. 94 f.).

It seems clear that the revolt began with the arrest and deposition of the tyrants, which must therefore be placed in 499 B.C. in the sixth year before the fall of Miletus (494 B.C.; cf. vi. 18). But while the events of the triennium between the fall of Miletus and the battle of Marathon are clearly dated by Herodotus (cf. Macan, App. VI), the chronology of the Ionic revolt is vague, the only fixed point being supplied by Thucydides' statement (iv. 102; cf. ch. 126 n.) that Aristagoras' death took place sixty years before the foundation of Amphipolis. Very possibly Macan is right in cutting down the length of the siege of Miletus to a single year (with E. Curtius) and in allowing a longer period to the revolt in Cyprus and Aeolis. But his scheme (App. V) is rather a correction than an interpretation of Herodotus. Busolt (ii. 548 n. 7) presses into the service of chronology fanciful anecdotes about Darius at Susa, and thus crowds the events above assigned to 498 and 497 into 498, and makes the siege of Miletus last 3 years, 497-4. Munro (C.A.H. iv. 232-3) suspects H.'s curiously explicit chronology of 493-1 B.C. and doubts if any of the events assigned to 491 B.C. are rightly dated. He places Marathon in 491.

1 **Καύκασα** must have been a harbour on the south-east coast of Chios (34) near Phanae (Strabo, p. 645; Liv. xxxvi. 43).

2 **τούτῳ τῷ στόλῳ**. Naxos was ruined by the next expedition (vi. 96).  
**θαλαμῆς**: a port-hole in the lowest row.

**διελόντας** . . . **κατὰ τοῦτο**, 'dividing him in this way.' The body was not really divided, but might be so spoken of, being half within and half without the ship. Stein **διέλκοντας**.

3 This story of the treachery of Megabates is very improbable. That a Persian of the blood royal should by treachery ruin a project expressly sanctioned by Darius, and to punish the insolence of a Greek tyrant risk disgrace for himself, is unlikely; that he should remain thereafter in high favour (32 n.), hardly credible. Nor are the Naxians, with the fate of Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and Lemnos before their eyes, likely to have been guileless enough to have no suspicions of the great armada gathered against them.

34 I **ἑσάξαντο** (cf. **προεσάξαντο**, i. 190, viii. 20): probably (Stein) from **σάπτεσθαι**, 'repaired,' 'strengthened,' rather than (Schweigg.) aorist

middle from ἐσάγειν, in which case καί must be struck out. Both seem difficult here. Hence Dietsch, κατὰ τάχος ἐσάξαντο, 'quickly laid up stores of food.'

3 τείχεα: forts like that on Mount Istone held by the Corcyrean nobles (Thuc. iii. 85, iv. 46).

35 2 τὸν ἐστιγμένον. Herodotus speaks as if this slave were a well-known character like the man in the iron mask, thus arousing the reader's curiosity; cf. 51. 1, 72. 3; vi. 119. 2; viii. 211, &c.

3 φυλασσομένων: there were sentinels on the principal roads; cf. 52; vii. 239. 3; Nehemiah ii. 7. Gellius, xvii. 9, adds the professed motive of the shaving, 'servo suo diu oculos aegros habenti capillum ex capite omni tamquam medendi gratia deradit,' &c.; and Polyaeus, Strat. i. 24, gives the message, Ἰστιαῖος Ἀρισταγόρα Ἰωνίαν ἀποστησον: but these details deserve no credit.

36 1 Grundy (p. 84 f.) sees in this incidental reference to conspirators an indication that the plan of revolt had been made before the expedition to Naxos. He holds that the other conspirators would never have admitted to their councils a tyrant in the Persian interest, who had just been engaged in an attempt to enslave a free Greek island, unless he had been beforehand implicated in the conspiracy: nor could Aristagoras have ventured to ask for aid in European Greece, unless he had some defence to offer for the attack on Naxos. He further points out how improbable it is that Megabates (cf. 33 n.) betrayed the intended expedition to the Naxians, and suggests that Aristagoras was the real culprit. On these and other grounds he forms the hypothesis that the object of Aristagoras in proposing the expedition was to bring about the mobilization and concentration of the Ionian fleet, the only possible means of securing that combination between the Greek cities necessary for the success of a revolt. But, as he admits, proof is impossible. Herodotus, by the inconsistencies and prejudices (97 n., 124 n.; vi. 3 n.) visible in his account, lays himself open to damaging criticism, but the reconstruction proposed has no secure basis. Patriotic Greeks in Ionia or Europe might gladly welcome the man who had seen the error of his ways and renounced Medism and Tyranny. Naxos may have been warned without Aristagoras' intervention, and it is quite after the manner of H. to introduce us suddenly to a fully fledged conspiracy without telling us exactly the steps by which it was formed. In fine, while we may legitimately doubt the fairness and accuracy of H., we have no sufficient grounds for rewriting the whole story. Discontent with the Persian and the tyrant was doubtless rife in Western Asia (ch. 124 n.); the means by which it was brought to a head, and the motives of the agents, remain uncertain.

2 The great geographer Hecataeus (cf. Introd. § 20) might well give such a catalogue as those found iii. 90 f.; vii. 61 f.

4 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ. Not equivalent to our book i, a division made later. It may perhaps be the history of Lydia (i. 1-94); cf. ἐν τοῖσι

Λιβυκοῖσι λόγοισι (ii. 161. 3), though ἐν τοῖσι πρώτοισι τῶν λόγων (vii. 93) refers to i. 171. Elsewhere the references are vaguer: ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ (ii. 38. 2; vi. 39. 1), ἐν τοῖσι ὀπισθε λόγοισι (v. 22. 1; i. 75. 1).

πλώσαντα. Myus (i. 142) lay originally on a bay at the mouth of the Maeander, but the river so silted up the bay that in Strabo's time it was three or four miles up stream, though it could still be reached by boat.

στρατόπεδον often includes the fleet; cf. 112. 1; vii. 181. 3, 236. 2, &c.; so στρατοπεδεύεσθαι, vii. 124, 183. 1.

ἐπιπλέειν, 'to be on deck,' like ἐπιβατεύειν, 'to serve as a marine' (vii. 96, 98), while ἐμπλέειν, 'to serve below,' is used of the crew (vii. 184. 5).

37 I Iatragoras: perhaps, as suggested by his name, a kinsman of Aristagoras.

Ἰβανῶλλιος: for another son Heraclides cf. 121 n. The name is Carian; cf. Ἀρι-δωλῖς (vii. 195) and Μαῖσ-ωλος (v. 118. 2). Mylasa (i. 171. 6) was the residence of the dynasts of Caria till they got possession of the Greek town, Halicarnassus (cf. Head, H. N. 622, 629).

Ἰστιαῖον Τύμνω: a Carian, afterwards released and restored (vii. 90). In the Athenian tribute list for 440 B. C. (C. I. A. i. 240; Hill, Sources, p. 71) we hear of Κᾶρες ὧν Τύμνης ἄρχει distinct from the men of Termera, and a coin of Termera (circ. 480-50 B. C., Head, H. N. 627) is inscribed τυμνο. Probably these refer to the grandson of our Tymnes.

Termera is a small place opposite Cos, on the promontory between Halicarnassus and Myndus, now Assarlik (cf. J. H. S. viii. 64 f.; xvi. 203 f.).

For Coes cf. iv. 97; v. 11, and for Aristagoras of Cyme iv. 138.

2 συναπισταῖατο. The optative with final ὥς ἄν is Homeric and Herodotean (Goodwin, § 329); cf. vii. 176. 4; viii. 7. 1; ix. 22. 3, 51. 3; so also ὅκως ἄν, i. 75. 5, &c.

38 2 στρατηγοί: doubtless, as at Athens, the chief civil as well as military magistrates, but, unlike the expelled tyrants, elected for a fixed period and responsible.

ἔδεε . . . ἐξευρεθῆναι. There seems to be here confusion between ἔδεε συμμαχίης τινός and ἔδεε συμμαχίην ἐξευρεθῆναι. But expegetic infinitives are not infrequent after verbs of begging or needing; cf. iii. 36. 3 προφάσιός τευ ἐδεόμην ἐπιλαβέσθαι.

39-48 Sparta at the time of Aristagoras' visit. Story of Cleomenes' accession (39-41). The adventures of Dorieus in Libya and Sicily (42-8). These are interesting as throwing light on the little known but important struggle of Greek and barbarian for the West (cf. 45 n.).

39 I The opening words take us back to the excursus on Spartan history (i. 65 f.), though incidentally Cleomenes has been already mentioned (iii. 148).



**Anaxandridas** was contemporary with Croesus (circ. 550, i. 67.1), and Cleomenes must have come to the throne soon after 520 (cf. Appendix XVII, § 1).

κατ' ἀνδραγαθίην. In merit Dorieus excelled his brother, who owed the crown to priority of birth (cf. 42).

ἀδελφεῆς . . . θυγατέρα: so Leonidas married his niece, Gorgo (vii. 239), and Archidamus his aunt, Lampito (vi. 71).

40 I οἱ ἐφόροι καὶ οἱ γέροντες. The Ephors were specially charged with the maintenance of the order established by Lycurgus. Hence it may have been part of their duties to guard against the extinction of either royal house (cf. 41. 2). But in this matter the Ephors are clearly acting as the presidents and executive (cf. 39) of the Gerousia. Ephors and Gerousia together formed the supreme criminal court (referred to vi. 72, 82, 85) as described by Paus. iii. 5. 2, with reference to the trial of king Pausanias on his return from Attica 403 B. C. βασιλεῖ δὲ τῷ Λακεδαιμονίων δικαστήριον ἐκάθιζον οἱ τε ὀνομαζόμενοι γέροντες ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσιν ὄντες ἀριθμόν, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχή, σὺν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁ τῆς οἰκίας βασιλεὺς τῆς ἐτέρας. As the executive of this court the Ephors can summon the king before them (Plut. Cleomenes 10), charge him with treason, and even imprison him (Thuc. i. 131).

2 οὐδαμῶς Σπαρτητικὰ. Bigamy was illegal throughout Greece; but the curious arrangements at Sparta (Polyb. xii. 6 b) by which (1) several brothers married one wife (cf. de Coulanges, *Nouv. Recherches*, p. 70 f.), now interpreted as an instance of the Levirate or a survival of polyandry, and (2) men lent their wives to friends (cf. Plut. Lyc. 15), made it seem necessary to Herodotus and Pausanias (iii. 3. 9) to declare that bigamy was unprecedented at Sparta.

41 I ἐσύτερον ἐπελθοῦσα: since ἐσύτερον always refers to a future event, and Paus. iii. 3. 9, imitating this passage, writes ἡ τε ἐπεισελθοῦσα, read (Stein) ὕστερον ἐπεσελθοῦσα.

ἔφεδρον. H. so calls the heir apparent, because he will take the king's place as champion of the state.

2 οἱ ἐφόροι. As in England, great officers of state are on occasion of a birth summoned to the queen's apartments. For the neglect of this precaution at the time of the birth of the 'Old Pretender' cf. Macaulay, *Hist.* ch. 8. The Spartans had to watch over the purity of the Heracleid race, through whom came their title to their territory.

3 Δημαρμένον: probably a son of the famous Chilon (i. 59 n.; vi. 65. 2).

42 I ἀκρομανής, 'mad on the surface,' 'slightly mad' (cf. ἀκρόζυμος, ἀκρόξεστος, ἀκροθώραξ, ἀκροκνέφαιος, ἀκροσαπής), or perhaps easily maddened; cf. ἀκροσφαλής: the more natural translation 'very mad' (cf. ἀκροδίκαιος, ἀκροπενθής, ἀκρόσοφος) is impossible in view of vi. 75, 84, which show that Cleomenes was at first ὑπομαργότερος, and only at the end of his life downright mad.



- 2 οὐτε . . . χρησάμενος. Cf. Cic. de Divin. i. 3 'Quam vero Graecia coloniam misit in Aeoliam, Ioniam, Asiam, Siciliam, Italiam sine Pythio aut Dodonaëo aut Hammonis oraculo? aut quod bellum susceptum ab ea sine consilio deorum est?' (cf. iv. 159; Thuc. iii. 92). Greek states as a rule procured the sanction of an oracle before founding a colony or undertaking a war. As the pronouncement of Pope Alexander VI legalized the Spanish and Portuguese occupation of America, so the oracle gave the Greek colonists assurance of success and a title to the land. But the oracle here, as elsewhere, acted on the suggestion of others, being in most cases set in motion by the state or men interested in the project; cf. iv. 159 n., and Holm, G. i. 244 f. (See note, p. 415.)

τῶν νομιζομένων. Cf. Thuc. i. 24 with Forbes, *ad loc.*, and for the kindling of the Prytaneum fire in the colony from that in the mother-city i. 146.

κατηγέοντο. The Theraeans were well-chosen guides, being colonists from Sparta (iv. 147 f.), and themselves founders of Cyrene (iv. 150 f.). For Spartan ambitions in North Africa cf. iv. 178 n. For Macae cf. iv. 175, and Cinyps, iv. 175, 198 n.

- 43 Eleon, in Boeotia near Tanagra, was the home of the legendary seer Bacis (viii. 20 n.).

Λαίου: perhaps 'oracles referring to Laius'; cf. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 906 Λαίου θέσφατα, but more probably 'collected by Laius'. Antichares was probably a χρησμολόγος (vii. 6. 3 n.), who made use of an apocryphal collection of oracles passing in the sixth century under Laius's name, and similar to those attributed to Orpheus, Musaeus, and Bacis (vii. 6; viii. 20). For an inscription supposed to be of the time of Laius cf. v. 59 n.

Ἡρακλείην. If taken of a town, the article (as in i. 16) would imply an existing city, made a Greek colony by Dorieus, but in spite of Diodorus (iv. 23 Δωριεὺς ἔκτισε πόλιν Ἡράκλειαν), there was clearly no such city near Mount Eryx (cf. 45. 1 *ad fin.*, 46. 1), Heraclea Minoa lying on the south coast (46. 2). Probably γῆν has fallen out before τήν, then Ἡρακλείη γῆ = Ἡρακλέος γῆ as Ἐρυνκος χώρα = Ἐρυνκίη χώρα (cf. 45. 1 *ad fin.*).

The claim of the Heracleid prince to the land of Heracles is similar to the Dorians' title to the Peloponnese, but in Sicily the claim is vitiated by the fact that the Heracles of Mount Eryx is no Greek hero but Tyrian Melkart (cf. ii. 44), accepted like Astarte-Aphrodite by the Elymi from their Phoenician neighbours. The general identification of Heracles with Melkart and Astarte with Aphrodite is, however, without sufficient grounds.

The Italy of Herodotus (cf. iv. 15. 1; vi. 127. 1) does not on the west coast extend to the north of the river Laus, Hyele (Velia) being in Oenotria (i. 167. 3): but it takes in all the Greek cities on the gulf of Tarentum, including Tarentum itself (i. 24. 1; iii. 136,

138) which Antiochus excluded. On Italy in this and other senses cf. Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*, i. ch. I.

44 I τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον. Sybaris was destroyed 510 B.C. (Diodor. xii. 9).

2 Συβαρίται. These are the remnants of the inhabitants of Old Sybaris, who dwelt in Laus and Scidrus (510-453 B.C.; cf. vi. 21 n.); their descendants settled at New Sybaris, 453-448, 445-444, and finally at Thurii (443 B.C.), where H. doubtless learned the story.

Telys is called βασιλεύς in the Sybarite, but τύραννος in the Crotoniate story. Freeman (S. ii. 434-5) holds that βασιλεύς is used of tyrants only by those who wished to flatter them (cf. vii. 161 n., vi. 23 n.), but in ch. 113 Aristocyprus and Philocyprus of Soli are called indifferently king and tyrant, and in ch. 35 Aristagoras fears to lose τὴν βασιλίην τῆς Μιλήτου. Telys (Diod. xii. 9) was a demagogue, who having obtained supreme power at Sybaris, banished 500 leading citizens. These took refuge at Croton, which, led by Pythagoras, refused to surrender the suppliants, whereupon Telys declared war and marched on Croton with an army 300,000 strong (Strabo 263). It is curious that H. does not regard the fall of Sybaris as a judgement on the Achaeans for driving out their Troezenian fellow colonists. Ar. Pol. v. 3. 11, 1303 a πλείους οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Τροϊζηνίους· ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.

Ἰαμιδέων: cf. ix. 33. I n.

45 I μαρτύρια. The citing of the evidence on both sides is an interesting advance on H.'s usual practice of merely giving both stories (cf. Introduction, § 27). The positive evidence alleged by Sybaris would in itself outweigh the negative proofs of Croton (Freeman, S. ii. 91). But it is noticeable that H. apparently has not seen the shrine by the Crathis (contrast § 2 τὰ καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἔτι ἐνέμοντο οἱ Καλλίῳ ἀπόγονοι), and the connexion of Dorieus with the campaign is best regarded as an attempt on the part of the oracle to justify the failure of its prediction that he would succeed.

For a similar unsuccessful Delphic crusade for Hellenism in the West, followed by a similar excuse, cf. i. 165, 167 nn.

τὸν ξηρὸν Κράθιν, 'the dry bed of the Crathis'. Sybaris lay between two streams, the Crathis (cf. i. 145 n.) and its tributary the Sybaris. The Crotoniates, when they destroyed the city, diverted the Crathis on to the site so as to destroy all the buildings (Strabo 263). Cf. also Diod. xi. 90; xii. 9; Lenormant, *La Grande Grèce*, i. 223, 290.

2 τοῖσι . . . ἀπογόνοισι. This is put in merely to contrast with Καλλίῳ ἀπόγονοι. Dorieus had certainly no descendants at Croton, even if Euryanax (ix. 10. 3) be his son.

46 I Φοινίκων: *Poenorum* (cf. iv. 197), i.e. the men of Carthage or of the Phoenician colonies in Sicily, now under her leadership. Segesta, a city of the Elymi, is as usual ready to help fellow

barbarians against the intruding Hellenes (Thuc. vi. 2; Freeman, S. i. 200 f.).

- 2 Μινώην. Tradition alleged that this town at the mouth of the Halycus had been founded by the Cretans, when Minos came to Sicily (cf. vii. 170 n.). The name Minoa, however, might well have been given it later by the Cretan colonists of Gela, or by the Megarians of Selinus (Thuc. vi. 4), Minos and Minoa being closely connected with Megara (Thuc. iii. 51). The name Makara (Heracl. Pont. F. H. G. ii. 220) may point to an early Phoenician settlement under the protection of Melkart (ch. 43 n.), the Tyrian Heracles. This conjecture would be confirmed if the inscription, Ras Melkart, on a series of Sicilian coins struck under Carthaginian rule (circ. 409–241 B. C.) could be referred to Heraclea Minoa, but Holm (S. iii. 674), now followed by Head (H. N. p. 136), interprets it of Cephaloedium, since Ras = κεφαλῇ = headland. The name Heraclea might be a translation of Makara, or it may have been given to the city by the Spartan colonists, to signify that here was the promised land of the oracle (ch. 43). This and similar details (ch. 47; vi. 17 n.; vii. 153, &c.) seem to indicate that H. collected materials in Sicily.

- 7 1 οἰκήτη. Cf. Cleinias at Artemisium, viii. 17.

- 2 ἱλάσκονται. On the worship of heroes cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 146 f., and for passages illustrating it Abbott, Exc. XII. Heroic honours are paid to mere men, to oekists of colonies, Timesius at Abdera (i. 168), Miltiades in the Chersonese (vi. 38), Hagnon and subsequently Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. v. 11); cf. also Diod. xi. 66; Xen. Hell. vii. 3. 12. More strictly analogous are the cases where worship is paid to enemies at the bidding of an oracle, to Onesilus at Amathus (v. 114) and to Artachaeus at Acanthus (vii. 117) for his great stature. For the effect of beauty and athletic powers on the Greek we may compare the case of Masistius (ix. 25) and the pardon of Dorieus at Athens (Xen. Hell. i. 5. 19; Paus. vi. 7. 4). The case of Philippus is the more remarkable as the men of Segesta were enemies and barbarians, though, as is shown by their coinage and the remains of the temple and theatre there, Hellenic in culture. On hero-worship cf. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults*.
- 48 For H.'s curious error as to the length of Cleomenes' reign cf. Appendix XVII, § 1.

ἀπαῖς, 'sonless' (cf. 67. 4 *ad fin.*), as is more fully explained (vii. 205. 1); Gorgo married Leonidas (vii. 205. 1, 239. 4).

- 9-54 *Aristagoras fails to persuade or bribe Cleomenes to march on Susa. Map and description of the countries between Sardis and Susa. The Royal Road.*

- 49 The project of marching on Susa and conquering Asia is an anachronism (cf. Cleomenes, Appendix XVII, § 3). Can it have come from the phil-Hellenic deserter Zopyrus? (cf. iii. 160 n. and J. H. S. xxvii. 37).

- 1 ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι. The story of the exhibition of the map and of the private interview with Cleomenes may perhaps come indirectly from Gorgo herself, since H. seems specially well informed about her: but the speech of Aristagoras is in the main a lively version of the official Persian itinerary (cf. 52).

χάλκεον πῖνακα. The oldest Greek map, that of Anaximander of Miletus, marks an epoch in Greek geography (H. Berger, i. 1 f.; Bunbury, i. 122, 145). Hecataeus is said to have made great improvements in this map, but it would rather seem that he merely corrected Anaximander's errors in his περιόδος γῆς, if indeed that work be his (cf. Intro. § 20). Cf. Eratosthenes (ap. Strab. p. 7) τὸν μὲν ('Αναξίμανδρον) ἐκδοῦναι πρῶτον γεωγραφικὸν πῖνακα, τὸν δὲ Ἑκαταίου καταλιπεῖν γράμμα, πιστούμενον ἐκείνου εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης αὐτοῦ γραφῆς: and Agathemerus i. 1 ('Αναξίμανδρος) πρῶτος ἐτόλμησε τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν πῖνακι γράψαι· μεθ' ὃν Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀνὴρ πολυπλάνης διηκρίβωσεν ὥστε θαυμασθῆναι τὸ πρᾶγμα. Doubtless this map exhibited that great scheme of Ionian geography rather unjustly ridiculed by Herodotus (iv. 36). For an ingenious reconstruction of such maps cf. Myres, R. G. S. Journal, viii. (1896) 605 f.

- 2 ὅσῳ προέστατε. For Lacedaemonian προστασία cf. i. 69 n.  
3 For the appeal to kinship and a common faith cf. ix. 90. 2, and especially viii. 144 n.

Compared with the Dorian hoplite, with his brazen helmet, cuirass and greaves, and great shield, his sword and 8 ft. spear, the Persians might fairly be called light-armed bowmen (cf. Aesch. Pers. 239, 40, and ix. 62), even if some had coats of mail (viii. 113, ix. 22).

For Persian arms and the κυρβάσις cf. vii. 61 n.

- 5 πολυαργυράτατοι: rich, not in silver but in money, a sense common in compounds, though rare for ἄργυρος itself (cf. ii. 121 a). Both Croesus (i. 69; vi. 125) and Pythius (vii. 28) were rich in *gold*, since the Pactolus brought down gold-dust from Mount Tmolus (i. 93. 1; v. 101). The mines there and on Mount Sipylus furnished electrum also (cf. i. 50-52 n.).

πολυπροβατώτατοι: cf. Strab. 568, 578; Arist. Av. 493; and now Angora wool.

πολυκαρπώτατοι: especially in vines. Cf. Il. iii. 184 Φρυγίην εἰσήλυθον ἀμπελόεσσαν.

For Cappadocians cf. i. 72 n.; vii. 72, and for the Cilician tribute iii. 90. 3.

For Matieni cf. 52. 5; i. 72 n., 189. 1, and for Cissia iii. 91. 4; vi. 119.

- 7 τὰ Σοῦσα ταῦτα: not deictic, like ἦδε τόνδε, &c., but = ἐκείνα, 'well known to you'. Apparently towns were not marked on the map; cf. § 1.

Though Xenophon (cf. Anab. iii. 5. 15; Cyrop. viii. 6. 22) makes the Persian king reside in Susa only three months in spring, and at Ecbatana two in summer, leaving seven winter months for Babylon,

Jew (cf. Nehem. i. 1 ; Esther i. 2 ; Dan. viii. 2) and Greek (cf. iii. 70 ; Aesch. Persae *pass.*, Ctesias) alike rightly regarded Susa as the capital and chief palace of the Great King. There Darius built a palace, restored after a fire by Artaxerxes Mnemon, which resembles that of Xerxes at Persepolis (cf. Dieulafoy, Acropole de la Suse, L'art antique de la Perse ; Perrot et Chipiez, vol. v, Nöldeke, Persepolis). Susa was also the principal treasury (Strab. 735, cf. 731 ; Arr. An. iii. 16), though there was also great treasure at Persepolis (Diod. xvii. 71 ; Strab. 730), and a smaller amount at Pasargadae (Arr. iii. 18) and Ecbatana (Arr. iii. 19).

- 8 ἀναβάλλεσθαι, 'ought you not to put off?' (Abbott) (cf. § 9 *ad init.* ; vi. 86 β. 2 *ad fin.* ; ix. 8 *ad init.*), rather than (Stein, L. & S.) 'ought you to risk?' (cf. Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. 1028 and ἀναρριπτόντες, vii. 50. 3).

For Messenians cf. iii. 47 ; for Arcadians, i. 66 f. ; for Argives, i. 82 ; vi. 76 f.

- 50 3 Cleomenes had called on the Ephors to expel Maeandrius (iii. 148) ; here he apparently dismisses Aristagoras on his own authority ; but cf. Appendix XVII, § 2.

- 51 1 ἱκετηρίην : suppliants, who were inviolable and secure of a hearing, bore branches of olive wreathed with wool (cf. vii. 141. 1), as in the opening scenes of the Iliad and the Oedipus Rex.

- 2 Cleomenes seems less proof against corruption than fifteen years before (iii. 148), but Gorgo's precocious cleverness has its counterpart in her later wisdom (vii. 239).

- 3 ἐπὶ πλέον : in greater detail (cf. ii. 171. 1), such as is given in the next chapters.

- 52 The description of this 'Royal road' may come directly, like the map of Aristagoras, from some Ionian geographer, but the distances, in parasangs and stages (cf. Xen. Anab. i. 2 f. ; Ctesias, Pers. § 64, p. 80), must be derived from some official Persian document. Roads of this kind united all the provinces of the empire with its centre Susa. Their importance was rather military and political than commercial, hence they were guarded at important points by forts and garrisons (§§ 2, 3 ; cf. 35. 3 n.), and studded at intervals of a day's caravan journey (i. e. three to five parasangs), not only with khans or caravanserais (καταγωγαί, §§ 3, 6) but also with royal post stations (σταθμοί, cf. ἀγγαροί, viii. 98). For the Great Khan's roads with 'sjambs', i. e. Horse-post houses or stations on them at every twenty-five to thirty miles, cf. M. Polo, Bk. II, ch. 26, i. 433 f. The general descriptions of such roads by Ctesias (*loc. cit.*) and Amyntas (Athen. 529 e) are lost ; Xenophon (Anab. i, ch. 2 and 4) gives details about one, which, unlike that of Herodotus, kept south of the great salt-desert (cf. § 1 n., ch. 54 n.). But the Royal road here from Sardis to Susa is far older than the Persian empire. Its immense détour to the north between Sardis and the Euphrates, and the fact that Sinope not Amisos was in early times the terminus



of the caravan-route from the East to the Euxine, point unmistakably (Ramsay, A. M. §§ 2, 3) to the existence of a great capital at Pteria [Boghaz-Keui; cf. i. 76 n. and for recent discoveries there E. Meyer, i, §§ 474, 478 f.; Hogarth, *Ionians and the East*, ch. 4]. To connect this Hittite capital in Cappadocia with Sardis and the Aegean on the one hand, and with Assyria and Babylon on the other, was the original purpose of the roads which later formed the 'Royal road'. (See note, p. 415.)

- I From Sardis to the Halys, through Lydia and Phrygia, is reckoned at  $94\frac{1}{2}$  paras. = 2,835 stades. This distance agrees fairly with the route sketched by Ramsay (*op. cit.*), amplifying and improving on Kiepert (Monatsb. Berl. Akad. 1857). The way would be by Satala to Akmonia, or to Keron Agora. Then to avoid the salt-desert, which spreads over the centre of the peninsula (cf. § 1 *διὰ οἰκομένης τε ἡ ὁδὸς ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφαλῆος*), the road curved northward by the city of Midas, Pessinus, and Gordium to Ancyra (cf. J. H. S. xix, p. 50 and map) and the bridge over the Halys.
- 2 δ' Ἄλνς. The gates and guardhouse at the crossing of the Halys may be held to imply the bridge (mentioned in i. 75. 3), especially as H. here writes *διεκπερᾶν*, not *διαπορθμεῖσαι* as in § 4. The Halys is fordable in summer at Tchikin Agal and Eccobriga, but communications are cut by floods in winter (Ramsay, A. M. 256 n.), so a bridge would be necessary if the route was to be in constant use. Herodotus had no accurate information about the Halys apart from the Royal road, and clearly did not know that if the road (as he rightly states) crossed the Halys once between Ancyra and Pteria, it must of necessity do so again on its way to the Euphrates, either between Pteria and Caesarea Mazaca, or, on Kiepert's hypothesis (*v. i.*), at Sebasteia (Siwas).

The distance along the Royal road between the Halys and the Euphrates is reckoned at  $104 + 15\frac{1}{2}$  parasangs = 3,585 stades, which is far too great for anything like a direct road from the bridge on the Halys to Melitene (Malatia) or Samosata (Samsat). Kiepert therefore rightly argued that the road must have made a considerable circuit, but he seems to be wrong in declaring that his *détour* must have been to the North and in taking the road round from Tavium by Zela and Comana Pontica to Sebasteia, to meet a route from Sinope. To touch Cilicia the road must have curved southward and then run eastward along the Melas (Tokma Su) to Melitene.

διξᾶς πύλας. The geography of Herodotus is reduced to hopeless confusion if these be identified with the well-known Cilician gates (Xen. An. i. 2. 21) between Tyana and Tarsus. Ramsay (C. B. I. xiv n.) and Anderson (cf. *inf.*) hold Herodotus guilty of this confusion. But his Cilicia extended north of Taurus (iii. 90 n.), and his gates should be placed further east.

- 3 To meet the difficulty that the road passes for three days'

journey through Cilicia, Hogarth (Macan, ii. 299 f.) ingeniously suggested that the road did not cross the Euphrates at Tomisa (Isoli), but turned south by Kiakhta to the crossing at Samosata. He points out that the distance from the spine of Taurus to the Euphrates is three days' journey, that monuments of all ages abound along this route, and that Samosata was early of importance. He also appeals to Artemidorus' account (Strab. 663) of the *κοινὴ ὁδός* from the east as corresponding to the Royal road here. J. G. Anderson (J. H. S. xvii. 41) disputes this correspondence, and argues forcibly that the hilly district north of Mount Masius is far more suitable for a great road than the desert to the south of it, through which a road crossing at Samosata must pass. Further, the 56½ parasangs assigned to Armenia correspond to the real distance from Tomisa on the Euphrates to the junction of the two streams forming the Tigris (Kiepert), while no geographer includes the desert south of Mount Masius in Armenia.

- 5 The insertion of some such words as those proposed by de la Barre (l. 25) *καὶ τριάκοντα . . . ἑκατον* is requisite to make the totals, given by Herodotus himself (ch. 53), 111 stations and 450 parasangs, square with the items, which otherwise only amount to 81 stations and 313 parasangs, and to remove the anomaly that in the case of the Matiēni alone the number of parasangs is omitted. Further, with the correction the number of parasangs from the southern border of Armenia to Susa (179½) agrees with the real distance from the passage of the Tigris, which is as the crow flies about 165 parasangs. The difference is little enough to allow for crossing two ranges of mountains, the Carduchian on the upper Tigris, and the pass between the valley of the Gyndes (Diyala) and that of the Choaspes (Kerkha). But the correction of this corrupt passage can hardly stop here. Stein urges the transposition of the words (ll. 25–7) *ἐκ δὲ ταύτης [τῆς Ἀρμενίης] . . . τέσσερες* with de la Barre's addition (*v. sup.*) to l. 18, after *αὐτοῖσι*, on the ground that the four rivers—the Tigris, the two Zabs, and the Gyndes, must be placed in Matiēne and not in Armenia, since otherwise Herodotus is not only flagrantly wrong in his geography but also inconsistent with himself (cf. § 4, i. 189, 202). If so, *τῆς Ἀρμενίης* is a gloss added when *ἐκ δὲ ταύτης* got severed from its original context. On this supposition Matiēne here (Meyer, iii, § 89 n.) includes the greater part of the land usually known as Assyria, but called by Xenophon, Media (Anab. ii. 4. 27; iii. 4. 7, 5. 14). For the various senses of Matiēne cf. i. 72 n., and for a more violent reconstruction of the text here, an ingenious but unconvincing article by H. Westberg, Klio, vi. 259 f.

*Γύνδης* is in the nominative because *ὄνομα ἔχει = ὀνομάζεται*; cf. iv. 56; vi. 103. 4 *ad fin.* For the story of Cyrus and the river cf. i. 189.

- 53 The parasang in Xenophon, as here, measures 30 stades or four Roman miles, thus corresponding to the modern Persian 'far-

sang' =  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 4 English miles. Other writers estimated it at 40 or 60 stades (Strabo 518), and Agathias (A. D. 570) as low as 21 stades.

Μεμόνια: cf. ii. 106 n.

ἐπ' ἡμέρη ἐκάστη. In ch. 54. 2 only three days are allowed for the 540 stades from Ephesus to Sardis; and in iv. 101, 200 stades = 25 Roman miles is taken as a day's journey, but the Royal road is through hilly country, and the 150 stades (20 miles) may be intended as a day's march for an army.

54 I Ephesus was at this time the natural starting-point for a journey to Upper Asia (ch. 100, viii. 103). The trade-route of later days (Strab. 663) went by the easier valleys of the Maeander and Lycus to Apameia-Celaenae, and so south of the central desert, but to reach Sardis and the Royal road from Ephesus Mount Tmolus must be crossed. In the days of the Lydian power probably the road from Sardis to the coast had led down the Hermus to Smyrna and Phocaea.

2 τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς: the Aegean; cf. vii. 28. 2, and τῆς Ἰώνων (ch. 50. 1). τρισί: cf. Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 11 Ἐφεσον ἢ ἀπέχει ἀπὸ Σάρδεων τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν. The addition of small details to make an unnecessary correction is characteristic of Herodotus.

55-96 *Digression on Greek history after the death of Pisistratus.*

a. 55-61. *The dream and assassination of Hipparchus, with digression on the Gephyraeans and the derivation of the Greek alphabet from Phoenicians in Boeotia.*

55 For the history of Pisistratus' tyranny cf. i. 59-64; Ath. Pol. 14 f.; and Appendix XVI, §§ 5-8. This digression on the liberation of Athens from the sway of the Pisistratidae, incidentally helps to explain why the suit of Aristagoras, rejected at Sparta, was granted at Athens.

Ἰππίω τοῦ τυράννου. These words seem intended as a protest against two popular errors (cf. vi. 123): (1) that Harmodius and Aristogiton freed Athens from tyranny, (2) that Hipparchus was the eldest son of Pisistratus and his successor in the tyranny. Both are implied in the famous song (Athen. 695 a) Ἐν μύρτου κλαδί τὸ ξίφος φορήσω ὥσπερ Ἀρμόδιος κ' Ἀριστογείτων, Ὅτε τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθίνας ἐποίησάτην: both are vigorously attacked by Thucydides (i. 20; vi. 53 f.). That the former error was prevalent soon after the fall of the tyranny is further shown by the statues of the tyrannicides (Harrison, Athens, 77 f.; E. Gardner, G. S. 182 f.; Collignon, S. G. i. 367 f.).

ἕτεα τέσσερα: not four whole years. Cf. Thuc. vi. 59 τυραννεύσας ἔτη τρία Ἰππίας ἔτι Ἀθηναίων καὶ παυθεὶς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ, Ath. Pol. 19 ἔτει τετάρτῳ μάλιστα . . . ἐξέπεσε. Hipparchus was slain at the end of the first Attic month (Hekatombaion; cf. ch. 56), i.e. August 514 B. C. Hippias then reigned till the year 511-510 B. C. (cf. i. 62 n.).

μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸ τοῦ. So also Thucydides vi. 59 τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις

χαλεπωτέρα μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ τυραννὶς κατέστη, Ath. Pol. 19 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαινε πολλῶ τραχυτέραν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα. For the abiding memory of Hippias' tyranny at Athens cf. Aristoph. Wasps 502, Lysist. 618, 1151 f.

56 I Παναθηναίων, 'the night before the Panathenaea'. For the genitive cf. vi. 46. I. The great Panathenaea were celebrated every fourth year, in the third year of the Olympiad, probably 24–28 Hekatombaion. The chief day, here called the Panathenaea, was the 28th, on which the robe (πέπλος) of Athena was brought in procession to the Acropolis, a scene familiar to us from the great Parthenon frieze. On the whole festival cf. A. Mommsen, Feste der Stadt Athen (p. 41 f.), and on Pisistratus' encouragement of such national festivals cf. Appendix XVI, § 7.

αἰνίσσασθαι τάδε τὰ ἔπεα, 'spake these riddling words'. Cf. Soph. Aj. 1158. The words remain obscure even after their full-silent, but apparently Hipparchus is encouraged to bear his fate with fortitude, sure that his murderers shall pay the penalty for their evil deed. The oracle would have additional point if H. like Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 17) held Thessalus (Hegesistratus, cf. ch. 94) responsible for the insult which excited the wrath of Harmodius and led to the conspiracy, as in that case Hipparchus would be an innocent victim. For the friendship of the Pisistratidae with soothsayers cf. vii. 6. 3 n. and Appendix XVI, § 7. H.'s insistence on the reality of the dream (ch. 55) and on its communication to the soothsayers shows that the story had been doubted.

2 ἀπειπάμενος: probably 'dismissing from his thoughts' (Stein, Abbott) rather than = *averrunco*, 'averting by sacrifice' (L. and S.).

ἔπεμπε τὴν πομπήν. Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 18), while differing on most points from Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 57 f.), agrees that Hipparchus, when he was slain, was marshalling the procession near the Leocorion, a monument in the inner Ceramicus.

57 I Γεφυραῖοι. H. rejects the family tradition in favour of a fanciful conjecture resting on the hypothesis that the Gephyraeans were Cadmeians, and Cadmus a Phoenician immigrant. Perhaps he connected Gephyra, the other name for Tanagra (cf. Strabo 404, Steph. Byz.), with Gephyrae in Syria, and was thus led to derive the Gephyraeans from Phoenicia (Petersen, de hist. gent. Attic. p. 6 f.), or he may have misinterpreted the name of Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, who dwelt at Eleon (ch. 43 n.) near Tanagra, and thus have imagined a connexion between the men of Tanagra and Cadmus 'the Phoenician' (Toepffer, Attic Geneal. 293 f.). In any case the name Γεφυραῖοι seems to be derived from γέφυρα, a bridge or dyke, as *pontifex* from *pons*; and even if Cadmean Thebes be a Phoenician settlement (cf. iv. 147. 4 n.), there is no reason to connect the Gephyraeans of Tanagra with Thebes. Their own tradition that they came from Euboea is far more probable.

2 In the traditional chronology the invasion of the Epigoni (cf.

ch. 61. 2 n.) and the expulsion of the Cadmeians takes place within a generation of the Trojan war, while the immigration of the Boeotians is sixty years after it (Thuc. i. 12).

**Ἀθηνίων**: here the whole land of Attica. Cf. 61. 2, 76 *ad fin.*, viii. 50. 2, ix. 17. 1; Hom. Od. iii. 278; Soph. Oed. Col. 24; Eur. Heraclid. 839. Apparently the Gephyraei settled near Aphidna (Plut. Mor. 628 D).

**ἔργεσθαι**. No doubt the privileges from which the Gephyraeans were debarred were religious. By this Arnold (on Thuc. vi. 56) would explain the exclusion of the sister of Harmodius from the Panathenaic procession, but Grote (iv. 59) replies that were this the explanation, Thucydides would surely have alluded to it.

58 I **γράμματα**. H.'s theory that the Greek alphabet, as he knew it, was of Phoenician origin is borne out by comparing the forms, names, and order of the early Greek and Phoenician letters (Roberts, Greek Epigraphy, § 4 f.). It contrasts favourably with the ascription of the invention to mythical heroes, such as Palamedes (Stesichorus), Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 460 f.), Musaeus, Orpheus, or Linus. Of course H. knew nothing of the primitive Cretan and Mycenaean scripts (A. J. Evans, J. H. S. xiv, xvii, and Scripta Minoa), which being earlier must probably have contributed to the formation of the Phoenician alphabet. His connexion of the earliest Greek alphabet with Cadmus and Boeotia is simply a part of his theory of Phoenician settlement, as is the hypothesis that it spread first among Ionians. H. has not the learning to distinguish the alphabets of Eastern and of Western Hellas, or to recognize that the Ionic alphabet in its final form is a late development of the former.

**ῥυθμόν** = σχῆμα, shape. Cf. Ar. Metaph. i. 4. 985 b ῥυθμός σχῆμά ἐστιν—διαφέρει γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α τοῦ Ν σχήματι. So below, μεταρρυθμίσαντες, 'changing the shape'.

H. seems unaware of the three most important modifications:

(1) The utilization of some Phoenician consonants, *aleph*, *he*, *yod*, *ayin*, to represent the vowels *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, with the subsequent addition of *u*, *ē*, and *ō* (Roberts, § 5).

(2) The evolution of double letters, the three new ones being *ph*, *ch*, *ps* (Roberts, §§ 9, 11).

(3) The disappearance of certain unnecessary sibilants (Roberts, § 6). H. does, however, record the survival of San alongside of Sigma (cf. i. 139 n.).

Clearly his interest is more in the form than in the sound of the letters. Yet though he records (ii. 36. 4 n.) that Egyptian writing went from right to left, he is clearly unaware that the same is true of the Phoenician, and of the earliest Greek inscriptions (Roberts, § 4, No. 1), nor does he notice the transitional *βουστροφηδόν* style (cf. Paus. v. 17. 6; Roberts, No. 42. 133 f.).



- 2 ἐφάτισαν . . . κεκληῖσθαι, 'gave them the name.' Cf. ch. 68 *ad fin.* ἐπωνυμίην ποιούμενοι κεκληῖσθαι, Pind. Ol. vi. 56.

**Φοινικήια.** Not an adjective but a substantive in Ionic='letters'; cf. Inscription of Teos, circ. 470 B. C. (Hicks, 23, § 6) ὁς ἂν . . . ἡ Φοινικήια ἐκκόψει. H. justly uses the name as an argument for his view of the origin of letters, just as he makes the survival of the name διφθέρα for 'book', in conjunction with the continued employment of skins as writing material among the barbarians, a proof of their early use among the Ionians.

- 3 βύβλων. Byblus or papyrus, made from the marsh-plant Byblus (cf. ii. 92. 5 n.), had been in use in Egypt from the earliest times (circ. 3500 B. C.). It cannot have been introduced into Greece till the opening of Egypt to foreigners by Psammetichus (ii. 154 n.) circ. 650 B. C., but was clearly in common use in the days of H., and was employed for keeping accounts when the Erechtheum was being rebuilt 407 B. C.; cf. Maunde Thompson, *Palaeography*, ch. 'iii'; Kenyon, *Papyri*, ch. ii. It continued to be in ordinary use throughout classical times, and was grown and used in Sicily as late as 1300 A. D.

**διφθεραί**: leather rolls were used by the Egyptians occasionally, by the Jews, and by the Persians. Diodorus (ii. 32) mentions βασιλικαὶ διφθεραί followed by Ctesias. The manufacture of parchment or vellum is a later improvement ascribed by Varro (Plin. N. H. xiii. 68) to Eumenes II of Pergamum (197–158 B. C.). No doubt Pergamum was the centre of the trade, but parchment superseded papyrus very slowly, its use for books is mainly late Roman, Byzantine, and mediaeval.

- 59 **Καδμήια γράμματα.** Herodotus assumes that the inscriptions are authentic, and thus carries back the writing to the days of Laius and Oedipus. But from their form and style they can hardly be earlier than the seventh century B. C. (Hicks, p. 2).

ἐν τῷ ἱρῷ: cf. i. 52 n.

Amphitryon, the human father of Heracles (ii. 44), was son of Alcaeus, king of Tiryns. The Teleboae or Taphii, a tribe from Acarnania, attacked Mycenae in the reign of Electryon, father of Alcmena and uncle of Amphitryon. Amphitryon later accidentally killed his uncle and fled with Alcmena to Thebes to be purified. But before she would marry him she exacted a promise that he would take vengeance on the Teleboae. Hence ἐὼν must be emended to ἐλὼν or something similar.

Laius was brother-in-law of Creon who purified Amphitryon.

For the importance of the genealogy of the house of Laius in Herodotean chronology, and for the fixing of chronology by synchronisms such as the voyage of the Argonauts and the Theban and Trojan wars, cf. E. Meyer, *Forsch.* i. 157 f.; App. XIV. 2.

- 60 Scaeus helped his father Hippocoon to drive Tyndareus from Lacedaemon, and was afterwards slain there, with his father and

brothers, by Heracles. He had therefore no connexion with Thebes, and is unlikely to have dedicated a tripod there as H. sees.

τεῖν: Doric and Epic for σοί. The abrupt change to the second person is peculiar. On extant inscriptions the god's name is in the vocative, not the dative, e. g. I. G. A. 402, Roberts No. 15 Ἄρτεμι σοὶ τόδ' ἄγαλμα Τελεστοδὶ[κη ἀνέθηκεν] &c., and I. G. A. 412, Roberts No. 7 Παῖ Διός, Ἐκφάντῳ δέξαι τόδ' ἄμυνφές ἄγαλμα, | σοὶ γὰρ ἐπυχόμενος τοῦτ' ἐτέλεσσε γρόφω.

ἄλλος. Pausanias (vi. 13. 5; cf. Frazer) saw at Olympia the statue of a victor in the boys' boxing, Scaeus from Samos, but its date seems to be circ. 350 B. C.

- 61 2 The chiefs of the Encheleis in southern Illyria (ix. 43. 1 n.) claimed descent from Cadmus (Strabo 326). So tradition alleged that Cadmus and Harmonia in their old age had wandered from Thebes and reigned in Illyria, where their tombs were to be seen. Hence the legend made the Cadmeians, when expelled from Thebes by the Epigoni (ὑπ' Ἀργείων), go likewise to the North-West under Laodamas, driving the Dorians out of Hestiaeotis on their way (i. 56. 3 n.), and find a new home with their kin in Illyria (Apollodor. iii. 5. 4); but cf. i. 146. 1.

κεχωρισμένα. H. is right in thinking such cults, distinct in ritual and meaning, point to a difference of race and origin.

Ἀχαιΐης: cf. Ar. Ach. 709 οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὴν τὴν Ἀχαιάν ῥαδίως ἠρέσχετο. The popular derivation of this title (from ἄχος) makes Demeter a *mater dolorosa* sorrowing for her daughter's loss. Presumably this worship existed at Aphidnae (cf. *sup.*), but it certainly also was known at Thespieae in Boeotia, M. A. T. iv. 191, Plut. Isis 69. Plutarch compares it with that of Demeter Thesmophoros, both being clearly of a secret character (ἔργα), that is, mysteries (ii. 81. 2, ii. 171. 2).

- 62-5 *The expulsion of the Pisistratids from Athens by the Spartans. Hippias retires to Sigeum.*

- 62 1 τῶν . . . φονέες. In these words Herodotus attempts to justify his digression.

- 2 γένος . . . Ἀθηναίων. Herodotus seems to have regarded the Alcmaeonids as of true Attic descent (cf. vi. 125 τὰ ἀνέκαθεν), neither Ionian (ch. 66. 2, 69. 1) nor, like the Pisistratidae, immigrants from Pylos (ch. 65. 3 n.). Pausanias (ii. 18. 8, 9), on the other hand, derives them along with the royal house of Melanthus (Medontidae), the Paeonidae, and perhaps the Pisistratidae, from Neleus, king of Pylos. Thus the Alcmaeonidae would be connected with the royal house (a tradition perhaps borne out by the occurrence of the names Alcmaeon and Megacles in the list of life-archons) and with the Pisistratidae, as alleged by Isocrates (περὶ ζεύγους, 25). It has been

ingeniously suggested by Toepffer (Att. Gen. 225 f.), that the Mes-senian origin of the royal and noble houses may be a fiction intended to support the claim of Athens to be the mother-city of the Ionian colonies, since the great families of Ionia (e.g. the royal house at Miletus) professed to be descended from Neleus of Pylos; but cf. i. 147 n.

φεύγοντες : *exules* (cf. i. 64 *ad fin.*), with acc. ii. 152. I, vi. 103. I, 123. I, elsewhere with *ὑπὸ τινός*.

Λειψύδριον : identified by Milchöfer with an ancient fort on a spur of Mount Parnes (Karagoufolesa),  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of Menidi, the cemetery of Acharnae (Frazer, Paus. v. p. 526). Paeonia (more properly Paeonidae) must have been at the foot of the mountain. There is therefore no need to alter the text to *ὑπὲρ Πάρνηθος* (cf. Ath. Pol. 19) as the fort would be above Paeonidae as well as upon Parnes. An interesting skolion (Ath. Pol. I. c., Athen. xv. p. 695) αἰαῖ Λειψύδριον προδωσέταιρον κτλ. records this defeat of the Alcmaeonids.

παρ' Ἀμφικτυόνων. The Amphictyonic council controlled the finance and undertook the care of the temple at Delphi. When the temple was burnt down in 548 B. C. (Chron. cf. i. 50) the estimate for rebuilding it was 300 talents and subscriptions were solicited from all parts of Greece, and even from Amasis of Egypt (ii. 180 n.). [For a similar national subscription to rebuild the temple destroyed in the fourth century cf. Xen. Hell. vi. 4. 2; Frazer, Paus. v. p. 634.] The collection, as might be expected, was a long business. It was going on before the death of Amasis (526 B. C.), but the Alcmaeonidae did not begin their contract till 514 B. C., after their defeat at Lipsydrium (Ath. Pol. 19), and in all probability did not complete the work till after their return to Athens (510 B. C.) (Philochorus, fr. 70; F. H. G. i. 395; Schol. Pind. Pyth. vii. 9). Grote (iv. 48), however, and Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (Arist. i. 34 n.) think that the Alcmaeonid contract must have been earlier.

- 3 Herodotus emphasizes the liberality of the Alcmaeonids. The Isocratean school and other later writers (cf. Isocr. de Perm. 232; Ath. Pol. 19; Philoch. fr. 70; Demosth. c. Meid. 144) allege that they got control of a large sum of money by undertaking the contract, and used it to effect the expulsion of the Pisistratids. In the case of a similar restoration at Delos (B. C. H. xiv. 389), half the sum agreed on was given to the contractors when the contract was signed, and four-tenths more when the work was half-done. It is therefore possible (as alleged by Philochorus, I. c., and argued by Wilamowitz, A. and A. i. 33 f.) that the Alcmaeonids misapplied the contract-money, and subsequently after their restoration made splendid amends by their magnificent rebuilding of the temple (Pind. Pyth. vii. 10). But the story is late and may well be inspired by envy and malice. The wealth of the Alcmaeonids seems to have depended largely on their connexion with the East (cf. vi. 125), not on landed estates, presumably now confiscated, in Attica. Their

reputation at Delphi makes the tale of embezzlement improbable, and supports the view taken by H.

παρίνου . . . Παρίου. Parian marble is the best for statues, and far more splendid than tufa or limestone, of which most of the older Greek temples are built. The French excavators at Delphi have found near the east façade of the temple, buried under the Sacred Way, two sets of archaic pediment-sculptures, one made of marble, the other of tufa. So, too, the architectural fragments are partly of tufa, partly of Parian marble, so far supporting H.'s account. Cf. Frazer, Paus. v, pp. 631-2; B. C. H. xx. (641 f.); Bury, Hermathena, x. 267 f.

- 63 2 Ἀγχιμόλιον . . . δόκιμον. Perhaps the fact that the expedition was sent by sea may account for the absence of the king, as apparently in the expedition to Samos (iii. 54 f.), and certainly at Salamis, where Eurybiades commands (viii. 42. 2).

The alleged bribery of the oracle is supported by other instances (cf. vi. 66 n.). It is, however, in this case denied by Plutarch (de Malign. Herod. ch. 23) and may be a fiction to cover a change in Spartan policy. For though the piety of the Spartans which made them slow to send troops to Marathon (vi. 106) and against Mardonius (ix. 7 f.) may have been genuine, it seems more likely that their motive in this case was political, viz. the friendship between the Pisistratids and Argos (i. 61; Ath. Pol. 19). Policy dictated the expulsion of the tyrants just as policy later counselled their restoration (ch. 91).

- 3 συμμαχίη. This alliance, along with many others (cf. Appendix XVI. 8), was made by Pisistratus. To compliment his allies he named one of his sons Thessalus (Thuc. i. 20, vi. 55; Ath. Pol. 17, ch. 94 n.). Thessaly, however, proved a broken reed both to the tyrants and later (Thuc. i. 107) to the democracy of Athens.

κοινῇ γνώμῃ . . . βασιλεία. The Thessalians in foreign affairs often acted in common (Thuc. i. 102, iv. 78), but it seems unlikely that there were real kings in Thessaly. The title is occasionally given to the chiefs of the leading families, e. g. the Aleuadae of Larissa (Pind. Pyth. x. 3; H. vii. 6. 2, but not in ix. 1. 1, 58. 1), and Orestes of Pharsalus (Thuc. i. 111). Here it seems to mean a general appointed to command the national army, the *ραγός*, though that term is first explicitly used of Jason of Pherae (Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 8). In Thucydides (iv. 78) the Thessalians are said to be under a close family oligarchy (*δυναστεία*), but probably this refers to the home government of the various cities. In 431 B. C. the troops sent to the aid of Athens are under seven commanders appointed by the seven cities which sent them (Thuc. ii. 22). (See note, p. 415.)

Κονιαίων. The only known Conium being in Phrygia (Plin. N. H. v. 32), and Cineas being certainly a Thessalian, Γονναίων (cf. vii. 128. 1, 173. 4) should be read.

- 4 Ἀλωπεκῆσι. The modern Ampelokipi ('vineyards'), some eleven

since, Cineas son of Kostas, mentioned as ally of Alcibiades (Thuc. ii. 95)

cf. the Pers. at Tanagra;

stadia from the gate along the Cephisian road, is held to be a perversion of this name. In that case the Cynosarges, a walled *τέμενος*, which contained a shrine of Heracles (vi. 116) and a gymnasium for the *νόθοι* of citizens, must be north-east of Athens at the foot of Mount Lycabettus. The position assigned suits the narrative in vi. 115 f., since the Persians in the bay could see the victors of Marathon encamped on the hill, and so would naturally put about and sail away (Frazer, Paus. ii, p. 193 f.). Recently, however, Dr. Dörpfeld has argued that Alopece and Cynosarges must have lain south of the Ilissus towards Phalerum, near the church of S. Marina, and Sir C. Smith has excavated a building south of the Olympieum on the bank of the river, which, on rather slight grounds, he holds to be Cynosarges (Frazer, Paus. v. 493 f.). This would suit the present passage, as its natural meaning is that the Spartans were ridden down in the plain between Phalerum and Athens and driven back to their ships. Their fallen leader would probably be buried near the spot at which he fell; hence, if Alopece be Ampelokipi, we have to suppose that the Spartans had marched past Athens, which is unlikely.

4 1 ἀποδέξαντες. This appointment of one king to command does not harmonize with the story told in ch. 74 f., or with the royal prerogative alleged in vi. 56. It is, however, the regular practice later (cf. Xen. Hell. v. 2. 3, vi. 5. 10, &c.), and may well be older than the quarrel between Cleomenes and Demaratus (ch. 75). Cf. Appendix XVII, § 2.

2 ἄστν: the lower city (cf. i. 14. 4, 176. 1), in contrast with the acropolis. The doubt whether the whole city was walled recurs in connexion with the campaigns of Marathon and Salamis. Here its easy capture may be explained by the existence of a party within it opposed to the tyrants. Apart from the inherent probability, the definite arguments for a prae-Themistoclean city-wall are strong.

1. The plain meaning of Thucydides (i. 89. 93) is that the Athenians rebuilt the walls of the city, parts of which were standing (H. ix. 13. 2), though they enlarged the circuit.

2. When Hipparchus was slain in the inner Ceramicus (ch. 56. 2 n.) his murderers entered through the gates (Thuc. vi. 57 εἶσω τῶν πυλῶν).

3. The gate of Hadrian professes to mark the limit of the city of Theseus:

αἶδ' εἶσ' Ἀθῆναι Θησέως ἡ πρὶν πόλις.

All that can be conceded to Dörpfeld and Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (Ph. U. i. 97 f.) is that the old wall may have been indefensible from lack of repairs, or in parts destroyed by the tyrants to make room for new buildings.

τοὺς τυράννοους: the reigning house, as βασιλείες is used vii. 6. 2, &c.

Πελαργικῶ: so more correctly than Πελασγικῶ. Thuc. ii. 17;



C. I. A. iv. 2. 27b *ad fin.*; Arist. Av. 832; Ath. Pol. 19. The alleged connexion with the Pelasgi seems to be a mistaken piece of erudition due to Hecataeus (cf. Appendix XV, § 5). The Pelasgic fortress apparently had nine gates [Cleidemus ap. Bekk. Anec. i. 419 *περιέβαλλον δὲ ἐννεάπυλον τὸ Πελασγικόν*, and Polemo ap. Schol. to Soph. Oed. Col. 489 *ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐννέα πυλῶν*], not distributed round the circuit, but arranged within each other like the famous Hexapylon of Syracuse. It was clearly an important part of the defences of the Acropolis in 510 B. C. (Ath. Pol. 19; Marm. Parium 45), but was doubtless destroyed by the Persians in 480 B. C. Thereafter it was an open space at the north-west end of the Acropolis (Thuc. ii. 17), close beneath the wall (Lucian, Piscator 47) and the cave of Pan (Lucian, Bis Accus. 8). It may have extended along the whole West front (Dörpfeld citing Lucian, Pisc. 42) from the Anaceum, shrine of Dioscuri north-west to the Asclepium south-west. On this and other disputed points cf. D'Ooge, The Acropolis of Athens, pp. 21–31 and 361–8.

- 65 1 *παῖδες τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν*: so also Ath. Pol. 19, copying Herodotus. Thucydides (vi. 55) says that Hippias alone had children (by his wife Myrrhine). Similarly, whereas H. speaks of the Pisistratidae stirring up the Persian king against Athens (vi. 94. 1, vii. 6. 2), Thucydides (vi. 59) names Hippias only.

2 *ἐπ' οἷσι*, 'on the terms asked by the Athenians'; cf. ch. 82. 3, vi. 108. 5.

3 *Σίγειον*. Cf. ch. 94 n.; Thuc. vi. 59.

*ἄρξαντες . . . ἔτεα*: i. e. thirty-six years of actual power, excluding the years of exile.

For the chronology cf. i. 62 n.

For the genealogies of the Attic kings and nobility cf. ch. 62. 2 n.

- 66–9 *The reforms of Cleisthenes at Athens with digression on the elder Cleisthenes of Sicily.*

- 66 1 *Ἰσαγόρης Τεισάνδρου*. This Tisander cannot be identical with the father of Hippoclidēs (vi. 127. 4, 128. 2), who was undoubtedly a Philaid, since if so H. would know he was sprung from Ajax. Nor is the statement that Isagoras was 'a friend of the tyrants' (Ath. Pol. 20) of much weight, since clearly he was the leader of the aristocrats.

*συγγενές* = *γεννήται*: *gentiles*, members of the clan or race

*Διὶ Κάρῳ*: cf. i. 171. 6 n. Plutarch (de Mal. Her. 23) criticizes this suggestion severely, regarding such a descent as a stigma comparable with the alleged Phoenician origin of Harmodius and Aristogiton (ch. 56, 57 n.). Macan ingeniously connects Carian Zeus with 'Caria', the citadel of Megara, where Zeus was worshipped (Paus. i. 40. 6). Cf. i. 171. 1 n.

- 2 *περὶ δυνάμις*: political power, i. e. election to the archonship (Ath. Pol. 13), which Isagoras held 508–507 B. C. (Marm. Par. 46).

ἑστασιάσαν. These parties recall, and to some extent represent, the old factions of the Shore and the Plain (i. 59). At the head of the former stood the Alcmaeonids, whose liberalism may have dated from Solon's act of amnesty, which by permitting their return bound them to support his legislation. They had taken the lead in the expulsion of the tyrants (ch. 63), and the restoration of liberty. Opposed to them were the land-holding class, who hoped for an oligarchy, and the secret supporters of the exiled tyrants.

τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται. Probably (1) the poor Diacrii, who had been supporters of Pisistratus (i. 59. 3), and (2) immigrants excluded from the phratries and the four Ionic tribes which remained the basis of Solon's constitution. The statement *ἡττώμενος δὲ ταῖς ἑταιρείαις ὁ Κλεισθένης* (Ath. Pol. 20. 1) may have been suggested by H.'s phraseology, but the definite mention of political clubs would seem, like the term *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* (Ath. Pol. 20. 4), to be an anachronism.

τετραφύλους ἔοντας Ἀθηναίους. Ancient tradition rightly made these four tribes not Attic by 'Ionic' (ch. 69. 1; Eur. Ion 1575 f.), [whether they were borrowed by Athens from Miletus (Wilamowitz, A. and A. ii. 241), or, as is more probable, were characteristic of all purely Ionic states, since they are found in Delos (B. C. H. x. 473, xiv. 418), in Teos (C. I. G. 3078, 3079), Cyzicus (C. I. G. 3657, 3663-5), &c.], deriving them from the four sons of Ion. The view that they represent castes can hardly be maintained (Strabo 383; Plut. Sol. 23). *Αἰγικορεῖς* might indeed mean the 'goat-herds' of rocky Diacria, and *Ἀργαδεῖς* might = *Ἐργαδεῖς* (Plut. Sol. 23), and mean either husbandmen or handicraftsmen, though even these etymologies are uncertain. But *Γελέοντες*, undoubtedly the true form (C. I. G. 3078, 3664, 3665), remains a riddle. Some connect it with *γελᾶν* = *splendere*, and see in it a class of priests and nobles, while others, deriving it from *γῆ*, make them peasant proprietors. But the latter are elsewhere (Busolt, ii. 96), *γεωμόροι*, *γεωργοί*, *ἄγροικοι*, and there is no trace of a priestly caste in Attica, while the nobles, Eupatrids, belonged to all four tribes. Again, the *Ὀπλητες* can hardly be the 'warriors', as in that case they would not come last in order, while if they are turned into handicraftsmen, tool-makers, they overlap the *Ἀργαδεῖς*. It may be better with Maas (Gott. Gel. Anz. 1889, 803; 1890, 353 n.), to connect the tribal names with half-forgotten deities, the Geleontes with Zeus Geleon (C. I. A. iii. 2), the *Ὀπλητες* with *Ὀπλόσμοι*, *Ὀπλόσμιος* being a title of Zeus in Arcadia, *Ὀπλοσμία* of Hera in Elis, while a tribe in Mantinea is *Ὀπλοδμία*; *Αἰγικορεῖς* with *Αἰγίς* (Eur. Ion 1580), and *Ἀργαδεῖς* with *Ἄργος*, the god of light. In any case, if the tribes ever had been castes or local divisions, no trace of the fact remained: they were in the time of Cleisthenes based on descent. Cf. Busolt, ii. 98 f. For the four Ionic tribes cf. Ramsay, *Asianic Elements in Greek Civilization*, pp. 243-66.

ἑτέρων: not Ionic but indigenous Attic heroes, Pausan. i. 5, Pseud.

Dem. Epitaph. 27-31. The names were Erechtheis, Aegaeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Acamantis, Oeneis, Cecropis, Hippothontis, Aeantis, Antiochis. Ajax was doubtless chosen as the hero of Salamis (cf. viii. 64 ; II. ii. 557-8), since 560 B. C. at any rate an Attic possession. The worship of the heroes gave a certain religious unity to the new tribes; their statues stood together in the Agora at Athens. Aristotle (Ath. Pol. ch. 21) tells us that the Pythia selected the ten eponymous heroes of the tribes from a hundred names submitted to her, a characteristic method of reconciling divine and human choice.

- 67 I 'This he did in imitation of his grandfather.' Cf. ix. 34. 1, and i. 176 *ad fin.* The resemblance between the two policies, on which H. again insists (ch. 69. 1), is less clear than the contrast. The historian's distorted view shows how inadequate was his appreciation of Cleisthenes' political reforms. Introd. § 32. For their real significance cf. ch. 69. 1 n. Cleisthenes of Sicyon reigned thirty-one years, circ. 600-570 B. C.; cf. vi. 126 f. and Appendix XVI, § 2.

✓ Ἀργείοισι. In legend Sicyon was a vassal-kingdom of the Pelopid monarchs of Argos: perhaps Dorian Argos attempted to reassert this old suzerainty, and was successfully resisted by Cleisthenes.

Ομήρεια ἔπεα. Even in the Iliad and Odyssey the constant use of 'Argives' for Greeks, and the position of Agamemnon as overlord of Sicyon, would be an offence to Cleisthenes, but it seems more probable that H. here, in spite of his doubt as to the authorship of the Epigoni (iv. 32, and cf. ii. 117), refers to the Thebais which began Ἀργος ἄειδε, θέα, πολυδίψιον, and to the Epigoni in which Adrastus must have played a great part.

τὰ πολλὰ πάντα, 'almost throughout'; cf. i. 203. 1, ii. 35. 2.

Ἀδρήστου. A., originally perhaps a local god, was in the Epics son of Talaus the Argive; expelled from Argos, he took refuge with Polybus of Sicyon, married his daughter, and inherited his kingdom. He took a leading part in the expeditions against Thebes, and seems to have returned to Argos (Paus. ii. 6. 6, &c.). There was a cult of the hero at Megara (Paus. i. 43. 1) as well as at Sicyon.

ἐκβαλεῖν. To recover or to expel the corpse is to recover or expel the hero. Cf. the stories of the bones of Orestes (i. 68 n.) and of Theseus (Plut. Theseus 36).

- 2 λυστήρα. Clearly intended to jingle with βασιλεύς (cf. 92) may be (1) = φόνεα λίθοις ἀναιροῦντα, Hesychius, cf. Cic. pro Dom. 5. 13 *percussor, lapidator*, or (2) a mere stone-thrower or skirmisher, not worthy of the hoplite's panoply, far less of a royal sceptre. If the Delphic god really gave this response to Cleisthenes, it was an ungrateful return to the man who had championed the cause of Delphi in the Sacred War (Paus. ii. 9. 6, x. 37. 6), and had joined in the re-institution of the Pythian festival, 582 B. C. (Paus. x. 7. 6), and who may well have founded the treasury of the Sicyonians recently discovered at Delphi (Paus. x. 11 ; Frazer, v. 270, 628). Probably

the oracle is a product of later days, when Dorian Sparta was all powerful at Delphi and blackened the fame of anti-Dorian tyrants.

ἔδοσαν. Cf. the help lent by Thebes to Aegina against Athens (ch. 80, 81).

- 3 Melanippus, a Theban hero (Aesch. S. c. Theb. 413), buried there outside the Proetid gate (Paus. ix. 18. 1), slew Tydeus and Mecisteus in fair fight before Thebes.

- 4 ἀπαις : without male issue (ch. 48). Adrastus was his grandson or son-in-law.

- 5 τὰ πάθρα : especially in the expeditions against Thebes. In the first he lost all his companions, escaping himself by a miracle ; in the second, only his son Aegialeus fell. Perhaps the story grew from the names Talaus ('wretched') and Adrastus, 'the inevitable might of Fate.'

χοροὺς μὲν : for the omission of the article cf. ix. 88. 1 ; i. 194. 4 ; ii. 402, &c. The worship of Dionysus was popular with the common people and favoured by the tyrants. Pisistratus founded the city Dionysia at Athens, or at least the dramatic performances. Periander of Corinth was the patron of Arion, the great maker of choric song (i. 23 n.).

ἀπέδωκε (cf. *reddidit*) here means 'assigned to D., to whom they of right belonged'. There is no reason to think that at Sicyon the chorus had first been given to Dionysus, then transferred to Adrastus, and now restored to D., nor can this have been true of the sacrifice now assigned to Melanippus. Choruses would be appropriate to Adrastus, whether as originally a Chthonian deity (Welcker) or as a guardian hero. For the connexion of tragic choruses with the worship of the dead cf. Ridgeway, *Origin of Tragedy*, pp. 26–39 ; and for the change of 'heroes' Thuc. v. 11.

- 8 I The Orthagoridae belonged to the non-Dorian population, and no doubt in some way abased the power and pride of the Dorians in favour of their own tribe. Yet it is difficult to believe that such terms of contempt can have been the official names of the Dorian tribes, maintained for sixty years after the death of Cleisthenes. Probably they were mere nicknames, which arose from some bitter jest of the tyrant (Bury, p. 156). The sixty years may be taken to end with the re-establishment of Dorian ascendancy, at the time when, led by Cleomenes, Sparta strove to enlarge her confederacy by the expulsion of the Pisistratidae (510 B. C.). At least we hear (Plut. de Mal Herod. ch. 22) of a Sicyonian tyrant Aeschines put down by the Spartans (cf. Appendix XVI, § 10).

- 2 τοὺς : the well-known Dorian tribes.

Δυμανάτας : elsewhere always *Δυμῆνες*. Steph. Byz. s. v. makes Dyman and Pamphylus sons of the Dorian king Aegimius, who adopted the Heracleid Hyllus. Of the real origin of the tribes nothing is certainly known (cf. Busolt, i. 530).

Αἰγιαλέος. Doubtless a local name, the men of the shore (cf. vii.



94). Probably the name is older than Cleisthenes, and was now revived. The eponymous hero Aegialeus (cf. ch. 66) is no doubt derived from the name of the tribe.

69 I καὶ οὗτος ὑπεριδὼν Ἴωνας. H. seems to regard Cleisthenes as of old Attic, as opposed to Ionic descent (ch. 62. 2 n.), and so likely to despise Ionians as his grandfather despised Dorians. But the motive is superficial and improbable. The Athenians still celebrated the Ionic festival, the Apaturia (i. 147), and retained the old tribes and phratries, at least for religious purposes. We also find Athens claiming kinship with the Ionians (ch. 97 ; ix. 106) as their mother city, and may attribute the contempt expressed for the Ionians, here and elsewhere, to later prejudice reflected in H. (cf. i. 143 n.).

The true meaning of the reforms was very different. By breaking down the old tribal organization, Cleisthenes was enabled to strengthen the state by the admission of many new citizens (cf. Ath. Pol. 20 ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν, Ar. Pol. iii. 2. 1275 b 37 πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους, and Ath. Pol. ch. 21), and to free it from the undue influence of the old families and clans. [Cf. Aristotle's sagacious remarks (Pol. vi. 4. 18, 19, 1319 b) on the necessity of breaking up old associations and forming new ones, when the franchise is extended.] By the wise choice of a natural local division, the deme, as the basis of his scheme, and the skilful distribution of the demes and trittyes among the ten tribes (Ath. Pol. ch. 21, *inf.* § 2), he provided against the crying danger of local factions, and also secured the permanence of his institutions. Lastly, by making Athens the one place where members of a tribe gathered together from their different trittyes for a common purpose, Cleisthenes elevated the city in the eyes of all its citizens, new and old. He thus completed the work, ascribed in legend to Theseus, but in reality left incomplete by Solon and Pisistratus, the unification (συνοικισμός) of Attica. For Cleisthenes' measures cf. Busolt (*op. cit.* 853 f.) and E. M. Walker in C. A. H. iv. 141-56.

2 ἀπωσμένον may be middle (Krüger), meaning 'which had before rejected him', or passive (Stein) 'before despised by him' (as an aristocrat).

φυλάρχους: properly, at Athens, the captains of the troop of horse furnished by each tribe at least as early as 411 B. C. (Ath. Pol. ch. 30 ; cf. ch. 61), and probably in the time of Herodotus. But these officers seem to date from the re-organization of the cavalry in the days of the Athenian empire, since no large force of horsemen is likely in early days or possible at Marathon (vi. 112 n.). H., who in the next words applies the term φυλάρχοι to the four old φυλοβασιλῆες, may be here using it loosely for the officials technically called ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν φυλῶν (C. I. A. ii. 554, 57-9, 564, 567 b), unless indeed these officials too are of later date, and the strategi lie concealed under this strange name.

δέκαχα = 'in ten parts' (cf. Hicks 81, l. 35) is an acceptable conjecture (Busolt, ii. 405 n. 3), as it not only improves the construction



but frees the text from the unlikely statement that there were exactly one hundred demes. Such a round number is improbable since

(1) The demes were not now first called into being (cf. τοὺς δήμους and i. 60. 4, 62. 1; ix. 73. 2), but existed at least in the days of the tyrants (cf. i. 60, 62 nn.), as may be seen from Pisistratus' κατὰ δήμους δικάσται (Ath. Pol. 16) and the Hermae set up by Hipparchus (Ps.-Plato, Hipp. 229 ἐπιγέγραπται λέγων ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὅτι ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τοῦ δήμου ἔστηκεν).

(2) The number of the demes in Polemo's time (second century B. C.; cf. Strabo 396) was 174, of which some 166 have been found on inscriptions: even in the fifth century there must have been more than one hundred.

(3) The supposed support of the number one hundred derived from the 'hundred heroes' fails, since the hundred heroes are not the eponymi of the demes, but the indigenous worthies from among whom the Pythia chose the ten eponymi of the tribes (Ath. Pol. 21; Busolt, ii. 406).

κατένειμε. For the principle of this distribution, the prevention of στάσις by combining different parts of Attica in one tribe, cf. Bury, p. 211. 2; Busolt, ii. 418 f. For a list of demes Pauly-Wiss. v. 35; and for their distribution into tribes ib. ii. 2227. H., caring but little for constitutional history, is silent on the point.

70-6 *The attempts of Cleomenes to promote oligarchic reaction at Athens foiled, first by the resistance of the Athenians and then by the refusal of the allies to follow him, with notes on the Cylonian ἄγος (71) and on Dorian invasions of Attica (76).*

I H. clearly places the constitution of Cleisthenes before the second visit of Cleomenes, Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 20) dates it to the archonship of Isagoras (508-7 B. C.), after Cleomenes' second intervention. The new constitution could only take definite form after the final defeat of Isagoras, yet the reformer must have previously won over the people to his side, and the βουλή which Cleomenes and Isagoras wish to dissolve, to whose aid the people rally, would seem probably to be the new democratic council of 500. Aristotle is dependent on H. for purely historical matter, but may have taken his date for the reforms (Isagoras' archonship) from an Atthis. Cf. Busolt, ii. 403.

2 ἐπιλέγων, 'describing them more exactly as the accursed.' Cf. the similar demand of Sparta just before the Peloponnesian war for the banishment of Pericles, an Alcmaeonid by maternal descent (Thuc. i. 126).

I I Thucydides (i. 126) completes and corrects this account of Cylon's *coup d'état*, which is clearly based on Alcmaeonid tradition. Plutarch (Solon 12) is in general agreement with Thucydides, but probably drew immediately from some Atthis. The chief points of difference are:

(1) Cylon received aid from his father-in-law, Theagenes of Megara.

(2) Being encouraged by the Delphic oracle to make the attempt at the chief festival of Zeus, he, an Olympic victor, chose the Olympic games, not the Attic Diasia.

(3) He actually seized the Acropolis and was there besieged for some time by the Attic levies under the *Archons*.

(4) Cylon and his brother escaped, their followers were slaughtered.

ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἐκόμησε, 'set his cap at a tyranny.' Cf. Arist. Vesp. 1317 ἐπὶ τῷ κομῆς: for ἐπὶ marking the end cf. i. 66. 1; and for pride in wearing the hair long cf. i. 82. 7, 8.

τὸ ἀγαλμα: probably the Athene Polias in the earlier Erechtheum. Cf. ch. 72. 3 n.

2 τοὺτους: presumably Cylon as well as his partisans, but cf. (4) *supra*.

οἱ πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων: ναυκραριέων (Stein, Abbott) would be an improvement. Naucraries were local districts whose presidents (ναύκραροι) were responsible (Ath. Pol. 8. 3; Pollux viii. 108; Bekk. Anec. i. 283) for levying money and contingents for the army and ships for the fleet (the name coming from ναῦς and κρά, the root of κραίνω, Busolt, ii. 191). The notion that Solon first instituted 48 such naucraries (12 in each of the four Ionic tribes) is due to Photius' misrepresentation of Ath. Pol. 8. 3, where their pre-existence is really implied. There is then no reason to doubt that the 'presidents of the naucraries' (prob. = ναύκραροι) were important officers, but the statement that they were the supreme power in the state (for ἔνεμον cf. i. 59. 6; v. 92 β 1) is directly contradicted by Thucydides (i. 126), who rightly names the archons, in which he is followed by Plutarch, Sol. 12 Μεγακλῆς ὁ ἀρχῶν καὶ οἱ συνάρχοντες. Aristotle (Ath. Pol.) rightly sees in the naucrari local officials (ch. 21), succeeded by the demarchs, while the archonship is the chief political office (ch. 13). The attempt of Harpocration to reconcile Herodotus and Thucydides by identifying archons and naucrari is a mere subterfuge contradicted by all other authorities; nor is it likely that the archons were the presidents of the naucrari as has been suggested. The true explanation of the passage is that Herodotus, or his authority, is anxious to absolve the Alcmaeonid archon, Megacles, from the guilt of the sacrilege by throwing the blame on another board of magistrates. For his Alcmaeonid leanings cf. vi. 121, and Appendix XVIII, § 6.

ὑπεγγύους πλὴν θανάτου. The agreement bound the suppliants to appear before a court of justice, but guaranteed them their lives. Cf. Plut. Sol. 12 τοὺς συνωμότας . . . ἐπὶ δίκῃ κατελθεῖν.

πρὸ τῆς Πεισιστράτου ἡλικίας: a vague date, yet natural in Herodotus, since his continuous history of Athens begins with Pisistratus. Thucydides gives two notes of time, the Olympiad

(*sup.*) and the synchronism with Theagenes. Aristotle (Ath. Pol.) apparently placed Cylon before Draco, and Euseb. Chron. i. 198 (cf. Paus. i. 28. 1) dates his victory in the foot-race at Olympia to 640 B. C. Hence, as he was apparently still young at the time of his rising (cf. τὴν ἐταυρήνην τῶν ἡλικιωτέων), Busolt (i. 670, ii. 206) and others prefer the date 632 B. C.

72 I αὐτός, 'alone.' But cf. Ath. Pol. 20. 3 ὑπεξελθόντος δὲ τοῦ Κλεισθέους μετ' ὀλίγων.

ὑπεξέσχε, 'retired' (vi. 74. 1; viii. 132. 2). He hoped by this to satisfy Cleomenes.

ἐπίστια. It is most unlikely that 700 families were implicated in the murder of the Cylonians, yet Aristotle follows H. verbally. Probably many newly enfranchised citizens were expelled at the same time, and thus completed the total of 700 households.

τὴν βουλὴν. Clearly to Herodotus the new Boule of five hundred, fifty from each tribe, which naturally championed democracy against this oligarchic reaction; yet, if we follow the chronology of Aristotle (cf. ch. 70. 1 n.), it would be the Solonian council of four hundred. Were the three hundred partisans of Isagoras to form an oligarchic council, from which the magistrates would be taken? There had been a council of three hundred convened to try the 'Accursed' (Plut. Sol. 12).

2 Λακεδαιμόνιοι. The Lacedaemonians were at times willing to save themselves, regardless of their allies (cf. Thuc. iii. 109): yet Isagoras (ch. 74. 1) escaped, and possibly his partisans, § 4 n.

3 ἡ φήμη: the well-known (cf. ch. 35. 2; ix. 100, 101) omen, contained in the words πάλιν χάρεε.

τὸ ἄδυτον τῆς θεοῦ: presumably the shrine of Athene Polias in the Erechtheum (viii. 41. 2, 51. 2 n.); but there was also on the Acropolis, before the Persian war, the old Hecatompedon discovered by Dörpfeld (M. A. I. xi. 1886, p. 337), between the sites of the Parthenon and Erechtheum (Frazer, Paus. Appendix, Bk. I). Dörpfeld further holds that this temple was rebuilt after the Persian war and existed at least as a treasury in the days of H., but this seems improbable (cf. D'Ooge, The Acropolis, p. 41 f., 369-97). If neither this temple nor the Erechtheum, which was rebuilt late in the Peloponnesian war, were restored when H. was writing his vagueness in referring to 'the temple' is more natural.

ἡ ἱερεΐη. The Eteobutadae supplied the priestess of Athena Polias, and the priest of Erechtheus (Aesch. Choeph. 572).

τὰς θύρας . . . ἀμείψαι, 'pass the folding doors,' as often in Tragedy; cf. Soph. Phil. 1262. With this attempt of Cleomenes we may compare his conduct at Argos, vi. 81, 82.

Δωριεῦσι: probably for all non-Ionians, perhaps for all but the priests. Cf. Caes. B. C. iii. 105 'in occultis ac reconditis templi, quo praeter sacerdotes adire fas non est, quae Graeci ἄδρυα appellant' (of Pergamum).

It seems odd that they remembered the no. 700. Did Ath families  
the oligarchs had 1000 & this is traditionally 5: Isag. had 300 with the exiles  
q3, the rest was Kleisthenes, some 1700?

'Αχαιός: as a Heracleid (vii. 204; viii. 131). For a discussion of the race of the Spartan kings cf. vi. 53 n. Cleomenes' reply gains point when we remember that his half-brother was Dorieus (ch. 41).

- 4 τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους, κτλ. On the historian's own showing Isagoras escaped (ch. 74. 1). Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 20) says all were let go: τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ πάντας ἀφείσαν ὑποσπόνδους. Aristophanes (Lysistrata 272) describes, with humorous exaggeration of its glories, this expulsion of Cleomenes from Athens.

κατέδησαν τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ (sc. δέσιν): imprisoned them for execution. Cf. iii. 119. 2, and the parallel expression κεκοσμημένον τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ (i. 109. 1).

Τιμησίθεος: Pausanias (vi. 8. 6) ascribes to him two victories in the pancratium at Olympia, and three at Delphi, besides exploits in war.

- 73 I 'Αθηναῖοι... συμμαχίην. The Athenians, presumably their assembly under its democratic leader, are the first to make advances to the Great King, and to invite his intervention in Greece. Naturally they were anxious to preserve their newly won liberties and their independence against the overwhelming power of the coalition arrayed by Sparta against them. Yet it is a shock to find that the chief champion of Hellas against the Mede had first proposed an alliance with him.

- 2 τίνες ἰόντες: a regular expression for the lordly contempt felt by Persian kings and princes for small and distant tribes and cities (i. 153. 1; v. 13. 2, 105. 1).

ἀπεκορύφου, 'put the matter to them in a nutshell.' Cf. κορυφὰ λόγων (Pind. Ol. vii. 68; Pyth. iii. 80).

- 3 ἐπὶ... βαλόμενοι, 'on their own responsibility, at their own risk' (iii. 71. 5, 155. 4; v. 106. 4; viii. 109. 1). Probably the envoys knew that Cleisthenes was ready to make submission, but were afterwards disavowed when their action raised a storm at Athens. H.'s Athenian (? Alcmaeonid) informants seem guilty here of at least *suppressio veri*. Cleisthenes henceforth disappears from history, presumably because he fell into disgrace. He may even perhaps have been banished, though the late tradition (Aelian, V. H. xiii. 24) that he was the first man ostracized deserves no credit (cf. Ath. Pol. ch. 22). The leanings of the Alcmaeonidae to the East may be partly explained by the origin of their wealth (vi. 125), and certainly throw light on their attitude in 490 B. C. (cf. Appendix XVIII, § 6).

- 74 I εἰς τὸ συλλέγει. It seems impossible that the Spartans and allies should not have known that the expedition was directed against Attica, especially as the Boeotians seize Oenoe by a concerted plan, but they may well have been ignorant of the purpose of Cleomenes to restore tyranny at Athens. On the question whether the king had authority to order an expedition see Appendix XVII, § 2, and vi. 56. 1.

- 2 'Ελευσίνα. The scholiast on Ar. Lys. 273 gives fuller details: τῶν

δὲ μετὰ Κλεομένους Ἐλευσίνα κατασχόντων (i. e. Isagoras and his fellow-exiles), Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς οἰκίας κατέσκαψαν καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἐδήμευσαν αὐτῶν δὲ θάνατον κατεψηφίσαντο, &c.

Οἰνὴ. There were two demes named Oenoe, one in the valley above the plain of Marathon, the other, here mentioned, on the borders of Boeotia, but on the Athenian side of Mount Cithaeron. It may be placed at Myoupoli (? Οἰνὴ πόλις), where there is a small walled town with outlying forts near the Boeotian border (Thuc. ii. 18), while the fortress commanding the road from Thebes to Athens and blocking the pass (Gyphtho-Kastro) must be Eleutherae (cf. Frazer, ii. 518 f.; v. 537 f.). For Oenoe, Eleutherae, and other border forts cf. J. H. S. xlvii (1926), pp. 1-26.

Ῥοῖαι was also near the road from Athens to Plataea and Thebes, but was on the northern slope of Cithaeron, and was never an Attic deme. It was only Athenian in the sense that it was connected with Plataea (vi. 108.6), and thus in alliance with Athens. For its site cf. ix. 15.3n.

ἀμφίβολή, 'between two fires'; the attack on Eleusis and on the northern frontier. Thucydides (ii. 76; iv. 32, 36) uses ἀμφίβολος in this sense.

75 1 Κορίνθιοι : this service is not cited by the Corinthian orator in Thuc. i. 41. Probably Corinth was unwilling by injuring Athens to strengthen Aegina; cf. ch. 92.

μετεβάλλοντο : rather 'wheeled round' (Stein) than 'changed their mind' (L. and S.).

2 ἐπέθη νόμος. The date of the law and of the hostility between Cleomenes and Demaratus is a little doubtful; cf. vi. 82. At any rate, henceforth custom forbade both kings to go forth together in command of the host. Indeed it was a little unusual for them both to be absent from Sparta. Cf. Xen. Hell. v. 3. 10 ἡ τῶν Φλειασίων πόλις . . . νομίζουσα ἔξω ὄντος Ἀγησιπόλειδος οὐκ ἂν ἐξελθεῖν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς Ἀγησίλαον, οὐδ' ἂν γενέσθαι ὥστε ἅμα ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς βασιλέας ἔξω Σπάρτης εἶναι. But the object of the law was military, to prevent division of command; ~~and~~ it certainly was not stretched to cover cases of absence on other business (cf. vi. 50. 2, 65. 1, 73) or of urgent necessity (Thuc. v. 75; Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 7, 8). In vii. 149. 2 H. seems to forget the existence of this law.

Note the parallelism. πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ . . . εἶποντο says of the Tyndaridae what τέως . . . εἶποντο has said of the kings.

τῶν Τυνδαριδῶν. The Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux (iv. 145. 5; ix. 73. 2), or rather their images. We may compare the Acacidæ (ch. 80; viii. 64, 83, 84) and I Sam. iv. 7 f. with Robertson-Smith, Religion of the Semites, i. 38. Stein's difficulty, that the old images (Plut. Mor. 478 A) could not be separated, might be met by sawing them asunder or by making new idols.

ἐπικλητοί : went forth with them, being summoned to their aid. Cf. the stories of the Dioscuri in Paus. iv. 16. 5, 9, iv. 27. 1 f., and in Macaulay's Lake Regillus.



76 The tradition that Megara was conquered by the Dorians after the rest of the Peloponnese is clear and well founded : that it was previously Ionic (i. e. Attic) and conquered when Codrus saved Attica seems a later invention supported by genealogical myths (Paus. i. 39; Busolt, i. 219 f.). It would appear to be the Nisa of the Homeric catalogue (Il. ii. 508), and if so belonged originally to Boeotia.

δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον. The expeditions under Anchimolius and Cleomenes (ch. 63-5), unlike the first, started from Sparta (ὄρμηθέντες ἐκ Σ.). The second coming of Cleomenes (ch. 72) is not counted, as it was undertaken οὐ σὺν μεγάλῃ χειρί: it would, too, spoil the historian's antithesis. It is impossible to say whether this schedule of expeditions was compiled when the events of 446 B. C. or 431 B. C. had made Dorian invasions familiar to Athens. In that case the omission of all reference to the doings of Pleistoanax (Thuc. i. 114) and Archidamus (Thuc. ii. 10f.) is remarkable, especially in view of the mention in ix. 73.

Ἀθήνας = Ἀττικὴν, ch. 57. 2 n.

77-8 *The Athenians take vengeance on Boeotia and Chalcis for their part in the invasion. The excellence of democracy.*

77 1 Βοιωτοὶ . . . Χαλκιδεῦσι. The hostility of the Boeotians is easily explained by the alliance of Athens with Plataea, probably just concluded (vi. 108 n.): that of Chalcis may be due to the expansion of Athens in the Thracian region, where Chalcis had interests, under Pisistratus (cf. App. XVI, § 8), or to Athenian friendship with Eretria (i. 61; vi. 100), the old rival of Chalcis.

2 κληροῦχοι. A cleruchy resembled a Roman, rather than a Greek or a modern colony, in being a measure of poor relief, and of military defence, rather than of emigration. The cleruchs who were settled on the confiscated lands remained Athenian citizens (cf. further Gilbert, G. A. i. 445 f.), liable to military and naval service (cf. viii. 1). This is probably the earliest instance of a policy widely applied later by Pericles. A fragmentary inscription (Hicks 4) is now held to record the regulation of affairs at Salamis after its conquest, and not the establishment of a cleruchy. That Athens possessed state-land in Salamis seems proved by viii. 11. 3.

ἵπποβοται (cf. Strabo 447): a suitable name for a rich oligarchy of knights, since in such states as Chalcis and Eretria the knightly cavalry was the chief force, and only the rich could afford to breed and keep horses. Cf. vi. 35. 1 τεθριπποτρόφος οἰκία, vi. 36. 125, Ar. Pol. iv. 3. 1289 b τοῦτο (i. e. τὸ ἵπποτρέφειν) οὐ ῥάδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν. διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαι πόλειςιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τοῦτοις ἦσαν. ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας οἶον Ἐρετρεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς.

παχέες: cf. ch. 30. 1.

- 3 δῖμνεως : Ionic for διμναίους, like εὐγεως from γέα (γῆ). For the sum cf. vi. 79. 1.

τειχέων. Probably the northern wall of the Acropolis, which may well have been scorched with fire when the earlier Erechtheum was burnt (viii. 53).

μεγάρου. The western cella, either (1) of the Erechtheum, the temple of Athena Polias, next the Pandroseum (viii. 51, 55); or (2), according to Dörpfeld, of the old Athena temple, the Hecatompedon (ch. 72 n.).

- 4 τέθριππον. The site of this monument is a standing puzzle to archaeologists. That it was, as H. says, originally set up circ. 505 B.C. seems certain, and also that it was destroyed or removed by the Persians in 480 B.C., so that the monument seen by H. was a reproduction erected about 450 B.C.—not, however, on the original site. The evidence is as follows. In 1887 a broken block of Eleusinian stone, evidently a fragment of an oblong base, was found in the ruins of a large building to the north-east of the Propylaea, probably near its original position. On the block may be seen, in letters belonging to the end of the sixth century B.C., the words (Hicks 12; C. I. A. iv.<sup>2</sup> 334 a) ὕβ]ΠΙΝ ΠΑΙΔΕ(ς), and below ΤΟΝ ΗΙΠΠΟΣ Δ[εκάτην. Previously, in 1869, a block of Pentelic marble, also a fragment of a base, had been found with an inscription in characters belonging to the middle of the fifth century (C. I. A. i. 334) to this effect : Αθ]ΕΝΑΙΟΝ ΕΡΑΜΑ[σιν, and in the line below ἦ]ΠΡΟΣ ΔΕ[κάτην, to which has been added more recently a scrap containing the syllable σιν twice repeated. Both inscriptions are clearly fragments of the dedication inscribed on the pedestal of the chariot : in both each couplet formed a single long line. But in the earlier the hexameters were transposed, the line referring to the chains standing first, which shows that the original monument stood near the chains hung on the wall, whereas the newer was near the entrance of the Acropolis. In all probability the trophy was restored after the conquest of Euboea by Pericles (i. e. 445 B.C.), or after that of Boeotia at the battle of Oenophyta (i. e. 456 B.C.). Either would be a suitable occasion for such a restoration. In favour of the latter Hauvette (p. 51) urges that H., who must have seen the new monument, since he (like Diodorus and the Anthology) quotes the verses in the new order, gives no hint that the trophy had just been restored. The epigram is to be ascribed to Simonides (Aristides, ii. 512; Dindorf) rather than to Agron (schol. *ad loc.*) ; cf. Bergk, Sim. fr. 162.

ἀριστερῆς χειρὸς . . . πρῶτα εἰσὶόντι ἐς τὰ προπύλαια. These words raise a further difficulty. Does H. mean the famous Propylaea of Mnesicles finished in 432 B.C.? To this there are the following objections : (1) Within the Propylaea there is no room for so large a monument as the chariot would seem to have been. (2) On the slope immediately in front to the left there is no suitable site.

(3) Pausanias (i. 28. 2) clearly implies that the chariot stood on the Acropolis itself inside the Propylaea. We must therefore infer that the restored chariot was moved when the new Propylaea of Mnesicles was built, and that H. is referring to the open space in front of the old Propylon. This gateway is still discernible behind the south-west wing of the Propylaea, set in the Pelasgic wall, and was probably restored by Cimon after the Persian war (cf. D'Ooge, *Acropolis*, pp. 72-7, 301 f., with fig. 7). No certain inference can be drawn as to the date of H.'s sojourn or sojourns in Athens (cf. Introduction, §§ 8, 10).

The epithets belong to different meaning of δεσμός, 'chain' (σιδήρεος), and 'prison' (ἀχλυόεις).

78 Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ἡῤῥήντο ends, as is shown by the pluperfect, the theme begun ch. 66 Ἀθῆναι . . . ἐγίνοντο μέζονες.

δηλοῖ: probably personal (cf. ii. 116. 6, 149. 2) rather than = δηλόν ὅτι (cf. ii. 117).

ἰσηγορίη, 'liberty,' 'equality,' as shown in the right of free speech, especially in matters political. Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. i. 12 ἰσηγορίαν καὶ τοῖς δούλοις πρὸς τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἐποιήσαμεν καὶ τοῖς μετοίκους πρὸς τοὺς ἀστούς. H. here, as usual, champions freedom and constitutional government against tyranny (cf. iii. 80 f. and Intro. § 7). His argument, though not conclusive, is interesting (Macan) as an early statement of the close relations between the political institutions and the foreign policy and fortunes of a state (cf. Polyb. vi. 3; Ar. Pol. v. 4. 8, 1304 a; vi. 7. 1, 1321 a). His prediction of military success for democracy may be true in a short national struggle for existence like the Persian war, but can hardly be extended to a career of conquest, still less to the maintenance of an empire (cf. Thuc. iii. 37).

ἐθελοκάκεον, 'would not do their best' (viii. 22. 2; ix. 67). Xerxes maintains the opposite view (vii. 103. 4). Hippocrates (de Aer. 23) supports H.: οἱ δὲ αὐτόνομοι, ὑπὲρ ἑωυτῶν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους αἰρεῖνται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων, προθυμεῖνται ἐκόντες καὶ ἐς τὸ δεινὸν ἔρχονται . . . οὕτως οἱ νόμοι οὐκ ἦκιστα τὴν ἐνψυχὴν ἐργάζονται. H. does less than justice to the Pisistratid tyranny (cf. App. XVI, §§ 5-8.) But its successes were diplomatic rather than military, and H.'s statements (cf. 66. 1) are comparative. Pisistratus, no doubt, laid the foundations of the Athenian Empire, but the building was greater than its foundations.

79-89 *Aegina makes alliance with Thebes and attacks Athens. Digression (82-8) on the old feud between Aegina and Athens and note (ch. 88) on Greek dress and pottery.*

79 1 ἐς πολύφημον: doubtless, like τῶν ἄγκιστα δέεσθαι and perhaps τιμωρήτηρων (ch. 80. 1), a quotation from the oracular response, probably a reminiscence of Od. ii. 150 ἀγορὴν πολύφημον.

2 Tanagra and Thespieae are the nearest considerable places east

and west of Thebes, but Coronea is further away to the north-west beyond Haliartus.

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ οὐ. 'The first example of a construction (unique in H.) very common in Plato . . . in which *μή* with the subjunctive expresses a suspicion that something may prove to be true, and *μή οὐ* that something may not be true,' Goodwin, § 265. '

- 80 1 Since Zeus was said to have carried off Aegina, the mother of Aeacus, to Oenone (i. e. Aegina; cf. viii. 46. 1) from Phlius, her father Aesopus must have been originally the river-god of the Phliasian stream (Paus. ii. 5. 2), but from an early date he was identified with the Boeotian river, and Aegina thus made a sister of Thebe, as in this oracle and in Pindar, Isthm. vii. 18; cf. Paus. ix. 1.

The interpretation illustrates the use of myths for political purposes; cf. ch. 67.

- 2 τοὺς Αἰακίδας. Probably images of Aeacus and his sons (cf. ch. 75). They are specially at home in Aegina (cf. viii. 64, 83, 84), yet Ajax and Telamon are at home in Salamis also (viii. 64), and thus are connected with Athens (ch. 66. 2), where too Aeacus is given a *τέμενος* (ch. 89). So the Aeacidae might well refuse to aid the foes of Athens.

- 81 2 εὐδαιμονίῃ μεγάλῃ. Great prosperity, especially if sudden, would be to H. a reason for expecting disaster. The wealth of Aegina, traced by Athenian scandal to buying gold as brass from thievish Helots at Plataea (ix. 80), was really of long standing, as is shown by their separate shrine at Naucratis (ii. 178), the proverbial wealth of Sostratus (iv. 152), and above all by the Aeginetan weights, measures, and coinage (vi. 127. 3 n.). But H. depreciates the Aeginetans as foes and rivals of Athens. Here they break the usages of war; in ix. 78 an Aeginetan proposes a worse outrage on Hellenic custom. In fine, their expulsion from their island is but the proper penalty for their cruelty and sacrilege (vi. 91). Nevertheless, he allows that the Athenians were the aggressors in the original war (ch. 85, 86), and implies that they acted unjustly in retaining the Aeginetan hostages (vi. 86). He also states that the Aeginetans showed patriotism in resisting Xerxes [though they submitted to Darius (vi. 49)] and won the prize of valour at Salamis (viii. 91, 93).

ἀκήρυκτον: a war without due notice, elsewhere an implacable war, or a guerilla war (Macan).

- 3 Φάληρον . . . παραλίης: the port (cf. ch. 63; vi. 116) and coast region (Ath. Pol. 21). For the damage done by such raids cf. Xen. Hell. v. 1.

- 82 1 Since *ὀφείλω* is used like 'owing' of evil as well as good (Plat. Rep. 332 B, 335 E) *προοφειλομένη ἔχθρη* is a 'hatred one has long had cause to feel, but has not satisfied.' So vi. 59 π. *φόρος*, 'tribute still in arrear'; Thuc. i. 32 *εὐεργασία π.* 'a kindness not yet repaid.'

ἐχρέωντο. For the consultation of the oracle on similar occasions cf. i. 167; iv. 151.

**Δαμίης καὶ Αἰξήσις.** These deities were also worshipped at Troezen and Epidaurus, and in Laconia. *Αἰξήσις* is clearly connected with 'Increase' (*αὔξειν*, cf. the Attic deity *Αἰξώ*), but the derivation of *Δαμίη* remains a problem. Most probably it may be connected with Mother-Earth, *Δημήτηρ*, since at Rome and in Italy the Bona Dea, an earth-goddess, worshipped exclusively by women (Ovid, *Fast.* v. 150f.), was called Damia, her victim *damium*, and her priestess *damiatrix*. These names must be of Greek origin, and seem to show that the Greek deity Damia migrated from Tarentum, where the feast of Dameia was celebrated, to Rome, and was there engrafted on the Italian Bona Dea = Fauna (Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, pp. 102-6). In any case it can hardly be doubtful that these goddesses are concerned with the increase of the fruits of the earth, and with child-birth in women. Their worship resembled that of Demeter and Persephone in the rallery practised at both by the women (ch. 83. 3 n.), in the throwing of stones as a religious rite, and in the manner of sacrifice (Paus. ii. 30. 4, 32. 2). In the fact that the statues were made of wood we may perhaps see a relic of the supposed fertilizing power of trees (cf. the May-pole). For parallel spring customs in many lands and their explanation cf. Frazer, Paus. ii. 492; iii. 266 f.

2 **ἱρωτάτας.** The *μορίαί* at Athens were held sacred and protected by law (Lysias, *περὶ σηκοῦ*, 2, 7, &c.). The first olive, still to be seen in the days of H. in the Erechtheum (viii. 55 n.), was the gift of Athena to Attica; hence the view that olives were once found in Attica only. The image of Athena Polias in the Erechtheum was made of olive-wood (Athenagoras, *Leg.* 17); indeed, primitive statues were generally made of wood (Paus. viii. 17. 2).

3 **ἀπάξουσιν.** The Athenians later required cleruchs and allies at Brea, Erythrae, and elsewhere to pay such contributions to the Panathenaea (Hicks 32, 41, 64).

**Ἀθηναίη τῇ Πολιάδι.** It seems clear that in inscriptions 'Athena Polias' may refer to the goddess of the Parthenon as well as to her of the Erechtheum, the title serving to distinguish the goddess who watches over the city and citadel of Athens from Athena Nike (Wyse, *Cl. Rev.* xii. 145-52; cf. also D'Ooge, *Acropolis*, 139-42, 385-9). But in literature Athena Polias naturally means the goddess of the Erechtheum, and here that meaning is made certain by the connexion with Erechtheus. On Erechtheus and his temple cf. viii. 55 n.

These offerings to the 'lady' and 'king' of the city of Athens from Epidaurus may be connected with the membership of both cities in the ancient Calaurian Amphictyony (Strabo, viii. 374).

83 1 The Aeginetans were Dorians from Epidaurus (viii. 46; Paus. ii. 29. 5). Hence their allegiance to the mother-city, and custom of going thither for justice; such dependence in early times is not in itself improbable, but of course the suits would be few and simple.



ἀγνωμοσύνη: *temeritas*, the opposite of σωφροσύνη. It shows itself as overweening self-confidence (here cf. iv. 93; ix. 41. 4), as obstinacy (vi. 10; ix. 4. 2), as conceit (ix. 3. 1), or merely as want of sense (ii. 172. 2; vii. 9. β 1).

ἀπίστησαν. The independence of Aegina must have been absolutely assured when Periander crushed Epidaurus (iii. 52. 7), circ. 600 B. C.

2 ὑπαιρέονται. By seizing the statues they would not only make themselves independent of the mother-city in their worship, but also secure the blessing of the deities (ch. 75, 81). So Juno is brought (with her own consent) from Veii to Rome (Livy, v. 22).

3 κερτόμοισι. Such coarse raillery was customary among worshippers of Demeter and Dionysus in Attica also. It was practised by those who went to Eleusis (γεφυρισμός, cf. Arist. Frogs 384 f.), by choruses of men at the feasts of Dionysus (Arist. Wasps 1362; Dem. de Cor. 122 τὰ ἀφ' ἀμάξης), and by companies of women at the Thesmophoria (Στήνια, cf. ii. 171. 2 n.). H. implies that men were present in Aegina during this part of the festival (cf. the celebration at Bubastis, ii. 60 n.), though no doubt excluded from the secret rites (ἄρρητοι ἱεροργίαι), which, as in the worship of Bona Dea and the Thesmophoria (ii. 171. 2 n.), were the essence of the cult. On their significance cf. ch. 82. 1 n.

5 1 H. puts in the forefront two points in which the Athenian story, dictated perhaps by unwillingness to admit defeat, differed from the Aeginetan, viz. (1) that the Athenians sent only one ship, (2) that they had no intention of making an armed attack, to which we get the Aeginetan answers in ch. 86. Meanwhile, the undisputed fact of the attempt to remove the statues is thrust away into a relative clause, οἱ πεμφθέντες.

2 ἀλλοφρονῆσαι = here 'were stunned, lost their wits' (cf. Hom. Il. xxiii. 698), whereas in vii. 205. 3 = 'with other thoughts', as in Hom. Od. x. 374. Similarly ἀλλογνῶσαι in Hippocrates means 'go mad', but in H. i. 85. 3 'fail to recognize'.

For the story in general compare that of the salvation of Delphi (viii. 37-40), those of the madness caused by Artemis (Paus. iii. 16. 9; vii. 19. 3), and above all the attempted rape of the statue of Hera from Samos, and the marvel by which it was prevented (Athen. 672 b).

ἀνακομισθῆναι αὐτόν, 'was conveyed back alone.'

5 1 οὐ ναυμαχῆσαι. The fact was admitted. The Athenian explanation was that no hostility was intended; the Aeginetan, that they preferred to fight on land.

3 H. is slow to believe, though not to record, anything which seemed to him to contradict the laws of nature (cf. iii. 116, iv. 25, and especially iv. 42. 4, and in general Introd. § 32).

σφι, 'before them.' The goddesses were no doubt represented

kneeling, and the story is an aetiological myth to explain this (cf. chs. 87, 88; ii. 131). The true explanation (Welcker, Frazer) is that they were goddesses of child-birth. So Latona brought forth Apollo and Artemis kneeling on the soft meadow (Hymn Apollo, 116f.). In this posture were represented Auge at Tegea (Paus. viii. 48. 7), and the Di Nixi (Festus, pp. 174-7) brought to Rome after the defeat of Antiochus or the sack of Corinth. Marble groups of the kind have been found at Myconus and near Sparta.

- 4 *ἐτοίμους...ποιέεσθαι*, 'had procured the help of the Argives' (i. 11.1), probably as mercenaries (cf. i. 61. 4; vi. 92. 2), though possibly the three Dorian states were leagued against Athens. Epidaurus must have been friendly to Aegina, otherwise it could have stopped the Argives or sent news to Athens. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (A. ii. 280 f.) has put forward a theory (somewhat discredited, like the sun-myths of comparative mythologists, by its too frequent use) that this war is a reflection into the distant past of incidents which really occurred in the struggles between Athens and Aegina in the period of the Persian wars. Undoubtedly the incidents, the landing of the Athenians, and their defeat by the Argives and Aeginetans, are more appropriate to that time, as is shown by the mention of a trireme (ch. 85); but the feud between Athens and Aegina seems really old, as is shown by the embargo on Attic pottery (ch. 88), and on the Athenian side by Solon's substitution of the Euboic standard for the Aeginetan in coinage, and by his prohibition of the export of corn (Busolt, ii. 307). H. vaguely takes the story back into the far past, when Epidaurus had lately been mistress of Aegina and friend of Athens (ch. 83), when images were still made of wood (ch. 82), and Attic women still wore Dorian dress (ch. 87. 3). This early war between Athens and Aegina may well have occurred (circ. 590-70 B. C.) when Athens, fresh from her victory over Megara, was ready for a yet bolder enterprise. Internal seditions and renewed troubles with Megara (i. 59 n.) may soon have checked these wider ambitions.

- 87 2 With this ferocious act compare the lynching of the wife and children of Lycidas in 479 B. C. by the women of Athens (ix. 5. 3), and the 'Lemnian deeds' recorded in vi. 138.

- 3 *ἄλλω* may be taken with *ᾧτεω*, being put forward for emphasis, or being = *ἄλλο* it is attracted into the case of the relative, cf. Il. xviii. 192 *ἄλλου δ' οὗ τευ οἶδα τευ ἂν κλυτὰ τεύχεα δύω*.

- 88 1 There were two types of Greek dress: 'the Ionic', used by the natives of Asia Minor—Phrygians, Lycians, Carians, and the Greeks who came in contact with them; and the Dorian, of which the Corinthian is an unknown variety, the primitive national dress worn by almost all Greeks except the Ionians. The Ionian chiton was a long linen garment like a night-gown, with full sleeves to the elbow, requiring neither brooch nor pin. The Dorian was a square woollen cloth, with the upper edge folded down forming the diplois.

It was simply folded round the body and fastened at the shoulder. The right side was thus left unprotected, unless this opening was, as in the Canephorae of the Erectheum, sewn up. (But in all cases a girdle was worn fastened round the loins, and under the girdle the dress could be so arranged as to overlap.) This Dorian chiton served for both outer and under garment, hence it is called ἱμάτιον (ch. 87. 2). There is great difficulty as to the dress of the Athenians in early days. Homer includes them among the Ἰάονες ἐλκεχίτωνες (Il. xiii. 685; cf. Thuc. iii. 104, Hom. hymn), and the men of Athens before the Persian wars wore long linen chitons (Thuc. i. 6) and fastened their hair with golden grasshoppers in the Ionian fashion. It is therefore hard to believe that while the men wore Ionian dress the women wore the Dorian, and that then each sex changed its style of dress. The evidence of monuments seems to show that in the early period of sculpture Ionic dress was common, but that after the Persian wars the Dorian dress prevailed. See P. Gardner, *Greek Antiquities*, p. 49 f.; Lady Evans, *Greek Dress*; and Studniczka, *Altgriechische Tracht*.

Κάρισα. For Carian influences on Ionia cf. i. 146 n.

- 2 ἀνατιθέναι. The offering would be made either before marriage (for which compare the offering of hair, iv. 34. 1 n.; Paus. i. 43. 4, ii. 32. 1; Frazer) or at child-birth (cf. ch. 86. 3 n.), with which may be compared the dedication of clothes to Artemis Brauronia at Athens (A. Mommsen, *Feste*, 456 f.; Schol. Callim. i. 77) and to Artemis at Syracuse (Anth. Pal. viii. 200 f.).

κέραμον. Attic pottery was known all over the Greek world for its excellence. Hence this embargo may have been a primitive measure of protection. So far as Argos is concerned it is supported by the results of the American excavations at the Heraeum. Many fragments were found of old varieties, such as the Mycenaean and Geometric wares, some of the later red-figure style prevalent after the Persian wars at Athens, but hardly any of the best period of the black-figure style or the early red-figure style of vases. In other words, the embargo was rigorous circ. 550–480 B.C. See J. C. Hoppin, *Cl. R.* xii, p. 86. For the use of pottery rather than silver, &c., in the service of the gods cf. Athen. xi. 482; Macrob. Sat. v. 21.

- 9 2 μαντήιον. This oracle must surely have been given when Aegina was finally conquered, or at least when Athens was bent on the conquest (458–457 B.C.). If so, the thirty years must be reckoned from that epoch, which takes us back to 488–487 B.C., the probable date of the Aeginetan war, misplaced by H. before 490 B.C. (vi. 87 f.). Athens could hardly have meditated the conquest of Aegina before Marathon, and before the building of her great navy. H. is probably guilty of an anachronism in dating the project and the oracle before the Ionic revolt (Macan, Appendix VIII, § 3; Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, A. and A. ii. 281).

ἀδικίου. H. reproduces the Athenian colouring of his source by using a term elsewhere only found in Attic legal proceedings.

- 3 Αἰακῷ. The protecting hero of Aegina, who was thus to be won over to the side of Athens (cf. 80. 2 n.). The shrine of Aeacus in the Agora could hardly have escaped the ravages of the Persians in 480 B. C. May it not be (like the oracle) of later date, connected perhaps with Cimon (cf. vi. 105. 3 n.), who as a Philaid traced descent from Aeacus?

90-3 *Project of the Spartans to restore Hippas defeated by the opposition of their allies, led by Sosicles the Corinthian. His speech on the saving of Cypselus and the iniquities of Periander.*

- 90 1 The abortive attempt of Sparta to restore Hippas need not have hindered Athenian vengeance on Aegina. The real impediment may have been lack of a fleet, or strained relations with Persia. But H. uses the supposed connexion as a means of transition from one subject to another. The date assumed is shortly before the coming of Aristagoras (ch. 97), i. e. just before 500 B. C.

τὰ ἐκ τῶν Ἀλκμεωνιδέων: cf. chs. 62, 63.

- 2 Such oracles were current later (cf. viii. 141. 1; Thuc. ii. 8). For Pisistratid knowledge of oracles and soothsaying cf. Appendix XVI. 7.

ἐν τῷ ἱρῷ: probably the Erechtheum (ch. 72. 3 n.).

- 91 1 The allegation that Sparta attempted to cripple a possible rival by destroying her liberties (ch. 78) and restoring tyranny may be derived from Attic tradition. As a rule, Sparta favoured narrow oligarchies as more congenial to her own temper and institutions, and more conformable to her interests (Thuc. i. 19. 76; Ar. Pol. 1307 b 24).

- 2 δόξαν φύσας, 'having got (or grown) a spirit.' Cf. Soph. O. C. 804 φύσας φανεί φρένας, on the analogy of physical growth as γλώσσαν (ii. 68. 3), κέρεια (iv. 29 *ad fin.*), πώγωνα (viii. 104).

τις καὶ ἄλλος. This vague prediction of future evils applies primarily to Corinth (ch. 93. 1), but also to Sparta herself (ch. 90. 2). It was fully justified by the event; indeed, it is no doubt a 'vaticinium post eventum'.

ἀμαρτῶν, 'that he has committed an error.' The participle must also be supplied with ἐκμεμαθήκασι, for though the Boeotians and Chalcidians had not, like Sparta and Corinth, made the mistake of helping the Athenians, they had carelessly allowed their power to grow. But it is better to change ὥστε to ὥσπερ (Stein) or ὥς γε (Abicht) and to make ἀμαρτῶν conditional = 'if he be so foolish as to reject our counsel'.

Grote (iv. 101) remarks on the interest and importance of this occasion, the first recorded instance of the consultation of her allies by Sparta. The practice thus begun made the Peloponnesian league a true confederacy, organized probably by the vigorous and

successful king, Cleomenes (cf. Appendix XVII, § 3). The necessity of such consultations was shown by the dispersion of the allies during the last campaign against Athens (ch. 75).

92 I Σωσικλῆς. There seems no doubt that Corinth again (cf. ch. 75) led the opposition to the Spartan proposal, since she needed an independent Athens as a counterweight to Aegina, and for the maintenance of her own freedom. On her southern border she was already hemmed in by cities subservient to Sparta; were Athens now to become a submissive subject of Lacedaemon, Corinthian liberty and even Corinthian commerce would be menaced. Sosicles may be an historical person, like the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 80 f.), but his speech is incredibly inapt to the occasion, and is no more historical than the political essays put in their mouths. The one good point is the inconsistency of Sparta's hostility to tyranny at home and support of a tyrant abroad, and this might have been improved by recalling the Spartan suppression of tyrants (cf. Appendix XVI, § 10). Of the stories told, that of Cypselus' childhood is not in point, since it does not illustrate the evils of tyranny, nor is there any attempt to show that a tyranny at Athens would injure Sparta or her allies. H., even in his set speeches, does not cease to be a story-teller, using the narrative style (*εἰρομένη λέξις*) suitable to the matter; he cannot, like Thucydides, give us the weighty political argument demanded by the crisis. We may further note his light-hearted assurance that he gives the actual words spoken (*τάδε*) in contrast with the more cautious phrases of Thucydides (*τοιαῦτα, τοιάδε*).

a I H., like the speaker, conceived of the earth as a flat surface under the solid canopy of heaven (cf. iv. 36). For marvels in nature cf. Archilochus, fr. 74; Eurip. Fr. 688; Virgil, Ecl. i. 60; Ovid, Trist. i. 8. 1 f.; and H. viii. 143. 2 n. A similar formula in treaties (Dion. Hal. vi. 95) was fraudulently misused (H. iv. 201. 2, 3).

ἰσοκρατίας: concrete = 'republics,' a word coined to avoid the use of 'democracies,' which might be distasteful to the Spartans, the equivalent of the abstract term *ἰσηγορίη* (ch. 78) and the commoner *ἰσονομίη* (iii. 80. 6, 142. 3; v. 37. 2).

2 φυλάσσοντες. The dual monarchy was itself a precaution against tyranny. Further, to provide against a dangerous personal pre-eminence was a constant principle of Spartan policy; hence the treatment of Cleomenes and Pausanias, and in later days of Lysander. Not till Sparta was in her last decline did king Cleomenes III win despotic power, to be followed by baser tyrants—Lycurgus, Machanidas, and Nabis (221-192 B. C.) (Plass. Tyrannis, ii. 171 f.). On the putting down of tyranny by Sparta cf. Appendix XVI, § 10.

β Here begins the tale of the Cypselids in three parts:—1. The saving of Cypselus; 2. The advice of Thrasybulus; 3. The ghost of Melissa.

The accepted tradition, which has been largely rationalized, ran



thus. At the time of the Dorian invasion the Heracleid Aletes became king in Corinth in place of the Sisyphid (Paus. ii. 4. 3, 4; Thuc. iv. 42). Ten Dorian kings reigned before the monarchy gave way to the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae, whose clan of two hundred or more families took its name from the fifth king Bacchis. After the death of the last king Telestes, annual Prytaneis were elected from the ruling race for ninety years (747-657 B. C.). But the whole scheme is highly artificial and due to late chronologists (Busolt, i. 631 f.).

ἐδίδουσαν καὶ ἤγοντο: the formal expression for ἐπιγαμία, *conubium*, though ἐκδίδουσα is more regular (ii. 47. 1; i. 196. 4; iv. 145. 5; Thuc. viii. 21). Legitimate marriage was clearly impossible outside the ruling clan, just as at Rome in early days there was no *conubium* between patrician and plebeian. Such close aristocracies claiming descent from a royal house were common (Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, p. 120 f.). They tended to become the narrowest of despotic oligarchies (δυναστεΐαι, Thuc. iii. 62; iv. 78; Ar. Pol. 1302 b 17, 1306 a 24), resembling real tyrannies. Cf. ἀνδράσι μουνάρχοισι *infra*.

Λάβδα. So called because her deformity resembled the letter Δ (Etym. Mag. 199). Perhaps the lameness is symbolic (cf. iv. 161; Xen. Hell. iii. 3. 3).

δήμου. Perhaps influenced by Attic usage; cf. ix. 73. 1 Σωφάνης... ἐκ δήμου Δεκελεῆθεν. Cf. Hom. Il. v. 710; Od. i. 103; xiii. 322, &c. But demes are known in Elis, Rhodes, &c., outside Attica; for a collection of instances cf. Pauly-Wissowa s. v. Petra probably lay south of Corinth on the northern slope of the Argive hills near Tenea.

Λαπίθης τε καὶ Καινείδης: generic and specific designation; so ch. 65. 3 Πύλιοι τε καὶ Νηλεΐδαι. Caeneus, the invulnerable Lapith, was slain by the weight of the trees hurled on him by the Centaurs in the fight at the wedding of Pirithous. The Lapiths are a prae-Hellenic Thessalian race; but, according to Paus. ii. 4. 4, v. 18. 7, the Cypselids sprang from Melas, son of Antasus, a man of Gonoessa above Sicyon, whom Aletes, in spite of a warning from an oracle, suffered to come to Corinth. In any case, Eetion belonged to the prae-Dorian 'Aeolic' population of Corinth (Thuc. iv. 42), the *tyrannis*, as usual in Peloponnese, marking an anti-Dorian reaction on the part of the conquered race.

2 οὐδέ, 'he had no children by this or any other woman.' Cf. i. 215. 2; ii. 52. 1, and especially Arist. Av. 694 γῆ δ' οὐδ' ἀῖρ οὐδ' οὐρανὸς ἦν.

ἄλοοίτροχον: cf. viii. 52. 2. A play on the synonym Petra, as the line before is on Eetion.

δικαίωσει. Here = 'chastise', as shown by l. 14. Cf. i. 100. 2; iii. 29. 3.

3 αἰετὸς ἐν πέτρῃσι: Ἡετίων (Dor. Ἀετίων) ἐκ Πέτρης.

λέοντα. The lion is a symbol of royal power, vi. 131. 2, and perhaps v. 56. 1, vii. 225. 2.

Corinth is called the city of Pirene (Pind. Ol. xiii. 161), but the site of the spring is uncertain. The Pirene of Strabo (379) (cf. Paus. ii. 5. 1; Frazer, iii. 32) is on Acro-Corinthus, a quarter of an hour from the summit by the east wall of the fortifications. The Pirene of Pausanias (ii. 3. 2) is in Old-Corinth at the foot of Acro-Corinthus, on the road from Lechaëum to the market-place, south-east of the well-known temple of Apollo. The latter Romanized fountain of Pirene has been thoroughly excavated by Professor Richardson, of the American school at Athens, who showed it me in 1899. See J. H. S. xix, p. 324; xx. 175; Century Magazine, March, 1899.

ὄφρυόντα, 'on a brow,' probably of the towering Acro-Corinthus, though the town itself stood on a rocky plateau two hundred feet above the plain. Cf. Il. xxii. 411 Ἴλιος ὄφρυόεσσα, Strab. 382 χώραν δ' ἔσχεν οὐκ εὐγεῶν σφόδρα, ἀλλὰ σκολιάν τε καὶ τραχείαν, ἀφ' οὗ πάντες ὄφρυόντα Κόρινθον εἰρήκασι καὶ παροιμιάζονται· Κόρινθος ὄφρυά τε καὶ κολαίνεται.

γ This story of Labda and her baby illustrates the tender and kindly feeling for children in Greece (Mahaffy, S. L., p. 163 f.).

Nic. Damasc. (fr. 58), F. H. G. iii. 391 gives a rationalized version of this story, explaining the connexion with Olympia, but not the chest: τοὺς δὲ οἶκτος εἰσῆλθε καὶ ἔγνωσαν μηκέτι ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλὰ φράσαντες τῷ πατρὶ τὰς ἀληθείας ἐκποδὼν ἀπιέναι. δόξαν δὲ οἱ μὲν εἶπαν, ὁ δὲ Ἀετίων εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν αὐτὸ ὑπεκτίθεται καὶ ἔτρεφεν ὥς ἱκέτην τοῦ θεοῦ.

ε ι ἀπὸ τῆς κυψέλης. Cf. Paus. v. 17. 5 τῆς μὲν δὴ σωτηρίας ἔνεκα τοῦ Κυψέλου τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένος οἱ ὀνομαζόμενοι Κυψελίδαι τὴν λάρνακα ἐς Ὀλυμπίαν ἀνέθεσαν, τὰς δὲ λάρνακας οἱ τότε ἐκάλουν Κορίνθιοι κυψέλας· ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ὄνομα Κυψέλον τῷ παιδί θέσθαι λέγουσι. Pausanias saw in the Heraeum at Olympia a chest (λάρναξ) of cedar, whose carvings and decorations he describes in full, believing it to be the hiding-place of Cypselus. This seems impossible, as a κυψέλη, to judge from the coins of Cypsela in Thrace, is a cylindrical jar, and the chest seems, from the account of its carvings and inscriptions, not to be earlier than 600 B. C. Probably the legend here given arose out of the name Cypselus, but the magnificent coffer seen by Pausanias may well have been, like the golden image of Zeus (Paus. v. 2. 3), a gift of the Corinthian tyrants. On the reconstructions of this famous monument of archaic art cf. Stuart Jones, J. H. S. xiv. 30, 80, and the summary of his (and other) views in Frazer, Paus. iii. 600 f.

ἀμφιδέξιον. Since the oracle is in no sense ambiguous this is best taken as two-handed, that is, two-edged (cf. ἀμφίκης), in the sense that while promising success to Cypselus and his sons, the oracle also prophesies the deposition of his grandsons. Nevertheless, since δεξιός is used of favourable omens, Stein (following Erotian, voc. Hippoc. p. 43, Klein ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφήκους, ἀλλ'

ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐχρήστου τίθεται κατὰ ἀμφοτέρα τὰ μέρη) construes 'doubly favourable'.

- 2 Periander's sons died before him; his successor was Psammetichus, son of his brother Gorgus, who only reigned three years (Ar. Pol. v. 12. 1315 b 26; Nic. Dam. fr. 60, F. H. G. iii. 393). The precision of this prophecy shows it was made after the event.

This is the conventional picture of the tyrant (cf. iii. 80 f.). Aristotle (Pol. v. 10. 12) and Nic. Damasc. (fr. 58), F. H. G. iii. 391 make Cypselus the popular leader (δημαγωγός), gaining and keeping power by the arts of a demagogue, unlike his harsher successor. See Appendix XVI. 3.

- ζ 1 τριήκοντα ἔτα. Aristotle (Pol. v. 12. 1315 b 22 f.) assigns 73½ years to the dynasty, 30 to Cypselus, 44 (? 40½) to Periander, 3 to Psammetichus. Busolt (i. 638 f.) takes 657 as the date of Cypselus' accession, 586-5 for the death of Periander.

Θρασυβούλῳ: cf. i. 20 f. Since Periander was one of the seven Sages, and a greater adept in the arts of tyranny than Thrasybulus, Aristotle (Pol. iii. 13. 1284 a 26 f.; v. 10. 1311 a 20) reverses the parts of the two despots. The story illustrates the truth that the opposite of Tyranny is Oligarchy rather than Democracy. Roman annalists apply the Greek tale less appropriately to Tarquinius Superbus and his son Sextus during his stay at Gabii (Liv. i. 54).

- 2 ἀναποδίζων, 'making him go back' (cf. ii. 116. 2 n.; Aesch. in Ctes. 192), i. e. cross-examining him concerning.

- η 2 Divination for buried treasure is a familiar process burlesqued by Scott (Antiquary, ch. 21).

Μέλισσα: killed, probably accidentally, by her husband (iii. 50 f.). Her real name was Lyside, Melissa being a name given her by Periander (Diog. Laert. i. 94), or a title as priestess of some goddess (Pind. Pyth. iv. 60, Schol.; Frazer, Paus. iv. 223, v. 621; J. H. S. xv. 11). For the geography cf. viii. 47. 1; Thuc. i. 46; Strabo 324; Paus. i. 17. 5. 'The Acheron flows through a profound and gloomy gorge, one of the darkest and deepest of the glens of Greece' (Leake, N. G. i. 241). Hence it was a spot likely to be accounted a descent into hell, where the ghost might be summoned back as was Samuel by the witch of Endor (1 Sam. 28). Other oracles of the dead were at Phigalea (Paus. iii. 17. 9; cf. Frazer), Heraclea Pontica (Plut. Cim. 6), and Taenarum (Plut. Mor. 560 E). On the custom of burning or burying with the dead clothes, &c., cf. iv. 71 n.

- 3 τὸ Ἡραῖον. Clearly the shrine of Ἥρα Βουναία, on the slope of Acro-Corinthus at the west end of the city (Paus. ii. 4. 7), not the distant temple on the headland of Peiraeum (Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 5).

ὄρυγμα: as an offering to the dead (Hom. Od. xi. 25; x. 517) For the similar custom of pouring offerings into the grave through a hole cf. Paus. x. 4. 10, with Frazer; Ridgeway, Origin of Tragedy, 30 f.

κατίκαλε. This admirable instance of animism is rationalized by

Ephorus (Diog. Laert. i. 96), who makes Periander plunder the ladies of Corinth to get gold for the colossal statue of Zeus at Olympia (cf. ε 1 n.). So Blakesley and Rawlinson think the clothes were burnt to get the inwrought gold! A similar tale is told of Dionysius the younger (Justin, xxi. 3).

θεοὺς . . . Ἑλληνίους. Cf. ii. 178 n.

- 93 I ἡμέραι, &c., 'the appointed days.' No doubt the antagonism between Corinth and Athens, which began with Themistocles' creation of a great navy, became embittered by the adhesion of Megara to Athens (Thuc. i. 105) and the conquest of Aegina (circ. 458 B. C.), and culminated in the Peloponnesian war, might have been foreseen, but probably the prophecy is *post eventum*. At this time Corinth feared Aegina more, and supported Athens on several occasions by thwarting Spartan designs (here and ch. 75), by arbitrating in her favour as regards Plataea (vi. 108), and by the loan of ships for the Aeginetan war (vi. 89; Thuc. i. 41). Commercial interest dictated both the earlier friendship and the later hostility.

On the acquaintance of the Pisistratidae with oracles cf. Appendix XVI, § 7.

- 94-6 *Hippias returns to Sigeum. Digression on the war between Athens and Mitylene for Sigeum. Artaphrenes insists that Athens must receive Hippias back.*

- 94 I Ἀμύντης: cf. ch. 17. His connexion with the Pisistratidae (only here indicated) may have arisen from Pisistratus' possessions on the Strymon and the Thermaic gulf (Ath. Pol. 15).

Ἀνθεμοῦντα: in Mygdonia, whence Amyntas had driven the Edonians over the Strymon (cf. Thuc. ii. 99, 100).

Θεσσαλοὶ (cf. ch. 63) Ἰωλκόν: on the Pagasaeon gulf, suitable for a naval power.

νόθον: illegitimate, since his mother Timonassa [was an Argive and] could not contract a legal marriage with Pisistratus. A difficulty arises, because while Thucydides (vi. 55) recognizes three legitimate sons of Pisistratus—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus, as recorded on the stele in the Acropolis—Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 17) states that only Hippias and Hipparchus were sons of his lawful wife, while Iophon and Hegesistratus, whose other name was Thessalus, were born of an Argive. The best solution is due to Toepffer (Beitrag, p. 251 f.). He holds that Hegesistratus, illegitimate by birth, was afterwards legitimized under the name of Thessalus, which name accordingly he bears later in Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 18) and in the decree of ἀτιμία against the tyrants (Thuc. vi. 55). Iophon, on the other hand, was never legitimized, and was therefore unmentioned in the decree.

Ἥγησιστρατον. This name was given him for the part he took in leading the Argive allies in the battle of Pallene (i. 62; Ath.

Pol. 17); that of Thessalus is doubtless a compliment to the Thessalian allies of Athens (ch. 63).

- 2 *ἐκ τε Ἀχιλλεύου*. The tomb of Achilles, near the mouth of the Scamander (Strabo 600).

*οὔτε συγγινωσκόμενοι*, 'not acknowledging their claim *but*, showing,' though the district was studded with Lesbian colonies, Athens claimed it (Aesch. Eum. 397).

*λόγῳ*: by an argument (cf. i. 129. 3), taken no doubt from Homer, and similar to those used to prove that Salamis belonged to Athens (Plut. Sol. 10; Il. ii. 558) and to support her claims to precedence (vii. 161; ix. 27).

- 95 I *Ἀλκαῖος*. Beloch (Gr. G. i. 330) holds to his peculiar opinion (Rhein. Mus. xlv. 465 ff.) that this synchronism between Alcaeus and Pisistratus is historical, and that there was no earlier war between Athens and Mitylene. Toepffer, on the other hand, follows Valckenaer in contending that H. here is recapitulating episodically the earlier history of the quarrel, and is quite aware there were two wars (Toepffer, Beitrage, p. 63, 240 f.); but E. Meyer (ii. § 402) rightly follows Grote in arguing that H. has unconsciously confused (1) the struggles of the time of Alcaeus, (2) the award of Periander, (3) the renewed wars in the times of Pisistratus and his sons. H.'s chronology of the sixth century, frequently confused and inaccurate (Appendix XV, § 6; Abbott, Exc. xi), is in this case self-contradictory. Periander's award cannot be later than 585 B.C., as he died about that time, and Hegesistratus was born after Pisistratus had become tyrant at Athens, circ. 560–555 (Ath. Pol. 17). We must then suppose that there was an earlier war in which (circ. 600 B.C.) Alcaeus lost his shield, and Pittacus of Mitylene, by the arts of the retiarius, vanquished the Athenian Phrynon in single combat (Strabo 599, 600), a fact whose omission Plutarch (Moralia 858 B) ascribes to the malevolence of H. This war was ended by the well-attested mediation of Periander (Ar. Rhet. i. 15; Diog. Laert. i. 74) before 590 B.C., and left the Athenians in possession of Sigeum. A memorial of their dominion there is the Attic inscription on the stele of Phanodikos the Proconnesian found there (Roehl, I. G. A. 492; Hicks, No. 8), which must be as early as the first quarter of the sixth century (Roberts, No. 42; Greek Epigraphy, p. 334). At some later time Athens lost possession of Sigeum, but regained it during the last tyranny of Pisistratus (circ. 535 B.C.).

The attempt of the Athenians to get a foothold on the Hellespont before they were secure even of Salamis may be explained by the great value of the Pontic corn-trade to an impoverished Attica (Ath. Pol. 2), and a desire to deprive Megara of this source of wealth. For the expansion of Athenian power under Pisistratus cf. Appendix XVI, § 8; for arbitration, v. 28 n.

- 2 *ἐπιτιθεῖ*, 'sends.' Cf. iii. 42 *ad fin.* A corrupt fragment of the

Livia, Kadmos 3 (1964), 99, n. 24, would emend to  
ὡς οὐχ ἀπαχρηῖ εἶχε.



poem is given by Strabo (600). Archilochus (fr. 6), Anacreon (fr. 28), and Horace (Odes ii. 7. 9) record similar misfortunes.

7-102 *Aristagoras induces Athens and Eretria to send aid, and the Paeonians to return to Europe. The Greeks burn Sardis, and as they retreat are defeated at Ephesus.*

97 1 ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ: i. e. 499 B. C. (ch. 33. 1 n.). We naturally infer that the negotiations with Artaphrenes took place shortly before 500 B. C.

2 Μιλήσιοι . . . ἄποικοι. If this speech were historical, this would be the earliest recognition of Athens as the mother-city of Ionia (Macan), though the idea may have inspired the ambitions of Pisi-stratus (Appendix XVI, § 8). The claim was supported by exploiting tradition and genealogies in the interest of politics (cf. i. 142, 147; v. 62 nn.).

πολλοὺς . . . ἔνα. The malicious suggestion that it was easier to impose on the whole people of Athens than on a single Spartan may well come from a Spartan source; but cf. i. 60. 3. 'The remark is a glaring instance of the political *naïveté* of Herodotus' (Macan). Throughout he treats the Ionic revolt as a scheme of desperate adventurers fraught with evils to Hellas (§ 3, ch. 28, vi. 3). Yet on his own showing the conquest of Greece was already projected at the Persian court (iii. 134), and Athens in particular was plainly threatened (chs. 73, 96). The action of Athens did but forestall an inevitable attack, and facilitated later the formation of the Delian confederacy (ix. 106 n.; viii. 3). Her fault lay not in supporting the Ionians now, but in deserting them later (ch. 103).

τρεῖς μυριάδας. This was the conventional estimate of the number of citizens in the days of H.: and is repeated (viii. 65. 1) for the Eleusinian procession, and (Arist. Eccles. 1132, Plato, Sympos. 175 E) for the audience in the theatre. The first authentic census gives the number of 21,000 for 317 B. C., but there is little doubt that the numbers were greater in Periclean and even in Cleisthenean Athens. The number of those receiving state pay (Ath. Pol. 24), and of those to be billeted on the allies (Arist. Vesp. 708), is put at 20,000; and 14,240 received the dole of corn in 444 B. C. (Plut. Per. 37). Beloch (Bev. ch. 3) would put the number of citizens in 431 B. C. at 35,000, and in 500 B. C. at 30,000; while Meyer (F. ii. 179), who accepts the 29,000 hoplites (including metics) stated by Thucydides (ii. 13) to have been on the muster-rolls in 431 B. C., reaches much higher totals—55,500 for 431 B. C. and nearly 50,000 for 500 B. C. This last estimate must surely be exaggerated, but that of H. may be roughly correct. Of course, no such number ever attended the Assembly, five or six thousand (Thuc. viii. 72) being a full house.

3 ἀρχὴ κακῶν. For the formula cf. Il. v. 62, xi. 604; Thuc. ii. 12; also ch. 28 and vi. 67. 3. Plutarch's criticism (de Mal. Her. 24) of

this dictum is for once just as well as patriotic: ἀρχεκάκους πολμήσας προσειπεῖν ὅτι τοσαύτας πόλεις καὶ τηλικαύτας Ἑλληνίδας ἐλευθεροῦν ἐπεχείρησαν ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων.

98 I τοὺς Παίονας. Cf. chs. 15, 23. I.

4 Δορίσκον. A landing at Doriscus seems unlikely, since it was a strong place (vii. 106) held by a Persian garrison (vii. 59). Moreover, Doriscus on the Hebrus is far from the home of the Paeonians on the Strymon (cf. the march of Xerxes, vii. 108–13).

99 I The long struggle between Chalcis and Eretria for the Lelantine plain, which culminated in a war of pan-Hellenic importance (Thuc. i. 15), would seem to belong to the seventh century. The war between the two principals was fought out with sword and lance (Archil. fr. 4; Strabo 448) by their knightly cavalry (Ar. Pol. 1289 b 36), the Thessalians helping Chalcis to gain the victory (Plut. Mor. 760f.). But the war was far more than a border feud: it was a struggle between two rival commercial leagues. Eretria was supported by Miletus, and probably by Megara and Aegina, while Chalcis had the help of Samos and Corinth. In the far West, Sybaris was allied to Miletus (vi. 21 n.), and Croton to Samos. Probably the rival Euboean cities were the channels through which the Eastern Greeks could trade with the West. Cf. iii. 59.4 n.; Busolt, i. 456; Meyer, ii, § 342. Eretria lost all importance for the time, and Chalcis was hardly recompensed for her losses by supremacy not only in Euboea but in the Thracian and Western colonies.

H. lets us see the importance of the contingent from Eretria and of the tie between Eretria and Miletus. He also constantly affirms that the expedition of Datis was directed against Eretria as well as Athens (vi. 43, 94, 98f.). Myres (J. H. S. xxvi. 96) connects this activity of Eretria with its thalassocracy 505–490 B. C., and suggests that Eretria also had a hand in the great defeat of the Boeotian and Chalcidians (v. 77), which H. represents as a purely Athenian victory.

2 στρατηγούς . . . ἀπέδεξε. Aristagoras seems to act as if he were still tyrant (cf. chs. 38, 49, 98).

100 I Κορησῶ. Coresus was a hill south of the river Cayster. The Ephesians seem to have lived on its slopes till moved down into the plain near the Artemisium by Croesus (Strabo 640), and to have returned there in the days of Alexander or of Lysimachus. West of the hill was the principal port of Ephesus down to Attalid times: at least Thrasyllus landed there in 408 B. C. (Xen. Hell. i. 2. 7). For a plan of recent excavations cf. Pauly Wissowa v. 2780.

ἡγεμόνας. The regular road (ch. 54) led up the Cayster and over Mount Tmolus by the pass of Kara Bel: but clearly the Ionians marched by mountain paths to surprise the enemy, otherwise guides would be unnecessary.

οὐδενὸς ἀντιωθέντος. Plutarch (de Malig. 24, Mor. 861) states that the Persians were besieging Miletus, and that the object of the

attack on Sardis was to raise the siege. If the Persians were busy elsewhere, we can better understand Artaphernes being caught unprepared and retiring to the citadel. But the story is quite inconsistent with H.

ἀκροπόλιος. For the topography of Sardis cf. i. 80 n.

01 1 πόλιν. This is clearly identical with τὸ ἄστυ (§ 1 *ad fin.*), 'the lower city.' Hence the same meaning must be given to ἐν τῇ πόλει (§ 2 *ad init.*), though Stein and Macan there construe 'Acropolis'. There is no reason to believe that there were Lydians in the Acropolis, or that all the Persians were within its walls. Nor could a fire in the lower city compel the garrison of the Acropolis to come down to the Agora and defend themselves there.

3 σὺν πλῆθει . . . προσφερομένους. If H. means the reinforcements of ch. 102 he writes loosely. Probably he refers to the garrison of the Acropolis called (ch. 100 *ad fin.*) ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν οὐκ ὀλίγην.

02 1 Κυβέβης. The 'Great Mother' goddess of the Phrygians worshipped at Pessinus, the μήτηρ Δινδυμήνη of i. 80. 1. For the Anatolian 'Great Mother' cf. App. I. 2, Frazer, G. B. iv, Bk. II, Attis, &c.; Ramsay, in Hastings' Bible Dictionary, extra vol., p. 120f. The Atys myth which involved her cult is connected with Sardis by H.'s story of the son of Croesus (i. 34. 2 n.). The Great Mother was worshipped at Athens in the days of Sophocles (Phil. 391), and identified by the Greeks with Rhea, mother of the gods (cf. iv. 76; Strabo 469), with Aphrodite, with Demeter, and with Artemis as the lady of the wild woods. But here she is regarded as a foreign goddess.

τὸ σκηπτόμενοι. This motive is again put forward vii. 8, β 3, and on the occasion of the destruction of Eretria (vi. 101. 3). The Persians burned temples at Branchidae (vi. 19. 3), Naxos (vi. 96. 1), Abae (viii. 33), and Athens (viii. 53. 2). But they spared Delos (vi. 97) and probably Delphi (ix. 42. 3). Cf. also Troy (vii. 43) and Halos (vii. 197). The Persians needed no excuse for destroying Hellenic shrines (cf. Appendix VIII, § 4), and the accidental destruction of a Lydian temple was clearly not the reason.

νομοὺς ἔχοντες. This should naturally refer to the three satrapies (iii. 90), but the Persians who put down the revolt—Daurises, Hymaees, and Otanes—were generals, not satraps (chs. 116–17, 122; cf. ch. 25. 1 n., App. VI, § 7).

3 στεφανηφόρους. At the greatest Hellenic festivals the prize was a crown (viii. 26). H. is careful to record athletic distinctions. Cf. ch. 47; viii. 47, &c.

03-7 Spread of the revolt to Caria and Cyprus, with story of Darius and Histiaeus (105–7).

3 1 τὸ . . . ἀπολιπόντες τοὺς Ἴωνας. Grote's suggestion (iv. 217) that the withdrawal of the Athenians was due to 'some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies' is a mere conjecture. It is far

more probable that the withdrawal of Athens, like the abstention of Sparta from all part in the war (Appendix XVII, § 3), was caused by more pressing needs nearer home. Twenty ships could not be kept permanently across the Aegean while Aegina with a superior navy (vi. 89) controlled the Saronic gulf. It may be, too, that the patriotic party had lost power at Athens. In 496–495 Hipparchus, son of Charmus, the leader of the Pisistratids, was elected first archon (Dion. Hal. v. 77; vi. 1; cf. Ar. Ath. Pol. 22), and the Alcmaeonids seem to have been willing both earlier and later (ch. 73 n.; Appendix XVIII, § 6) to make terms with Persia. Miltiades had not yet returned from the Chersonese to lead the patriots, though there must have been many at Athens reluctant to leave Miletus to its fate (cf. vi. 21 n.).

- 2 **Βυζάντιον**: as a Megarian colony unconnected with Ionia, but ready to throw off the Persian yoke (cf. v. 26 n.).

**τὰς ἄλλας**: cf. v. 117; vi. 33.


**ἐκπλώσαντες . . . τὸν Ἑλλάσποντον**. In this curious construction **ἔξω** redundantly (cf. iii. 16. 1) repeats the **ἐκ** in **ἐκπλώσαντες** which governs the accusative. Cf. ch. 104. 2; vii. 29. 1, and especially vii. 58. 1 **ἔξω τὸν Ἑλλάσποντον πλέων**.

**Καῦνον**. The accusative is an oversight due to a change of construction; cf. iv. 156. 2. For **Caunus** cf. i. 172.

- 104 Cyprus had submitted to Persia (iii. 91) with Phoenicia, when Egypt, on which it had been dependent in the days of Amasis (ii. 182), was tottering to its fall. Esar-haddon (circ. 675 B.C.) enumerates ten vassal kings of Cyprus, among them the lords of Curium, Paphos, and probably Soli and Citium. Diodorus (xvi. 42) gives nine chief cities in the fourth century—Salamis, Citium, Marium, Amathus, Curium, Paphos, Soli, Lapithus, and Ceryneia. Of these Salamis, Soli, Curium, and Amathus are mentioned by H. Salamis, as in the days of Evagoras, seems to be the head of the Hellenic faction, **Amathus** (**Hamath**) of the native or Phoenician. Cyprus, after sharing in Aegean culture, developed a mixed Greek and Phoenician civilization of its own. Cf. Excavations in Cyprus (B. M.), at Paphos (J. H. S. ix. 147 f.), and at Salamis (J. H. S. xii. 59 f.); Myres, Catalogue of the Cyprus Museum.

- 1 H. gives us the following genealogy of the kings of Salamis:

1. Euelthon
2. Siromus
3. Chersis



But Euelthon is king in the days of Arcesilaus III of Cyrene (iv. 162); so it is hardly possible that his great-grandson should have reached man's estate in 498 B.C. It has therefore been

suggested that Siromus (= Hiram) is the king of Tyre (circ. 550–530 B. C.), vii. 98, erroneously thrust into the line of Greek princes.

- 5 I Ἴωνων οὐδένα λόγον. The regular attitude of the Persian kings towards Ionians; cf. Cyrus (i. 153) and Cambyses (ii. 1). Yet it cost Darius at least one fleet and army, and took five years to put down the revolt (Macan). On H.'s unfavourable view of the Ionians cf. i. 142 n.

εἰρέσθαι. Again a standing formula for a characteristically oriental ignorance of Greece on the part of the Persians; cf. i. 153; v. 73 n.

- 2 ἐκγενέσθαι: a good example of the infinitive expressing a wish. Goodwin, § 785; cf. Hom. Il. ii. 413; vii. 179; Arist. Ach. 816.

- 6 6 θεοὺς . . . βασιλῆους: cf. iii. 65. 6 n.

For the project of conquering or colonizing Sardinia cf. i. 170; v. 124; vi. 2; and for the mistake as to its size i. 170 n. For a similar rash promise to ignore the claims of cleanliness, the story of duchess Isabella and the siege of Ostend (1601–4) (Littré, Dict. Franç., s. v. Isabelle).

- 8–15 *Double battle of Salamis. Persian victory on land, and reconquest of Cyprus.*

Cyprus is the key of the Levant (Grundy, p. 105). Thence the Greeks could threaten the communications of Persia with the West, since 'the only really practicable military line of communication' touches the shore of the Levant at the corner commanded by Cyprus. They could also block the advance of the Phoenician fleet to the Aegean. Its strategic value both for attack and defence led Pausanias in 478 B. C. (Thuc. i. 94) and the Athenians, both in 459 B. C. (Thuc. i. 104) and in 449 B. C. (Thuc. i. 112), again to attempt its liberation.

- 8 2 ἄκρην. That is, the promontory (Cap St. André) at the end of the long tongue of land now 'the Carpass', called by Ptolemy (v. 13. 3) οὐρὰ βοός. Strabo (682) is more exact in limiting the name αἱ κλείδες to the rocky islands off the point, as the plural indicates (Hogarth, Devia Cypria, 81 f.).

- 9 I οἱ τύραννοι: more properly (110. 1 n.) βασιλῆες. The opposition of Greek to Phoenician explains their appearance as champions of Hellenic freedom, as it does the similar position of the tyrants of Syracuse and Acragas (vii. 165 f.).

- 2 ὅκως . . . ἔσται. The future indicative with ὅκως has the same force as the subjunctive in final clauses (Goodwin, § 324). The clause depends on ποιεῖν.

- 3 τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἴωνων. This Pan-Ionic council is a revival of that at work fifty years before (i. 141). Its direction of affairs is implied in the brief deliberation of ch. 108. 2; cf. vi. 7. P. Gardner (J. H. S. xxxi. 151–60) sees in a set of electrum staters and similar silver coins a series issued by the league of revolted cities. There is some



humour in the airs of superiority attributed to the Ionians. 'To avoid facing the Persian infantry (cf. vi. 112) on the plea of discipline (cf. vi. 12), and to remind the men of Cyprus of their servitude to the Mede (cf. iv. 142), are malicious touches in H.'s Ionian portraiture' (Macan). (See note, p. 415.)

- 110 τὸ πεδίον. This plain stretches right along Cyprus from east to west, separating the mountain masses of the south-west from the range along the north coast. There is but a low watershed between the larger eastern part in which Salamis stood and the north-western portion round the Bay of Soli.

οἱ βασιλῆες: cf. 113. 2; but *τύραννοι*, 109, 113. 1. There were nine hereditary princes (Diod. xvi. 42), one in each of the cities named in ch. 104 n.

- III 1 The Carians were adepts in war (i. 171 n.). For their courage cf. ch. 118 f.

2 For the ghastly wounds inflicted by a fighting horse cf. Marbot's story of the battle of Eylau (Memoirs E. T., p. 215).

3 H., who is imbued with the spirit of Romance, here voices the prevailing sentiment of mediaeval chivalry. Cf. Virg. Aen. xi. 688, and especially Aen. x. 829 'Hoc tamen infelix miseram solabere mortem: | Aeneae magni dextra cadis'.

- 112 1 πεζῇ καὶ νηυσί: as in the later battle of Salamis in 449 B. C. (Thuc. i. 112), and in that of the Eurymedon (Thuc. i. 100).

2 δρεπάνω: a weapon peculiar to Carians and Lycians; cf. vii. 92, 93.

- 113 1 Κουρίες. H. seems uncertain of the Argive colonization of Curium affirmed by Strabo (683). Steph. Byz. says Κούριον πόλις Κύπρου ἀπὸ Κουρέως τοῦ Κινύρου παιδός, implying Phoenician origin, since Cinyras in legend is Eastern. Probably Peloponnesians really settled in Cyprus in prehistoric times, since Mycenaean pottery is common there, and the Cypriote dialect resembles most closely the Arcadian, the earliest Peloponnesian tongue. Further, the existence of the Cypriote syllabary shows that the colonization took place before the adoption of the alphabet (Busolt, i. 318 f.).

πολεμιστήρια ἄρματα. Meyer (i, §§ 455, 577) derives both horse and war chariot from invading Aryans. Whatever be the origin of the horse (cf. Ridgway, Thorough-bred Horse), the war-chariot seems to have spread through Western Asia *circ.* 1600 B. C., perhaps from the Hittites, to Egypt, Crete, and Greece. It long held its own against cavalry, since it was better suited for archers (e. g. Hittites and Egyptians), and ages passed before men devised weapons and armour suitable for use on horseback (Ridgway, pp. 481-2). But the chariot is unknown in Greek warfare after Homer, since its use in processions at Eretria (Strabo 448) proves nothing. Its survival in Cyprus may be due to oriental influence: indeed, it is tempting to see in the treacherous charioteers an oriental element in the population. Scythed chariots seem to be a later Persian invention used at Cunaxa (Xen. An. i. 8. 10). (See note, p. 415.)

- 2 Σολίων. Soli was believed to be an Athenian Colony (Strabo 683; Plut. Solon 26). The visit of Solon to Soli, and the rebuilding of the city on the plain instead of on the height (αἰπεῖα), is recorded in one of his elegies addressed to Philocyprus (Plut. Solon 26): νῦν δὲ σὺ μὲν Σολίοισι πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἀνάσσω | τήνδε πόλιν ναίοις καὶ γένος ὑμέτερον. Solon's visit is traditionally dated circ. 590–580 B. C., and cannot have been later than 560 B. C. It is therefore remarkable that a son of his friend should still be on the throne and killed in battle in 497 B. C.
- 4 2 ὥς ἤρωι. For such honours to a dead enemy cf. ch. 47. 2 n.; and for a similar command from an oracle, the curious case of Cleomedes of Astypalaea (492 B. C.), cf. Paus. vi. 9. 6 f.
- 5 1 μέχρι ἔμευ. The phrase simply means 'to my time', and need not imply a visit to Cyprus (cf. Introd. § 16).
- 2 πολιορκεμένη. Idalium, too, appears to have stood a long siege, as we learn from the bilingual bronze tablet referring to the work of the surgeon Onasilus and his brother when the Medes and men of Citium besieged Idalium (G. D. I. i. 60).  
ὑπορύσσοντες. Mining seems to have been a favourite Persian operation (cf. iv. 200. 2, vi. 18), learnt perhaps from the Assyrians and Babylonians.
- 5-23 *Suppression of the revolt on the Hellespont (117) in the Troad and Aeolis (122-3). Hard fighting in Caria.*
- 116 ἐνιαυτόν. The one year of Cyprian liberty and the fall of Miletus in the sixth year of the revolt (vi. 18) are the two definite notes of time in H.; cf. v. 33 n.  
κατεδεδούλωντο. The tense must not be taken to mean that the reconquest of Cyprus preceded the events next described, since its revolt followed the battle related ch. 102, now again mentioned. Probably the defeat of the Ionians was not so complete as is here implied; certainly the burning of Sardis had destroyed Persian prestige and encouraged revolt. But the story of a naval victory in the Pamphylian sea, and of Eretrian exploits (taken by Plut. de Mal. H. 24 from Lysanias), can hardly be reconciled with H.'s narrative.  
῾Οτάνης. For satraps and generals in Asia Minor cf. ch. 25 n. and App. VI. 7. The practice of marrying the king's daughters to prominent nobles was intended to attach them to the throne and so strengthen the royal power.
- 117 The Hellespontine cities are enumerated in geographical order from south-west to north-east, i.e. the order in which a force advancing from Sardis would naturally attack them.
- 3-21 H. is here probably recording stories heard at his first home, Halicarnassus; cf. the prominence of Artemisia (viii. 68-9, 87-8, 101-3).
- 1 Λευκάς στήλας: unidentified as yet, is shown to be near the

Marsyas by the use of *τε καί* (ch. 101. 2 ; i. 2. 2). The Carian Marsyas, the modern China Chai, must be distinguished from the better-known Phrygian tributary of the Maeander (vii. 26. 3 n.).

*Ἰδριάδος χώρης*. Its capital, Idrias or Chrysaoris (Paus. v. 21. 10), later called Stratonicea, is now Eski Hissar. In the neighbourhood was a temple of Zeus Chrysaoreus, at which the Carian league met (Strabo 660), but this confederacy appears to belong to a later age (Hicks, J. H. S. xi. 117). To H., Mylasa (i. 171) and Labraunda (ch. 119) are the great Carian shrines.

- 2 Pixodarus, son of Mausolus, is presumably a Carian dynast, forefather of the man commemorated by the famous Mausoleum, who ruled at Mylasa, and later (B. C. 377–353) in Halicarnassus (Strabo 656). Another Pixodarus reigned B. C. 341–335 (Head, H. N. 630).

Cindyae is near Bargylia (Strabo 658), probably at Sirtmesh Kale, a Carian fortress (J. H. S. xvi. 196).

*Συνένεσις*: cf. i. 74. 3 n. ; vii. 98 ; ix. 107. 3 n.

- 3 *δηλαδὴ . . . ὥς οὐκ* shows that the sentence is not final, but records the opinion that they will be driven into the river and never return home. Logically, *ὥς* should precede the dependent clause *ἣν φύγη*, &c.

H., as usual, shows complete ignorance of tactics ; he really thinks that an army should fight where no retreat is possible. Cf. Ar. Eth. iii. 8. 5, with Schol.

- 119 1 The Carians apparently were defeated on the low ground near the junction of the Marsyas and Maeander. They retreated towards Mylasa, but rallied to defend the sanctuary of Labraunda, perhaps disputing the pass from the basin of the Marsyas to that of Mylasa near Alinda (J. H. S. xvi. 192).

- 2 There were apparently three temples of Zeus (Strabo 659) : *ἔχουσι δὲ οἱ Μυλασεῖς ἱερὰ δύο τοῦ Δίος, τοῦ τε Ὅσογῶ καλουμένου καὶ Λαβραννηνοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ δὲ Λάβραυνδα κώμη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ὄρει κατὰ τὴν ὑπέρθεσιν τὴν ἐξ Ἀλαβάνδων εἰς τὰ Μύλασα ἄπωθεν τῆς πόλεως· ἐνταῦθα νεὸς ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος καὶ ξόανον Διὸς Στρατίου· τιμᾶται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Μυλασέων, ὁδὸς τε ἔστρωται σχεδὸν τι καὶ ἐξήκοντα σταδίῳ μέχρι τῆς πόλεως ἱερὰ καλουμένη, δι' ἧς πομποστολεῖται τὰ ἱερὰ . . . ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἴδια τῆς πόλεως, τρίτον δὲ ἐστὶν ἱερὸν τοῦ Καρίου Διός, κοινὸν ἀπάντων Καρῶν οὐ μέτεστι καὶ Λυδοῖς καὶ Μυσοῖς ὥς ἀδελφοῖς. Zeus appears, then, to be worshipped under three forms : Zeus Karios (cf. i. 171), Zeus Stratios or Labraundeus, and Zeus Osogos (Farnell, Cults, i. 170), but the three forms seem sometimes to be confounded together. Zeus Labraundeus is clearly the Carian war-god, carrying the double-axe (*Λάβρυς*, Plut. Mor. 301 F), often depicted on coins of this region (Head, B. M. Cat. Lydia, p. cxxviii). The name Labraunda is clearly derived from *Λάβρυς* ; perhaps *Λαβύρινθος* too may be formed from the same root, as the double-axe is a frequent symbol for the deity in the palace of Knossos discovered by A. J. Evans. Cf. Burrows,*

Discoveries in Crete, 110 f. The double-axe seems also to be one of the attributes of the Hittite god Tesub (cf. E. Meyer, i. 479, 481).

- 121 τὸ τρῶμα ἀνέλαβον, 'retrieved the disaster'; cf. vii. 231, viii. 109. 2; Diod. xvi. 19. In view of these passages it is unlikely that τὸ τρῶμα is governed by μετά, and ἀνέλαβον, intrans., 'recovered'.

Πηδάσω (cf. Πηδασεῖς, vi. 20 *ad fin.*) is placed by Kiepert at Karaja Hissar. Cf. Liv. xxxiii. 30, and especially Strabo (611) Πήδασον δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ νῦν Στρατονεϊκῶν πολίχνιον ἐστὶ. But Strabo distinguishes from this little place, Pedasa, once a great city, the centre of a district Pedasis (cf. Plin. N. H. v. 107), above Halicarnassus, placed by Myres (J. H. S. xvi. 192-4) at Giuk Chalar. Cf. i. 175; viii. 104.

Μύρσος ὁ Γύγεω: cf. iii. 122. 1. Presumably a Mermnad (cf. i. 7 n. and vii. 27. 1 n.).

Ἡρακλείδης. The recently discovered fragment of Sosylus, a Spartan who taught Hannibal Greek (Polyb. iii. 20. 5; Nepos, Han. 13), alleges that Heraclides won a victory at Artemisium, defeating the Phoenician διεκπλοῦς by having a second line in reserve ready to attack them as soon as they had penetrated the first line. Whether this refers to the well-known battle (Wilcken, Hermes, xli. 103 f., xlii. 512), or to some unknown combat during the Ionic revolt (Rühl, Rhein. Mus. lxi. 352 f.), cannot be determined (Tarn, J. H. S. xxviii. 216). Munro (C. A. H. iv. 289) holds that Heraclides helped the Massaliots to defeat the Carthaginians off the Iberian Artemisium (Dianium).

Ἰβανῶλλος: cf. ch. 37. 1.

- 1 Κίος: a Milesian colony (like most towns on this coast), was in later times reckoned Bithynian (Strabo 564; Ptolemy, v. 1).
- 2 Γέργιθας: vii. 43. 2 n.
- 123 ἐτάχθησαν. The phrase probably implies that the plan of operations was devised at Susa, not by the satrap Artaphrenes. Apparently the campaign against Ionia is roughly synchronous with those by which the Hellespont and Caria were recovered.
- 4-6 *Flight and death of Aristagoras.* H., who consistently depreciates the Ionic revolt (ch. 28, 97 n.; vi. 3 n.), naturally regards its authors as untrustworthy adventurers. Aristagoras is moved to action by his own financial difficulties, and fear of losing his tyranny (ch. 35). He has a glib tongue to deceive the multitude (v. 97) and a bribe for the Spartan king (v. 51), but he takes no active part in warfare, e.g. in the march on Sardis (v. 99) or the expedition to Cyprus (v. 108 f.). Here he is represented as a coward deserting those he has led into danger. But it would seem probable that discontent had been rife in Western Asia Minor since 512 B. C. (iv. 137), and that there was a widespread movement against the local tyrants imposed by Persia (v. 37), the message of Histiaeus (v. 35) being merely the signal and the expedition to Naxos the opportunity for a premeditated rising (cf. ch. 36 n.; Grundy, p. 84 f.). Aristagoras may have been merely the mouthpiece of the general discontent or

the agent of Histiaeus, but the wide extent and initial success of the revolt shows that it was something more than a plot of selfish intriguers.

125 Λέρον: a small island some thirty miles south-west of Miletus, colonized thence (Strabo 635). The suggestion of Hecataeus seems absurd, though there was perhaps more hope of defeating the Phoenician fleet than the Persian army which threatened Miletus.

126 2 The date which suits H.'s narrative best, 497 B. C. (cf. what is said of Histiaeus, v. 108. 1, vi. 1. 1), is rendered certain by chronological data supplied by Thucydides (iv. 102), who reckons sixty years between the Athenian foundation of Amphipolis in 437-436 B. C. (Diod. xii. 32) and the attempt of Aristagoras (cf. Busolt, iii. 199 f.). πόλιν: almost certainly 'Εννέα Ὀδοί (vii. 114), the later Amphipolis (Thuc. iv. 102). The vagueness of H.'s topography, both here and in ix. 75 n., makes it probable that he wrote these passages before 437 B. C.

## BOOK VI

### 1-5 *The intrigues of Histiaeus in Ionia.*

It is worth noticing that H., who elsewhere insists on the part played by Aristagoras (v. 28, 30f., 98), here seems to regard the intrigues of Histiaeus as not merely the occasion (v. 35, 124 n.) but the cause of the revolt. Histiaeus was a man of wide ambitions (v. 23 n., 106), but his aims are obscure. Anxious to escape from his gilded captivity (v. 35), he has no policy but opportunist self-seeking. His earlier loyalty to Darius was interested (iv. 137 f.), and apparently he would even now have been willing to re-establish himself in Miletus (v. 106) as the great king's viceroy of Ionia. Hampered by the opposition of Artaphrenes and by his exclusion from Miletus, he escaped captivity or death in Chios by claiming to be the author of the national revolt. Eventually distrusted by both sides, he became a mere free-lance and perished miserably. For a more favourable view of him, resting largely on conjecture, cf. Klio ix. 341-51.

3 κακὸν τοσούτον. No Ionian would at the time have thus described their great struggle for freedom, undertaken of their own free will, but H., after the event, endorsed the shallow view that the revolt was a blunder, if not a crime (v. 28, 97 n., 124).

αὐτοῖσι grammatically goes with ἐξέφανε, but, as is shown by its position, also qualifies τὴν . . . αἰτίην, 'what was the true cause that brought the revolt on them.'

This tale of intended transportation was a happy invention in view of the Persians' dealings with Barca (iv. 204), the Paeonians (v. 12 n., 14), and subsequently with the Eretrians (vi. 119) and the Milesians themselves (vi. 20), and of the hatred felt for the Ionians



by the Phoenician traders, whom they had supplanted in the Levant and threatened in the West (i. 163; iv. 152). For Greek proposals to transplant the Ionians cf. i. 170; ix. 10f.

- 4 These Persian traitors in Sardis are a puzzle. Could they be Lydians who still nourished national aspirations?

5 1 κατήγον: *reducebant* (i. 60. 5); imperfect, because they failed; cf. § 2 ἐπειθε and ἔπεισε.

Chios and Miletus were old friends (i. 18. 3), hence the former will not use force but only persuasion in favour of Histiaeus.

- 3 That merchant vessels from Ionia are meant is shown by ch. 26. 1. Miletus would suffer most from this blockade, as she traded largely with her colonies and factories on the Euxine. Histiaeus in grasping at power in the North-East Aegean showed at least a keen eye for a trade route.

6-17 *The battle of Lade. The gathering of the fleets, and the secret intrigues of the exiled tyrants (6-10). The attempt of Dionysius of Phocaea to train the Greeks (11, 12). The battle lost through the treachery of the Samians and others (13-17).*

- 6 The four great naval powers of the Persian empire are combined against the Ionians. Phoenicia, Egypt, Cilicia, and Cyprus furnish Xerxes with 750 ships (vii. 89 f.).

- 7 προβούλους σφέων αὐτῶν. The genitive is objective; cf. vii. 172. 1 πρόβουλοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος. These deputies must not be confused with the standing committees appointed in some oligarchic states to examine measures before they were submitted to the people. Ar. Pol. 1299 b 31-8, &c., Thuc. viii. 1.

Πανώνιον: cf. i. 148 n.; v. 109. 3 n.

The resolution shows that the Ionians realized the importance of their sea-power (i. 27; v. 109 n.) as their past history had taught them (i. 17).

Lade protected the entrance to the harbour, and played an important part in the siege by Alexander (Arrian, Anab. i. 18 f.). Still an island in the days of Strabo (635), it has now been converted by the alluvial deposit into a hill in the plain of the Maeander.

- 8 For similar detailed catalogues compare those of Xerxes' army (vii. 61 f.) and fleet (vii. 89 f.), of the Greek fleets at Artemisium (viii. 1 f.) and at Salamis (viii. 43 f.), and of the Greek army at Plataea (ix. 28), as well as the catalogue of ships and men in the Iliad (Bk. II). The cities on the Hellespont had been reduced by Daurises (v. 117), the Aeolic cities in the Troad by Hymaeus (v. 122); those in Aeolis proper probably shared the fate of Cyme (v. 123). Only the island power of Lesbos is left to represent the Aeolians. The Dorian cities are here and elsewhere in the Ionic revolt conspicuous by their absence. Of the twelve Ionic cities, Clazomenae was in Persian hands (v. 123), while Lebedus and

What was Byzantium's status now? — A

Colophon, which lie on the route from Clazomenae to Miletus, may also have fallen. The men of Ephesus took little part in the revolt, for though they furnished guides for the march to Sardis (v. 100), they massacred the fugitive Chians (vi. 16). The small number of Phocaeen ships (three) shows how much that city was reduced by the great emigration (i. 165-7); Samos, on the other hand, has quite recovered after its devastation twenty years before (iii. 149). The order is roughly geographical, but the Samians are posted on the wing as being the best sailors. The numbers of the contingents agree with the total and may well be authentic; for the 'six hundred' Persian ships cf. Appendix XIX, § 2.

- 9 4 τὰ περ, 'which shall assuredly (*revera*, cf. iii. 68. 2) come upon them.' The remark is not part of the message, but a parenthetical assurance that the threats are serious (cf. ch. 32).

Βάκτρα: the city Balkh (ix. 113. 1), mentioned as the furthest limit of the Persian Empire (cf. iv. 204).

- 10 ἀγνωμοσύνη (cf. v. 83. 1). To stigmatize as obstinacy a refusal to listen to proposals of treachery shows a bias against the Ionians and for the Samians, which makes it likely that the story comes from a Samian source (cf. 13).

- 11 1 ἡγορόωντο. The word in this epic form may be ironically reminiscent of such passages as II. iv. 1, viii. 230. Elaborate oratory, an Ionic failing (iii. 46), was certainly unseasonable, yet the campaign of Salamis too was conducted by discussion (viii. 49, 56 f.).

- 2 Ἐπὶ ξυροῦ, 'balanced on a razor's edge.' Cf. II. x. 173.

- 12 1 ἐπὶ κέρας, 'in column.' Att. ἐπὶ κέρως (Thuc. ii. 90, &c.). For the accus. cf. vi. 111. 3; ix. 31. 2 ἐπὶ τάξιν.

ὅπως: not final 'in order that' (Krüger), but temporal 'as often as' (Stein, Macan). In sense co-ordinate with ἐχέσκε παρείχε τε. Cf. i. 17. 2.

διέκπλοον. This manœuvre (cf. ch. 15. 2) is again mentioned at Artemisium (viii. 9), but was first used with effect by the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. ii. 83, 89, &c.), its absence in the battle of Sybota proving the inferior skill of the Corinthian and Corcyrean navies (Thuc. i. 49). It consisted in breaking through the enemy's line, and then turning rapidly to ram one of his ships on its defenceless side or stern. It demanded great skill in the coxswain and efficiency in the oarsmen. It was met by forming in a circle with prows outward (cf. viii. 11), a device which proved useless against Athenian daring and skill (Thuc. ii. 83), or by drawing up the ships on the wings in a double line (Xen. Hell. i. 6. 29-31), or by having a second line in reserve (v. 121 n.). If H. is not guilty of an anachronism, the Athenians only perfected a manœuvre practised by the Ionians. Sosylus even makes it a Phoenician device brilliantly met by Heraclides (v. 121 n.).

- 3 The grievance was that Dionysius kept the sailors on board practising manœuvres, and the marines under arms all day, in-

stead of letting them enjoy themselves ashore like an army in tents.

ἐκπλώσαντες. For the metaphor, here strikingly appropriate, cf. iii. 155. 3.

- 1 I Anxious to insist on the cogency of the motives which led the Samians to betray the Ionian cause, H. thrusts the bare fact of their treachery between two attempts to excuse it, οἱ Σάμιοι resuming the οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Σαμίων. His primary motive for insisting on the insubordination and effeminacy of the Ionians is to whitewash the Samians. But we can hardly doubt that he was also influenced by the facts and feelings of his own day. The contrast between Lade and Salamis (implicit in H. and explicitly drawn out by Grote, iv. 229) was surely made by men of the Periclean age, when Athenians justified their suzerainty over their Ionic kinsmen by boasting of superior courage and discipline (Thuc. i. 75, 99). Yet the Ionians had long been adventurous sailors, had already once beaten the king's fleet (v. 112), and owed their defeat at Lade to treachery.

πενταπλήσιον: a gross exaggeration. The full force of Xerxes is 1207 ships (vii. 89), or without the Greek and Carian contingents 830.

- 2 For Syloson cf. iii. 139 f., for Aeaces iv. 138.
- 4 I ἐπὶ κέρας implies an intention to use the διέκπλους. Cf. 12. 1, 15. 2. οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως συγγράψαι. The similar confession about Salamis (viii. 87. 1) and the reason here given, mutual recriminations, show how conflicting and untrustworthy were the traditions of the different states. On the other hand, they give us a little more confidence when H. by his silence implies that he is satisfied with the evidence at his command.

- 3 τὸ κοινόν. No doubt the eleven patriotic trierarchs were members of the Samian aristocracy (τοῖς τε ἔχουσι, ch. 22. 1), opposed to the philo-Persian partisans of the tyrant. Hence after Mycale and the liberation of Samos their conduct is commemorated by the Samian government, which remained aristocratic at least till 440 B.C. (Thuc. i. 115). H. must have seen the stele in Samos (Introduction, § 21, n. 1).

πατρόθεν, 'with the addition of their fathers names.' For this honour cf. iii. 1. 4, viii. 90. 4; ll. x. 68; Thuc. vii. 69.

- 15 τεσσεράκοντα. The number on the Persian ships at Salamis was thirty beside the native troops; on the Athenian there are said to have been only eighteen (Plut. Them. 14); in the Peloponnesian war the number was reduced to ten (vii. 184. 2 n.). The large number of marines here would only be useful for boarding in the old-fashioned style (Thuc. i. 49); their presence makes it all the more likely that the ascription of the διέκπλους to the Ionians (§ 2; cf. 12. 1) is an anachronism.

- I Μυκάλην. The Chians, having broken the Persian line, could

force their way through the channel past Trogillum, but the crippled ships had to be beached on Mycale and abandoned.

- 2 For the Thesmophoria cf. ii. 171 n., and for similar worships v. 61, 82, 83 n.

οἱ Ἐφέσιοι. This extraordinary ignorance of the fight at Lade may be an excuse put forward when Ephesian abstinence from all share in the struggle except this slaughter of the vanquished was accounted treason by patriotic Greeks.

For a real outrage of the kind cf. ch. 138.

- 17 γαύλους: cf. iii. 136. 1 n.

Σικελίην: where H. probably heard the story; cf. ch. 22; v. 46 n. ληιστής. The buccaneer was still respectable (Thuc. i. 5). To prey on the enemies of his country would no more seem wrong to Dionysius than to our own Elizabethan seamen (cf. i. 163. 2 n.). By making first for Phoenicia he at once baffled pursuit, and surprised the enemy's convoys.

- 18-21 *The fall of Miletus, with notes on her friendship with Sybaris and Athens.*

- 18 ὑπορίσσοντες: cf. v. 115. 2 n.

κατ' ἄκρης, 'from top to bottom'; ch. 82. 2. First in Homer, Il. xiii. 772; xv. 557 κατ' ἄκρης | ἴλιον αἰπυρὴν ἐλέειν. In later writers it seems to imply citadel and all. Cf. Thuc. iv. 112.

ἕκτωρ ἔτει: i. e. from the seizure of the other tyrants by Aristagoras (v. 37). On the chronology cf. v. 33 n.

συμπεσεῖν: usually 'coincide' in time, here (cf. ii. 49. 2; vii. 151) 'agree with, fulfil.'

- 19 The synchronism between the Ionic revolt and the Argive war is valuable (ch. 77 n.).

- 1 περὶ σωτηρίας. Bury (Klio ii. 14 f.) shows that the only occasion on which this epicene oracle is probable is during the visit of Aristagoras to Greece. The Argives, threatened by a Spartan attack (ch. 77), consulted the oracle περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλιος τῆς σφετέρης, yet the answer given concerns Miletus as much as Argos, though Miletus had not sent to inquire of Delphi. The answer of the oracle is only explicable on the assumption that the Milesians had asked Argos for help, and Argos had agreed to consult Delphi. We may be sure that Aristagoras sought aid at other places besides Sparta and Athens. Eretria sent five ships (v. 99), doubtless at his request. What more natural than that, rebuffed at Sparta, he should turn to Sparta's rival? But Argos may well have regarded the risk as too great, and not have gone beyond a promise to inquire of the oracle whether it would be safe for their city to send help to Ionia. Cf., however, the doubts as to the oracle raised by Wells, J.H.S. xxv. 194-5.

Delphi now, as later (vii. 140 f.), may have thought the Great King invincible, as did Aristagoras (v. 124) and the Samians (vi. 13), and have foreshadowed, if it did not originate, the

historian's opinion that the authors of the revolt merely brought evil on their country (v. 28, 97 n.). Probably, too, the proposed confiscation of the treasures at Branchidae (v. 36), which the priests at Branchidae and Delphi must have known was only too likely to be carried out under the hard pressure of war, prejudiced Delphi against Miletus.

3 Περσίων . . . κομητέων, 'as may be seen in the sculptures of Persepolis,' &c.; hence βαθυχαιτήεις Μῆδος, Aesch. ap. Athen. 627 a.

ἱρόν: the whole precinct with all its contents (iv. 108. 2). The actual temple (νῆος) and the oracle seem to have occupied different parts of it (Strabo 634).

Διδύμοισι. The word is borrowed from the oracle. Elsewhere (i. 46. 2, 157 f.) H. calls it Branchidae. H. clearly ascribes the ruin of this and other Greek temples in Asia (25, 32) to Darius. Hence, unless we suppose the work was done twice over, Strabo (634) can hardly be right in attributing the sack of Branchidae and the others, except that of Ephesus, to Xerxes in 479 B. C. Strabo's account seems to depend on the story that the Branchidae themselves betrayed the temple and its treasures, a crime for which their descendants in Sogdiana were said to have been punished by Alexander (Strabo 518; Plut. Mor. 557 B; Q. Curtius, vii. 23). The story may come from Callisthenes (Strabo 814), but is discredited by the silence of Arrian, though accepted by Grote, xii. 25.

πολλάκις: explicitly twice, i. 92. 2; v. 36. 3; but cf. also i. 46. 2, 157 f.; ii. 159. 3.

20 For such transplantations cf. iv. 204 n.; vi. 3 n. The expatriation of the Milesians can hardly have been complete, since Milesians destroy the fugitive Persians after Mycale (ix. 99, 104). Yet Miletus, though again prosperous under Athens, never recovered her old position.

Ἐρυθρῇ: cf. i. 1 n.; iii. 93. 2; iv. 37.

Καρσί Πηδασεύσι. For the two places cf. v. 121 n. We cannot tell which is here meant, nor is it obvious why Carians, who had also revolted, should be rewarded at the expense of Miletus. Perhaps it was the Persian policy to set the native races against the Greek and so to hold both in subjection.

I I Λάόν τε καὶ Σκιδρόν. Originally dependent colonies of Sybaris, which, after the destruction of that city in 510 B. C. (cf. v. 44), probably received the exiles. Both lay on the west coast of Italy, probably not far apart. Laus was on the river still called Lao, the boundary of Lucania (Strabo 253), four hundred stades from Velia.

ἐξινώθησαν. Cf. Athen. xii. 519 b ἐφόρουν δ' οἱ Συβαρίται καὶ ἱμάτια Μιλησίων ἐρίων πεποιημένα· ἀφ' ὧν δὴ καὶ αἱ φιλίας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγένοντο, ὡς ὁ Τιμαῖος ἱστορεῖ. ἡγάπων γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἐξ Ἰταλίας Τυρρηνοῦς, τῶν δ' ἔξωθεν τοὺς Ἴωνας. These friendships of Sybaris with Miletus and Etruria were doubtless commercial. Sybaris was the dépôt to



which the wares of Asia and Egypt were brought by Milesian ships (cf. v. 99 n.). Thence they were carried overland to Laus, and there reshipped for Etruria. The control of this land-route was all the more important, as foes of Miletus, Chalcis, and her allies (v. 99 n.) commanded the Straits of Messina. The friendship of the Etruscans with Sybaris is in marked contrast with their hostility to other Greeks in the Tyrrhene seas (cf. i. 166). Further proof of the importance of this overland route may be found in the alliance coins (Pais, *Ancient Italy*, p. 83) of Siris and Pyxus (before 510 B.C.), and later of New Sybaris and Posidonia (circ. 450), Croton and Temesa, &c. (Hill, G. and R. C., pp. 104, 115), and in the frequent occurrence of Greek vases in Campanian and Etruscan tombs (Lenormant, *La Grande Grèce*, i. 263 f.). The colony of Thurii may have been an attempt to revive this old trade, Athens here, as elsewhere, figuring as the heir of Miletus (v. 97. 2 n.). Themistocles would seem to have originated the idea of a colony in that district (viii. 62; Plut. Them. 32), afterwards imperfectly realized by Pericles.

- 2 οὐδὲν ὁμοίως. For asyndeton in such appended notes, which may be later additions by the author, cf. i. 20; vii. 54. 3, 111. 2, &c. 'In this they (the Sybarites) were quite unlike the Athenians.'

Phrynichus was an elder contemporary of Aeschylus. Of his drama on the fall of Miletus no fragment has survived. It was probably the first attempt to treat in tragedy an event of the day, an attempt repeated by Phrynichus in his *Phoenissae* (476 B.C.), which, like the *Persae* of Aeschylus, represented the defeat of Xerxes. His earlier drama may have contained reproaches of Athens for the desertion of Miletus (οἰκία κακά), and have been intended to awaken the national spirit and inspire resistance to Persia, perhaps by sea, since Themistocles, choragus for Phrynichus in 476 B.C. (Plut. Them. 5), is said to have begun the building of Piraeus as archon in 493 B.C. (vii. 143 n.). For his manifesto the author was punished, probably by those responsible for the withdrawal from Ionia (v. 103 n.; cf. Meyer, iii, § 182-3). Cf. the prosecution of Miltiades (ch. 104) on his return from the Chersonese.

διδάξαντι: the term for the teaching of actors and chorus by the author (i. 23) = 'putting on the stage'.

- 22-5 *The exiled Samians in the West. Treacherous seizure of Zancle. Submission of Samos and Caria.*

- 22 2 Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν. A Sicel city, important under the native prince Ducetius, circ. 445 B.C. (Freeman, S. ii. 109 f.). This is another abortive attempt to spread Hellenism in the West. On the north coast of Sicily, which is almost harbourless, because the hills run right down to the sea, there was no Greek colony between Tyndaris and Himera. Hence the importance of Καλὴ Ἀκτὴ which faced πρὸς Τυρρηνίην. Cf. the communistic Cnidian settlement on the

Lipari islands (Thuc. iii. 88; Diod. v. 9; Paus. x. 11. 4, with Frazer). Originally perhaps a military brotherhood like the knights of St. John at Rhodes, it became a nest of pirates (Liv. v. 28). The Samians as friends of Chalcis (v. 99 n.) were on good terms with her colonists in the West. Zancle was a joint colony from Euboic Chalcis and Campanian Cumae (Thuc. vi. 4), but seems at this time to have been a dependency of Dorian Gela.

Μιλησίων οἱ ἐκπεφυγότες: i. e. from Lade (ch. 8). Thuc. vi. 4 says more vaguely (Ζαγκλαῖοι) ὑπὸ Σαμίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἴωνων ἐκπίπτουσιν, οἱ Μήδους φεύγοντες προσέβαλον τῇ Σικελίᾳ.

3 I Ἐπιζεφυρίοισι. The epithet distinguishes the Italiot colony from the Locrians of the mother-country, the Opuntii (vii. 203) and the Ozolae (viii. 32), both of whom claimed to be its founders.

2 Ἀναξίλῃος: tyrant B. C. 494-476 (Diod. xi. 48). For his friendship with the barbarian cf. vii. 164, 165.

Rhegium, like its neighbour across the strait, Zancle, was a Chalcidic colony. The close connexion of the two, and of the Samians with Anaxilaus, is attested by the adoption of similar types on the coins, the calf's head being a Samian type, and the lion's head perhaps taken from the lion's scalp of Samos (Hill, H. G. C. 29 f., and in more detail Dodd, J. H. S. xxviii. 56-76). Anaxilaus was probably bent on establishing his own supremacy over Zancle, an object he in the end attained (vii. 164 n.).

3 Hippocrates ruled 498-491 B. C.; cf. vii. 154, 155. He and Anaxilaus are tyrants, while Scythes (§§ 1 and 4) is βασιλεὺς and μούναρχος, probably because H. drew from a source favourable to Scythes. Apparently Hippocrates is not an equal ally but his overlord (vii. 154; Freeman, S. ii. 113).

4 Ἴνυκα: an unimportant place, probably in the territory of Acragas (vii. 170), famed for its wine.

4 I Himera was a settlement of Zancleaeans (Thuc. vi. 5. 1).

δικαιοτάτον. This righteousness is in marked contrast with the conduct of Democedes (iii. 135). It was hereditary in the family, if Cadmus, who resigned the tyranny of Cos (vii. 164), is the son of the same Scythes, as is held by Stein, Macan, and Busolt, though denied by Holm, Freeman, and E. Meyer. Cadmus' resignation of that tyranny and recapture of Zancle from the Samians are more natural if his father was the exiled lord of Zancle. For a reconstruction of the story cf. vii. 164 n. The full account in Pausanias (iv. 25) is misdated after the second Messenian war, and so confused as to be worthless.

2 ἀπονητί. H., a true Greek, is more impressed by the cleverness of the Samians than by their baseness. But he emphasizes the one good point in their conduct, their mercy to the captive aristocrats (ch. 23).

25 Caria had been temporarily saved from subjugation by the victory of Heraclides (v. 121).

- 26-30 *The last adventures and death of Histiaeus.*
- 26 I τὰς Ἰώνων ὀλκάδας. Cf. ch. 5. 3 n.
- 2 Πολίχνη : a common name found near Syracuse (Thuc. vii. 4; Diod. xiii. 7, xiv. 72), in the Troad (Strabo 603), in Crete (vii. 170. 1; Thuc. ii. 85), &c. Here probably a town in Chios, or on the mainland opposite (cf. Thuc. viii. 14, 23).
- 27 I προσημαίνειν : not really impersonal, ὁ θεός must be supplied (cf. § 3 and i. 45. 2 *ad fin.*). The theology is that of the age, but it is curious that H. does not here mention the iniquity of Chios (i. 160) (Macan).
- 2 Reading and writing were taught in public schools for boys. For another disaster to such a school cf. Thuc. vii. 29.
- 3 ὁ θεός : perhaps Apollo, but cf. i. 31. 3 n.
- ἐς γόνυ, 'cast down,' a metaphor from wrestling; Aesch. Pers. 930 Ἀσία δὲ χθὼν αἰνῶς ἐπὶ γόνυ κέκλιται.
- 28 I Θάσον. The attraction was doubtless the gold mines (ii. 44; vi. 46). For Atarneus cf. i. 160 n.; for the Caician plain ii. 10 n., and for its fruitfulness Strabo 624 σφόδρα εὐδαίμονα γῆν σχεδὸν δέ τι τὴν ἀρίστην τῆς Μυσίας.
- 2 Ἄρπαγος. Can this otherwise unknown Persian general be a descendant of Harpagus, the Mede conqueror of this region half a century earlier? (i. 162 f.). If so, he should not be called ἀνὴρ Πέρσης.
- 29 I φιλοψυχήν . . . ἀναιρέεται, 'entertains a craven love of life.' So Cic. Tusc. iii. 14 'recipiat . . . timiditatem'.
- 30 I ἀνεσταύρωσαν. Impaling was a Persian custom (iii. 159; vii. 238; Behistun Inscr.). The explanation of the satrap's and general's action is doubtless correct. The Persian grandees (cf. v. 23, vi. 1) feared and distrusted the Greek tyrant, who may have been ready to serve Darius, but not his lieutenants.
- 2 For benefactors cf. viii. 85 n., and for the justice and mercy shown them, i. 137; vii. 194.
- 31-2 493 B. C. *Final reduction of Ionia, and of Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos.*
- 31 I τῷ δευτέρῳ ἔτει, 'next year,' i. e. 493 B. C.
- 2 The passage is used in the Pseudo-Platonic Menexenus 240 C (cf. Laws 698 D) in describing the fall of Eretria. In fact, this 'netting' of the population would be as impossible in the mountains and clefts of the smaller islands as in Euboea. Indeed, the flourishing condition of these regions soon after shows that these severities have been exaggerated. M. Polo, i. ch. 18 (Yule, ii. 98), speaks of the Caraonas (apparently a Tartar tribe in Persia) riding abreast so as to catch every living thing outside the fortified towns and villages. A similar method was tried in Tasmania in 1850, but without much success. Cf. N. Ling Roth, Aborigines of Tasmania, p. 2, for this modern instance.

- 32 Cf. i. 169. The thrice-repeated conquest is true of the Ionians on the mainland, but the islanders had not been conquered by Croesus (i. 27), nor yet probably by Cyrus, who had no fleet (i. 143), though the Ionian islands submitted (i. 169). Samos probably surrendered when Cambyses got control of the Phoenician navy (iii. 44), Lesbos and Chios before the Scythian expedition of Darius (iv. 97. 138) (Macan).
- 33-41 *Reduction of the Hellespont and Chersonese. Story of the establishment of the elder Miltiades in the Chersonese and of his successors. Flight of the younger Miltiades to Athens.*
- 3 1 αὐτοῖσι . . . κατ' ἡπειρον: to the Persian army attacking by land (v. 117. 122), as opposed to the Phoenician fleet.  
 τεῖχεα τὰ ἐπὶ Θρηίκης, 'strongholds on the coast of Thrace.' For a list cf. Scylax, Periplus, 68. On Perinthus cf. v. 1 n., on Byzantium iv. 144, v. 26 nn. Selymbria was a Megarian colony founded before Byzantium, i. e. before 660 B. C.; Mesembria too was Megarian, the ending βρια being Thracian for city (Strabo 319).  
 2 οἰκησαν, 'took up their abode in,' not οἰκισαν, 'founded'; the previous existence of Mesembria is implied in iv. 93.  
 For Proconnesus, Artaca, and Cyzicus cf. iv. 14.  
 3 Οἰβάρεϊ: probably brother of Bubares (vii. 22. 2), and perhaps successor to Daurises (v. 121f.).  
 ἐν Δασκυλείῳ. Cf. Thuc. i. 129; the third satrapy, iii. 90 n., v. 25 n.; cf. App. I.  
 Cardia lay on the west side of the Chersonese, at the narrowest part of the Isthmus (vii. 58). Loyalty to Persia (cf. ix. 115), rather than its geographical position, explains its escape.
- 4 1 The Dolonci occur elsewhere only in Steph. Byz., and in the catalogues of Pliny (H. N. iv. 41) and Solinus. The Apsinthii (ix. 119), evidently just north of the Chersonese (ch. 37), are said to have extended as far as the Hebrus (iv. 90), where the district round the city Aenus had once been called Apsinthis (Steph. Byz.; Strabo 331, fr. 58). Myres (J. H. S. xxvii. 173) holds that the Apsinthii and Caeni overran the region occupied by Pelasgians in the Homeric catalogue.  
 2 ἱρὴν. Wayfarers on the road were under the god's protection. This sacred way seems to have led east by Daulis, Panopeus, and Chaeronea, then south-east by Coronea, Haliartus, and Thebes, then south over Cithaeron to Eleusis, whence it was continued to Athens by the best-known ὁδὸς ἱερὰ (Paus. i. 36, 37). This was the route of the sacred embassies to Delphi; by it Apollo himself once went (Strabo 422).  
 ἐκτρέπονται. It is not clear how the Dolonci could turn off this road to go to Athens since Laciadae, in which stood the family home of the Philaids (Plut. Cim. 10), was between Eleusis and Athens. Hence van Herwerden would omit ἐκ as a dittograph from ἐκάλεε.

35 Mahaffy (*Social Life in Greece*, 144) draws attention to this picture of the old Attic country life (cf. Thuc. ii. 15-7).

1 *τηνικαῦτα* : during Pisistratus' first tyranny (i. 64), while Croesus still reigned (ch. 37), i. e. circ. 558 B.C.

*ἰδυνάστευε*. In H. a vague term applied to a powerful city (v. 97. 1) or to prominent individuals (39. 2), even if they were subjects of a tyrant. The technical sense of *δυναστεία*, narrow and despotic oligarchy (Thuc. iii. 62, iv. 78 ; Ar. Pol. 1293 a 31), belongs to a more advanced political science.

*τεθριπποτρόφον* : a sign of wealth (chs. 36, 103, 122, v. 77. 2 n. ; Arist. Nub. 13 f.).

Pausanias (i. 35. 2) makes Philaeus the son of Eurysaces, the only son of Ajax recognized by Sophocles, but Plutarch (Solon 10), with Herodotus, Hellanicus, and Pherecydes, regards him as the son of Ajax. Further, he makes the brothers, Philaeus and Eurysaces, surrender Salamis to Athens, Philaeus settling in Brauron, where the deme Philaidae lay.

2 *αἰχμὰς* : the wearing of arms had passed out of use (Thuc. i. 6).

The Dolonci may have seen in the encouragement of a Greek colony their only hope of resisting the Apsinthii ; but probably the initiative came from Athens. Pisistratus was fully alive to the importance of Thrace and the Hellespont (i. 64 ; v. 94, 95 ; Appendix XVI, § 8). Miltiades in the Chersonese might prove a useful vassal of the ruler of Athens, in Attica he would have been discontented, and perhaps disloyal. The removal of dangerous citizens was part of the policy of despots. Cf. the pilgrim fathers in America.

36 2 *ἀπετείχισε* : from sea to sea, Cardia being on the north and Pactya on the south coast of the Chersonese. The wall was rebuilt by Pericles (Plut. Per. 19), by Dercyllidas (Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 8 f.), and finally by the emperor Justinian.

The measurements given are accurate, though Dercyllidas measured the breadth as 37 stades (Xen. l. c.) ; Strabo (p. 331, fr. 52, 54) follows Scylax (68) in giving rough approximations, 40 and 400 stades.

37 1 *Λαμψακηνοῖσι*. Probably Miltiades, like Pisistratus (v. 94), tried to seize a stronghold on the Asiatic side.

*ἐν γνῶμῃ γεγόνως* : not a mere periphrasis for *ἐγνωσμένος*, but 'standing high in favour with'.

2 *πίτυος τρόπον*. The old name of Lampsacus was Pityusa (Charon, fr. 6, F. H. G. i. 33 ; Strabo 589). No Lampsacene could have misunderstood the jest, nor could H., if he had read Charon (Macan ; cf. Introduction, § 19 (b)). *ἡνὶ δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ τῶν ἑκαστῶν ἑκαστὸν ἔχοντα τὸν οὐρανόν.*

38 1 *ὁμομητρίου*. Miltiades and Cimon were sons of the same mother by different fathers (cf. v. 25. 1). Since, however, the Cimonidae were afterwards recognized as Philaidae, there was probably relationship by descent or adoption on the father's side also. The genealogy as given by H. is :





awkwardly inserting the notice of his flight before the Scyths after mentioning his return. H. means that the fortunes of Miltiades went from bad to worse, his final expulsion by the Phoenicians being a yet greater misfortune than his temporary flight before the Scyths. Thus *τρίτῳ ἔτει τούτων* must mean the third year *before* this (cf. § 2; Cobet, Abicht), or, if this translation be thought impossible, *πρὸ* must be inserted before *τούτων* (Stein). Wells (Stud. Herod. pp. 118–20) gives another interpretation of this obscure passage (ch. 40).

I *Σκύθαι οἱ νομάδες*: cf. iv. 11. 1. 19.

*ἐρεθισθέντες ὑπὸ Δαρείου*. The idea of a war of vengeance on the part of the Scyths seems a mere fiction (ch. 84), since the expedition of Darius was at least fifteen, and probably twenty years before. Perhaps the Scyths took advantage of the temporary weakening of the Persian Empire by the Ionic revolt; more probably these nomads were some Thracian or Moesian tribe and not Scyths. Grote's suggestion (iv. 201) that it was the Persians and not the Scyths who expelled Miltiades is not what H. says, and rests on Miltiades' supposed treachery to Darius at the bridge over the Danube (iv. 137). But this patriotic scheme is very doubtful; perhaps it was invented when the tyrant of Chersonese had reached Athens (ch. 104), and was anxious to prove himself a true friend of Hellenic liberties (Thirlwall, ii, App. II; Macan, App. iii, § 14; Klio ix. 413).

41 I *τότε*: i. e. 493 B. C. Miltiades fled at the first approach of the Phoenicians, as is shown by the mention of Tenedos (cf. ch. 31) and by his starting from Cardia.

4 *κεκοσμέσθαι* = *τελέουσι ἐς* (ch. 108. 5), 'are reckoned as'; cf. iii. 91. 2.

#### 42 *The settlement of Ionia by Artaphrenes.*

I *ἐς νεῖκος φέρον*: hostile, opposed to *εἰρηναία* (ch. 43); cf. *ἐς αἰσχύνῃ φέροντα* (iii. 133; i. 10), *ἐς ἄκεσιν* (iv. 90).

*δωσιδικοί*. The meaning is clearly that all warfare between cities, as well as piracy and brigandage, was abolished, and *δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβολῶν* established throughout Ionia. We cannot say how far such treaties already existed, but the position of Histiaeus shows that hitherto the local authorities in Ionia had been allowed much independence. The organizing genius of Darius took advantage of the revolt and its suppression to put an end to this. Thus the Ionians were compelled by their Persian masters to accept a unity which they had refused to impose on themselves at the suggestion of Thales (i. 170). In the same way private wars were checked by the Athenian *ἀρχή* (Thuc. i. 115). Evidence of long-continued enmity may be found in the dispute between Samos and Priene recorded in an Inscription in the Ashmolean Museum (Hicks<sup>1</sup>, 152).

2 *φόρους*: cf. iii. 89, 90. The statement as to the tribute is defective and difficult. Doubtless the arrangement of Artaphrenes applied to other revolted tributaries as well as to Ionians, but H. mentions only the most important, just as the whole rebellion is usually called

the Ionic revolt. Again, the words *ἐτι καὶ ἐς ἐμέ* cannot bear the natural meaning that tribute was still paid to Persia in accordance with this assessment at the time when H. wrote his history, but must be explained in one of the following ways:

(1) Grote (v. 194-5) thinks that the Persian king still maintained his claim to the old tribute, though it was not really paid. The satrap was still responsible to the king for the money, though unable to exact it. As soon as the Athenian power seemed broken in 412, the great king pressed Tissaphernes for payment (Thuc. viii. 5). The claim had been for years in abeyance but never withdrawn. We may compare the grants of Myus and Lampsacus to Themistocles (Thuc. i. 138), and of Myrrhina and Gryneium to Gongylus the Eretrian (Xen. Hell. iii. 1. 6). The latter were held by Gongylus' descendants in 399 B.C., but all four cities were included in the Athenian empire in its palmy days.

(2) Some suggest that the unlucky states on the Asiatic seaboard paid tribute both to Athens and to the Great King. Some such arrangement seems certainly to have prevailed on the coast of Thrace under the Odrysian kings (Thuc. ii. 97), but the cases are not really parallel.

(3) Another suggestion is that the assessment of Artaphernes was the basis of the Athenian *φόρος*, which was certainly paid by these cities before 450 B.C., and probably from 465. If, however, H. meant that the Athenian *τακταί* used the old valuation, he has failed to express himself clearly, and the frequent alterations of the *Phoros* on the existing quota lists seem inconsistent with this explanation.

(4) The simplest explanation is that H. uses *ἐς ἐμέ* loosely, meaning merely till the Persian power was overthrown, i. e. between 479 and circ. 465 B.C. Some of the states were still paying tribute when H. was a boy; in all he could (and doubtless did) talk with those to whom the claims of the Persian tax-collector were familiar. So a septuagenarian Bengalee might well write to-day: 'The rule of John Company lasted down to my time,' although it really ended in 1858.

It should further be noticed that Diodorus (x. 25. 2) ascribes not only this regulation of taxes, but also the restoration of constitutional government in Ionia (cf. ch. 43 n.) to Artaphernes, acting on the suggestion of Hecataeus. Was H. unwilling to allow credit to his great predecessor for the conciliatory and successful reorganization of Ionia?

43-5 *Mardonius establishes democracies in Ionia. He invades Europe subjugating Thasos and Macedon, but loses his fleet off Mount Athos and retires.*

43 I τῷ ἔαρ: of 492 B.C. H. here begins his year, like Thucydides, with spring.

- 3 H. is so anxious to put forward his supposed proof that he makes ἐπέω the main verb instead of leaving it in a dependent clause. Cf. i. 27. 2; ii. 103. 2; vi. 14. 1, &c.

For the speech of Otanes cf. iii. 80, and for the 'Seven' iii. 84.

It has been held that this is a reply to criticisms passed on the story of the debate (iii. 80 f.), but the incredulity of the critics is already noticed there, and may perhaps apply rather to the tradition handed down to H. than to the form given it in his work. The proof here alleged is of the weakest. Otanes, not Gobryas, was the advocate of democracy, and there was all the difference between establishing democracy in Persia and permitting it in Ionia. Further H. seems to have exaggerated and misrepresented the action of Mardonius. In many Greek and Carian cities (vii. 98, 195) dynasts held their own. So in Chios Strattis (iv. 138; viii. 132), in Samos Aeaces (ch. 25), in Cos Cadmus (vii. 164), in Halicarnassus Artemisia (vii. 99). In Lampsacus, too, the sons of Aeantides, son of Hippoclus (iv. 138) succeeded to the throne (Thuc. vi. 59). Here again, as in ch. 42, it is true that H. only speaks of Ionians, but such a measure would naturally extend to all the revolted states which had expelled their tyrants. This establishment of democracies then may mean little more than the restoration of local liberties ascribed by Diodorus to Artaphrenes (ch. 42 n.). In any case it would seem to have been partial, and dictated rather by distrust of the tyranny which had proved a dangerous instrument of government, than by any preference for democracy.

- 44 1 Μακεδόνας (cf. v. 17 f.). H. (vii. 108) speaks as if Megabazus had conquered Macedon before Mardonius, but probably the Persian troops did not actually cross the Strymon till 492 B.C.  
 ἐντὸς Μακεδόνων: from a Persian point of view, i.e. east of Macedon (cf. i. 6. 1).  
 2 μέχρι Ἀκάνθου: i.e. where Xerxes later cut his canal (vii. 22). Mount Athos is a harbourless coast off which high seas and dangerous currents are prevalent (vii. 24 n.).  
 3 For Persian inability to swim cf. viii. 89.  
 45 1 Βρύγοι. These Thracian neighbours of Macedon may be placed between the Strymon and Mount Athos. In the list of tribes given in vii. 185 they come between the men of Chalcidice and the Pieres. The two passages agree if in vii. 185 the Pieres are the branch of the tribe who lived east of the Strymon (vii. 112). Scymnus Chius (434) and Strabo (326) locate the Brygi far to the west on the borders of Epirus and Illyria. Probably they are connected with the Βρίγες (vii. 73), the European ancestors of the Phrygians.  
 2 αἰσχροῦς ἀγωνισάμενος. Macan suggests that with the exception of the loss to the fleet the expedition was a brilliant success, since H. elsewhere (vii. 9. n. 2) allows Mardonius to claim credit for his operations, and acknowledges his success in reconquering Thrace and Macedon (vii. 108). But if the object of the campaign was the

conquest of Hellas in general and of Athens and Eretria in particular, his task was unfulfilled. And in spite of modern scepticism there is good reason to suppose that the idea of a punitive expedition and wide schemes of conquest were entertained at the Persian court. The conquest of European Hellas may well have seemed the only means of securing the dominion of Persia over the Greeks of Asia. The expedition of Datis shows that Athens and Eretria were to be punished, and also that the advance by land was considered to have failed. Probably its difficulties had not been foreseen. When this plan of campaign was again adopted, great preparations were made to meet them (vii. 21 f.). No doubt Greek writers exaggerate the failure of Mardonius, but his losses were real, and his recall is best explained by Darius' adoption of a different plan of operations.

46-50 491 B.C. *Reduction of Thasos. Darius demands earth and water from the Greeks. Medism of Aegina.*

46 I δευτέρῳ . . . τούτων. In the next year after these things, i.e. 491 B.C.

Θασίους. Macan suggests that this second submission of Thasos is a dittograph, i.e. that H. gives two accounts drawn from different sources of one surrender. It is doubtless true that the accounts are quite independent, the second being perhaps learned by H. in Thasos. But the prosperity of the Thasians might well cause their jealous neighbours falsely to accuse them of intending to take advantage of the recent Persian losses.

\*Αβδηρα : colonized from Clazomenae and recolonized from Teos (i. 168 n.). It may, however, have been earlier a Phoenician station, since the name is Phoenician, and the early coins are of the Phoenician standard (Head, H. N. 253). It was evidently loyal to Persia (viii. 120).

2 πολιορκηθέντες : cf. ch. 28. The blockade showed them the necessity of equipping a fleet.

ἐκ τῆς ἡπείρου. On the opposite coast of Thrace the Thasians held Stryme, Galepsus, Osyme, Daton, Scaptesyle, &c. (vii. 108, 118, ix. 75 ; Thuc. i. 100, iv. 107). From these mines the state drew its ordinary revenue, royalties, &c., while the citizens were free from land-tax and apparently all direct taxes (§ 3). Thasos is said to have spent four hundred talents in entertaining Xerxes (vii. 118); its tribute to Athens at its highest was only thirty talents, which is, however, as much as was paid by any state.

47 This passage proves a visit to Thasos and to its mines over against Samothrace. Yet though the site of Koenyra is marked by the modern Kenira, Tozer (I. of Aeg. 307) could neither find nor hear of any traces of mining in that district.

I Φοίνικες. This settlement from Tyre is dated by H. (ii. 44) five generations before the birth of Heracles, on the faith of mythical genealogies ; cf. iv. 147, v. 59. Thasos was colonized from Paros



(Thuc. iv. 104) circ. 700 B. C. (Busolt, i. 458), the best-known colonist being the poet Archilochus.

τοῦ Φοίνικος. For the genealogy cf. i. 2. 1 n.

οὔνομα ἔσχε. The old name was Aeria (Steph. Byz.) or Odonis (Hesych.). For the aorist cf. vii. 61. 3, 74. 1.

- 49 I πολλοὶ μὲν ἡπειρωτῶν. The expression is vague and perhaps exaggerated, though Thessaly, Boeotia, Argos, and Delphi may have made submission.

πάντες δὲ νησιῶται. Many had been already conquered. The phrase may apply to the Cyclades, except Naxos and Delos (cf. 96, 97), and to Lemnos, Imbros, and Samothrace.

The account here given plainly implies that Sparta and Athens refused to submit, but the omission of the story told later (vii. 133 f.) of the treatment of the Persian heralds is remarkable. Cf. vii. 137 n.

- 2 This appeal to Sparta against Aegina (491 B. C.) implies recognition by Athens of Spartan hegemony (for which cf. i. 69 n.). Either Miltiades (cf. the sending of Philippides before Marathon, ch. 105) or Themistocles (cf. the tale of Polycritus at Salamis, viii. 92) may well have seen how menacing was the attitude of Aegina, and how necessary to Athens the help of Sparta.

- 50 I Cleomenes is given his full style and title, probably to add emphasis; ch. 36. 1.

- 2 Κριός: cf. ch. 73. 2; viii. 92. Possibly the wrestler referred to by Simonides, fr. 13 ἐπέεαθ' ὁ Κριὸς οὐκ ἀεικέως: cf. Arist. Nub. 1356. Such plays on names were irresistible; cf. § 3, and Cicero, Verrines, II. iv. 43, &c. But the jest of Cleomenes is bitter, like those in Shakespeare attributed to Gaunt (Rich. II, Act ii, Sc. 1).

- 3 The retreat of Cleomenes from Aegina without hostages and his return with the other king to take them, implies that he admitted the validity of the plea (ch. 73). Yet the presence of both kings might seem to contravene the law made some fifteen years before (v. 75 n.). On the powers of the Spartan kings in foreign affairs cf. App. XVII, § 2.

- 51-60 *The story of the dual kingship at Sparta. Privileges of the kings with notes on non-Hellenic customs* (ch. 59, 60). This digression (the main story is not resumed till ch. 61) is the most important contribution in H. to Greek constitutional history. It illustrates admirably how much and how little the Greeks knew of their origins, and also the religious and military character of early kingship. The legend of the twins is a clumsy fiction intended to account for the dual kingship. The most probable origin of this anomaly is the fusion of two distinct communities whose chiefs shared the throne. That the two royal houses were of different origin seems proved by the fact that their homes and tombs were to be found in different quarters of Sparta, those of the Agiads close to the Acropolis (Paus.

iii. 14. 2), those of the Eurypontids on the heights of New Sparta (Paus. iii. 12. 8). The two quarters may have been originally (cf. the case of Rome) two distinct communities. It is perhaps most likely that both communities and both kings were Dorian invaders (Duncker, G. i. 351 f.), and that the claims of the kings to Achæan descent (cf. v. 72; i. 67; vii. 159) were a fiction intended to justify the Dorian conquest. Wachsmuth, however (Jahrbuch f. Philologie, 1868, p. 1 f.), sees in the superior dignity of the elder (Agiad) line, and in the claim of Cleomenes to be an Achæan (v. 72), indications that the old Achæan royal house survived side by side with that of the invading Dorians. In any case, the rival theory that the dual kingship was instituted to weaken the royal power (cf. the Consulship at Rome) confuses effect and cause, and fails to explain such facts as the separate burying-places. For other instances of double kingship in Greece and elsewhere (e. g. Siam), and for further discussion cf. Busolt, i. 546. 4; Frazer, Paus. iii. 312.

- 52 1 It is interesting to note H.'s claim to speak from complete knowledge of Greek poets; cf. ch. 53. 1, and Introduction, § 18. The poets' story was that Aristodemus died just *before* the Dorian invasion (Paus. iii. 1. 6; Apollodorus ii. 8. 2). H. follows local Spartan tradition, as does Xenophon (Ages. viii. ~~7~~).
- 2 Ἀργείην. Sister of Theras (iv. 147), and of Theban descent.
- 5 τιμάν. Probably the oracle punned on the double sense of γεραίτερον, 'elder' and 'more honourable'. The verse may have ended γεραίτερον ἔστι γεραίρειν. For τιμάν and γεραίρειν together cf. v. 67. 5.
- 6 The device of Panites, used to interpret the oracle, might well have settled the question of succession. Indeed, the younger child seems to have been brought up as a private individual (§ 7). The story is inconsistent as well as unhistorical.
- 7 ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ, 'in some state building' (cf. vii. 144 ἐν τῷ κοινῷ) (Abbott) rather than (Stein) 'at the public charge' under official guardianship (cf. ch. 57. 2, 92. 2). Theras is ignored in this story, but cf. iv. 147.

- 53 1 τὰ λεγόμενα: i. e. the common Hellenic tradition found in the poets and logographers.

τούτους . . . βασιλείας. The Heracleid leaders (cf. § 2) of the Dorian invasion. The genealogy is Hyllus—Heracles—Amphitryon—Alcaeus—Perseus.

τοῦ θεοῦ: i. e. Zeus, called father of Perseus (vii. 61. 3). 'Omitting the god, the accepted list is correct.' H. cannot accept the divine parentage of Perseus, as is shown by his treatment elsewhere of heroic genealogies (cf. ii. 43-5, 142-6; iv. 5. 1).

ἥδη . . . ἐτέλειον. Perseus and his race, though by descent Egyptian, from his time on were accounted Hellenes reigning for four generations in Argos. For ἐτέλειον cf. ii. 51. 2; vi. 108. 5.

- 2 Ἀμφιτρώων. Had there been in the case of Perseus a reputed mortal father as in the case of Heracles Amphitryon, H. might have

\* Look at the fragment of Aristod. 5. 1. Heracles (sic) had a son named Perseus. The same that Aristod. 5. 1. Heracles (sic) had a son named Perseus.

assumed the existence of two Perseus' (cf. ii. 43), one son of a god, the other of a mortal.

ἰθαγενέες : by direct descent genuine. H. (cf. ii. 91. 5) accepts the well-known Danaid legend, from the Epic Danaïs, and the Supplices of Aeschylus.

54 This 'Persian' story varies from the ordinary Hellenic (vii. 61. 150) in the important points, that Perseus does not go from Argos to Cepheus, king of the Cepheneas (i. e. the Assyrians, vii. 61. 2), to marry his daughter Andromeda, and so become the father of Perses, the eponym of the Persians, but is himself of Assyrian descent, and the first of his family to become a Greek. Yet the envoys of Xerxes (vii. 150) are represented as accepting the ordinary Greek view.

55 ὅ τι δέ, 'wherefore and for what services they, though Egyptians, attained.' The points omitted are the adoption of the Heracleid Hyllus by the Dorian king Aegimius, which gave the Dorians a claim to the heritage of the Heracleids, the Peloponnese, and the exploits of the Heracleids who led the Dorian invasion (ix. 26 f.).

ἄλλοισι. Possibly the writer of the Epic 'Aegimius', more probably the Logographers, e. g. Charon of Lampsacus; cf. *Intro.* § 19. This refusal to repeat a story which had already received literary treatment cannot be generalized into a maxim for H.'s whole work (Macan, p. lxxxiii n.).

56 The honours given the Spartan kings are divided into three classes : (1) in war, ch. 56 ; (2) in peace, ch. 57 ; (3) after death, ch. 58. H. (cf. 58. 1) perhaps regards them as resting on some such contract between king and people as the monthly oath in *Xen. Rep. Lac.* xv. 7. The eponymous hero Lacedaemon is (in *Paus.* iii. 1. 2, 20. 2), son of Zeus and Taygete, and husband of Sparta. His shrine was at Alesiae between Therapne and Taygetus. With *Zeus Λακεδαιμών* Stein compares *Zeus Ἀγαμέμνων*, *Z. Ἀμφιάραος*, *Z. Ἀμφικτύων*, *Z. Ἡρακλῆς*, *Z. Τροφώνιος*, but none of these is so definitely local. *Zeus Λακεδαιμών* would seem to be a primitive local deity, possibly chthonian, afterwards degraded into a 'hero'. *Zeus Οὐράνιος* is the lord of the heavens. The latter cult (τὰ μέγαρα Οὐράνια) continued under the Roman empire (*C. I. G.* 1241, 1420). The Spartan kings as Heracleids were descendants of Zeus, and his natural representatives, as were the Heracleid kings of Macedon of the Bottiaean Zeus, and the Aeacid princes in Epirus of the Dodonaean (*Preller*, i. 149). *Xenophon* (*Rep. Lac.* xiii and xv) tells us the king offered all public sacrifices, and in particular, to Zeus Agetor on setting forth to war, and to Zeus and Athena on crossing the frontier.

πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν. Perhaps in prehistoric times the kings could actually declare war, but, even if this be so, the necessity of the people's consent was early established (cf. *App.* XVII, § 2). Traces of the royal control of foreign affairs may be found even in

the fifth century (cf. v. 74, 75; vi. 73), but later this power was vested in the Ephors (Xen. Hell. iii. 1. 1; v. 2. 9, 11); Xenophon describes this state of things when he limits the power of the kings to the conduct of the campaign. (Rep. Lac. ch. xv στρατίαν ὅποι ἂν ἡ πόλις ἐκπέμψῃ ἡγεῖσθαι, cf. ch. xiii.) Only when he had crossed the frontier after favourable auspices (διαβατήρια) did the king exercise a really sovran power (Thuc. v. 60, 66; viii. 5, and in general App. XVII, § 2). Even in the field insubordination was not unknown (ix. 55; Thuc. v. 72).

ἐν τῷ ἀγεί. Probably such an execration entailed exile (cf. Thuc. v. 72). Such curses often were extended to the whole house (cf. Hicks, 23; C. I. G. 2691; Aeschin. c. Ctes. § 110).

πρώτους: cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. xiii οὐδεὶς αὐτοῦ πρόσθεν πορεύεται, πλὴν Σκιρίται καὶ οἱ προερευνώμενοι ἵππεις.

ἐκατόν. The full number of ἵππεις was three hundred; cf. i. 67. 5 n., vii. 205. 2, viii. 124. 3; Thuc. v. 72. This hundred might be the contingent of one of the three Dorian tribes.

προβάτοισι: for offerings, victims being required for the διαβατήρια and for sacrifices before battle. The king's perquisites remind us of Homeric customs (cf. Il. vii. 321; Od. iv. 66), and may be due to the religious origin of the office. For similar priestly claims cf. 1 Sam. ii. 13 f.

57 I θυσίη . . . δημοτελής: offered by the kings; cf. 56 n.; Xen. Rep. Lac. xv. 2.

ἀρχεσθαι: sc. τοὺς νέμοντας, the attendants. For similar honours cf. Thuc. i. 25 οὔτε Κορινθίῳ ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν (Abbott).

διπλησια. οὐχ ἵνα διπλάσια καταφάγοιεν, ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τιμῇσαι ἔχοιεν, εἴ τινα βούλουτο (Xen. Rep. Lac. xv. 4). Xerxes (vii. 103. 1) distinctly alludes to this custom.

σπονδαρχίας: again a Homeric custom (Il. xii. 310 f.).

2 νεομηνίας. The first day of the month ('new moon') was everywhere sacred, and a day of offering to the gods (ἱερὰ ἐπιμήνια, ἔμμηνα: cf. viii. 41. 2); the seventh was the birthday of Apollo and specially dedicated to him (Hesiod, Ἔργα 770). For the accusative cf. i. 181. 5, 186. 3; vii. 50. 4, 203. 1.

μέδιμνον. The old view that the Laconian or Aeginetan medimnus was half as much again as the Attic (Athenaeus, 141 C) is disproved by Ath. Pol. ch. 10 (Sandys, note; cf. G. F. Hill, Num. Chron. 1897, p. 284 f.). Probably the Pheidonian measures are equivalent to the Babylonian, and stood to the Solonian in the ratio of 12 : 13. Since the Attic medimnus contains nearly twelve gallons, the Pheidonian would be nearly eleven gallons.

τετάρτη cannot be the Attic τέταρτον, which, being the quarter of the sextarius (ξέστη), belongs to Roman times and is far too small, being about a quarter of a pint. Since the monthly contribution of each Spartan to the Syssitia was a medimnus of meal and eight χόες of wine (Plut. Lyc. 12), this Laconian τετάρτη may be one of eight

χόες, or about five and a half gallons; if, however, the proportion given in § 3 of one cotyle to two choenices be taken, it would be but two χόες.

προεδρίας: concrete; cf. iv. 88. 1. For the abstract sense cf. i. 54. 2; ix. 73. 3. This custom is illustrated by the anecdote in ch. 67.

προξένους. Proxeni are usually citizens of a foreign city who undertook to watch over the interests of the community which they represented, e.g. Callias was Proxenus of Sparta at Athens (cf. viii. 136. 1; Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 4). The Proxenia in these cases seems to have been almost hereditary in character (Thuc. v. 43; vi. 89). It does not appear probable that the kings had the appointment either of these Spartan Proxeni abroad or of the representatives of foreign states in Sparta. Hence P. Monceaux has suggested that these proxeni nominated by the kings were special ones appointed to do the honours of the state to foreigners who had no ordinary representative at Sparta; for some late analogies cf. Smith, *Antiquities*, i. 978.

Πύθιοι. The connexion of Sparta with Delphi was peculiarly close. Cic. de Divin. i. 95 '(Lacedaemonii) de rebus maioribus semper aut Delphis oraculum aut ab Hammone aut a Dodona petebant'. Cf. v. 63, 90; vii. 220. Other states employed *θεωροί*.

σιτεόμενοι. Apparently they messed with the king at the Phiditia. Xen. Rep. Lac. xv. 5 ἔδωκε δ' αὐτὸν καὶ συσκήνους δύο ἐκατέρῳ προσ-ελέσθαι οἱ δὲ καὶ Πύθιοι καλοῦνται.

- 3 The prisoners at Sphacteria were allowed two *Attic* choenices of meal and two cotylae of wine; their servants were given half this amount (Thuc. iv. 16).

- 4 τὰς μαντήϊας: so Cleomenes carried off a collection from Athens (v. 90).

μούνους: i.e. without the Ephors and Gerousia.

πατρούχου. An only daughter was styled *ἐπίκληρος* (or in Doric *ἐπιπαματίς* or *παμῶχος*), which means not that she is the heiress, but that she passes with the inheritance. Aristotle (Pol. ii. 6. 11, 1270 a 26 f.) distinctly tells us that if a father died intestate leaving only a daughter, the heir, as guardian of the orphan daughter, chose her a husband, and that even the father had but recently acquired the right to dispose of his daughter's hand as he pleased. In the days of H. the kings dealt with the question, as did the Archon Eponymus at Athens. In so doing they clearly acted as judges merely determining to whom the *ἐπίκληρος* belonged by law. All this is explained by the primitive constitution of the Graeco-Roman family. The inheritance, along with the household cults, and *patria potestas*, always passed to males. If, then, there were no sons but only a daughter, the ancient principle debarred her from heirship, but by custom she passed with the inheritance to the nearest male relative, whom she married (so Gorgo Leonidas, vii. 205; cf. also vi. 71; Plut. Agis 11). Apparently a father, if he gave an only



daughter in marriage, must give her to the nearest relative, or to an adopted son. But adoption (§ 5) itself took place before the kings, and must have been subject to legal rules. If the father died without betrothing his daughter, the nearest male relative could claim both the inheritance and the hand of the daughter. If there were several claimants the kings decided between them. The same principles held good in Crete (cf. the Gortyna Code) and at Athens. Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *Nouvelles Recherches*, pp. 97 f.

ὁδῶν δημοσιέων. According to Stein and Gilbert, this refers only to the delimitation of roads and private estates, but the kings as leaders in war may have been charged with the care of roads.

5 παρίξιν. The words imply that the kings were not *ex-officio* presidents. Doubtless the Ephors both convened (Xen. Hell. iii. 3. 8) and presided over the Gerousia. Cf. App. XVII, § 2.

δύο ψήφους τιθεμένους. There can be little doubt Thucydides refers to this passage (i. 20. 3) when he gives as an instance of popular errors the belief that each of the Spartan kings had two votes, not one only, since he corrects in the same sentence another supposed error in H. (ix. 53), πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὄντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμενα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οὐκ ὁρθῶς οἴονται, ὥσπερ τοὺς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας μὴ μᾶ ψήφῳ προστίθεσθαι ἑκάτερον ἀλλὰ δυοῖν, καὶ τὸν Πιτανάτην λόχον αὐτοῖς εἶναι ὃς οὐδ' ἐγένετο πώποτε. But H., though the expression is obscure, probably means not that each king had two votes, but that two votes were given for the *two* absent kings, and that the vote of the relative who acted as proxy for both was the third. He, however, overlooks the fact that the same person could not be the nearest relative of both kings, since the two houses were only related by a fictitious genealogy and never inter-married. Really there must have been two proxies, one for each king. H. Richards (Cl. R. xix. 343) would omit *τρίτην δὲ τὴν ἐωντῶν* as a late insertion, and so get clearly the sense that the nearest relative of each king gave two votes, his own and that of the king his kinsman.

58 I λέβητας. Beating a bronze cauldron would keep off evil spirits, the original meaning of the 'passing bell'. Cf. A. B. Cook, J. H. S. xxii. 14 f.

καταμαίνεσθαι. Such extravagant signs of mourning (*μισμοί*) as tearing the hair, rending the garments, and throwing dust on the head and clothing, were at Athens restricted by Solon (Plut. ch. 12 ; cf. Thuc. ii. 45), and at Sparta forbidden by Lycurgus for private persons (Plut. Lyc. 27, Mor. 238 D). They are a survival from barbarism (cf. viii. 99 ; ix. 24) or from heroic times (cf. Il. xviii. 23 f.). So Xen. Rep. Lac. xv. 9 αἱ δὲ τελευτήσαντι τιμαὶ βασιλεῖ δέδονται, τῇδε βούλονται δηλοῦν οἱ Λυκούργον νόμοι, ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἥρωας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς προτετιμῆκασιν. Cf. Xen. Hell. iii. 3. 1.

- 2 Λακεδαίμονος = Laconia (cf. vii. 234. 2), including Messenia (Paus. iv. 14. 4).

ἀριθμῶ, 'in fixed number.' Cf. Thuc. ii. 72.

- 3 εἶδωλον. This took the place of the body if it could not be brought home, but the only certain case before the time of H. is that of Leonidas (vii. 238; cf. Plut. Agis 21). Later Agesipolis (Xen. Hell. v. 3. 19) and Agesilaus (Plut. ch. 40) died on foreign service, but their bodies were embalmed in honey or wax and brought home.

ἀγορή: traffic (cf. i. 153. 2) as well as public business.

ἀρχαιεσίη: meeting for election.

- 59, 60 These chapters contain additional notes subsequently inserted by the author; perhaps they are meant to bear on the alleged Persian or Egyptian descent of the Spartan kings (cf. 53, 54).

- 60 κήρυκες: the most famous are the Talthybiadae, sprung from the herald of the Atridae (vii. 134).

αὐληταί: important, as the Spartan army marched to battle to the sound of the flute (Thuc. v. 70).

μάγειροι: clearly those who prepared the Phiditia. They had their heroes, Μάττων (kneader) and Κεράων (mixer), whose statues stood on the Hyacinthine way (Athen. 39 E). Apparently they accompanied the army on campaigns (ix. 82).

No general caste-system should be inferred. Nowhere in the ancient world, not even in Egypt (ii. 164 f.), was there so fully established a caste-system as now exists in India, where status is fixed and free competition eliminated. Yet in all non-progressive societies, such as Sparta, crafts tend to be hereditary.

σφίας παρακληίονσι, 'shut out the hereditary heralds.'

- 61-70 *The birth, deposition and exile of Demaratus.*

- 61 1 προεργαζόμενον. πρό is not temporal but = 'for,' 'on behalf of'; cf. ii. 158. 5 *ad fin.* H.'s tone here is unusually favourable to Cleomenes. ἐπίβασιν: either making an attack = ἐπιβαίνων (Stein), or getting a footing; cf. Plat. Rep. 511 B, and ἐπιβατεύων (ch. 65. 4) (Schweighauser).

βασιλεύοντι. He was contemporary with Anaxandridas, circ. 550 B.C.; cf. i. 67. 1.

- 3 μιν: resumed in αὐτήν: i.e. dependent on ἐφόρεε (Stein); cf. i. 115. 2.

Therapne stood on some precipitous heights nearly two miles south-east of Sparta on the opposite side of the Eurotas. The view that it was the site of Homeric (Achaean) Sparta, suggested by its commanding position, is confirmed by the discovery there of Mycenaean pottery and by the worship of Helen and Menelaus (Isoc. x. 63). This sanctuary of Helen is probably identical with the temple of Menelaus, where Menelaus and Helen were buried (Paus. iii. 19. 9). Its ruins, and near them some Mycenaean remains, have been discovered on the top of the hill called Menelaion

(Polyb. v. 18. 21; Liv. xxxiv. 28). Castor and Pollux, Helen's brothers, were supposed to lie buried in Therapne on alternate days (Pind. Nem. x. 55; Pyth. xi. 62; cf. Frazer on Paus. iii. 19. 9). The Phoebeum was below Therapne in the plain on the western bank of the Eurotas (Paus. iii. 14. 9).

Ἑλένης. The view that Helen was a goddess of beauty, and the identification of her with ξείνη Ἀφροδίτη (ii. 112), seem to be H.'s own conjectures, and erroneous. The foreign Aphrodite must be Astarte, while Helen was a native heroine more akin to Artemis (Wide, Lakonische Kulte, 340 f.), perhaps originally a tree nymph. The Rhodians worshipped Helen of the tree (Paus. iii. 19. 9, with Frazer), and the Spartans Helen's plane-tree (Theocr. xviii. 43). The whole story reads like the miracle of a mediaeval saint, and illustrates a side of Greek life which hardly appears in our literary sources.

- 62 2 Ordinary Greek feeling seems to have been less shocked by a technical observance and a virtual breach of contract (cf. iv. 154. 201; Thuc. iii. 34) than by a refusal to be bound by an oath whose real purport had not been understood. Euripides earned much opprobrium by making Hippolytus say in such a case (612) ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμῶμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώματος, yet all moral philosophers would now agree with Cicero (De Off. iii. 29. 107) that such an oath was not binding.

Probably the true motive of Ariston's third marriage was the barrenness of his earlier wives (cf. v. 39 f.).

- 63 1 τοὺς δέκα: the usual ten lunar months; cf. 69. 5.  
2 ἐν θῶκῳ: at a sitting of the council. So Paus. iii. 7. 7 ἐν βουλῇ.  
ἐπὶ δακτύλων: a well-known mode of counting (cf. Juv. x. 249 with Mayor), especially among savages (cf. Tylor, P. C. i. 244 f.).  
πρῆγμα . . . οὐδέν, 'paid no heed' (cf. vii. 150. 3). The carelessness of the Ephors is incredible, since it was their duty to preserve the purity of the Heracleid race (v. 39).

- 3 εὐδοκιμέοντι. For Ariston's victories cf. i. 67 n.

ἄρην: a rare word, here used for εὐχὴν to get the play on the name Δημάρετος. Cf. Ἀρήτη (Hom. Od. vii. 54), Louis le Désiré and Samuel (1 Sam. i. 20).

- 64 διὰ τό or διὰ τὰ (MSS.) cannot mean 'on which account' = δι' ὃ or δι' αὐτό: nor did Cleomenes attack Demaratus on account of any doubts of his legitimacy. For διότι cf. vii. 197. 3, 205. 1; Cl. R. xix. 343.

διεβλήθη, 'was at enmity with' (i. 118. 2; v. 35. 1). To the grounds given (v. 75; vi. 50 f.) we may perhaps add the conduct of Demaratus in and after the Argive war; cf. ch. 82 (Macan).

- 65 1 Ἄγιος: called Agesilaus in the list of Eurypontids (viii. 131). The reigning line was Theopompus, Archidamus, Zeuxidamus, Anaxidamus, Archidamus, Agasicles, Ariston, Demaratus: for the collateral line cf. viii. 131 n.

- 2 Χίλων: probably grandson of the famous Ephor (cf. i. 59; Hunt,

Rylands Pap. i, pp. 29, 31), and brother of Prinetales (v. 41. 3), the father of Cleomenes' mother.

ἀρπάσας : dependent on φθάσας. The forms of marriage by capture survived at Sparta (Plut. Lyc. 15); Demaratus seems to have turned the form into a reality. On marriage by capture cf. M<sup>c</sup>Lenan, *Studies in Ancient History*, I. ii-v, with Westermarck's criticisms, H. M. ch. xvii.

- 3 οὐκ ἰκνεομένως, 'without right.' Cf. ἰκνέεται, &c., ii. 36. 1; vi. 57. 21, 86 a 3.

κατωμοσίην : the oath of accusation, answering apparently to the προωμοσία of an Attic suit; it might be met by the defendant's ἀντωμοσία. Then the suit proper (ἐδίωκε) began with the proofs alleged on either side. Leotychides tried to revive the memory of Ariston's saying. For the court cf. v. 40 n.

- 4 ἐπιβατεύων, 'taking his stand upon.' The word implies that the claim was unfounded; cf. iii. 63. 3, 67. 2, ix. 95, and vi. 61 n., and the Homeric use of ἐπιβαίνειν.

μάρτυρας. The trial must be placed in 491 B. C., when Demaratus had been king quite twenty years. The Ephors summoned must have been in extreme old age, if any survived.

- 66 2 πρόμαντιν : cf. vii. 111. 2. For bribery of the oracle cf. v. 63. 1 n.

- 67 2 γυμνοπαιδία : one of the three great Spartan festivals, the others being the Carneia and the Hyacinthia; it took place just after midsummer (Thuc. v. 82; Xen. Hell. vi. 4. 16). Choruses of naked boys, youths, and men danced and sang in honour of Apollo in the Agora (Paus. iii. 119) and in the theatre just east of the Agora (Xen. *l. c.*; Plut. Ages. 29).

ἄρχειν, 'to be a magistrate.' Probably Demaratus conducted the festival as Ephor (Xen. Plut. *l. c.*) unless he was one of the βίδεοι who supervised the youths' gymnastics (Paus. iii. 11. 2; Gilbert, i. 26). In any case Leotychides as king would have the seat of honour (57. 2).

- 3 μυρίης . . . εὐδαιμονίης. The alternative, not seriously meant, is added for rhetorical contrast; cf. vii. 8. γ 3, viii. 68. γ.

κατακαλυψάμενος : *obvoluto capite*, as a sign of dejection (Hom. Od. x. 53).

- 68 1 καταπτόμενος, 'appealing to' (cf. viii. 65. 6 *ad fin.*). Here it might mean 'laying hold of', as τοῦδε implies that there was an altar of Ζεὺς ἐρκείος at hand, and his altar would naturally stand in the court-yard (Hom. Od. xxii. 334). Ζεὺς ἐρκείος is the god of the home and also of the family (Soph. Antig. 487; Farnell, *Cults*, i. 54). He is akin to, though not the same as, Ζεὺς ἐφέστιος (i. 44. 2).

Demaratus is anxious to get from his mother a denial on oath, hence the ceremony by which he makes her partaker of the sacrifice (σπλάγχνων), and accursed if she forswore herself (Macan; cf. Iwan Muller, v. 3, § 77; Hermann, *Gr. Antiq.* ii<sup>2</sup>. 22).

ὄνοφορβόν. Malicious rationalism turned the muleteer's god

Astrabacus into a muleteer. The views taken of Spartan women are widely divergent (Abbott); Plutarch (Lyc. 15; Mor. 228 B, C) represents adultery as unknown (cf. Isoc. Panath. 259), but Aristotle (Pol. 1269 b 22 f., with Newman) accuses them of every kind of excess.

59 3 The Heroon lay just outside the door from the court to the street. For Astrabacus cf. Paus. iii. 16. 9 μαρτύρια δέ μοι καὶ τάδε τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Ὀρθίαν τὸ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων εἶναι ξόανον· τοῖτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀστράβακος καὶ Ἀλώπεκος οἱ Ἴρβου τοῦ Ἀμφισθένης τοῦ Ἀμφικλέους τοῦ Ἀγιδος τὸ ἄγαλμα εὗροντες αὐτίκα παρεφρόνησαν, wherefore the Spartans dedicated a shrine to them near that of Lycurgus (Paus. iii. 16. 6), and presumably near that of Artemis. The heroes are usually connected with the fox and the sumpter-mule, ἀστράβη being a pack-saddle, but Wide (Lakon. Kulte, p. 279) interprets 'one riding on a mule-saddle', and compares Dionysus. Their insertion in the genealogy of the royal house is clearly late.

5 Hippocrates i. 447 (ed. Kühn) τίττειν καὶ ἐπτάμηνα καὶ ὀκτάμηνα καὶ ἐννεάμηνα καὶ δεκάμηνα καὶ ἐνδεκάμηνα, καὶ τούτων τὰ ὀκτάμηνα οὐ περιγίνεσθαι suggests why the eighth month is not here mentioned.

70 Plutarch (Agis, ch. 11) mentions an old law invoked against Agis IV, forbidding any Heracleid to settle abroad under pain of death. But this law was not enforced against Dorieus, and if Demaratus was not son of Ariston and king, he was no Heracleid (Macan).

2 Zacynthus proved a less secure refuge for Hegesistratus (ix. 37 *ad fin.*). It is noticeable that Themistocles too escaped to Persia by way of western Greece (Thuc. i. 136, 137). According to Xenophon (Hell. iii. i. 6; cf. Anab. ii. i. 3, vii. 8, 17) Xerxes gave Demaratus the cities Pergamus, Halisarna, and Teuthrania in the Troad, which his descendants, Procles and Eurysthenes, still retained. We may compare the rewards given to Gongylus, the Eretrian traitor (Xen. Hell. iii. i. 6), to Themistocles (Thuc. i. 138), and to Histiaeus and Coes (v. 11).

3 Λακεδαιμόνιοισι, 'in the opinion of the Spartans'; cf. iii. 88. 2. Their opinion is not justified by his recorded deeds or sayings (Plut. Mor. 220). He plays a greater part at the Persian court (vii. 3, 101 f., 209, 234 f.).

προσέβαλε: conferred on them the honour of an Olympic victory, perhaps by having the victory proclaimed in the name of the city and not in his own (cf. 103. 2). For the irregular construction cf. i. 85. 1.

71-2 *Leotyichides and his fate later.*

71 1 The grand-daughter of Zeuxidamus, Cynisca was the first woman to win a prize at Olympia with horses (Paus. iii. 8. 1, vi. 1. 6; Frazer, *ad loc.*). This she is said to have done at the suggestion of her brother Agesilaus to prove that such victories were a mere question of expense, not of merit (Plut. Ages. 20) (Abbott).



2 Λαμπιτώ: in Plato, Alc. i. 124; Plut. Ages. 1 Λαμπιδώ, mother of Agis II. The object of marrying Lampito to her nephew was to prevent rivalry between the families.

72 1 ἑστρατήγησε. Two tyrants, Aristomedes and Angelus, are said to have been expelled (Plut. de Mal. 21). This expedition is usually placed soon after the repulse of Xerxes, and regarded as an attempt to punish the Medism of the Aleuadae, the princes of Larisa (cf. vii. 6, 130, ix. 58; Paus. iii. 7. 9), as Thebes had been already punished (ix. 86 f.), and as it was proposed to punish other traitors (cf. vii. 132, 213). Busolt (iii. 80-7) takes the expedition as part of the Spartan policy of turning the Amphictyonic league into a weapon against Medism, and fixes the expedition with Duncker in 476 B. C., explaining the erroneous dating of the reign of Archidamus in Diodorus (xii. 35) 476-434 B. C., as due to a confusion between the banishment of Leotychides 476 B. C. and his death 469 B. C. E. Meyer, however (F. ii. 504-9), argues that the crown passed to Archidamus, not at the death, but on the exile of Leotychides (Thuc. iii. 26, v. 16; Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 25, v. 2. 6), and therefore that the exile of Leotychides must be placed in 469-468 and the expedition shortly before, as soon as Sparta had put down opposition in the Peloponnese. In view, however, of the case of Agesipolis, whose twenty years in exile are reckoned in his reign (Diod. xiii. 75), Busolt's solution is preferable. (For another suggestion cf. Grote abridged, 273, ed. note.)

2 δικάστηριον: for the court cf. v. 40 n.

The Spartans were considered corruptible (iii. 56), and the charge is specifically made against both Ephors and Gerontes (Ar. Pol. ii. 9, 1270 b 9 f., 1271 a 3). Of the kings Cleomenes resists Maeandrius (iii. 148), and with difficulty Aristagoras (v. 51 f.), yet he is suspect in the case of Argos (ch. 82), while Pleistoanax and his adviser were bribed by Pericles (Thuc. v. 16; Plut. Per. 22). Of other distinguished Spartans, Eurybiades was believed to have been bribed by Themistocles (viii. 5), and Pausanias trusted to bribery to secure his acquittal (Thuc. i. 131).

Τεγέην. So Hegesistratus took refuge in Tegea (ix. 37. 4), as did the king Pausanias in the temple of Athena Alea (Paus. iii. 5. 6).

73 Cleomenes takes hostages of Aegina.

74-84 The exile, restoration, and awful death of Cleomenes, with theories accounting for his fate. Digression on his earlier defeat of the Argives, and their desperate condition.

74 1 ὑπεξίσχε (cf. v. 72. 1). Ephialtes, too, took refuge in Thessaly (vii. 213. 2).

Νῶακριν. In northern Arcadia, near the river Crathis (i. 145), some five hours north-west of the city of Pheneus, to which it belonged.

ἔφορκον: with acc. of the object by which the oath is taken; cf.

Hom. Il. xiv. 271 *νῦν μοι ὅμοσον ἄατον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ*, and 'Iovem lapidem iurare', with Strachan-Davidson, Polybius, Prolegom. viii. Although this is the only instance recorded in history, there can be no doubt that an oath by the water of Styx had always been regarded by the Arcadians as most solemn, and that when the poets made the gods swear by Styx, they only transferred to heaven a practice long customary on earth. Hom. Il. xv. 37 *τὸ κατειβόμενον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ, ὃς τε μέγιστος | ὄρκος δεινὸς τε πέλει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν*: Hesiod, Theog. 785. The water of Styx was supposed to be instantly fatal (Paus. viii. 18. 4; Plin. Nat. Hist. ii. § 231, xxxi. § 26) and to burst or corrode all vessels save those of horn. Yet it is chemically harmless, though being snow-water it is icy cold. Perhaps its supposed deadliness caused it to be used as a kind of ordeal. Such oaths, accompanied by draughts or libations of water, are common (Frazer, Paus. iv. 254). The Styx is the only considerable waterfall in Greece, but H. is right in calling the stream *ὀλίγον* (Tozer, G. p. 118). Frazer (Paus. iv. 252) describes the scene as one of 'sublime but wild and desolate grandeur'.

*Φερεῶ*: at the south-west foot of Mount Cyllene, quite eight hours from the Styx, but the nearest large town. It is remarkable for its lake, which at intervals is drained away through subterranean channels (*katavothra*) into the Ladon, leaving a rich swampy plain (Frazer, iv. 231-2, 235 f.; J. H. S. xxii. 228-40).

- 75 An Arcadia combined into a federal league, traces of which are found on coins (Hill, G. and R. C. 107), would have been a serious menace to Sparta. The project of Cleomenes seems to have been revived by Themistocles, for all Arcadia, except Mantinea, fought against Sparta at Dipaea (ix. 35). It was realized by Epaminondas.

- 3 *ἐς Ἐλευσίνα*: cf. v. 74.

*τῶν θεῶν*: the goddesses Demeter and Persephone.

For sacrilege at Eleusis and its consequences cf. ix. 65.

*καταγινέων*. Probably 'bringing home', as Cleomenes gave out that he would take a ransom (79. 1); Stein, however, prefers 'bringing down', as the grove of Argos lay on a hill. Macan follows Panofsky in holding that these variant accounts do not represent genuine local traditions, but are conjectures due to the historian. Clearly, however, there was a general belief that Cleomenes came to a bad end, while each people would naturally select the impiety which injured itself as the ground of heaven's vengeance. Again, H. distinguishes his own opinion (ch. 84) from these more widely accepted views. Some critics, quite needlessly, see in the story of Cleomenes' awful death a Spartan fiction devised to hide the fact that he was put out of the way as a danger to the state.

- 76 The arguments for dating this war between Sparta and Argos after 500 B. C., and not (with Paus. iii. 4. 1) just after 520 B. C., are given in Appendix XVII, § 3.

- 1 *Στυμφλίδος λίμνης*. The lake of Stymphalus, near the foot of

Mount Cyllene, may be  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles in length and half a mile in breadth, but its area has varied greatly at different times. An escarpment of rock runs down sheer into the water, and at the foot of this there is an arched cavern through which the lake is discharged (Tozer, G. p. 112). The view that the water which here enters the cavern reappears as the Erasinus near Argos is still held by the natives of the valley, and is generally accepted, though the distance (thirty miles) is much greater than the length of any of the other subterranean rivers of the Peloponnese, and several high mountains and intersecting ridges intervene (Leake, Morea, iii. 113; cf. further Frazer, Paus. iv. 268-75).

- 2 Ἐρασίνου. The river Erasinus was at that time the southern boundary of Argolis; Cleomenes sacrificed to the river-god (αὐτῷ) the usual διαβατήρια (cf. Thuc. v. 54), but the omens were unfavourable (οὐκ ἐκαλλιέρεε) (cf. ix. 36, 38).

Θυρέην: in Spartan territory (i. 82), and near the shore (Thuc. iv. 57).

ταῦρον: so Od. iii. 6. The Pylians sacrifice ταύρους παμμέλανας, ἐνοσίχθονι κυναρχαίτῃ.

πλοίοισι: supplied by Sicyon and Aegina, in spite of the suzerainty claimed by Argos over both cities; cf. ch. 92. Macan suggests that the demonstration on the Erasinus was a feint to draw the Argives away from the city, as the ships must have been summoned beforehand.

- 77 2 ἐπίκοινα: adverbial (i. 216. 1). For the Milesian half of the response cf. ch. 19 n. The oracle is obscure enough to be regarded as a genuine Pythian response. It is not easy to see how it could raise a suspicion of trickery, unless it be assumed that the victory of the female over the male implies a success won by craft over force. But at least three interpretations are possible:

1. Hera of Argos shall defeat and drive out him of Lacedaemon (Cleomenes or Apollo), but it will be a Cadmeian victory, bringing mourning and ruin on Argos. But unless the first lines be applied to the expulsion of Cleomenes by Hera (ch. 82), they promise Argos a victory not recorded by H.

2. Sparta (female) shall conquer Argos (a male hero), so the women of Argos shall make lamentation, and men in time to come count that day the ruin of Argos. In this case, however, ἐξέλασθῃ remains unexplained.

3. Later authors (Pausanias, ii. 20. 8; Plutarch, Moralia, p. 245 D, E, quoting Socrates of Argos, F. H. G. iv. 497) tell us how Telesilla, the poetess, armed the women, the infirm, and the slaves, and drove back Cleomenes from the defenceless town after his victory in the field. This tradition, which fits the oracle admirably, is clearly of local Argive origin, whereas H. gives us the official Spartan version, which presents obvious difficulties (cf. ch. 82 n.). But the story of Telesilla appears to be late and is most probably unhistorical, since it seems designed to explain the oracle, and the

festival of Wantonness (τὰ Ὑβριστικά) at Argos. At this feast the women dressed as men and the men as women, even wearing veils (Plutarch, *l. c.*; Polyaeus, viii. 33). Such exchange of garments is a widely spread religious custom, particularly at the time of marriage; thus Argive brides wore beards (Plutarch, *l. c.*) and Spartan brides men's clothes on their wedding nights (Plut. Lyc. 15). So too there was in Cyprus a sacrifice to a bearded Aphrodite, at which men were dressed as women and women as men (Macrob. Sat. iii. 8; Servius on Aen. ii. 632); for other parallels see Frazer, Paus. iii. 197; Farnell, ii. 634-5, 748 n. 104. Again, Lucian (Amores 30) says that in consequence of Telesilla's victory the war-god (Ares) was deemed at Argos a god of women, and Plutarch adds (*l. c.*) that the victorious women built a temple to the war-god (Enyalios), but in view of Pausanias' statement that the statue of Telesilla stood in front of the temple of Aphrodite, it seems likely that the supposed war-god is really an armed Aphrodite, a goddess of Eastern origin (cf. i. 105 n.; Frazer, iii. 338; Farnell, ii. 653-4). The story of Telesilla then seems to be an aetiological myth, founded on a misunderstood rite and a misinterpreted oracle. Wells (*op. cit.* pp. 91-4) defends the historical character of the tale of Telesilla.

ἀμφιδρυφέας = Homeric (Il. ii. 700), as are κῦδος ἄρεσθαι, ἐπεσσομένων, δοῦρι δαμασθείς.

ὄφης = Argos. Δωριεῖς καὶ μάλιστα Ἀργεῖοι τὴν ὄφιν ἄργαν ἐκάλουν, Bekker, Anec. 442. Again, Ἀργειφόντης, the title of Hermes, who slew Argos or Panoptes, was interpreted as ὀφιοκτόνος. Hence, though the proper crest of Argos is the wolf or wolf's head (Busolt, i. 214), the serpent is used as the symbol of Argos (Soph. Ant. 125) and borne as arms by Adrastus (Eur. Phoen. 1137). It may be added that Sepeia gives further point, since like Mount Sepia in Arcadia, it doubtless got its name from the presence there of the σήψ, a dangerous viper (= ὄφης) described by Pausanias. See Paus. viii. 4. 7, 16. 2, Frazer, *ad loc.*

τριέλκτος, 'of three coils' (cf. τρικάρηνος, ix. 81 n.), an inferior variant *metri gratia* for ἀέλκτος, 'coilless.'

- 3 ταῦτα πάντα συνελθόντα: loosely used of two things (cf. v. 36. 1), said by Stein to be the invasion and the oracle, but this is vague and unsatisfactory. Bury (Klio ii. 19) ingeniously suggests that one portent (ὄφης τριέλκτος) was realized, in that Sepeia, the place of snakes, was in danger, and the other, the driving forth of the male by the female, in that the waters of the river Erasinus, a male divinity, were driven forth by the Stymphalian lake, a female (cf. 76). The explanation is far-fetched, but not more so than other interpretations. It might well have occurred to the Argives, though not contemplated at Delphi.

- 78 Polyaeus (Strat. i. 14) repeats the improbable story here given. Plutarch (Mor. 223) says Cleomenes tricked the Argives by agreeing to a truce for seven *days*, and attacking them on the third *night*.

This may be an Argive excuse for defeat, but H.'s story may be 'a Spartan version devised to disguise the king's breach of faith' (Macan).

79 1 ἄποινα, 'ransom' (Homeric); cf. ix. 120. 3. For the tariff of two minas cf. v. 77. 3.

80 The weight attached to the oracle by a king who knew that oracles could be bought (ch. 66), and who neither here nor elsewhere (at the Heraeum (81), at Eleusis (75), or at Athens (v. 72)), shrank from sacrilege, is a glaring inconsistency. It is most unlikely that Cleomenes after a great victory would allow himself to be robbed of its fruits by any such scruple. More probable explanations of his failure to attack the town are (1) the bribery alleged (ch. 82, cf. 72 n.); or (2) reluctance to face great loss of life in storming the wall, and consciousness of the Spartans lack of skill in siege operations (ix. 70; Thuc. i. 102; cf. Busolt, *Lakedaimonier*, i. 335); or (3) unwillingness to destroy Argos, 'the kite which frightened the other cities of the Akte to take refuge under the wing of Sparta,' and by her close connexion with Aegina kept Corinth loyal to Sparta (Grundy, Thuc. i. 223; J. H. S. xxviii. 85).

81 The Heraeum stood on a terraced hill at the foot of a bare steep mountain, some forty-five stades north-east of Argos, and but twenty-five south-east from Mycenae, with which it was connected by a sacred road. The temple entered by Cleomenes was burnt down in 423 B. C. (Thuc. iv. 133), and a new one built immediately below it. For a summary of the results of the American excavations cf. Frazer, Paus. iii. 165-79 and v. 561-2.

ὁ ἱεὺς. Probably a subordinate attendant (ξήκορος). Cleomenes would hardly have scourged the *priestess* of Hera (cf. i. 31). For the incident cf. v. 72.

82 1 ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐφόρους. The ephors may have held a preliminary inquiry, but such a charge must have come before the court described in v. 40 n.; cf. vi. 72, 85.

2 αἰρεῖν ἄν = in direct narration ἤρεον ἄν, *capere* m. The infinitive, like πεποιῆσθαι, seems to be loosely dependent on μαθεῖν. 'I should have perceived I was destined to take.'

κατ' ἄκρης: cf. 18. Had the flame appeared at the head (ἄκρη = κεφαλὴ) the conquest of Argos would have been complete (κατ' ἄκρης).

πιστά τε καὶ οἰκότα. The explanation for which H. pointedly refuses to be responsible (§ 1) was satisfactory to the Spartans. Probably the plea was really used by Cleomenes and became the official Spartan account.

83 1 ἀνδρῶν ἐχθρώθη: cf. Solon, fr. 37. 4 πολλῶν ἄν ἀνδρῶν ἥδ' ἐχθρώθη πόλις, Hom. Il. v. 642, Verg. Aen. viii. 571. The number of fallen is given as 6,000 by H. (vii. 148. 2), as 5,000 by Pausanias (iii. 4. 1). Later Argive tradition (ridiculed by Plutarch, Mor. 245) chose the sacred number 7,777, but this, as well as the stories that Cleomenes



made a truce for *seven* days (Plut. Mor. 223) and that the battle was fought on the *seventh* day of the month (Ar. Pol. v. 3. 7, 1303 a 6), is no doubt due to the connexion with the festival of the Hubristika.

οἱ δοῦλοι. There appear to have been at Argos serfs (known as Γυνήσιοι), resembling the Spartan Helots (Pollux, iii. 83), who might be described as δοῦλοι, though, like the Helots, they served as light-armed. Plutarch, however (Mor. 243), attacks H. for this statement (ἐπανορθούμενοι δὲ τὴν ὀλιγανδρίαν, οὐχ ὥς Ἡρόδοτος ἱστορεῖ τοῖς δούλοις, ἀλλὰ τῶν περιόικων ποιησάμενοι πολίτας τοὺς ἀρίστους συνώκισαι τὰς γυναῖκας), clearly meaning that dependants of the same type as the Spartan Perioeci were granted citizenship and *connubium*. Aristotle (I. c.): ἐν Ἀργεὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἡγαγάνθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιόικων τινάς is generally interpreted (Gilbert, Gr. Staats, ii. 75; Susemihl, *ad loc.*) in agreement with Plutarch; but Newman (*ad loc.*) holds that there as elsewhere Aristotle means by 'Perioeci' serfs. If so, H. is justified in calling them δοῦλοι. For a fuller account of the troubles of the Argives cf. P. A. Seymour in J. H. S. xlii, pp. 24 f. *Annals, CE 1960*.

Though Argos was professedly neutral in the Persian war, Tiryns and Mycenae sent hoplites to Plataea (ix. 28. 4) and had their names inscribed on the three-headed snake (ix. 81 n.). They were therefore at that period independent. For the remains of Tiryns see Frazer, iii. 217-30.

- 2 Φιγαλεὺς. Phigaleia is south-west Arcadia, near the Messenian frontier, and is built on a high plateau, bounded by deep glens, surrounded on three sides by mountains. Four miles off is the famous temple of Bassae (Frazer, Paus. iv. 390-404).

The war ended in the destruction of Tiryns and Mycenae (Paus. v. 23. 3; vii. 25. 6; ii. 16. 5; 25. 8). An aggressive war on the part of Tiryns is only conceivable if Argos was engaged elsewhere. Now about 472 Argos was allied to Tegea against the Spartans (cf. ix. 35 n.), by whom the allies were defeated near Tegea, but in the next great battle, fought by the Arcadians against the Spartans at Dipaea (circ. 470), the Argives took no part. The suggestion seems probable that Tiryns was encouraged to attack Argos by the battle of Tegea, and that the Argives were absent from the field of Dipaea because they were fully occupied in the siege of Tiryns, which was obstinately defended (Busolt, iii. 121 f.). Possibly Mycenae too fell at this time (468 B. C.). More probably, however, it was while Sparta was occupied with the Helot revolt after 464 B. C. (Diod. xi. 65); cf. Busolt, iii. 244; Meyer, iii, § 325. Neither city was left so completely desolate as Strabo (372) implies, as is proved by remains at Mycenae (Frazer, iii. 97 f.). Tirynthians found refuge at Halieis (viii. 137. 2 n.).

- 34 2 τοὺς νομάδας: of the whole nation (cf. iv. 11. 1), not the particular section (iv. 19). This programme of a joint attack on the Persian is even more magnificent than the scheme of Aristagoras (v. 49-54).

But it is even less likely to have been conceived by a Scyth than by the astute Milesian. The whole story seems like a spiteful bit of gossip invented to explain the term ἐπισκυθίζειν. For Scythian raids on upper Asia cf. i. 104. 2; iv. 11. 1; 12. 3; and Append. XII.

- 3 ἀκρητοποσίην. The Greeks diluted their wine with water, and to drink undiluted wine was dangerous and barbaric. Athen. 36 b ἐὰν δ' ἴσος ἴσῳ προσφέρῃ, μανίαν ποιεῖ Ἐὰν δ' ἄκρατον, παράλυσιν τῶν σωμάτων: Plato, Laws 637 E Σκύθαι δὲ καὶ Θράκες ἀκράτῳ παντάσῃ χρώμενοι, κτλ.

Ἐπισκυθίσον, 'pour in Scythian style,' i. e. unmixed wine. (We may compare the use of ἀποσχυθίζειν for *scalping*, described in iv. 64. 2.) The verb may have had the origin here attributed to it (cf. Athenaeus x. 7, 427 b), but Anacreon (fl. 540 B. C.) is quoted (Athen. l. c.) for a similar phrase and practice: Σκυθικὴν πόσιν παρ' οἴνῳ μελετῶμεν.

- 85-93 *The refusal of Athens to restore at the request of Leotychides the Aeginetan hostages leads to renewed hostilities between Aegina and Athens.*

The change in Spartan policy, indicated by the demand for the restoration of the Aeginetan hostages, is in all probability subsequent to the battle of Marathon and the Parian expedition, its motive being fear of Athenian ambition. For the chronology cf. ch. 93 n.

- 85 For the hostages cf. ch. 73, and for the court v. 40 n.

2 ὅπως . . . μὴ . . . ἐσβάλωσι. Only here does H. use independent ὅπως μὴ with the subjunctive, expressing a desire to avert something (Goodwin, §§ 278, 280; v. 79. 2 n.).

- 86 The beautiful tale of Glaucus, with its high moral, is strangely placed in the mouth of a man who had reached the throne by corruption of the Pythia (ch. 65), and who was himself corrupt (ch. 72). Neither this nor the inexactitude of the parallel between Glaucus and the Athenians induces H. to sacrifice so good a story.

1 προφάσις εἰλκον: perhaps 'lengthen out excuses', but 'drag in by the hair of the head' would suit Arist. Lys. 726 πάσας τε προφάσεις ὥστ' ἀπελθεῖν οἴκαδε | ἔλκουσιν.

- 2 κατὰ . . . ἱμέο: *avorum memoria*, i. e. circ. 550 B. C., when Miletus was much troubled by internal dissensions (v. 28 n.).

3 ἱκνευμένῳ, 'at the appointed time,' *fatali tempore*, 'in the fullness of time'; cf. 65. 3 n. The fall of a house is the work of fate, no mere chance.

5 ἀποδοῦναι: infinitive for imperative, usually, as here, joined with an imperative; cf. iii. 134. 5, 155. 5; v. 23. 3.

β σύμβολα might be merely the token of friendship (*tessera hospitalis*; cf. schol. ad Eur. Med. 613), which would prove to Glaucus that the applicants were heirs of the Milesian, but here

probably = tallies, proofs of the agreement such as two halves of a broken coin.

- 2 με περιφέρει, 'nothing you say brings me to remember the fact.' περιφέρει is here active, 'remettre en mémoire'; cf. Plat. Laches 180 E περιφέρει δέ τις με καὶ μνήμη ἄρτι τῶνδε λεγόντων.

νόμοισι: the common laws of the Greeks, recognized by Spartan and Ionian alike. Glaucus will make a public and legal disavowal of the deposit on oath (cf. γ).

- γ 1 λήσσηται: cf. iii. 47. 2, and especially Hesiod, Ἔργα 322 εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίη μέγαν ὄλβον ἔλθται, | ἥ ὅγ' ἀπὸ γλώσσης λήσσηται κτλ.

- 2 Ὀρκου πάῤ. The punishment for the broken oath personified, yet without name or visible form. For similar phrases cf. viii. 77 n.; Epicharm. fr. 150 ἐγγύας ἅτα 'στι θυγάτηρ, ἐγγύα δὲ ζαμίας. In Hesiod Ὀρκος himself punishes perjury. Theog. 231 Ὀρκον θ' ὅς δὴ πλείστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους | πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἐκὼν ἐπιόρκον ὁμόςση. Cf. also Ἔργα 219.

ἀνδρός. The line is from Hesiod, where ἀμείνων = *beatior*, and is contrasted with ἀμαυροτέρη. Ἔργ. 285 ὅς δέ κε μαρτυρήσιν ἐκὼν ἐπιόρκον ὁμόσας ψεύσεται, . . . | τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται, | ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων. The penalty of the destruction of the house, which would leave the dead ancestors without the honours due to them, the gods without their sacrifices, the hearth without its flame, is the most fearful known to the primitive moralist. Individual punishment in the life after death is a later idea.

It was a maxim in Attic law τὸν βουλευσάντα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνέχεσθαι καὶ τὸν τῇ χειρὶ ἐργασάμενον (Andoc. de Myst. § 90). For the wickedness of tempting God cf. i. 159.

- 87 τῶν πρότερον ἀδικημάτων: cf. v. 81. H. regards the Aeginetans as again the aggressors, though they might justly complain of the refusal of Athens to restore the hostages.

πεντετηρίς: a quadrennial festival like the Panathenaea (ch. iii. 2, v. 56). A regatta was held off Sunium (Lys. xxi. 5), probably in honour of Poseidon (Paus. ii. 35. 1), to whom the great temple on the cape was dedicated (viii. 121 n.), while that of Athena (Paus. i. 1) lay a quarter of a mile to the north-east. For Greek boat-races cf. P. Gardner, J. H. S. ii. 90 f., 315 f., xi. 146 f.

τὴν θεωρίδα: the ship conveying the θεωροί from Athens to Sunium. Macan (App. VIII, § 5) ingeniously suggests that these captives were exchanged for the Aeginetan hostages. Both, in spite of their importance (78), disappear henceforth from view.

- 88 Κνοίθου καλεόμενος, 'son of Cnoethus,' an expression not uncommon in poetry. Cf. also vii. 143. 1 and Thuc. viii. 6.

τὴν παλαιήν. Probably the old city was some few miles from the coast, as was the ancient practice (Thuc. i. 7).

- 89 τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. Corinth had twice saved Athens from Spartan

aggression about 506 B.C. (v. 75, 92), and had long found it to her interest to support Athens against the stronger power of Aegina. Her friendship did not survive the creation of the great Athenian navy by Themistocles (vii. 144), as is shown by the enmity of Adimantus in 480 B.C. (viii. 61 f.). It turned into active hostility circ. 458 B.C. (Thuc. i. 105 f.).

πενταδράχμους: five drachmas (i.e. francs) a piece is of course a nominal price.

For the Corinthians' conduct cf. Thuc. i. 41 νεῶν γὰρ μακρὸν σπανίσαντες ποτε πρὸς τὸν Αἰγινήτων ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ πόλεμον παρὰ Κορινθίων εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐλάβετε.

The number of the Athenian ships, fifty, making with twenty Corinthian vessels the total seventy, may be an inference from the fifty naucraries of the Cleisthenic constitution (Cleidemus, fr. 8, F. H. G. i. 360). In ch. 132 the Athenian fleet sent to Paros is seventy sail, as is the Aeginetan in ch. 92. 1; but these numbers may rest on the total given here, the Aeginetan fleet being presumed to be equal in number to the enemy; and even if the number of Miltiades' fleet be correct, we may suppose that it included as transports ships unfit for action, or, again, that the Athenian navy had been allowed to decay between 489 and 486 B.C. Macan indeed argues that though the principal war is subsequent to Marathon, the Corinthian loan of ships must be placed earlier (possibly during the Ionic revolt, 498 B.C.), because '(1) Miltiades took seventy ships to Paros, (2) it is scarcely credible the Corinthian gift to Athens was after Marathon'. But the loan of ships can hardly be separated from the great war which he rightly places circ. 486 (cf. *inf.* ch. 93 n.), and Corinth would still prefer Athens to Aegina till Themistocles made the navy of Athens superior; so it is easier to suppose an error in the number of Miltiades' fleet than to dislocate the whole narrative of Herodotus.

90 With this settlement of raiding exiles cf. the Corcyreans at Mount Istone (Thuc. iii. 85; iv. 46), Messenians at Pylos (Thuc. iv. 41; v. 56), Samians at Anaëa (Thuc. iv. 75), Lesbians at Rhoeteum and Antandrus (Thuc. iv. 52, 75).

91 1 ὕστερον: i.e. on any theory after 490 B.C., the rising of Nicodromus being probably in H.'s view before Marathon. Even if the rising be dated 486 B.C. there is still room for an interval, as the war with Aegina went on till 481 (vii. 144. 1, 145. 1).

ἐκπεσόντες πρότερον. Cf. Thuc. ii. 27 (431 B.C.) 'Ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ Αἰγινίτας τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐξ Αἰγίνης Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐτοὺς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας, ἐπικαλέσαντες οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσιν αἰτίους εἶναι. . . . ἐκπεσοῦσι δὲ τοῖς Αἰγινήταις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔδοσαν Θυρέαν οἰκεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν νέμεσθαι. It is characteristic that Thucydides should give the political ground and that H. should palliate Athenian violence by representing the expulsion of the Aeginetans as a consequence of their own impiety. This notice of the expulsion of the

Aeginetans 431 B.C. is one of the latest references in H.'s work, and written when old stories were eagerly raked up at Athens against the Aeginetans. The historian can hardly have known of the later extirpation of the Aeginetans settled at Thyrea in 424 B.C. (Thuc. iv. 57) or he would not have failed to allude to it (cf. *Intro.* § 9).

2 *θεσμοφόρον*: cf. ii. 171. 2 n.; vi. 16. 2.

92 1 *ἑβδομήκοντα*: cf. 89 n. The Aeginetans put only thirty ships in line at Salamis, though they had some others (perhaps twelve) manned (viii. 46 n.).

*τοὺς . . . πρότερον*: cf. v. 86. 4. The town of Aegina was besieged (ix. 75).

*ἀνάγκη λαμβθεῖσαι* is the historian's, or the Aeginetans', excuse for sending the ships.

2 Since Sicyon paid the fine, at a time when Argos was too weak to enforce it, probably Argos had the right to impose it, as head of a religious association and guardian of the temple of Apollo Pythaeus (Thuc. v. 53. 47, with Busolt, *Lakedaimonier*, p. 83 f.). But the presidency of a religious amphictyony could be, and was by Pheidon, used to advance a claim to political suzerainty over the whole 'lot of Temenus'.

*πεντάεθλον ἐπασκῆσας* (cf. ix. 105). 'Having practised the pentathlon' (cf. ix. 75) implies a victory which Pausanias (i. 29. 5) tells us was won at Nemea. For the Pentathlon cf. ix. 33. 2 n.

3 *ἐπασκῆων*: practising, i.e. engaging in single combat. Cf. ii. 77. 1, 166. 2; iii. 82. 3.

For Sophanes cf. ix. 74, 75, and for Decelea ix. 73.

93 The story breaks off short. Apparently the Athenians are successful both on sea (92. 1; Thuc. i. 41) and land (92. 3); yet we find their fleet in disorder (93), and defeated with the loss of four ships. No doubt the Argive corps suffered severely in the land-fight, but only a success of the Aeginetans on land can account for a second sea-battle, and the disorder and final retreat of the Athenians. Hence it has been proposed to transfer to this war the events given by H. as the Argive and Aeginetan version of the earlier war (v. 86, 87 n.; Busolt, ii. 648). That Aegina had the better in the war is proved by the increase of the Athenian navy, which was justified by the exigencies of this war.

The date of this war has been much discussed. H. placed its outbreak before Marathon, as is shown by its position in his narrative and by the pluperfect in ch. 94: *Ἀθηναίοισι μὲν δὴ πόλεμος συνῆπτο πρὸς Αἰγινήτας, ὃ δὲ Πέρσης τὸ ἑωυτοῦ ἐποίησε*. But the reasons for preferring a later date (circ. 488–486) are very strong.

1. The accession of Leotychides, since it follows the arrival of the heralds of Darius, must be placed late in 491 B.C. There is not time before Marathon (490 B.C.) for the discovery of the corruption of the Pythia, the exile of Cleomenes, his restoration and his death



(85. 1). Yet his death preceded the demand for the return of the hostages, which led to this war.

2. The Aeginetan war is always treated as the ground or pretext for the creation of a great Athenian navy by Themistocles (vii. 144; Thuc. i. 14), dated by Ath. Pol. 22 to 483 B.C., and clearly immediately preceded the invasion of Xerxes, since in 480 the feud between Athens and Aegina is still the bitterest among patriotic Greeks (vii. 145). The connexion of the Aeginetan war with the Attic navy dates it to the years preceding Salamis. Did the war belong to 491–490 B.C. we might well ask what were the Aeginetans about when Datis and Artaphrenes sacked Eretria and threatened Athens.

3. The oracle (v. 89) bidding the Athenians wait thirty years for their revenge would seem to be a *vaticinium post eventum* dating from 458 B.C., when Aegina was reduced. If so, it would refer to the greatest war between Athens and Aegina and would date it about 488 B.C. (cf. v. 89 n.). (1. 49)

4. If the Argive war of Cleomenes be correctly placed, circ. 495 B.C. (cf. App. XVII. 3), it would be barely possible that Argos should send a thousand volunteers as early as 490 B.C., though she might have sufficiently recovered to do so four years later. On the whole question cf. Macan, App. VIII, §§ 5, 6; Busolt, ii. 644 f.

5. The dispatch of the whole navy (cf. 89 n.) to Paros in 489 B.C. is irreconcilable with a still undecided struggle with Aegina.

94–101 *Datis and Artaphrenes sail across the Aegean, conquering Naxos and the Cyclades, Carystus, and Eretria. Note on Delos and its earthquake (97, 98).*

94 I δ Πέρσης: the Persian king (i. 80. 4; ii. 137. 2) resumed in ó Δαρείος (cf. vii. 165; v. 1. 2).

Πεισιστρατιδῶν. In v. 96 (circ. 507) Hippias is intriguing from Sigeium, in 490 (as later, vii. 6) Pisistratidae are at the Persian court; cf. Thuc. vi. 59.

2 Μῆδον. Medes were occasionally employed in high commands, Mazares (i. 156 f.) and Harpagus (i. 162 f.) by Cyrus, the sons of Datis (vii. 38) by Xerxes, and by Darius earlier in his reign, Tachamaspatas, and Intaphres (Behist. Inscr. ii. 14. 6; iii. 14. 3). Here Datis is evidently in command; Artaphrenes, who was probably still young, seems to hold an honorary position. He is son (vii. 74) of Artaphrenes, brother of Darius, once satrap of Sardis (v. 25 f.).

95 I Ἀλῆιον πεδίον, said to derive its name from a town Alae (Steph. Byz.), is a rich plain, inland from Mallus, between the rivers Sarus and Pyramus (Arrian, Anab. ii. 5; Strabo 676). The name at least is Homeric; cf. Il. vi. 201 Βελλεροφόντης . . . καὶ πεδίον τὸ Ἀλῆιον

οἶος ἀλάτο. The military road from the Euphrates through the Cilician gates to Tarsus, used by the younger Cyrus, traversed this plain.

ἐπιταχθεῖς: ordered the year before (491 B.C.); cf. 48. 2.

Warships for the transport of horses were a novelty at Athens in 430 B.C. (Thuc. ii. 56), so their early use by the Persians is to be noted.

- 2 ἐξακοσίησι. This does not include the horse transports, and since it appears to be a conventional number for a great Persian fleet (cf. App. XIX, § 2), cannot safely be used as a basis for calculating the Persian force at Marathon, though it may exclude the exaggerated totals given by late authors (cf. 117 n.).

To H. the natural course is to coast round the shores of the Aegean, as did Mardonius (ch. 43) and Xerxes (Bk. VII). διὰ νήσων is the technical term for the opposite course by the open sea between the islands, i. e. the Cyclades; cf. v. 30, 31.

προτέρω: a slip on the part of the historian, as the disaster at Athos (ch. 45, 46) took place the year before the preparations of Darius, which are just above said to be τῷ προτέρῳ ἔτει.

- 96 Ἰκάριον. The Icarian sea reached from Chios to Cos, where the Carpathian began (Strabo 488). Icarus itself (95. 2) is due west of Samos.

τῶν πρότερον: cf. v. 34. Though the resistance of the Naxians was successful in 500 B.C., the hardships of the four months' siege may have been severe. Further, the failure of the Ionic revolt had no doubt dispirited the Greeks of the islands. Plutarch (de Mal. Her. 36, Mor. 869 B) follows the Naxian chroniclers (ᾠρογράφοι) in declaring that Datis, after laying waste the town and part of the island, was repulsed by the Naxians. But the subjugation of Naxos is proved by viii. 46. 3, and could only be doubted by a blind patriotism.

ὄρεα: the interior of Naxos is mountainous. The capital was on the north-west coast.

- 97 1 Δῆλος. For a summary of the history of Delos, and the antiquities discovered by the French excavators, see Jebb, J. H. S. i, pp. 7-62; and for a general description of Delos, Rhenea, and Tenos, Tozer, Isl. Aeg. i. Tenos is some thirteen miles due north of Delos. Rhenea is but half a mile away and is much larger than Delos, to which, however, Polycrates made it an appendage. The sacred associations of Delos did not extend to Rhenea, hence it served as the Delian necropolis (Strabo 486; cf. Thuc. iii. 104).

- 2 οἱ δύο θεοί: Apollo and Artemis (iv. 35. 2). The Persians may well have seen in them their own gods of sun and moon, Mithra and Mah (cf. i. 131. 2). But Datis may also have wished to please his Ionian sailors, or have been influenced by Hippias. To turn the religious meetings of Ionians at Delos to political account is an idea of Pisistratus (Thuc. iii. 104) which may well have been

adopted by Hippias, as it was later by democratic Athens. In any case toleration was the policy of the Persian monarchs (E. Meyer, iii, § 57), and in particular of Darius; cf. his letter to Gadatas (Hicks, 20): *ὅτι δὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ θεῶν μου διαθέσιν ἀφανίζεις, δώσω σοὶ μὴ μεταβαλομένῳ πείραν ἡδικημένου θυμοῦ· φντοurgoὺς γὰρ ἱεροῦς Ἀπολλῶνος φόρον ἔπρασσες καὶ χώραν σκαπανέων βέβηλον ἐπέτασες, ἀγνοῶν ἐμῶν προγόνων εἰς τὸν θεὸν νοῦν.*

- 98 I καὶ Ἴωνας. The same kind of remark is made ii. 1. 2, iii. 1. 1. It may be added here to mark the fact that the Greeks of Asia and the Islands were now first compelled to fight against their kinsmen in the mother country (Abbott).

*σεισθεῖσα.* Thucydides (ii. 8), speaking of 431 B. C. says *ἔτι δὲ Δῆλος ἐκινήθη ὀλίγον πρὸ τούτων, πρότερον οὐπω σεισθεῖσα ἀφ' οὗ Ἕλληνες μέμνηται· ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ ἐδόκει ἐπὶ τοῖς μέλλουσι γενήσεσθαι σημῆναι.* It can hardly be doubted that Delian tradition, as H. says, recognized only one earthquake, and that Thucydides is deliberately correcting the date given by his predecessor. Nor can H., when he visited Delos (cf. *ὡς ἔλεγον Δῆλιοι, μέχρι ἐμεῦ*), or when he wrote the passage, as it would seem (c. 92) after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, have heard of more than one earthquake. Hence it is unlikely that the historians refer to two separate earthquakes. It is, however, probable that both misdated the earthquake. H. must be taken to mean soon after the departure of Datis, i. e. 490 B. C., or at least before the invasion of Xerxes in 480 B. C. Thucydides, although a little later (ii. 16) he says *ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄρτι ἀνελιφότες τὰς κατασκευὰς μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά*, can hardly have intended any date before 445 by the phrase *ὀλίγον πρὸ τούτων*. Possibly the earthquake really occurred some time before H.'s visit, circ. 460 B. C., and was connected by credulous piety either with the Persian or the Peloponnesian war, and its date altered accordingly. But certainty is unattainable.

According to Pindar (fr. 58 (65), ap. Strabo 485), Delos was borne about by winds and waves till Leto gave birth to her children there; afterwards it was firmly fixed, supported on four iron columns.

- 2 Darius reigned 522-486 B. C., Xerxes 486-465 B. C., Artaxerxes 465-424 B. C. (vii. 4 n.). The words do not imply that Artaxerxes' reign was over, nor does H. elsewhere refer clearly to an event so late. Cf. *Intro.* § 9. Yet the identification of these three reigns with three generations—that is, one hundred years (ii. 142. 2)—implies that the passage was written nearly a century after the accession of Darius; and though the war between the leaders of Greece might be the battle of Tanagra, and other hostilities before 445 B. C., the phrase has far more point if written in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. Twenty generations = 666½ years (ii. 142. 2), so the period intended is 1189-522 B. C. H. seems to place the Trojan war circ. 1260 B. C. (ii. 145 *ad fin.*), and the Dorian migration was usually dated some eighty years later, so that the

meaning would be that never since the return of the Heracleids had Greece been so troubled.

- 3 ἀεικής: poetical=οὐκ εἰκός, 'wonderful, extraordinary'; cf. iii. 33. The un-Herodotean phrase ἐν χρησμῷ ἦν γεγραμμένον betrays the interpolation of the quotation.

δύναται . . . καλείεν. These words have but a slight connexion with the context, and look like a footnote appended either by the historian or by a commentator. The ignorance of Persian is similar to that shown elsewhere (cf. i. 131, 139 nn.).

The author evidently believes that Artaxerxes is a compound of Xerxes, whereas the Persian forms Khshayârshâ and Artakhshathra are plainly distinct. Nor are the translations in any sense accurate. Dârayavau probably means 'he who holds goods', *bonorum possessor*, though it might perhaps mean 'he who holds back', Greek ἑκτωρ, Lat. *coercitor*. Khshayârshâ='the mighty prince'. If Khshaya can=Shah, or prince, since *arsha* is clearly ἀρσην (cf. Arsames, Arsakes), 'strong, mighty,' Artakhshathra (later Ardashir)='he whose kingdom or rule is perfect.' Arta=perfect, *excelsum*; shathra=*regnum*. See further Darmesteter in Abbott, p. 330, and Meyer, Forsch. i. 194-5. A. B. Cook (Cl. R. xxi. 169) would rewrite the passage Δαρείος ἀρηίος, Ξέρξης ἐρξίης, Ἀρταξέρξης κάρτα ἐρξίης, so as to connect the Persian names with the Greek words similar to them.

- 99 2 Carystus, famous for its green and white marble (*cipollino*), lay in a deep bay on the south coast of Euboea. The Carystians, being Dryopians (Thuc. vii. 57), were not kinsmen of Ionians. Their unwillingness to attack their neighbours may have been prompted by trade connexions (iv. 33 n.). They suffered later for yielding now and for joining Xerxes in 480 B.C. (viii. 66. 112). Indeed, their subjugation by Athens (ix. 105; Thuc. i. 98) was doubtless justified by the charge of Medism.

- 100 1 τοὺς τετρακισχιλίους: cf. v. 77. 2 n.

Clearly H. is anxious to justify the Athenian people for not sending succour from Attica, and the Athenian cleruchs for leaving Eretria to its fate, by emphasizing the divided counsels and positive treachery of the Eretrians. After Marathon it may well have been thought that a bold stand might have been made at Eretria. At the time so heroic a counsel could only be justified if the Eretrians, like the Athenians, were willing to meet the Persians in the open field. It is likely enough that in Eretria, which had favoured Pisistratus (i. 62), the Medizing party was strong, but H. implies that there was but one true man, Aeschines, in a rotten State. Curiously enough Xenophon (Hell. iii. 1. 6) says there was but one Eretrian who Medized, Gongylus; and his treachery seems to have been of later date, as he is lieutenant and agent of Pausanias in Byzantium B.C. 478-477 (Thuc. i. 128). For his reward cf. ch. 42 n.

ιδέας, 'their thoughts took two shapes or forms'; cf. 119. 2. So too ὁδός, i. 95. 1; ii. 20. 1.

3 τὰ πρῶτα: *unus e primoribus*. Cf. ix. 78. i; iii. 157. 4 n.; also Arist. Ran. 421; Eur. Med. 917. In imitation Lucretius i. 86 'Ductores Danaum delecti, prima virorum'.

101 I Ταμύνας: cf. Strabo 448 ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἐρετρικῇ πόλιν ἦν Ταμύναι πλησίον τοῦ Πορθμοῦ. The other places were probably dependent villages (Bähr). *Wahne, Heine 1947, 130ff.*

3 ἐνέπρησαν. A distinction seems to be drawn between the enslavement of the men by order of Darius (94. 2) and this perhaps unauthorized act of vengeance. The burning of temples is not infrequent (v. 102 n.), but the motive of the war was not religious, nor should this view be attributed to H. (as by Wecklein, Ber. der Bayer. Akad. (1878), 263 f.). Eretria (for whose earlier history cf. v. 99 n.) never recovered after its destruction, though it was rebuilt on the old site (American Journal of Archaeology, vii, 233 f.), and sent seven ships to Salamis (viii. 46. 2), and, with its colony Styra, 600 hoplites to Plataea (ix. 28. 5).

102-8 *The preliminaries of the battle of Marathon. The Persian landing, the generalship of Miltiades, the appeal to Sparta for aid, and the coming of the Plataeans.*

102 κατέρχοντες τε πολλόν. If the text be sound, κατέρχοντες is probably transitive, 'bringing the Athenians into great straits' (cf. v. 63. 4), not intransitive, 'in great haste'.

Μαραθών: here used for the whole district, the Tetrapolis, not merely the deme of Marathon. But it is not so near Eretria as Rhamnus or Oropus, and not such good ground for cavalry as the Athenian or the Thriasian plains. Though the plain of Marathon extends in a perfect level along the bay, and is in length about six miles, and in breadth at least a mile and a half, the ground is by no means as favourable to the Persians as it appeared. It is divided into two halves by a mountain torrent (Charadra) which rushes down from Mount Pentelicus. And the apparent length of the plain is deceptive, for at either extremity there is a marsh. That on the south-west is small, but that on the north-east is extensive and impassable, reaching from the mountains almost to the sea. On the reasons for landing at Marathon, and for the absence of the Persian horse from the battle, cf. App. XVIII, §§ 5, 8.

103 I Cf. Ath. Pol. 22 (501 B. C.) ἔπειτα τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἡρουντο κατὰ φυλάς, ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἓνα, τῆς δὲ ἀπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμῶν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος.

ὁ δέκατος. Stein holds that the order of the Strategi followed the annual order of the tribes (cf. 111 n.) which they commanded, and to which they belonged, and that in this year the Oeneid tribe to which Miltiades of Laciadae belonged must have been tenth and last: but the phrase suggests rather δέκατος αὐτός (Thuc. i. 116, ii. 13), which implies superiority over colleagues.



2 τὠντὸ ἐξενείκασθαι, 'to win the same honours with.' For the fact cf. 36. 1.

3 As Pisistratus died in 528-527, this third victory would fall in 524 B. C. (Olymp. 64).

πρυτανήιον. The Prytaneum stood later on the north-west of the Acropolis (Paus. i. 18. 3, with Frazer), and there seems no sufficient reason for the hypothesis (Curtius and Dörpfeld) of an earlier Prytaneum south of the Acropolis (E. A. Gardner, Athens, p. 126).

ὑπέισαντες. This is the only instance recorded in which the Athenian tyrants adopted Periander's policy (cf. v. 92 η 1 τοὺς ὑπερόχους . . . φονεύειν).

τέθαιπται : cf. Marcellinus, vit. Thuc. 17 πρὸς γὰρ ταῖς Μελιτίσι πύλαις καλουμέναις ἐστὶν ἐν Κοίλῃ τὰ καλούμενα Κιμώνια μνήματα. The gate was between the long walls (Gardner, Athens, 65-6), probably in the hollow between the hill of the Nymphs and that of the Pnyx, where the city deme Melite adjoins the suburban Koile. The tombs would be on either side the way just outside (πρό) the gate.

104 1 Cf. ch. 41.

2 οἱ ἐχθροί. These enemies were probably the same who prosecuted him later with more success (ch. 136), Xanthippus and his Alcmaeonid friends. They might easily excite the people against a tyrant whose dominion over the Chersonese had the support of the Pisistratidae, although his father had been murdered by them. For internal politics at Athens cf. v. 103 n., vi. 21 n. ; App. XVIII, § 6.

στρατηγός . . . αἰρεθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου. If this means election by the Ecclesia, and not by a single tribe, it is an anachronism (Ath. Pol. 22, cit. *sup.*), but probably H. is only contrasting the people as an electoral body with the judicial dicastery.

105 1 It is most improbable that Athens had no understanding with Sparta before the mission of Philippides. Indeed, his hasty dispatch by the generals seems an appeal to an existing ally to fulfil her obligations. But if, as Busolt (ii. 580) suggests, Sparta had concluded only an *ἐπιμαχία* with Athens, the *casus foederis* would only arise when the Persians directly attacked Attica (Thuc. i. 44 ; v. 47, 48, &c.). Nor could the Athenians reasonably demand aid until they had resolved to risk a battle in the field (Hauvette, 250).

Φιλιππίδης, though only found in the second family of MSS., is supported by the other authorities (Paus. i. 28. 4, viii. 54-6 ; Plut. Herod. Malign. 26, &c.), and almost certainly right. It is a common Athenian name (C. I. A.), whereas Pheidippides is a witticism of Aristophanes (Nub. 67), which he would hardly have dared to make had the name been consecrated in the tale of Marathon.

Mount Parthenion divides the little plain of Hysiae from that of Tegea. It is crossed directly by the 'ladder of the Bey', a path paved in Turkish style with large unhewn blocks, and one of the wildest and most desolate tracks in Greece (Paus. viii. 54. 6 ; cf. Frazer, iv. 446). Here we may believe Philippides saw the vision

of Pan, though the sanctuary is placed by M. Bérard on the circuitous carriage-road, where he found an inscription on bronze.

- 3 Πανὸς ἱόν. The grotto of Pan and of Apollo have been excavated by M. Cavvadias (1897). There are two caves with narrow entrances, partly blocked by natural pillars of rock, so that they offer complete seclusion, though but narrow space within. These would be suitable for the secret meetings of Apollo and Creusa (Ion 10 f., 492 f., 936 f.), which Pausanias (i. 28. 4) places in the cave of Apollo, but Euripides in that of Pan, as does Aristophanes that of Cinesias and Myrrhina (Lys. 911 f.). Subsequently the worship of Apollo seems to have been transferred to the more open cave where votive tablets were found (Gardner, Athens, p. 93 f.; for a full discussion with plan cf. D'Ooge, Acropolis, pp. 6-9), the more secret caves being now the shrine of Pan. In the grotto was a statue of Pan (Anthol. Plan. 232; cf. 259) with an inscription ascribed to Simonides, fr. 136 τὸν τραγόπουν ἐμὲ Πᾶνα, τὸν Ἀρκάδα, τὸν κατὰ Μῆδων, | τὸν μετ' Ἀθηναίων στήσατο Μιλτιάδης. Such a statue, now at Cambridge, was discovered in a garden at the foot of the Acropolis, but it appears to have decorated a column or balustrade like the similar statue found in Peiraeus (Michaelis, Ancient Marbles in Great Britain, p. 248). The representations of the cave of Pan on Attic coins of Antonine date, giving views of the Acropolis, appear to be too inaccurate to be of service (J. H. S. viii, pp. 24-5). His worship may have been established or revived by Cimon (καταστάντων σφι εὖ ἦδη τῶν πρηγμάτων). (Cf. Macan, ii. 153, 181.)

λαμπάδι = a torch-race (cf. viii. 98. 2 n.).

Browning in his Pheidippides (ii. 582, ed. 1896) accepts Lucian's addition to the story that Pheidippides ran back to fight at Marathon, and died after bringing the news of the victory to Athens, a feat commemorated by the Marathon races of to-day.

- 106 I δευτεραίος. Isocrates (Panath. 24) makes the distance 1,200 stades = 150 miles. Pliny (vii. § 84) 'cucurrisse MCLX (or, as quoted by Solinus, MCCXL) stadia ab Athenis Lacedaemonem biduo Philippidem'. Pliny adds other and even more astounding long distance runs.

τοὺς ἄρχοντας: cf. iii. 46, and App. XVII, § 2.

- 2 ἀρχαιοτάτην: the regular Athenian claim (vii. 161. 3; Thuc. i. 2, 6).

- 3 μὴ οὐ might mean 'unless the moon be full that day' (cf. ch. 9. 1); but that a full moon should fall on the ninth of the month would imply a grossly disordered calendar, and the answer must be taken to mean that the Spartans could not go out on the 9th or any day till the 15th (full moon). The ancient authorities (Paus. i. 28. 4; Plut. *infr.*; Schol. Arist. Ach. 84, &c.) speak as if this rule was valid for all months, but H. may only mean it to apply to the month Carneius (Attic Metageitnion), when the Carneia, in honour of Apollo Carneius, were celebrated 7th-15th, i. e. up to the full moon





(Eur. Alc. 449–51), and all Dorians abstained from warfare (H. vii. 206; Thuc. v. 54. 75). It is, however, to be noticed that in other like cases (vii. 206, ix. 7) he specifies the festival which hindered action. Plutarch's criticism of H. (de Malign. 26) οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄλλας μυρίας ἐξόδους καὶ μάχας πεποιήνται μηνὸς ἱσταμένου μὴ περιμείναντες τὴν πανσέληνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτης τῆς μάχης ἐπὶ τῇ Βοηδρομιῶνος ἱσταμένου γενομένης ὀλίγον ἀπελείφθησαν is in the first part vague and inaccurate, and in the second rests on a confusion between the actual day of the battle and that of the yearly festival at which, in fulfilment of a vow of the Polemarch, five hundred goats were sacrificed to Artemis Agrotera (cf. Boeckh, Kl. Schr. iv. 85 f., vi. 329 f.). The most probable date is Metageitnion 17 = Sept. 12, i. e. the full moon of the month Metageitnion which preceded the festival. The speed of the Spartan march seems to show that their desire to help Athens was genuine, and that the battle took place on the first day it was lawful for them to march.

07 1 For the dream and its interpretation compare that of Caesar (Suet. ch. 7).

2 **Styra** is a town in south-west Euboea over against Marathon. Aegilia lies just off its harbour.

3 In many lands a sneeze is by itself regarded as ominous, and even to dream of losing a tooth portends death or misfortune (Class. Phil. i. 235; vi. 429 f.).

108 The ancient Marathon must be placed not at the modern Marathon, which is far too near Oenoe (Ninoi) and contains no ancient remains, but, with most topographers from Leake (Top. of Athens, ii. 89–92) to Milchöfer (Karten von Attika, text, iii, p. 52), at or near Vrana, a commanding site with abundant ancient remains. The camp of the Athenians was probably not at the Μάνδρα τῆς Γραίας (Lolling, M. A. I. i, p. 67 f.), since that enclosure seems to be the work of Herodes Atticus in later days and not the precinct of Heracles. Again, if the Athenian camp was in the side valley of Avlona the Persians would be hidden from the Athenians by the intervening ridge of Kotroni; this position too might be threatened in rear by a Persian advance up the Charadra past Oenoe, and would not have guarded the coast road to Athens by Pallene. Further this site, like that under Mount Agrieliki, preferred by Leake and Milchöfer (*l. c.*), is waterless. Hence the most suitable position for the Heracleum and the Athenian camp seems to be the convent of St. George on the spur of Mount Aphorismos above Vrana. This contains ancient remains, which may well be those of the Heracleum, the Christian champion having naturally replaced the heathen hero. Cf. Caspari, J. H. S. xxxi. 100 f. (See note, p. 415.)

1 ἐδεώκεσαν. According to Thucydides (iii. 68) this took place ninety-two years before the destruction of Plataea in 427 B.C., i. e. in 519–518 B.C., a date accepted by Curtius and E. Meyer (ii, § 478) and defended by Wells (J. H. S. xxv. 193 f.). But Herodotus (cf. v.



76) seems to know nothing of any Spartan expedition against Attica at that date, nor does he mention the presence (*παρευχούσι*) of Cleomenes in central Greece before his intervention in Attica after the fall of Hippias (509–508 B.C.). Again, an attempt to embroil Athens and Thebes is unlikely when Hippias was on good terms with Sparta (v. 91), but probable enough when Athens had asserted her independence. Busolt (ii. 399) and Macan (*ad loc.*) adopt Gutschmid's suggestion of an error of  $\Delta$  (=10) in an uncial MS. of Thucydides. Cf. further Grote (iv. 94), who first advocated the date 509 B.C., and, *per contra*, his editors (Abridgement, p. 82).

2 Cf. the speech of the Plataean orator in Thuc. iii. 55.

4 This altar, like that in the Pythium (cf. Hicks, 10), was set up by Pisistratus, son of Hippias, as archon in the Agora, and was afterwards enlarged (Thuc. vi. 54). It was the 'miliarium aureum' of Athens, whence roads in all directions started and distances were measured (ii. 7. 1; Arist. Av. 1005; C. I. A. ii. 1078). It was specially honoured with offerings and processions (Xen. Hipp. iii. 2; Pind. fr. 45). For its use as an asylum for suppliants cf. Diod. xii. 39; Plut. Per. 31.

The twelve gods (ii. 4. 2) at Athens were Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Demeter, Apollo, Artemis, Hephaestus, Athene, Ares, Aphrodite, Hermes, Hestia. Cf. the Borghese altar in the Louvre and Bau-meister (*s. v.* Zwölfgötter).

5 For the policy of Corinth cf. ch. 89; v. 75, 92. *(cf. Cleomenes)*  
ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν (cf. 53. 1), 'to belong to the Boeotian league under Theban hegemony.'

τῇ μάχῃ: not the victory recorded in v. 77, for the battle here mentioned precedes the annexation of Hysiae by Athens. In v. 74 Hysiae is Athenian, but it is lost again to the Boeotians, in whose possession it was in 479 B.C. (ix. 15. 3, 25. 3).

109–17 *Battle of Marathon. The decision to fight. The rout of the Persians and the return of Miltiades to Athens. The losses on each side.*

109 2 ὁ τῷ κυάμφ λαχών. The lot was not reintroduced after the tyranny for the archonship till 487–486 B.C. Cf. Ath. Pol. 22 εὐθὺς δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει ἐπὶ Τελεσίνου ἀρχοντος ἐκνήμευσαν τοὺς ἐννέα ἀρχοντας κατὰ φυλὰς ἐκ τῶν προκριθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν πεντακοσίων τότε μετὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρῶτον· οἱ δὲ πρότεροι πάντες ἦσαν αἰρετοί. In this *obiter dictum* then H. is guilty of a slight anachronism, though he is careful to distinguish the duties of the polemarch at Marathon and in his own day.

τὸ παλαιόν. In later days the Polemarch had no military duties but retained jurisdiction over metics and privileged aliens, and also the right to offer certain sacrifices, e.g. those in commemoration of Marathon, and of Harmodius and Aristogiton (Ath. Pol. 58).

Like Callimachus, Harmodius and Aristogiton (v. 55, 57) were of Aphidna, a deme of the Aeantid tribe (ix. 73. 2).

3 πόλις . . . πρώτη. This confident prophecy of Athenian empire is an anachronism due to Herodotus or to his Philaid source.

5 σαθρόν: the metaphor appears to be taken from a squall (ἐμπεσοῦσαν διασεΐσειν) splitting a ship and causing a leak; cf. Plat. Gorg. 493 Ε ἀγγελία σαθρά. Miltiades' fear of a Medizing party hostile to the Athenian government was apparently well grounded; cf. chs. 115, 121, 124, and App. XVIII, § 6.

III ο πρυτανή: though not used in the same sense elsewhere, clearly means to H. 'the command' which he conceived as changing every day. This is confirmed by Plut. Arist. ch. 5, and believed by Diodorus (xiii. 97. 106) to have been the case at Arginusae and Aegospotami. Possibly, however, in the source followed by H., πρυτανεία may have been used more nearly in its ordinary sense to denote an order of precedence among the tribes and their commanders. Such an arrangement existed in Alexander's army (Arrian, i. 14. 6, 28. 3, &c.). In that case, however, the tribe of Miltiades (Oeneis presumably) should have been on the right wing on the day of the battle, but there is evidence to show it was not. Cf. ch. III n., and App. XVIII, § 4.

III I ἡγήετο. The right wing was the post of honour and of danger in Greek armies (ix. 28. 46; Thuc. v. 71), and was naturally led by the king (Eur. Supp. 657) and by his successor in command (Ath. Pol. 3. 2), the Polemarch; cf. App. XVIII, § 4.

ὡς ἀριθμέοντο αἱ φυλαί. The fixed official order instituted by Cleisthenes (v. 66. 2)—Erechtheis, Aegeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Acamantis, Oeneis, Cecropis, Hippothoontis, Aeantis, Antiochis—is followed on inscriptions of the time of the Peloponnesian war (C. I. A. i. 443, 446, 447). As arrangement by tribes is expressly attested by Pausanias (i. 32. 3) for the monument at Marathon, and is confirmed by the stele of the tribe Erechtheis (459-458 B.C., Hicks 26), this would seem to be the natural meaning here. It is, however, inconsistent with the traditions in Plutarch (Aristid. 5) that the tribes Antiochis and Leontis stood together in the centre, and (Mor. 628 D) that the Aeantis stood on the right of the line. The latter point is confirmed by a reference to an elegy of Aeschylus, and might be explained by the fact that the Polemarch belonged to the tribe Aeantis, only in that case H. would naturally have written αἱ ἄλλαι φυλαί. Plutarch implies (Mor. 628 D) that the Aeantis was πρυτανεύουσα φυλή at the time of Marathon. It is likely enough that the order of the tribes in battle was determined by lot, as was that of the Prytanies (Ath. Pol. 43. 2), but improbable that the two were identical. Stein's argument (ch. 103 n.) for placing the Oeneis under Miltiades on the left is not convincing.

2 Five such quadrennial festivals—Delia, Brauronia, Heracleia, Eleusinia, and Panathenaea—are enumerated (Ath. Pol. 54. 7;

cf. ch. 87 n.). Of these the Panathenaea was far the most important. κατεύχεται. The herald in the assembly (cf. Thuc. vi. 32) used this regular form of prayer.

- 3 ἐγίνετο τοιόνδε. It is most unlikely that this arrangement was accidental (Stein) or that this weakening of the centre is a fiction designed to explain its defeat. No doubt it was intended to prevent outflanking, but it would seem probable that the centre was obstructed by plantations of olives and vines (cf. Corn. Nep. 5), and that Miltiades therefore decided to concentrate a decisive force on either wing where the country was open, and suitable for a charge of hoplites (Caspari, J. H. S. xxxi. 103).

II2 I ἀπέιθσαν, 'were let go like runners' (cf. vii. 122).

δρόμῳ. The thrice-repeated statement that the Athenians charged at the double (§§ 2, 3) is not to be explained away as an inference from the festival of the Boedromia (A. Mommsen, Feste Athen. 176) or by making δρόμῳ the opposite of βάδην (ix. 57. 1), 'quick' and 'slow' march. On the other hand, an orderly and effective charge after a mile's run in full armour would be beyond the power of any large body of soldiers, however well trained. The 'mile', however, is probably an inference from the distance between the Athenian position near Vrana and the place where they charged the Persians near the Soros. No doubt the advance was rapid, but only for the last 200 yards, when within bowshot, would the Attic hoplites charge at full speed. I have shown (C.Q. xiii (1919), pp. 40-2) that in accounts of battles βάδην means 'at foot's pace', and δρόμῳ 'at the double'.

- 2 καὶ πάγχυ is best taken (Stein) with μανίην . . . ἐπέφερον (cf. viii. 10. 1 n. and the common use of τὸ κάρτα, i. 71. 2 = *haud dubie*): others would join it here with ὀλεθρίην.

ἵππου . . . τοξευμάτων (ix. 49. 3). The existence at Athens of a class of ἵππεῖς, and the alleged furnishing of two horsemen by each naucrary, might seem to prove that Athens possessed cavalry. But Helbig has shown (Les' Ἴππεῖς Athéniens, p. 191 f.) from vases, &c., that these knights were, at least till 478 B. C., equipped not as true cavalry but as mounted infantry. Hence Athens depended on Thessalian horse in 510 B. C. (v. 63), and in 490 B. C. had certainly no cavalry fit to meet the Persian (cf. also ix. 40, 68, 69). At Salamis (Plut. Them. 14; Aesch. Pers. 460) the Athenians had archers, and at Plataea (ix. 22. 1, 60. 3) a regular corps of bowmen. The barbarians' astonishment at the absence of these forces may fairly be held to imply the presence of archers on their side otherwise unmentioned. For the cavalry cf. App. XVIII, § 8.

- 3 πρῶτοι . . . ἀνίσχοντο. The statement, taken literally, is an exaggeration, disproved by the conduct of the Greeks in resisting the conquest of Ionia (i. 169) and in the Ionic revolt (v. 2, 102, 110, 113; vi. 28). Yet the fear of the Mede is proved by Theognis 764 πίνωμεν χαρίεντα μετ' ἀλλήλοισι λέγοντες | μηδὲν τὸν Μῆδων δειδιώτες πόλεμον (cf. 775), and the first occasion on which the Greeks won

a clear victory in the open field might well be described by an Athenian as the first occasion on which Greeks dared to face the Mede (cf. *Introd.* § 32 (2)). The Persians had borrowed the Medic dress (cf. i. 135 ; vii. 62).

- 113 I Πέρσαι... καὶ Σάκαι. The centre appears to have been the regular post of the best troops in Persian as in Turkish armies (cf. *Arrian*, *Anab.* ii. 8. 11 ; *Xen. Anab.* i. 8. 21-3), though not at Plataea (ix. 31). The Sacae or Amyrgian Scyths (iii. 93. 3 ; vii. 64. 2 nn.) were among the troops selected by Mardonius (viii. 113. 2).

The imperfects used throughout this chapter are not only graphic, but show that the actions recorded are continuous or incomplete.

- 114 In the picture of Marathon in the Stoa Poikile there were figures of Miltiades cheering on his men with extended hand (*Aeschin.* c. *Ctes.* iii. 186 ; *Corn. Nep. Milt.* 6), of Callimachus (*Paus.* i. 15. 3, with *Frazer*), of *Cynegirus* (*Plin. N. H.* xxxv, § 57), and apparently of his brother *Aeschylus* (*Paus.* i. 21. 2), who is said to have caused the fact to be recorded on his tomb as his greatest distinction. There were also figures of *Datis* and *Artaphrenes* (*Plin. l. c.*) and of *Epizelus* (117 n.).

For the scenes depicted and for their relation to H.'s account cf. *App.* XVIII. 1. The historian's simple and straightforward account of *Cynegirus*' bravery contrasts most favourably with the tasteless exaggeration of later romancers, e. g. *Justin*, ii. 9.

- 115 ἐξανακρουσάμενοι, 'pushing off to the open sea.' Cf. ἐξανάγεσθαι.

A force that was hurrying round *Sunium* would not waste time in picking up prisoners. *Grundy* (p. 191) reasonably suggests that the Persian fleet was divided, the first section sailing direct to *Phalerum*, the second following after picking up the prisoners (cf. *App.* XVIII, § 7 f.).

ἀναδέξαι : as a signal (cf. vii. 128. 2 ; *Xen. Hell.* ii. 1. 27) whose meaning had been agreed upon beforehand. For the time and meaning of the signal cf. *App.* XVIII, § 8.

- 116 On the *Heracleum* cf. v. 63. 4 n. For a similar coincidence cf. ix. 101.

The distance from Marathon to Athens (twenty-five miles by the modern road, twenty-two by *Kephisia* and the hills) is more than an army could march after a pitched battle, nor could the Athenians leave Marathon before they were certain of the intentions of the enemy. But the voyage round *Sunium* (seventy miles) would take longer. Hence both march and voyage, placed by *Plutarch* (*Arist.* 5) on the same day as the battle, should probably be assigned to the following day. If the Athenians really by a heroic effort marched back on the actual day of battle, it must have been to meet a detachment carried by a flying squadron which set sail before the battle (*J. H. S.* xxxi. 104, and *App.* XVIII, §§ 8, 9).

τότε : until *Themistocles* made the triple harbour of *Piraeus* the



port and arsenal of Athens. Even if he began this work in 493 B. C. (vii. 143. 1 n.; Thuc. i. 93), it would not be finished in 490.

- 117 The number of the slain (as of captured ships, ch. 115) is probably trustworthy. The names of the Athenians would be recorded on the stelae which once adorned the great mound (Soros) over the tomb of the fallen heroes (Paus. i. 32. 3). That the Soros is the grave of the victors has been proved by recent excavations (Frazer, ii. 433-4). The barbarian dead may well have been counted on the field. The moderation of the estimate contrasts most favourably with later exaggerations—the 200,000 of the inscription in the Stoa Poikile (Suidas), 300,000 of Pausanias (iv. 25. 5), or the innumerable multitude of Xenophon (Anab. iii. 2. 12) and Plutarch (de Malign. 26; 862 B). It is noticeable that H. gives no figures for the total number engaged on either side. Both Justin (ii. 9) and Nepos (Milt. 5) give 1,000 Plataeans, a good round exaggeration (ix. 28. 6 n.); but the former puts the Athenians at 10,000, the latter at 9,000 (cf. Paus. iv. 25. 5; x. 20. 2). These numbers are probably derived from Ephorus, and rest on a calculation of 1,000 men to a tribe. Yet they may well be near the truth, allowing for the total omission of light-armed troops. On the other hand, even the lowest ancient estimate of the Persians—200,000 foot (of whom only 100,000 fought in the battle) and 10,000 horse (Nep. Milt. 4, 5)—is greatly exaggerated, not to speak of the 500,000 of Plato (Menex. 240 A) and Lysias (Epitaph. 21), or the 600,000 of Justin (ii. 9). Modern estimates rest on conjecture or on the number of the Persian ships (vi. 95 n.), an insecure foundation. Duncker's 60,000 is an outside estimate; perhaps 40,000 would be nearer the mark.

Θάμα: Epizelus was depicted in the Stoa Poikile (Aelian, N. H. vii. 38). Blindness following on a vision is not in itself incredible (Acts ix. 1-9). But the vision is recorded with some doubt by H. It is strange that he, unlike Pausanias (i. 15), puts the supernatural aid on the side of the Persians, not of the Greeks. Cf. also App. XVIII, §§ 1 and 3.

118-20 *The return of the Persians to Asia, and the arrival of the Spartans.*

- 118 1 According to Ctesias (Pers. 18, p. 69), Datis fell at Marathon.  
Μυκόνος: a little east of Delos.
- 2 Δήλιον is more nearly opposite Eretria than Chalcis. For the temple cf. Thuc. iv. 76, 89 f.
- 119 2 Ardericca in Cissia (cf. iii. 91. 4), not the village on the Euphrates (i. 185. 2), may be at Kir-Ab, thirty-five miles from Susa, where there are remains of an ancient road and town, and where bitumen is still collected in the way described by H. His description suggests a visit, though the phrase μέχρι ἐμέο (§ 4) does not affirm it (cf. Introd. § 16 (4)). Strabo (747) places Eretrians in Gordyene on the upper Tigris, but H. is supported by the epigram of Plato, Anth.



Pal. vii. 259 Εὐβοίης γένος ἔσμεν Ἑρετρικόν, ἄγχι δὲ Σούσων | κείμεθα·  
 φεῦ, γαίης ὅσσον ἀπ' ἡμετέρης.

σταθμῶ, 'station' (v. 52. 1); here settlement of dependents on a crown domain.

3 τριφασίας ὁδοῦς. The second receiver had three outlets by which the different elements in the petroleum were separated. For the κηλωνηῖον cf. i. 193, 1 n.

4 τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν. Diodorus (xvii. 119) says that some Boeotians, settled by Xerxes beyond the Tigris, still spoke their mother-tongue when Alexander came there.

120 According to Plato (Laws 698 E; cf. Menex. 240 C) the Spartans came the day after the battle, and H. implies that they arrived before the burial of the Persian dead. Isocrates (Paneg. 87) allows three days and nights for the march of 1,200 stades, but even so the feat is wonderful (cf. 106).

121-4 *The shield-signal. Defence of the Alcmaeonids.*

121 1 H.'s attempt to prove Alcmaeonid hatred of the barbarian and of the tyrant is illogical and unconvincing. Even here (125) he relates their friendship with Croesus, the first barbarian who enslaved Greeks (i. 6. 2), and with Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon (126 f.), and he conveniently forgets their alliance with Pisistratus (i. 60; Plut. Mor. 863 B) (Macan); cf. Plut. Mor. 862-3 and App. XVIII, § 6.

The house of Callias was one of the richest and noblest in Athens. Plutarch (Mor. 863) attacks H. for dragging in the story to please Hipponicus, the head of the house in H.'s time, but the critic seems to have confused two relatives of the same name.

2 ὑπὸ τοῦ δημοσίου (sc. δούλου): the public slave acting as auctioneer.

122 The chapter is an interpolation, probably a note of some reader. (1) It is wanting in the best family of MSS. (2) The καὶ οἱ Ἀλκμεωνίδαι of 123. 1 answers to the Καλλίης τε of 121. 2. (3) It is not criticized by Plutarch in his attack on H. for mentioning Callias (ch. 121 n.). (4) The following phrases and words are late or un-Herodotean: τὰ προλελεγμένα = τὰ μοι πρότερον εἴρηται, ἐφανερώθη = ἀπολαμπρυνθεῖς (70. 3), δωρήη = dowry; so σφι . . . ἐκείνησι is incorrect. (5) The imitations of H. ἄξιον μνήμην ἔχειν (i. 14. 1; ii. 111. 4), ἄκρος (v. 112. 1), γάμον ὠραῖαι (i. 196. 1), τοῦτο μὲν . . . τοῦτο δέ are rather forced. Yet the facts stated may be true, though ἐλευθερῶν is rhetorical exaggeration.

1 ἱππῶ νικήσας. In Ol. 54 = 564 B.C. Schol. ad Arist. Av. 283.

123 1 ἔφευγον (v. 62. 2). The Alcmaeonidae were in exile not throughout the tyranny, but from the second restoration of Pisistratus till the expulsion of his sons.

2 Thucydides (vi. 54) agrees in denying that Harmodius and Aristogeiton freed Athens (cf. v. 55 n.).

πρότερον: cf. v. 63, where the story is said to be Athenian.

124 I ἀλλὰ γάρ introduces an objection met by μὲν ὦν, *immo*, 'on the contrary'. H.'s assertion is discredited by the position held at the time by Miltiades, the head of the rival house of Philaids, by the ostracism of Megacles in 487 B.C., and by the ode of Pindar (Pyth. vii); cf. further App. XVIII, § 6.

2 ἀνεδέχθη. Delbrück (Perserkriege 60 f. and Wilamowitz, A. and A. ii. 85) consider the shield-signal an invention of the excited imagination of the returning Athenian hoplites, but it is one of the incidents most positively attested. Nor is it victorious but vanquished armies which imagine treason in this way. For a better explanation cf. App. XVIII, § 8.

125-31 *Tales of the Alcmaeonid house. Of Croesus and Alcmaeon (125). Of the wooing of Agariste (126-30).*

125 H. again insists on the eminence of the Alcmaeonids (cf. v. 62. 2 n.). Megacles, father of Alcmaeon, was archon at the time of the Cylonian massacre (? 632 B.C.) (cf. v. 71 n.). That Alcmaeon was the founder of the family's great wealth is suggested by the name Alcmaeonid, and by the story here given, which is obviously a comic version of the enrichment of the family by the Lydian king or by successful trade with Sardis (Meyer, i.<sup>1</sup> § 488). As is usual in such stories (cf. i. 29. 1; vi. 127. 3 n.), the chronology is confused and erroneous. Croesus reigned in Lydia circ. 560-546 B.C. (or five years later, Busolt, ii. 458-60), and his embassy to Delphi is not likely to have been earlier than 556-555 (Marmor Parium); but Alcmaeon appears to have been general in the Sacred war with Cirrha (circ. 595-586 B.C., Plut. Sol. 11), and circ. 550 B.C. has a grand-daughter old enough to be married to Pisistratus. The marriage of Megacles and Agariste (*inf.*) must therefore be placed before 565, probably 572 B.C. (cf. 126. 2), and the connexion of Alcmaeon with the Lydian king a generation earlier (*inf.*). It is, however, mis-spent ingenuity to transfer the services of Alcmaeon to the embassy sent to Delphi by Alyattes (i. 19. 25), and ascribe the wealth of the Alcmaeonids to the gratitude of that king. These anecdotes disregard chronology, nor has H. a fixed scheme for the sixth century (cf. App. XIV. 6 and Abbott, Exc. xi to Bk. V). Mahaffy (Soc. Greece, p. 158) contrasts the under-bred sharpness of the Greek and the courteous generosity of the Oriental.

5 Ὀλυμπιάδα: Isocrates, περὶ ζεύγ. 25 ἑπὶ πᾶσι γὰρ ζεύγει πρῶτος Ἀλκμειῶν τῶν πολιτῶν Ὀλυμπιάσιν ἐνίκησε. This was the only *Olympic* victory of the house when Pindar wrote Pyth. vii. 14. (490 or 486 B.C.). It seems to belong to Ol. 47 (592 B.C.).

126 Aristotle, ? Pol. v. 12, 1315 b 11 f.; Plut. Mor. 553 B, speak as if the tyranny was held only by Orthagoras (Andreas) and his sons. But as it lasted a century (Ar. *l. c.*, Diod. viii. fr. 24=Ephorus) the genealogy here given seems preferable. (See note, p. 415.)

Orthagoras=Andreas, said to be a cook (Diodor. l. c.), circ. 670

Myron I (victor in chariot-race at Olympia 648 B.C.; Paus. vi. 19. 2)

Aristonymus (perhaps never tyrant; Busolt, i, pp. 661, 662)

Myron II (circ. 605) Isodamus Cleisthenes (circ. 600–570). (N. Dam.)

Myron II made himself hated by his oppressive rule; after a rule of seven years he was slain by his brothers, and succeeded by the younger (? Ephorus) of them, Cleisthenes, who reigned for thirty-one years in prosperity (Nic. Dam. Fr. 61, F. H. G. iii. 394).

Grote (iii. 38 n.) suggests that the tale is an imitation of the Epic 'Wooing of Helen', and Stein that it comes from an ode of Pindar (cf. also ch. 130. 1 n.). The fact of the wedding of the daughter and heiress (cf. Busolt, i. 666) of Cleisthenes is doubtless historical, the details are obviously fictitious.

2 'Ολυμπίων: perhaps Ol. 52 = 572 B.C.

127 I 'Ιταλίας: cf. v. 43 n.

εἰς ἀνὴρ intensifies the superlative; cf. Aesch. Pers. 327. Anecdotes of the luxury of Smindyrides are given (from Timaeus) by Athenaeus, p. 273 b c, 541 b. He is said not to have seen the sun rise or set for twenty years, and to have been attended by 1,000 fowlers and 1,000 cooks. According to Seneca (de Ir. ii. 25) he complained of crumpled rose-leaves on his couch, and declared that to see a man hard at work in the field made him feel tired.

Σίριτης: on Siris see viii. 62. 2 n.

2 Τιτόρμου. In Aelian, V. H. xii. 22, Titormus is said to have conquered Milo in a trial of strength, a story which would bring his date down to circ. 520 B.C. In such stories anachronisms are common (cf. I. vi. 27. 2, 125 n., 291 n.).

3 Λεωκίδης: identified by Müller with Lakedas, an effeminate king of Argos, twelfth in descent from Temenus (Paus. ii. 19. 2).

Lehmann supposes H. confused two Pheidons (Hermes, xxxv. 648 f.; Klio ii. 336; cf. v. 113 n.).

Φείδωνος. The date here assigned to Pheidon, viz. the age of Cleisthenes (circ. 600–570), though accepted by Beloch (i. 282; Rh. Mus. xlv. 595) and Trieber, and supported by the statement that he expelled the Elean Agonothetae, apparently after 572 B.C. (cf. Busolt, i. 604 and 612), can hardly be maintained. If, indeed, Pheidon first coined money (Ephorus in Strabo 358, Marm. Par.) in Greece proper, he would belong to the seventh century according

to the numismatists, but the statement is an unhistorical amplification of H. (τὰ μέτρα) and inconsistent with the dates explicitly or implicitly assigned to Pheidon by Ephorus and the Parian marble.

On the other hand, Ephorus making Pheidon the tenth descendant of Temenus (Strab. *l. c.*; cf. Paus. ii. 19. 2) would appear to place him circ. 800-770 B. C. (Busolt, i. 613), or a generation later (Abbott, Exc. vi to Bk. VI). The yet earlier dates for Pheidon seem due to his connexion with the royal line of Macedon. Caranus, the founder of the dynasty (unknown till the fourth century), is declared to be brother of Pheidon, and seventh in descent from Temenus (Theopomp. Fr. 30, F. H. G. i. 283), and eleventh from Heracles. This made the Macedonian dynasty older than the Median, then believed to have succeeded the Assyrian in 884 (Ctesias), and placed Pheidon in the same generation as Lycurgus, circ. 900-870 (Marm. Par. 894 B. C.). Finally, when Lycurgus, on account of the disk of Iphitus, was brought down to the first Olympiad (776 B. C.), Caranus and Pheidon too were moved down. Pheidon's accession was fixed in 798 (Jerome; cf. Eusebius and Syncellus), and his Olympiad (the 8th) fifty years later, as the crown and consummation of a long and prosperous reign (748 B. C.) (Paus. vi. 22. 2). This date is accepted by Grote (ii. 315), Duncker (ii. 67), Holm (i. 215), and Abbott (*l. c.*).

Pausanias, however, makes Pheidon celebrate the Olympia in conjunction with the men of Pisa. Now Strabo (355) distinctly places the presidency of the Pisatans after the 26th Olympiad, though quite aware of Ephorus' views on Pheidon (p. 358). Africanus also knows no break in the official (Elean) list of Olympiads till the 28th, which was held by the Pisatans. Hence Falconer and Weissenborn would emend the text of Pausanias (28th for 8th), and so date Pheidon in 668 B. C. Whether the emendation be justifiable or not, the date is most suitable (Curtius, Busolt, *l. c.*, Macan, Bury, p. 860). Pheidon would thus be placed between the two Messenian wars at the time of the great Argive victory over the Spartans at Hysiae (Paus. ii. 24. 7). This date would also make it possible for him to have spread abroad the use of the Φειδώνεια μέτρα (used at Athens before Solon, Ath. Pol. ch. 10), or rather perhaps of the Aeginetan system of weights and measures. Lastly, the anachronism here is more intelligible if the 28th Olympiad be accepted. In a legend Solon and Croesus may well meet, but hardly Croesus and Lycurgus. Wells (*op. cit.* pp. 54-62) argues strongly for placing Pheidon in the eighth century B. C. rather than in the seventh, and P. Gardner (*op. cit.* pp. 111-13) inclines to the earlier date.

In any case the anti-Dorian and anti-Argive policy of Cleisthenes (cf. v. 67) makes the presence of a son or descendant of the Dorian despot of Argos among the suitors of Agariste improbable. It is noticeable that the list of suitors contains no representative of the Samos, Chalcis, Croton, Corinth league, for which cf. v. 99 n.

Ἀζήν : i. e. of Azania, a district comprising Western and North-

Western Arcadia. Paeus is in the north-west, Trapezus in the south-west near Mount Lycæus.

- 128 1 ὀργῆς. In the original sense, common in poetry and Ionic, 'temper, disposition.'

γυμνάσια. The application of athletic tests is very characteristic of Greek ideas.

- 2 Hippocleides, son of Tisander, was, according to the chronicler Pherecydes, descended from the Aeantid Philaus (cf. Marc. Thuc. 3), whose mother Lysidice was a descendant of Caeneus, from whom the Cypselids traced their line (v. 92 β). It is also probable that Hippocleides is the brother of the Philaid Cypselus (ch. 34. 1), whose name may point to some more recent intermarriage between the Philaids and Cypselids, or to an attempt to revive the legendary connexion.

- 129 1 τῆς . . . κατακλίσιος, 'the marriage feast.' Cf. i. 126. 3; ix. 16. 1.

- 2 ἐς τὸ μέσον: stories told 'for all to hear.' Cf. ch. 130. 1; vii. 8. δ 2.

κατέχων: rather 'holding as with a charm' than 'surpassing'.

ἑμμέλειαν: strictly a 'tragic dance' (Aristoxenus); here simply 'dance tune'.

- 3 σχημάτια, 'figures' (cf. Arist. Pax 322), including comic gestures and mimicry.

ἄλλα: idiomatic; 'others that were Attic.' Cf. i. 193. 3.

- 4 A. B. Cook, on rather slight grounds, sees in Hippocleides' third performance a Theban Dionysiac or Cabeiric dance (Cl. R. xxi. 169; cf. 232).

γε μέν, (you dance well) 'nevertheless you have danced away your marriage.'

- 130 1 ὀνομάζεται, 'is proverbial.' Macan (App. XIV) quotes an interesting parallel from Buddhist Birth-stories (Rhys Davids) in an old Eastern fable, 'The Dancing Peacock'; but it remains uncertain whether H. is the borrower or the original.

- 2 νόμοισι. These words imply that marriage with an alien was at that time recognized as legitimate by Attic law, as is shown by the position of Cleisthenes, Themistocles, and Cimon. By a law of Pericles, 451 B. C. (Plut. Per. 37, and especially Ath. Pol. 26), ἐγνώσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἢ γεγινώς. This law was in accordance with the general feeling in Greece that only those descended from two citizen parents were genuine citizens (Ar. Pol. 1275 b 21, 1278 a 34; Gilbert, S. ii. 297).

- 131 1 ἐβώσθησαν, 'their fame was noised abroad.' Cf. iii. 39. 3; viii. 124. 1.

- 2 Λέοντα: a symbol of royal power: cf. v. 92. β 3, and the oracular parody (424 B. C.) in Arist. Eq. 1037 ἔστι γυνή, τέξει δὲ λέονθ' ἱεραὶς ἐν Ἀθήναις. The birth of Pericles may be dated 493 B. C. or later, since he first took part in public affairs circ. 463 B. C. (Ath. Pol. 27 against Plut. Per. 16). It is tempting to see in this exaltation of Pericles the key to H.'s defence and glorification of the Alcmaeonids, and to suppose that this excursus (ch. 121–31), or at least the story of the wedding (126–31), was inserted in the history (circ. 432–0 B. C.)



when the ancient curse on the Alcmaeonids was turned into a weapon against Pericles. The male line of the Alcmaeonids disappeared; Pericles and Alcibiades were connected with the family on the female side.

132-6 *Miltiades' expedition against Paros. His failure, condemnation, and death.*

132 τῶμα, 'disaster,' seems to require the insertion of Περσέων; but cf. ix. 90. 1.

ἔβδομήκοντα. For this number cf. ch. 89 n.

133 1 Paros was a most prosperous island, rich in marble (iii. 57; v. 62), Tozer, I. Aeg. p. 115. In the historian's own time it paid a tribute of 16½ talents to Athens, an amount only exceeded by Thasos and Aegina (30 talents), and more than twice as much as Naxos and Andros, larger islands, paid. Beloch (i. 402-3) suggests it was then the mart of the Aegean, as in Roman times Delos, and in modern Syra.

**Hydarnes**: probably not the man who took part in the conspiracy of the seven, but his son was commander of the 'Immortals' in the invasion of Xerxes (viii. 83, 211), and subsequently στρατηγὸς τῶν παραθαλασσίων (vii. 135). He may have already held this command when Miltiades was driven from the Chersonese, 493 B. C. (ch. 33).

3 καὶ τῇ, 'wherever there was from time to time a weak place in the wall.' The genitive τοῦ τείχεος depends on τῇ. The iterative form ἔσκε emphasizes ἐκάστοτε. For ἐπίμαχον cf. i. 84. 3.

134 H.'s account of the Parian expedition shows his characteristic defects (Introd. § 32): (1) the ascription of great events to petty personal motives (ch. 133, the rancour of Miltiades); (2) the preference for a version of the tale (the Parian) attributing the event to divine interference. Some critics (e.g. Macan, App. XI) have therefore preferred the rationalizing version of Ephorus (fr. 107, F. H. G. i. 263; Steph. Byz. s. v. Πάρος; cf. Corn. Nep. Milt. ch. 7, 8) ὁ δὲ Μιλτιάδης τῶν μὲν ἄλλων νήσων τινὰς ἀποβάσεις ποιησάμενος ἐπόρθησε. Πάρον δέ, εὐδαιμονεστάτην καὶ μεγίστην οὖσαν τότε τῶν Κυκλάδων, καθεζόμενος ἐπολιόρκει πολὺν χρόνον τῆς θαλάττης εἰργων, καὶ κατὰ γῆν μηχανήματα ἄγων· ἥδη τῶν τειχῶν πιπτόντων, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ παραδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν διωμολογημένων, ὕλης τινὸς ἐξ αὐτομάτου περὶ τὴν Μύκονον ἐξαφθείσης, οἱ μὲν Πάριοι τὸν Δάτιν αὐτοῖς πυρσεύειν ὑπολαβόντες, ἐχέουσιντο τὰς ὁμολογίας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τῷ Μιλτιάδῃ παρέδωκαν. ὅθεν φασὶν ἡμᾶς ἔτι καὶ νῦν χρῆσθαι τῇ παροιμίᾳ, τοὺς ψευδομένους τὰς ὁμολογίας ἀνοπαριάζειν φάσκοντας. Now in this version there are good points. For an isolated attack on Paros is substituted a commission to punish the islands which had assisted the barbarian, and the subjugation of several (Nepos, Milt. 7 'Ut insulas quae barbaros adiuverant bello persequeretur. Quo imperio plerasque ad officium redire coegit nonnullas vi expugnavit'). Such an attempt to establish Athenian dominion in the Cyclades, the dream of Pisistratus (cf. App. XVI. 8), is in itself probable. Yet even the motive may be an inference from the pretext given in H. (133. 1), just as the

supposed signal fire of Datis on Myconos (Nepōs' *in continenti* is a physical impossibility) is apparently an inference from Datis' stay at Myconos (ch. 118). The only independent element in Ephorus (E. Meyer, F. i. 19) appears to be the proverbial phrase ἀναπαριάζειν, the explanation of which is the kernel of his narrative. But the explanation is untrustworthy. Miltiades' expedition can hardly have taken place before the spring of 489 B. C. [there is an interval after Marathon (autumn 490) during which Miltiades enjoyed increased fame (ch. 132)], and in 489 B. C. Datis cannot well have been even thought to be lingering in the neighbourhood of Myconos. Lastly, the precise duration of the expedition given by H. (135), twenty-six days, looks like genuine tradition, and contrasts favourably with the vague πολὺν χρόνον of Ephorus. Probably Ephorus, like modern critics, was offended by the shortcomings of H. and rationalized the traditional story. I have argued in detail (J. H. S. xxxix (1919), pp. 58-61) that the account in Nepos (Ephorus) of the Parian expedition and the trial of Miltiades is untrustworthy.

1 τῶν χθονίων. Demeter Thesmophoros (cf. § 2, ch. 16. 2 n.) and Persephone (vii. 153. 2).

2 κινήσοντα. Probably Miltiades was to steal a sacred image, like the Palladium, on which the safety of the state depended.

H. inserts in an account ascribed to all Greeks, but presumably Athenian, a Parian story heard perhaps on the spot; cf. κολωνός, and αἵμασιγή, a dry wall (cf. i. 180 n.), defining the ἔρκος. The Athenian account, with its unfavourable view of Miltiades' motives and conduct, is probably Alcmaeonid, derived perhaps from the speech made by Xanthippus in prosecuting Miltiades (ch. 136).

135 2 ἄρρητα. For secret rites confined to women cf. v. 82, 83 nn.

3 δεῖν (cf. ii. 161. 3). To H. this is the general nemesis of too great success and fame; by the time of Pausanias (iii. 12. 7) a special transgression has been discovered, the proposal to throw the heralds of Darius into the Barathron, for which cause the wrath of Talthymbius fell on Miltiades. This tradition must have been unknown to H. (cf. vii. 133. 2), and like the story in Plato (Gorgias 516 E) that Miltiades himself only escaped being cast into the Barathron through the interference of the Prytanis, seems a later accretion designed to heighten the effect.

φανῆναι : i. e. an apparition was sent to Miltiades in the shape of Timo (Stein); cf. iv. 15. 2; vii. 16. γ 1 and 3; viii. 37. 2; ix. 100, and φάσμα, vi. 69. 1, 117. 3.

136 1 Xanthippus, father of Pericles (cf. ch. 131. 2). The enmity still existed in the next generation between Pericles and Cimon.

The charge was clearly ἀπατησέως τοῦ δήμου, a form of προδοσία. But treason was not exactly defined till the archonship of Euclides, 403 B. C. (Nepos, Milt. 7). Ephorus makes the treason consist in taking bribes from the Persian, for in his account there is no deceiving of the people.

The procedure was no doubt by εἰσαγγελία (ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον) before the Assembly; cf. Plato, *l. c.*

- 2 σηπομένου: mortification following a sprain or bruise seems improbable. In the account of Nepos (Milt. 7) Miltiades had been wounded in the siege.

οἱ φῖλοι: Nepos (*l. c.*) names his brother Stesagoras (*al. Tisagoras*), but he was long dead; cf. ch. 38.✓

- 3 προσγενομένου. At least in an ἄγων τιμητός there were two questions decided by separate votes: (1) the guilt of the accused, (2) the amount of the penalty. Miltiades was found guilty on the charge of deceiving the people, but on the second point the people was favourable to him. The penalty of death proposed by Xanthippus was reduced to a fine of fifty talents, which was probably proposed by his friends. They would suggest a large sum so as to secure the rejection of the death-penalty (contrast the case of Socrates). The suggestion of Nepos (Ephorus) that fifty talents was the cost of the expedition is a mere guess. The exaggerations of later writers, e.g. that Miltiades died in prison (Nepos, Milt. 7; Diod. x. 30; Plut. Cim. 4), and that Cimon was imprisoned, are baseless fictions (Meyer, F. ii. 25 f.) unknown to H.

137-40 *The Pelasgi in Attica and in Lemnos. Miltiades secures Lemnos for Athens.*

- 137 Stein approves the suggestion of E. Meyer (F. i. 14 f.) that the conquest of Lemnos and Imbros was not the work of the great Miltiades, but of his namesake and predecessor, the son of Cypselus (cf. vi. 34 f.), oekist of the Chersonese. If so, he acted as the agent of Pisistratus (cf. vi. 37) in seizing Lemnos and expelling the Pelasgi. This would fit in with the prediction (ch. 140. 1), which regards the conqueror of Lemnos as representing Athens. Meyer urges that there was no time for the conquest and Hellenizing (cf. viii. 11) of the island during the troubled period of the Ionic revolt, so that he would in any case date the settlement of Attic cleruchs there, even if ascribed to Miltiades II, to the period of Pisistratid rule, before the Persian conquest of the islands (v. 27). But H. distinctly says that up to that time the Pelasgi still dwelt there (v. 26 ἀμφοτέρας ἔτι τότε ὑπὸ Πελασγῶν οἰκομένης). It seems therefore better to accept the solution of Busolt (ii. 531; iii. 415) that the Pelasgi, already weakened by the Persian conquest, were expelled by Miltiades after 500, who settled the island as tyrant of the Chersonese, and that the Attic cleruchy in Lemnos (Thuc. vii. 57; C. I. A. i. 443, 444) is to be connected with the reduction of the tribute circ. 447 B.C. Previously, as in the Chersonese, there had been settlers from Attica, not a formal Attic colony.

The rest of the chapter is a long parenthesis, to explain εἴτε δικάως εἴτε ἀδίκως: then the subject here, Πελασγοί, is resumed loosely 138. 1.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 \* Miltiades II, conqueror of Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese.  
 Name: Miltiades II, 1274-1271

1 Ἑκαταῖος . . . ἀδίκως. Hecataeus used the expression unjustly in his work. Cf. ch. 53. 2; on Hecataeus cf. *Introd.* § 20.

On the Pelasgi cf. *App.* XV. 5. E. Meyer holds that there was no old Attic tradition about the Pelasgi, the story given here being a mere reply to Hecataeus (*F.* i. 8 f.).

2 τοῦ τείχεος. Probably the early tradition here followed made the 'Pelasgic' wall run right round the Acropolis (*D'Ooge*, p. 21). On the more special sense of *Pelasgicon* cf. v. 64 n.

3 Ἐννεάκρουνος. The name is here an anachronism, since only in the days of the tyrants was the spring *Callirhoe* walled in and re-named 'Nine-Spouts' (*Thuc.* ii. 15. 5). The position of *Callirhoe-Enneacrunus* is much disputed. That there was a *Callirhoe* on the *Ilissus* is clear; cf. *Ps.-Plat. Axiochus* 362 A γενομένη μοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισσὸν . . . Κλεινίαν ὄρω τὸν Ἀξιόχου θέοντα ἐπὶ Καλλιρόην. This site south of the Acropolis, near the (later) *Olympieium*, would suit this passage, since it should be outside the old city and towards *Hymettus*. The ordinary interpretation of *Thucydides* (ii. 15. 5) favours the same position. But *Pausanias* (i. 14. 1) mentions an *Enneacrunus*, apparently in the *Agora*, somewhere near the *Pnyx* and the *Areopagus*. Most topographers believe in a break in the narrative of *Pausanias* (*Leake*, *Curtius*) or a mistaken identification of *Enneacrunus* on his part (*Frazer*, ii. 112 f., v. 485 f.; *Gardner*, *Athens*, 28 f., 535 f.). But *Dörpfeld* (for whose views cf. *Harrison's Primitive Athens*) interprets the older authors, and especially *Thucydides*, in conformity with the natural meaning of *Pausanias*, and believes he has found the true *Callirhoe-Enneacrunus* in a cistern, conduit, and other water-works hewn in the rock below the *Pnyx* (*Primitive Athens*, 111-36 and 153 f.).

τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. The Pelasgians are said by *Strabo* (401) to have been driven from *Boeotia* to *Attica* by the *Boeotian* immigration, i. e. some two generations after the *Trojan war* (*Thuc.* i. 12; cf. vii. 176. 4). The *Pelasgian* sojourn in *Attica* would thus be dated circ. 1100-1000 B.C.

οἰκέτας. H. is not thinking of the fancied golden age when there were no slaves (*Athen.* 263, 267), but contrasting primitive simplicity (cf. viii. 137) with the large households of later days. There were slaves even in *Homeric* days, but in the more backward parts of *Greece*, *Phocis*, and *Locris*, there were but few even as late as the time of *Aristotle* (*Timaeus*, fr. 67, *F. H. G.* i. 207; *Athen.* 264, 272).

4 ἀλλά. *Placia* and *Scylace* on the *Propontis* (i. 57. 2), *Samo-thrace* (ii. 57. 3), *Imbros* (v. 26), and perhaps near *Creston* (i. 57. 1) and at *Antandrus* (vii. 42. 1). Cf. *Myres*, *J. H. S.* xxvii. 191 f.

138 The story may be a reminiscence of primitive customs, marriage by capture and exogamy, on which see *McLennan*, *Studies in Ancient History* (ch. vii, f.), and *Westermarck* (ch. xiv), and (especially on exogamy) *Frazer*, *Totemism and Exogamy* (vol. iv).

*Brauron* lay on the east coast of *Attica*, between *Prasiae* and

Marathon, probably at the modern Vraona (Frazer, Paus. ii. 446). Attic legend (Eurip. Iph. in Taur. 1435 f.) identified Brauronian Artemis with the Tauric Artemis brought by Orestes (but cf. Paus. iii. 16. 7, as well as i. 23. 7, 33. 1, and Harrison, Ancient Athens, p. 395 f.). The implied dependence of Brauron on Athens, and possibly the festival itself, belong to a later date than the legendary expulsion of the Pelasgi.

2 ἀρχεῖν. The legend invented to justify Athenian dominion over Lemnos treats these Attic boys as its natural lords and masters; cf. the tale of Cyrus i. 114.

4 Θόαντι. The ordinary legend was that King Thoas was concealed by his daughter Hypsipyle, but afterwards discovered and killed by the other women (Apollodor. i. 9. 17; iii. 6. 4). H. may be only summarizing, not differing from this account. Cf. Aesch. Choeph. 633 ἤκασεν δέ | τις τὸ δεινὸν αὐτὸν Δημνίοισι πῆμασιν.

139 2 For the curse of fruitlessness cf. iii. 65. 7, v. 82. 1, ix. 93. 3; and for similar visitations i. 167. 1; iv. 151. 1.

4 ἐξανύσῃ: abs. to 'arrive at'. Cf. vii. 183. 3, and κατανύσας, ch. 140. 1.

πολλόν: far, about 140 miles.

140 1 τότε: at least five hundred years before the Ionian revolt by the ordinary computation; cf. 137. 3 n.

κατεστηκότων: during the prevalence of the Etesian winds, which blow from the north-east during July, August, and September.

2 Hephaestia and Myrina are the two towns of the islands. The former in the north-east (Palaeopoli), though not very strong for defence, was well situated for commerce (Tozer, I. Aeg. p. 268); the latter (Kastro) in the south-west occupies a striking position which marks it out as the natural capital (*ib.* p. 246). The former paid twice as much tribute as Myrina to Athens in 444 B.C. and later.

The capture of Lemnos forms an admirable finale, making a pause in the history before the great war, and recalling the great services of the hero Miltiades instead of closing the book with his miserable death.

## BOOK VII

1-4 *Further preparations against Greece. Dispute about the succession to the Persian throne. Death of Darius.*

There is an obvious break between the sixth and seventh books. Indeed, it is probable that the story of the Invasion of Xerxes was written before the rest of the history (cf. Introd. § 12).

1 1 τὴν ἐς Σάρδεις ἐσβολήν. For the 'attack on Sardis' cf. 8. 3 and especially v. 99 f.



- 2 κατὰ πόλιν. H. writes like a Greek here, though at times (e.g. 8. γ 3) he remembers that there are tribes as well as cities in the East. No real attempt was made to 'urbanize' the interior of Asia before Alexander.

πολλῶ πλέω. Nothing is said in iii. 89f. of Persian subjects furnishing contingents, but no doubt this had been part of Darius' organization. Cf. App. VI. 8.

νέας: war-ships, and especially triremes (cf. viii. 1, 2).

πλοῖα: transports, to carry horses (ἱππαγωγά, cf. 21. 2, 97) and provisions (σιταγωγά, cf. 186. 1, 191. 1).

ἐπὶ τρία ἔτεα. For the chronology cf. vii. 20 n.

- 2 I νόμον. There is no hint of any such rule or law, when Cambyses invaded Egypt (ii. 1; iii. 1), Darius Scythia (iv. 1. 83), or Xerxes Greece, though Xerxes clearly made his uncle Artabanus viceroy during his absence (ch. 52). On the other hand, Cyrus is said to have named Cambyses as his successor before his last expedition (i. 208). The fact that the monuments call Cambyses 'king of Babylon' in the lifetime of Cyrus (E. Meyer, F. ii. 470-2) cannot be used as an argument, as Babylon was in a special position till the time of Xerxes (i. 183 n.). Perhaps the question arose because Darius was old; on this ground Artaxerxes Mnemon appointed a successor to avoid strife (Plut. Artax. 26): or possibly Plutarch (Mor. 488) and Justin (ii. 10), who call the eldest son Ariamenes, are right in saying that the dispute arose after the death of Darius, and was decided by the intervention of one of his brothers, Artabanus or Artaphrenes.

- 2 Gobryas was one of the seven (iii. 70). For the family of Darius cf. iii. 88 n.; vii. 11.

- 3 I κατὰ πῶντό, 'at the same time' (i.e. 487-486 B.C.). Demaratus had gone into exile voluntarily (circ. 491 B.C.); cf. vi. 67-70.

- 3 Nothing is known otherwise of this alleged Spartan custom. H. himself attaches no weight to this supposed intervention of Demaratus, whose importance he as a rule exaggerates. The true reason doubtless was the influence of Atossa (§ 4) as daughter of Cyrus and chief wife of Darius. She held the position filled by Amestris under Xerxes (ix. 109 f.), and by Parysatis under Darius Nothus. Cf. the influence of Bathsheba with David, 1 Kings i.

- 4 Darius died in the autumn of 486 B.C. and had reigned thirty-six years (Manetho, fr. 68, 69, F. H. G. ii. 595). Ctesias' statement (Pers. 19, p. 69) that he reigned only thirty-one years is worthless. Weissbach, Z. D. M. G. (1901), p. 195 f., esp. 220, and (1908) 629-47, shows that, the death of Artaxerxes being placed in 425-424 (Thuc. iv. 50), his reign being at least forty years and ten months in length, must have begun in 465, and that Xerxes, since he reigned over twenty years (Ptolemaic Canon), must have come to the throne in 486.

5, 6 *Counsellors who urged Xerxes to war. Mardonius, the Aleuadae, the Pisistratidae, and Onomacritus.*

5 1 ἀνεχώρησε: like ἀναβαίνειν (i. 109. 4; vii. 205. 1), ἀναλαμβάνειν (vii. 154. 1), of regular succession by an heir, opposed to περιχωρεῖν, περιελθεῖν (i. 7. 1 n.), when a kingdom passes into strange hands.

2 Cf. Aesch. Pers. 236 στρατὸς τοιοῦτος ἔρξας πολλὰ δὴ Μήδους κακά: and for similar imitations vii. 8. γ 3, 16. α 1, 103. 4; viii. 68. γ, 109. 3; and in general, Introduction, § 18.

ἀλλ' εἰ . . . πρήσσοις. Stein says εἰ with optative is here a mild imperative; cf. Hom. Il. x. 111; xv. 571; xvi. 559 ἀλλ' εἴ μιν ἀεικισσαίμεθ' ἐλόντες, and xxiv. 74. Cf. Monro, Homeric Grammar, § 311. Goodwin (§ 723) regards these as optatives in a wish with εἰ, which was probably in origin a protasis, with apodosis suppressed.

3 τιμωρός: better construed 'demanding vengeance' than = σύμμαχος, 'that helped him,' for which cf. v. 65. 1; vii. 6. 1.

δένδρεα. The Persians took great pride in the cultivation of fruit-trees and gardens. Cf. Vendidad, iii, § 4, l. 12: 'Which is the third place where the Earth feels most happy.' Ahuramazda answered, 'It is the place where one of the faithful cultivates most corn, grass, and fruit'; and iii, § 23, l. 76. So Xerxes pays great honour to a splendid plane-tree (ch. 31), and Darius commends his servant Gadatas for acclimatizing crops and fruit-trees in lower Asia (Hicks, 20). Kings and satraps rivalled each other in laying out gardens and orchards (Xen. Oecon. 4).

6 2 Ἀλευάδαι. This famous and powerful family, which claimed descent from a mythical king of Thessaly, Aleuas (ch. 130. 3, ix. 58. 2; Pind. Pyth. x. 5), was connected with the house of Antiochus of Pharsalus (Theoc. xvi. 34 f.) and with the Scopadae of Crannon (Ovid, Ibis 511 f.). They do not seem to have been 'kings' of Thessaly, though the title is also used of other Thessalian dynasts (v. 63. 3 n.; Thuc. i. 111), but rather *ταγοί* of Thessaly (a title first clearly used of Jason of Pherae, Xen. Hell. vi. 1; cf. ix. 1; Pind. Pyth. x. 70), and kings or dynasts of Larissa on the Peneius. Even in their own district their power seems to have been disputed by the democratic faction. Thorax (cf. Pind. Pyth. x. 64) with his brothers invites Xerxes to invade Greece (ix. 1), is the first to join him (vii. 172; Paus. vii. 10. 2), and actively supports the Persian (ix. 1. 58), whereas the people of Thessaly begged the Greeks to defend their land (vii. 172). The Aleuadae no doubt hoped with Persian aid to establish themselves as kings of Thessaly; though foiled in this, they escaped complete subjection to Sparta by bribing Leotyichides (vi. 72; Paus. iii. 7. 9). They had probably been allied with the Pisistratidae when that family ruled Athens (v. 63. 94).

προσπρίεσθαι (Stein), like *προτείνεσθαι* (v. 24. 4; vii. 161. 1), *προίσχουσθαι* (i. 141. 1), to 'offer, promise', is middle rather than passive = *προσκεισθαι* (L. & S.; Abicht), 'to be urgent with.'

3 χρησμολόγος applies both to the seers (μάντις) and prophets (χρησμοφδός), like Musaeus, Bacis (viii. 96. 2), Amphilytus (i. 62. 4), 'qui . . . concitatione quadam animi aut soluto liberoque motu futura praesentiunt, . . . ut Bacis Boeotius, ut Epimenides Cres, ut Sibylla Erythraea' (Cic. Div. i. 18. 34), and to the learned and skilled interpreters of ancient sayings and oracles (ch. 142. 3), whose advice in times of crisis had great weight (Thuc. ii. 8). Of the latter class was Onomacritus who collected and arranged a number of oracles currently ascribed to the mythical seer Musaeus, which with the similar collection ascribed to Orpheus were the chief specimens of this apocryphal literature. To him may be ascribed the Pisistratid collection of oracles (v. 90. 2; cf. Introd. § 24 (3)) and skill in their interpretation (v. 93. 2). He is said to have been commissioned by Pisistratus along with three colleagues to collect and arrange the scattered lays of Homer (Cramer, Anec. i. 6); if so, he must by now (485 B.C.) have been quite an old man. He had a bad reputation as a forger (§ 3) and interpolator (Schol. Harl. Od. xi. 604); indeed, some writers treat the work of Musaeus as wholly or mainly a forgery (Clem. Alex. p. 397, Potter; Paus. i. 22. 7), while others regard it as a compilation from old materials (Plut. Mor. 407 B).

In the Pisistratid family Hipparchus appears to have been specially the patron of poets, e.g. Anacreon and Simonides (Plato, Hipparch. 228 f.).

Λάσος: a lyric and dithyrambic poet said to have been the teacher of Pindar and inventor of the cyclic chorus, and to have written a treatise on music.

The Νέαι (νησοί), which lay off the east coast of Lemnos, were raised from the sea by volcanic eruptions (Plin. ii. § 202, Steph. Byz.), Mount Mosychlos, on the east coast of Lemnos, being active in ancient times. The prophecy was fulfilled, for that part of Lemnos is now submerged, while one of these small islands, Chryse (still existent in 72 B.C.; cf. App. Mith. 77), had disappeared even when Pausanias (viii. 33. 4) wrote. The 'sacred' volcanic isle which appeared (circ. 197 B.C.) between Thera and Planasia, was also the subject of an oracle (Plut. Mor. 399).

ἀφανιζοίατο: present, because that tense is usual in oracles; cf. ch. 140, 220.

4 σφάλμα φέρον seems to mean here (cf. viii. 137. 3) 'portending' misfortune, while in ix. 9. 2 it means 'bringing evil on'.

τήν τε ἑλασιν ἐξηγεόμενος: rather 'expounding the course of the expedition' according to the oracle (cf. ἐξηγητής, i. 78. 2) than advising or explaining, as in iii. 4. 3; vi. 135. 2.

7 *Suppression of the Egyptian revolt.* From Egyptian sources we learn that a native king Chabbasch reigned more than one year, the death of an Apis occurring in his second year, and that some

measures were taken to protect the mouths of the Nile against the Persian fleet (Macan).

- 7 δευτέρῳ . . . ἔτει : i. e. in 484 B.C., probably in the spring.  
 δουλοτέρην. Darius had treated the Egyptians very well, building and repairing temples, re-establishing the decayed college of scribes at Sais (inscription of Uzahor, cf. iii. 16 n., Meyer, iii, § 101), completing the canal from the Nile to the Red Sea (ii. 158 nn.), and in general paying respect to the priesthood (ii. 110) and customs of Egypt. Henceforward little or no regard was paid to Egyptian prejudices; in Egypt as in Babylon the Persian king ceases to figure as a national king (i. 183 n.).

Ἀχαιμένει : cf. ch. 236. He was full brother of Xerxes (vii. 97), and fell at Papremis 459 B.C. (iii. 12. 4).

Ἰνάρως : for his revolt cf. iii. 15. 3.

# 8-II Persian Council. Speeches of Xerxes, Mardonius, and Artabanus.

- 8 I ἐπικλητον, 'specially summoned,' like the Athenian ἐκκλησίαι σύγκλητοι. Elsewhere it is used of the counsellors (= σύμβουλος) summoned to advise the king or general (viii. 101. 1; ix. 42. 2); cf. the Aetolian Apokletoi or select council (Liv. xxxv. 34; Polyb. xx. 1 and 10). Those summoned would include the seven councillors or princes (Ezra vii. 14, 15; Esther i. 14; cf. iii. 14. 5 n.), together with the principal officials, satraps, and generals (cf. ch. 8. 8, 19. 2, 26. 2). The scene on the famous Darius vase at Naples (found at Canosa 1851) is an ideal representation of such a council, leading to strife between Asia and Hellas. In the upper row are figures of gods, Asia misled by Apate, Hellas defended by Pallas and Zeus, Artemis and Apollo. Below, the subjects of the Persian bring tribute, or express their obedience by kneeling before the king's treasurer. In the middle row Darius sits on a throne; behind him stands a young Persian guard, before him an older man in travelling garb standing on a plinth of gold (Ael. V. H. xii. 62) earnestly warns the king. Five councillors sit or stand round, two in Persian, three in Greek attire. There is no reason to identify this scene with the council described by H.; the king has the name Darius inscribed by him, the warning councillor has nothing to identify him with Artabanus, and half the councillors are in Greek dress. Cf. Baumeister, p. 408.

- α Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Demosth. § 41) quotes this speech of Xerxes as a proof that Ἡροδότου λέξιν τῆς τ' αὐστηρᾶς ἀρμονίας καὶ τῆς ἡδείας ἀρμονίας μέσσην εἶναι καὶ τὰ κράτιστα εἰληφέναι παρ' ἐκατέρας.

- I καταγγήσομαι, 'the first to institute.' Cf. ii. 49. 1, 56. 3. For the thought cf. Thuc. v. 105. 2.

θεός . . . ἄγει. Since the phrase is fatalistic, and as a rule implies impending ruin, it is in the mouth of Xerxes ominous. Cf. Xen.

Anab. vi. 3. 18; Soph. Oed. Col. 997; and 252 οὐ γὰρ ἴδοις ἂν ἀθρῶν βροτῶν, | ὅστις ἂν, εἰ θεὸς | ἄγοι, ἐκφυγεῖν δύναίτο.

- 2 An ambitious longing to rival his father's exploits is described by Atossa (Aesch. Pers. 753 f.) as one of the motives which misled Xerxes.

προσγινόμενον. The present tense without ἂν marks the absolute confidence of Xerxes. That which is contingent on success is represented as already won. For H.'s exaggerated opinion of the size of Europe cf. iv. 42 n.

- β 2 οἱ: referring to a town; cf. C. I. G. 71 b ἐν τῇσι πόλισιν οἱ ἂν χρῶνται, Hom. Od. xxiii. 318; so τούτων, i. 16.

- 3 ἄμα Ἀρισταγόρῃ. Aristagoras had not himself accompanied the expedition (v. 99. 2) but was its author.

- γ 1 Διὸς αἰθέρι. The heaven, where Zeus abode, is formed like a hemisphere, overhanging the flat disk of earth (cf. iv. 36; v. 92 a); hence the boundaries of earth and heaven meet (cf. i. 131. 2). The suggestion is that the Persian king is god on earth as Zeus in heaven (cf. ch. 56. 2).

- 2 σφέας: of lands, as ch. 108. 2 of towns, 195 of ships, and like μιν (cf. v. 114. 1; vi. 82. 1), often of things.

- 3 δούλιον ζυγόν: cf. Aesch. Pers. 50 ζυγὸν ἀμφιβαλεῖν δούλιον Ἑλλάδι, and ch. 5. 2 n.

- δ δῶρα τὰ τιμώτατα. Cf. iii. 83. 1 n.

ἐν ἡμετέρῳ: strangely used for ἐν ἡμετέρῳ or ἐν ἡμῶν. Cf. i. 35. 4.

- 9 1 Ἴωνας. For the use of Ionians for all Greeks, dramatically appropriate in the mouth of an Oriental (Arist. Ach. 104) cf. i. 142 n.

- 2 Mardonius exaggerates grossly. Only small sections of the Indians (iii. 98, 101) and of the African Ethiopians (iii. 97) with the Amyrgian Sacae (cf. ch. 64. 2; iii. 93. 3) and the Eastern Ethiopians (iii. 94, vii. 70) were subjects of the Persian empire.

- α Reliance on mere masses of men and abundance of gold is characteristically Persian. Cf. ch. 48, 103; Aesch. Pers. 235, 237 ὧδέ τις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδροπλήθεια στρατοῦ; | . . . | καὶ τί πρὸς τοῦτοισιν ἄλλο; πλοῦτος ἐξαρκὴς δόμοις;

For Mardonius' expedition cf. vi. 43 f., and especially vi. 45 n.

- β H. seems to be putting his own ideas into the mouth of Mardonius (cf. ch. 10. ε, 46, &c.). Polybius (xiii. 3) says that the ancients fought on the principles here described from a desire for honourable and decisive battle. Grundy (Thucydides, ch. ix) finds the explanation in the geographical character of Greece, and in the necessity of fighting in the plain to defend its corn-crop.

- 2 So Pericles says of the Spartans (Thuc. i. 140) βούλονται δὲ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα διαλύεσθαι. Cf. Eur. Phoen. 515.

- γ The attributes ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης and ἀπάσας both belong in sense to πλῆθος and νέας, but to avoid repetition and to preserve the balance of words are attached each to one only. Cf. Hom. Od. i. 5 ἀρνύμενος ἦν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἐταίρων.



ἀπὸ πείρης. Cf. Theocr. xv. 62 *πείρα θην πάντα τελεῖται*, and Theogn. 571.

- 10 I ἐπιλήνας, 'smooth over, make plausible'; cf. *λεαίνειν*, used metaphorically (viii. 142. 4) as well as more literally (i. 200; iv. 122. 1).

Ἀρτάβανος: cf. iv. 83. 1 n.

- α I παραρίψωμεν: rub on the touch-stone, on which pure gold left a dark stain. For the common simile cf. Theogn. 449, 1105, and especially 417 *ἐς βῆσανον δ' ἐλθὼν παραρίβομαι ὥστε μολὶβδῶ | χρυσός*. Cf. also Pind. Pyth. x. 67, and Bacch. fr. (Bergk 22, Kenyon 51).

- β 2 οὐκ ὦν . . . ἐχώρησε, 'suppose success did not attend them on both elements'; i.e. as shown by the succeeding clause, they fail on land. This repeats from a different point of view the suggestion already made *συνήνεικε ἦτοι κτλ.*

- γ οἰκῆϊη, 'my own mother-wit'; cf. iii. 81. 2. The sentence should go on *ἀλλὰ τῷ παθείει οἶον κτλ.*

- 2 δῆργαστο: passive = *διέφθαρτο*, 'it would have been all over with.' Cf. ch. 224. 1; i. 213, &c.

- ε δρῆς. The asyndeton is usual in this expression; cf. ch. 50. 3; Xen. Mem. iii. 4. 3, &c. For the thought cf. Eur. fr. 964 *τῶν ἄγαν γὰρ ἄπτεται θεός, τὰ μικρὰ δ' εἰς τύχην ἀφείς ἐᾷ*, Soph. Aj. 758 *τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα | πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις*.

φαντάζεσθαι: properly show oneself (iv. 124. 2; vii. 15. 2); here *se ostentare*, 'make a show of oneself.' Cf. *φαντασία* in Polybius.

κνίζειν: of jealousy, as of other painful emotions, e.g. repentance (ch. 12. 1) and desire (vi. 62. 1).

κολοῦειν. This phrase (cf. Hes. Epy. 6; Archil. fr. 56; Arist. Lys. 772) expresses the common Greek view (here ascribed to the Persian, Artabanus, cf. ch. 46, and in iii. 40 to the Egyptian Amasis) of the envy of the gods; cf. i. 32. 1 n., *Introd.* § 36.

φόβον, 'panic.' Instances iv. 203. 3, vii. 43. 2; Thuc. vii. 80.

βροντήν. Instances viii. 12 and 13, 37. 3.

δι' ὧν ἐφθάρησαν. This tmesis with ὧν is usual in H. with the 'gnomic' Aorist; cf. also i. 194. 4.

- ζ ἐπειχθῆναι is transitive and governs *πᾶν πρῆγμα*: the whole phrase is the subject of *τίκτει*.

- η διαβολή: cf. Isocr. Antid. 18 *ἔστι μέγιστον κακὸν διαβολή· τί γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο ταύτης κακουργότερον*; and Lucian, *Διαβολή* 4. Apelles' picture of calumny there described gave rise to that by Botticelli. Lying was a grave offence in Persia (i. 138 n.; Vendid. iv. 54-5; Behist. Inscr. i. 10, iv. 5, 6, 13, 14).

- θ 3 ἀνάξεις, 'lead by sea,' starting from the Asiatic coast; so i. 94. 7; II. ix. 338.

διαφορεύμενον (so Eur. Bacch. 739) = *ἐλκεσθαι* (i. 140. 1), *διασπᾶσθαι* (iii. 13. 2).

The Greeks would leave the fallen foe unburied (ix. 83) to the fate threatened in Homer (II. ii. 391; xv. 348). H. makes Artabanus

speak like a Greek (cf. 10. ε, 46), and quite forgets that the fate, here treated as a great misfortune, was the form of burial prescribed for the Magi (i. 140 n.), and apparently for all true believers in the Avesta (Vendid. vi. 44 f.).

σέ γε: Homeric anaphora; cf. ii. 173. 4. The return from the third to the second person adds emphasis to the conclusion of the speech.

- II 1 μῆδ' ἐνα depends on the negation implied in ῥύσεται; cf. i. 86. 2, v. 101. 1, ix. 12. 1; Goodwin, § 807 f.

2 For the genealogy cf. App. IV, § 3.

- 3 ὑπὸ Ἑλληνισι. The idea of a Greek conquest of Asia could not have occurred to Xerxes, or even to a Greek in 481 B.C.; it was the result of the victories of Cimon.

τὸ μέσον, 'there is no middle course left in this quarrel.'

- 4 τὸ δεινόν: refers ironically to 10. α 2, β 2.

Φρύξ: so 8. γ 1; Soph. Aj. 1292. More correctly, as son of Tantalus, Λυδός (Pind. Ol. i. 24, ix. 9); cf. Strabo 665 οἱ ποιεῖται δὲ μάλιστα οἱ τραγικοὶ συγχέοντες τὰ ἔθνη τοὺς Τρῶας καὶ τοὺς Μυσοὺς καὶ τοὺς Λυδοὺς Φρύγας προσαγορεύουσιν. Here it is appropriate as a common name for slaves.

πατέρων. The Persians regarded all Asia as their own (i. 4. 4; ix. 116. 3), but the claim here made may be founded on a mythical descent (ch. 61. 2, 3) from Perseus and Andromeda (ch. 150. 2), daughter of Cepheus, brother of Ninus, who extended the sway of Assyria over Phrygia and Lydia (i. 7). The Persian king might claim to be the legitimate successor of the Assyrian.

- 12 18 *The dreams of Xerxes and Artabanus finally determine the king to make war.*

- 12 1 νυκτί. To the Greek as to us night brings counsel; so Menander ἐν νυκτὶ βουλὴ τοῖς σοφοῖσι γίγνεται, Plut. Them. 26 νυκτὶ φωνήν, νυκτὶ βουλήν, νυκτὶ τὴν νίκην δίδου.

κου expresses doubt (iii. 40. 1), and throws the responsibility for the story on the Persians.

- 2 The dream is modelled on that sent to Agamemnon (II. ii. 66). In imposing human form (cf. v. 56. 1) the sprite, by the will of God (cf. 15. 3), misleads and deceives the dreamer. So on the vase described (ch. 8 n.), Ἀπάτη, with lighted torches in her hands, incites Asia to make war on Hellas.

οὔτε . . . πάρα = πάρεστι, 'neque adest qui tibi indulgeat.' Cf. Soph. Ant. 261 οὐδ' ὁ κωλύων παρῆν.

- 13 2 ἡ νεότης ἐπέξσε: a metaphor from water boiling over; cf. Ar. Thesmo. 468; Eur. Hec. 583. Xerxes must have been at least thirty-five, since he was probably born soon after the accession of Darius in 521 (cf. ch. 3. 2), and in 479 he had a grown-up son and daughter-in-law (ix. 108).

- 14 μέγας καὶ πολλός. Perhaps parodied by Aristophanes (Av. 488)

of the Περσικὸς ὄρνις with suggestion of the 'great king': οὕτω δ' ἰσχυρὲ τε καὶ μέγας ἦν τότε καὶ πολὺς. For other parodies cf. i. 4 n.

- 15 3 The king wore a special upright tiara and saffron-coloured shoes. His mantle and trousers were purple, his robe too was purple, and on it were embroidered in white hawks or falcons, the sacred birds of Ormuzd. The robe was girt in by a golden girdle (cf. viii. 120), from which hung his sword, adorned with precious stones.

- 16 θρόνον. It was a capital offence to sit on the king's throne (Quint. Curt. viii. 4; Val. Max. v. 1); hence Artabanus might suspect a trap and hesitate. The Persian throne is a high-backed chair, like the Assyrian, but simpler.

- a 1 ὁμιλῖαι: cf. Menander in 1 Corinth. xv. 33 φθειρουσιν ἥθη χρησθ' ὁμιλῖαι κακαί, and especially Aesch. Pers. 753 ταῦτα τοῖς κακοῖς ὁμιλῶν ἀνδράσιν διδάσκεται | θούριος Ξέρξης.

φύσι τῇ ἑωυτῆς χρᾶσθαι: paraphrased by Polyb. xi. 29 ἡ μὲν ἰδία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβὴς καὶ στάσιμος. So Liv. xxviii. 27 'sicut natura maris per se immobilis est'. This simile, called by Livy (xxxviii. 10) a *vulgata similitudo* for the passion of the mob, is first found in Solon, fr. 12 ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταρασσεται' ἣν δέ τις αὐτὴν | μὴ κινή, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη.

- β 2 This early explanation of dreams is an attempt to get rid of the supernatural character attributed to them in primitive times. It remains the best explanation, however insufficient. Cf. Attius in Cic. De Div. i, § 45 'rex, quae in vita usurpant homines, cogitant, curant, vident, Quaeque agunt vigilantes agitantque, ea si cui in somno accidunt minus mirum est'.

- γ 2 εἰ . . . ποιήσεται depends on μαθητέον ἔσται. Artabanus tests in this way his own explanation (β 2) of the dream as a natural phenomenon, while εἰ οὕτω δεδόκηται (3) means, if Xerxes has irrevocably determined on the change of clothes.

- 18 1 Putting out the eyes has always been a common punishment in the East. So Nebuchadnezzar put out the eyes of Zedekiah (Jer. xxxix. 7, lii. 11), and men whose eyes had been put out for their crimes were a common sight in the highways within the government of Cyrus the younger (Xen. Anab. i. 9. 13).

- 19-25 *Greatness of the expedition. Further preparations, especially the canal through Mount Athos and magazines.*

- 19 μάγοι ἔκριναν: cf. i. 107. 1, 120. 1; Cic. de Div. i, ch. 23. The interpretation of dreams and of other signs and wonders (cf. ch. 37. 2) was a special function of the Magi. For parallels in Egypt and Babylon cf. Gen. ch. xli, and Daniel ch. ii and iv. For the vision cf. i. 108.

The crown of olives is suspiciously Greek. It would most readily occur to the mind of an Athenian, who had observed the sudden change in the fortunes of Xerxes after the taking of the Acropolis and the destruction of the olive sacred to Athena (viii. 55; cf. v. 82).

The change indicated by the fading of the crown, the Magi prudently ignored.

- 20 I The chronology here implied for the ten years (cf. Thuc. i. 18) between Marathon and Salamis would seem to be the following :

490 B. C. (autumn). Marathon.

490 B. C. (winter)—487 B. C. (spring). Orders given for another expedition, followed by three years (ἐπὶ τρία ἔτη, vii. 1. 2), but apparently not full years (cf. *inf.*), of preparations.

487 B. C. (τετάρτῳ ἔτει, vii. 1. 3). Revolt of Egypt.

486 B. C. (autumn τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει). Death of Darius ; cf. vii. 4 n.

485 B. C. Xerxes reduces Egypt (δευτέρῳ ἔτει μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τὸν Δαρείου, vii. 7).

484 (spring)—480 (spring). Four *full* years of preparation (τέσσερα ἔτη πλήρη, vii. 20. 1).

480 (spring). In the spring of the fifth year the expedition proper begins with the march from Sardis (vii. 37. 1 ἅμα τῷ ἔαρι παρεσκευασμένος ὁ στρατὸς ἐκ τῶν Σαρδίων ὁρμάτο). The march of the king from Susa by Critalla belongs to the preparations for the expedition.

- 2 στόλων . . . μέγιστος. Thucydides grudgingly agrees (i. 23). This comparison of Xerxes' expedition with others (ch. 20. 2-21. 1) reads like a later addition suggested by χειρὶ μεγάλη πλήθεος. It interrupts the account of the preparations.

τὸν Δαρείου : cf. Bk. IV, especially ch. 83-98, 118-42.

τὸν Σκυθικόν : cf. i. 103 f. ; iv. 1. 11, 12.

κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα : especially the 'Catalogue', II. ii. 484 f. ; cf. Thuc. i. 10.

τὸν Μυσῶν. H., our oldest authority, holds that this movement included both Teucrians and Mysians, and that they passed from Asia to Europe by the Bosphorus, and conquered Thracians as far as the Peneius and the Adriatic. His grounds appear to be (cf. Stein) :

(1) The Paeonians regarded Teucrians from Troy as their ancestors (cf. v. 13. 2).

(2) Paeonian and kindred races were settled in scattered groups from the Propontis to the Illyrian mountains, e. g. in North Thessaly, in the Pelagonian (i. e. Paeonian) Tripolis ; cf. the local legends of Dyrrhachium and the Cestrini on the Adriatic (Appian, B. C. ii. 39 ; Paus. ii. 23. 6).

(3) The Bithynians claimed to be Thracians driven from their homes on the Strymon by Teucrians (vii. 75) and Mysians.

(4) A number of similar names are found on both sides the Hellespont (Strabo 590), e. g. in Thrace a river Arisbus, in Lesbos and the Troad towns called Arisba, at Troy a Scaean gate, in Thrace a Scaean fort and river.

(5) In Homer Priam's allies extend from Western Asia Minor to the Axius.

(6) The musical skill and orgiastic rites of Phrygia are attributed to the earliest Thracians. Strabo, in fact (470-1), completely identifies the two civilizations.

But, as Macan points out, all of these (except (1), which is itself disputable) are consistent with a 'Mysian' migration from Thrace to Asia, while (2) and (3) distinctly favour the idea that the earlier habitat of the tribes in question was European. We may therefore prefer the later view (Strabo 295, 566), which represented the Mysians as immigrants from Thrace or Moesia. This is supported by H.'s statement (vii. 75) that this Teucro-Mysian movement drove the Bithynians from the Strymon to Asia, and by the earliest use of the word Mysian in Homer (Il. xiii. 5), where the race is placed in Thrace or Moesia. [In later passages (Il. ii. 858; x. 430) their habitat is doubtful, though presumably in Asia.] The tradition that the crossing was by the Bosphorus is confirmed by the statement of Strabo (566) that it was named of old the Mysian Bosphorus, and by the fact that this would be the natural crossing-place from Moesia to maritime Mysia near Cius (E. Meyer, Troas). Again, the Teucrians seem to have had no connexion with the Mysians before they met in the Troad, but are best derived from Cyprus (Meyer, i, § 491 n.).

Finally, H. is led to date the migration before the Trojan war by the presence of Mysians in Homeric Thrace and their absence from the Troad. The rival theory naturally dated the movement into Mysia later, as Mysians and Teucrians are not found in the Troad in Homer. For a fuller discussion cf. Macan, *ad loc.*

Ἰόνιον πόντον: the Adriatic (vi. 127. 2; ix. 92. 2).

τὸ πρὸς μεσαμβρίας: southwards, adverbial accus.; cf. iv. 99. 1.

21 2 ἅμα στρατευόμενοι. They had to furnish transports for horse, and also serve themselves. This also applies to those nations who furnished other kinds of ships or supplies; in the muster-roll (ch. 89f.) no tribe is missing.

μακρὰς νῆας: i.e. triremes and penteconters (36. 1), which were better fitted than round-built merchant-ships to withstand the currents in the straits.

22 1 τοῦτο μὲν: taken up again with its antithesis, ch. 25. 1; cf. iv. 76. 1, with 78. 1.

προσπαισάντων. For the facts cf. vi. 44 f.

ἐνθεῦτεν... ἐρμώμενοι: cf. v. 94. 2. At Elaeus, close to the southern point of the Thracian Chersonese, the fleet was left commanding the Hellespont; thence were brought materials for the work and supplies for the men landed on Athos (cf. ch. 23. 4).

ὑπὸ μαστίγων. The use of the whip was repulsive to the free Greek. It is, however, well attested for the Assyrians (Layard, Nineveh and Babylon, 110-13), the Persians (ch. 56. 1, 223. 2; cf. 103. 4 and especially Xen. Anab. iii. 4, § 25), and the modern Turks.

2 κατήκον: reaching right down to the sea; so of a cape, ch. 33, but of the vale of Tempe 130. 1; cf. Thuc. iv. 109 ὁ Ἀθῶς αὐτῆς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν τελευτᾷ ἐς τὸ Αἰγαῖον πέλαγος.

Τορώνης: cf. ch. 122.



- 3 Σάνη: cf. Thuc. iv. 109 Σάνην μὲν Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίαν παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν διώρυχα ἐς τὸ πρὸς Εὐβοίαν πέλαγος τετραμμένην. Thucydides knows only this Sane on the Acte, which (with the five other small towns mentioned below, and Thuc. iv. 109; Strabo 330, fr. 33) belonged later to the Athenian confederacy, and is named on the Tribute-lists without any qualifying epithet; but H. (ch. 123) and Strabo (330, fr. 27) also mention a Sane on the western coast of Pallene.
- 23 H. distinctly affirms both the completion (ch. 37) and the use of the canal (ch. 122); cf. Thuc. iv. 109. The ridicule cast on the assertion in antiquity (Juv. x. 174; Lucian, Dial. Mort. 20) is entirely undeserved, and the doubts whether it was ever completed (Stein, Wecklein) are unwarranted. Demetrius of Scepsis, indeed (Strabo 331, fr. 35), declared that after passing through ten stades of earth the canal must have been stopped by a bank of rock a stade broad. At present there are said to be 'about 200 yards in the middle where the ground bears no appearance of ever having been touched. . . . But it is probable that the central part was afterwards filled up to allow a more ready passage into and out of the peninsula' (Wolfe, ap. Mayor, Juvenal, x. 174). 'Captain Spratt (R. G. S., 1847) found distinct traces of the ancient cutting almost across the whole isthmus, only failing where the canal approached the sea, and somewhat indistinctly marked in the alluvial plain north of the hills (cf. also Leake, N. G. iii. 145; Hauvette, p. 291). The canal forms a line of ponds from two to eight feet deep and from sixty to ninety broad. It was cut through beds of tertiary sands and marls, being probably where it was deepest not more than sixty feet below the natural surface of the ground, which at its highest point rises only fifty-one feet above the sea-level' (Rawlinson). The work was not great but easy, hence Stein's comparison with the Corinth canal (cf. App. XVI, § 4), where there is a mile of rock and the land rises 255 feet above the sea, is misleading.
- The distance across, 2,500 yards, agrees nearly with the 'twelve stades' of H., but its breadth may have been less than he implies (ch. 24). Demetrius gives 100 feet, which agrees better with the modern remains (cf. *sup.*). With the making of the canal may be connected the hoard of 300 Darics found in the neighbourhood before 1840 (Borell, Num. Chron. vi. 153). (See note, p. 415.)
- 1 ἐπὶ βάθρων: rather steps or stages in the side of the canal than ladders. The ascription to the expert Phoenicians (cf. vi. 47) alone of the only possible way of making the canal shows that H. is here repeating a popular story (Hauvette, p. 291; Macan, ii. 147).
- 3 κάτω τε δή. Parataxis as in ch. 12. 1.
- τοῖσι ἄλλοισι: brachylogy for τοῖσι τῶν ἄλλων ἔργοισι.
- 24 For the canal of Darius cf. ii. 158. 1 n. Xerxes may no doubt have wished to rival his father (ch. 8 a), but that his motive was pride is avowedly a suggestion of H. Indeed, the importance attached to the canal seems due to the historian. Aeschylus never

mentions it, though he refers repeatedly to the Hellespont Bridge (Pers. 69 f., 130, 723, 745). Only later did the turning of land into sea as well as sea into land by Xerxes become a rhetorical commonplace (Juv. x. 173; Mayor, *ad loc.*). But in the opinion of Leake (*l. c.*, quoted in full by Grote, *Abridgement*, p. 170) Xerxes was perfectly justified in cutting this canal as well from the security which it afforded his fleet (cf. ch. 22. 1) as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The canal (if renewed) would be useful for the navigation of the Aegean, since there are between the Hellespont and Salonica no harbours protected against the South-West wind (Scirocco), while if the canal were available, ships might shelter from it in the bay of Acanthus, and from the North wind in the Singitic gulf (Anderson, *Papers of Univ. Coll.*, Sheffield, 1897, p. 221).

For such transportation cf. the famous Δίολκος at Corinth, traces of which still remain (Thuc. iii. 15, viii. 7 and 8; Polyb. iv. 19, v. 101), and the similar transport at Leucas (Thuc. iii. 81, iv. 8) and Tarentum (Polyb. viii. 36). But the operation would have taken time and might have been difficult for so vast a fleet.

Στρυμόνα: cf. ch. 114.

25 I δπλα: cables (ch. 36. I. 3; ix. 115, 121).

βύβλινα: cf. ii. 92. 5 n.

λευκολίνου: parallel to βύβλινα (cf. ch. 34); the adjective λευκολίνης is first used 349 B.C. (C. I. G. 155. 11). λευκολίνου, not white flax, which would be too weak, but λευκία (imported by Hiero II from Spain for the ropes of his state-galley Athenaeus, p. 206), i.e. *Spartogras*, *stipa tenacissima*, which the Phoenicians may have learned to use in Spain long before the time of Xerxes (Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen*, E. T., p. 134).

καταβάλλειν: loosely connected with παρεσκευάζετο; cf. iv. 64. 3; viii. 107. 1 *ad fin.* The sense is then resumed in καταβάλλειν ἐκέλευε, to bring in the additional circumstances in the dependent clause ἀναπυθόμενος δέ, &c. (cf. iii. 9. 4; v. 21. 2). καταβάλλειν cannot depend on ἐπιτάξας, as others beside the Phoenicians and Egyptians transported supplies (§ 2).

2 Λευκή Ἀκτή: a headland on the Propontis (Scylax, *Periplus*, 68; Lysias, v. Alc. § 27, p. 142, with Harpocration (*s. v.*)), near the Thracian Chersonese. H. first mentions the chief magazine, which would serve for the first march or two from Abydos, then the others in order from east to west.

Τυρόδιζα: said to be (Steph. Byz.) 'a city of Thrace, after Serrhium' in the tribute-list of 425 B.C. (Hicks, 64). Now Serrhium is near Doriscus (Liv. xxxi. 16) and Cape Serrhium (ch. 59. 2) = Cape Makri, but Tyrodiza belongs to the Hellespontine not the Thracian district, and such a situation is more in accordance with its dependence on Perinthus, hence Stein seems right in identifying it

with *Τερίστασις*, placed by Scylax (68), just after Leuce Acte, and in interpreting the common Thracian termination *διζα* as equivalent to *στασις*. At Doriscus (ch. 58), Eion (ch. 113), and Therma (121) the army halted.

ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι : added to distinguish this Eion (cf. viii. 118. 1; Thuc. i. 98, iv. 50) from Ἡϊὼν ἢ ἐπὶ Θράκης Μενδαίων ἀποικία (Thuc. iv. 7), apparently in Chalcidice on the Thermaic gulf.

26-32 *The march from Critalla to Sardis. The riches of Pythius the Lydian.*

26 1 ἄπας. Clearly the contingents from Western Asia Minor would not join the king till he reached Sardis or Abydos, but H. insists on the muster at Critalla.

Critalla, otherwise unknown, must have been at some great meeting-place of roads in Eastern Asia Minor. Macan (ii. 128 f.) identifies it with Tyana, believing that Xerxes kept south of the Halys and the desert, along the route followed by the Roman road from Tyana to Iconium, and thence to Tyriaeum and Celaenae. But this route, whether in this form, or in that described by Strabo (663), seems to be no earlier than the fourth century. As Xerxes crossed the Halys (§ 3), Critalla should be somewhere on the Royal road (cf. v. 52), perhaps at Caesarea Mazaca, and Xerxes must have followed the circuitous route of that road by Pteria, Ancyra, and Pessinus. He must then have turned south into the Maeander valley to avoid the rough and difficult route by Satala and the Hermus valley. (See note, p. 416.)

3 Κελαινάς: an important town in the plain at the junction of the Marsyas and the Maeander. To the north-east was its acropolis on an outlying spur of the range Djebel-Sultan. Xerxes, on his return from Greece, is said to have built him a palace by the source of the Marsyas and a fortress on the acropolis above, while the younger Cyrus had a palace at the source of the Maeander and a large park round it (Xen. Anab. i. 2. 7, 8). Apameia was built by Antiochus I (circ. 275 B. C.) above the old town on the banks of the Marsyas. [For a full description see Ramsay, C. B. pp. 396-483.] Its most striking feature is the group of springs that form the head-water of the Maeander. A coin of Apameia, struck under Gordian, shows the local goddess surrounded by four river-gods entitled Μαί(ανδρος), Μαρ(σύας), Θέρ(υα), Ὀρ(γύας). Of these the Therma must be the modern Ilidja, the only hot-spring of the place, while the Orgas may be the modern Norgas Chai; the Maeander is probably the Sheik Arab Su, rising in or near a lake behind a protruding ridge of Mount Djebel-Sultan, thence rushing down a ravine into the plain, but afterwards flowing gently round the spur of the protruding ridge and through the plain till it is joined by the Marsyas in the lower city of Celaenae. The Marsyas, called by H. Καταρρήκτης, was a rapid stream 25 feet broad, rising in

a cave beneath the acropolis, and flowing through the city; cf. Xen. Anab. i. 27; Strabo 577-8. Clearly this is the Dineir Water, described by Hamilton (i. 499): 'At the base of a rocky cliff a considerable stream of water gushes out with great rapidity. . . . It appeared as if it had formerly risen in the centre of a great cavern and that the surrounding rocks had fallen in from the cliffs above.' This entirely agrees with the descriptions of undoubted eyewitnesses, Xenophon and Strabo, who state that it rose from beneath the Acropolis hill. Possibly the Agora was just below, but more probably H. is in error. For a full discussion of the streams, with many references, cf. Ramsay, C. B. 397-412, 451-7.

Xenophon (*l. c.*) says he saw the skin of Marsyas in the cave where the stream rose. Perhaps the local river-god, Masnes or Masses (Müller, F. H. G. iv. 629), whose stream made music and whose symbol was a water-skin, was confused with the spirit of flute-music. At any rate the mythical contest of Apollo and Marsyas typifies the struggle between the wilder Phrygian flute-music and the soberer music of the Greek lyre. Hence Marsyas is connected with other local heroes, 'inventors' of the flute and Phrygian mode, Hyagnis and Olympus, and also with the worship of the Mother of the Gods, and of Dionysus.

Σαλῆνοῦ. Marsyas is also called a Satyr, but this is a distinction without a difference, according to Miss Harrison (*Prolegomena*, p. 388).

27 I ὑποκατήμενος, 'awaited'; usually of lying in wait for (viii. 40. 2).

Πύθιος: probably a son of the unfortunate son of Croesus (i. 34), who had inherited the colossal wealth of the Mermnad kings, since in the days of Cyrus it was not customary to confiscate the goods of conquered monarchs, and the Mermnadae had apparently taken no part in any revolt against Darius. The name Pythius might be due to Croesus' relation with Delphi (cf. v. 94 n., and the sons of Cimon Lacedaemonius, Eleius, and Thessalus). Plutarch (*Mor.* 263 B), in his moralizing tale, makes him governor of a city and an owner of gold mines.

2 πλατανίστῳ . . . ἀμπέλῳ: both were believed to be the works of Theodorus the Samian (*Phot. Bibl.* 612 ff.; *Himer. Ecl.* xxxi. 8), and were renowned less for size than for the workmanship and precious stones, e. g. the bunches of grapes on the vine (*Athenaeus* xii. 514 f.). The date of the artist (cf. i. 51. 3; iii. 41. 1) shows that they must have been made for Alyattes and inherited by Pythius. After their transference to the treasury at Susa they became wonders of the world, though Antiochus the Arcadian, anxious to depreciate the resources of Persia, declared τὴν ὑμνουμένην χρυσὴν πλάτανον οὐχ ἱκανὴν εἶναι τέττιγι σκιὰν παρέχειν (*Xen. Hell.* vii. I. 38). Their fame continued even in the middle ages, long after they had been melted down by Antigonius, 316 B. C. (*Diodorus*, xix. 48).

28 2 Δαρεϊκῶν. On the gold 'Daric' cf. iii. 89. 2 n.

30 I Ἄνανα. The bitter salt lake Adji. Tuz. Göl, near Tchardak (cf.

Ramsay, C. and B. 218, 230-1). Hamilton, i. 503: 'Owing to the great evaporation constantly going on the salt crystallizes on the surface and is scraped off with large wooden spades.'

**Colossae**, three miles NNW. from the modern Chonas (Χῶναι), lies on the banks of the Lycus on rising ground that overhangs the river at the point where it enters a deep and picturesque gorge. It remained in 401 B. C. a populous city, prosperous and great (Xen. Anab. i. 2. 6), but decayed after the foundation of Laodicea (probably 260 B. C.), and was in Strabo's time a small town (πόλις) (Strabo 576). H.'s account of the underground course of the Lycus is improbable compared with Strabo's, who says (578): 'It flows for the greater part of its course underground, and thereafter appears to view and joins other rivers.' This is the modern native account, according to which the source of the Lycus is in the lake of Anaua (just as that of the Maeander is in that of Aurocrene; cf. *sup.*). It issues from its underground course near Dere-Keui from beneath a chasm, where the sound of a subterranean river can be distinctly heard (Hamilton, i. 507). There is no probability that the Lycus ever flowed at Colossae through an underground channel five stadia long, or that arches were formed over it as over some smaller streams by petrification; but the stream does pass through a deep and narrow cleft of about that length, and in places goes underground for a few yards. H. has erroneously combined these facts; cf. G. Weber, M. A. I. (1891), xv. 196 f.; and for a more far-fetched explanation Ramsay, C. B. 209-11.

2 **Κύδραρον**: identified by Radet (Lydie, p. 324 f.) with the Caraura of Strabo (578), on the boundary of Phrygia and *Caria*, but the name is interchangeable with Hydrela (Liv. xxxvii. 56), the variation of ρ and λ being common. If so, it lay north of the Lycus, and south-east of the Maeander near Hierapolis (Steph. Byz.). A position in the valley of the Lycus, just before it joins the Maeander, suits H.'s narrative (Ramsay, C. and B. 85, 172-5).

31 **Καλλάτηβον**. Clearly in the Cogamus valley, probably near Ine Göl, since the tamarisk-tree, which gave the inhabitants their staple industry, is very abundant in the neighbourhood, but does not grow in the mountain passes to the south-east (Hamilton, ii. 374 f.). Radet's restoration of the name in an inscription found at Baharlar is shown to be most improbable (Anderson, J. H. S. xviii. 87-9).

The 'honey' was made by thickening the tamarisk syrup with wheat-flour; cf. i. 193. 4; iv. 194. For the Persians' pride in the cultivation of trees cf. ch. 5. 3 n. Pliny (xvi, § 240) saw a similar tree near Apamea-Celaenae, and Hamilton (i. 517) 'the half-ruined trunk of one of the most gigantic he had ever seen' near Laodiceia ad Lycum. So a Lycian tree was honoured by the legate Licinius Mucianus for its girth and shade (Plin. xii, § 9). The Chinar or oriental plane is honoured in Persia (Yule, M. Polo, i. 135).

**ἀθανάτω**. When the appointed guardian died, a successor was



ready to take his place (Abicht), so there was always a guardian. 'Le roi est mort, vive le roi.' It was for the same reason that the 10,000 were called 'Immortals' (ch. 83. 1), but it does not seem likely that one of them was detailed for this duty (Rawlinson).

With this account of Xerxes' march from Celaenae to Sardis should be compared the Anabasis of Cyrus in the opposite direction (Xen. Anab. i. 2. 6-9) and the distances there given (Macan, ii. 130).

- 32 Sparta and Athens were excluded for the reasons given in ch. 133. For the earlier mission cf. vi. 48.

33-7 *The bridges over the Hellespont.*

- 33 οἱ δέ. The Phoenicians and Egyptians entrusted with the work (ch. 25. 1, 34. 1).

ἀκτὴ: a wooded hilly promontory on the European side between the bays of Sestos (Zemenik) and Coila (Kilia). Madytus (Maito) is a small town some miles further south (Xen. Hell. i. 1. 3). Abydos lay at Cape Nagara, where there are ruins, but of its harbour no trace remains, and much of its great plain (ch. 45) has disappeared, washed away by the strong currents (34 n.).

χρόνος: i. e. in 478 B. C.; cf. ix. 116 f. for details.

- 34 τὴν μὲν λευκολίνου (sc. γεφύραν from ἐγεφύρουν). The author can speak of one bridge as made of 'White-flax' (25. 1) and the other of byblus, because the cables are the foundation of the whole bridge, and the bridge is, as it were, suspended on them (ἐντεταμέναι, viii. 117. 1; ix. 114. 1).

ἑπτὰ στάδιοι. This is the distance given by almost all ancient authors (iv. 85. 4; Plin. H. N. iv, § 75), so that the strait was known as ἑπταστάδιον (Strabo 125, 591); Xenophon (Hell. iv. 8. 5) says not more than eight. The measurement can never have been correct except for the very narrowest part, which now measures over 2,000 yards, i. e. over ten stades. The difference may be explained by the washing away of the coasts by the strong currents which strike the European shore near Sestos and then rebound on the Asiatic at Abydos (cf. ch. 36 n.). H., from the way he gives the measurement here, seems to have held that both bridges were placed on each occasion at the narrowest part of the strait, but his view would seem to neglect the following considerations (see note, p. 416):

(1) That the different number of ships used for the two bridges (ch. 36. 1) implies a difference of site or of angle.

(2) That the current would be strongest in the narrowest part.

(3) That not the cape itself, but the little valleys on either side would be the most convenient landing-places for the host.

- 35 I ἐπικέσθαι μάλιστα = μαστιγῶσαι, hence with double accusative. For ἐφικέσθαι cf. Plat. Hipp. Maj. 292 A ἂν τύχη βακτηριαν ἔχων ... εὖ μάλα μὲν ἐφικέσθαι πειράσεται: cf. also Soph. O. T. 809.

Clearly to H. the implication was that the Hellespont was a slave to be scourged and chained; cf. Juv. x. 183, Mayor *ad loc.* The scourging, has, however, been interpreted (Spiegel, Eranisch. Alter. ii. 191) as a religious ceremony, or an attempt by magical rites to compel the Hellespont to submit. Again, the chains have been supposed to be an over-literal interpretation of Aeschylus' figurative description of the bridges (Pers. 746) ὅστις Ἑλλησποντον ἱρόν, δοῦλον ὥς, δεσμώμασιν | ἤλπισε σχήσειν ῥέοντα, Βόσπορον, ῥόον θεοῦ, | καὶ πόρον μετερρῦθμιζε, καὶ πέδαις σφυρηλάτοις | περιβαλὼν πολλὴν κέλευθον ἤνυσεν πολλῶ στρατῶ (Thirlwall, Stein, &c.). But H., who found the supposed branding suspicious, considered the other punishments (again alleged, ch. 54. 3; viii. 109. 3) a natural trait in Xerxes, in consonance with other rewards and punishments bestowed or inflicted by Persians on irrational or inanimate things iii. 16; vii. 54, 88). Religious and legal survivals show us how common the idea once was. Thus at Athens animals which had killed a human being, as well as inanimate instruments of death, were tried for murder (Ath. Pol. 57, *ad fin.*; Dem. Aristocr. 76, p. 645), and this old-world practice is approved by Plato (Laws, pp. 873-4). So Pausanias has recorded the punishment of two statues for accidental homicide (v. 27. 10; vi. 11. 6). The same point is illustrated by the ritual of the Bouphonia, Paus. i. 24. 4 (Frazer *ad loc.*), i. 28. 11; the guilt of slaying the ox is cast on the inanimate axe or knife. In the Zendavesta (Vendid. xiii. 5. 31) a dog (cf. Plut. Sol. 24), in the Jewish law an ox (Exodus xxi. 28), might be punished for murder. Animals were frequently tried in courts on the continent of Europe from A.D. 1120 to 1740. Finally, 'an Old English law only repealed in the reign of Victoria ordained that a beast that killed a man, a cartwheel that ran over him, or a tree that fell on him and killed him, was deodand, given to God, i. e. forfeited and sold for the benefit of the poor' (Tylor, P. C. i. 286; Frazer, Paus. ii. 371. 2).

ἤδη δὲ ἤκουσα : of a variant or additional story not credited by the author; cf. iv. 77. 2 n.

στιγῆας. Runaway slaves were branded on the forehead as a punishment; cf. Arist. Av. 760 δραπέτης ἐστιγμένος, and Diphilus, *ar.* Athen. 225; and for Roman parallels Juv. xiv. 24 with Mayor's note. The branding of the Thebans (ch. 233. 2 n.) is probably a malicious tale.

- 2 θύει : as to other water and rivers (i. 131. 2, 138. 2; cf. vii. 113. 2). The contempt for salt water, compared with the fertilizing water of springs and rivers, seems a genuinely Iranian view.

ποταμῶ. The narrow land-locked Hellespont, with a stream running some three knots an hour, presents to a person sailing in it the appearance of a river: hence to Homer it is ἀγάρροος, and (for a river) πλατὺς and ἀπείρων.

- 36 This account of the bridges is full of unsolved difficulties. It is

impossible to describe mechanism intelligibly without diagrams, as is shown by the obscurities in Caesar's account of his bridge over the Rhine (B. G. iv. 17). Further, since the bridges had long since perished, H. had to rely on hearsay, supplemented perhaps by inspection of the remains of the cables at Athens (§ 3; cf. ix. 121). He adds to the difficulties of the description by attempting to give us the actual process of construction in four stages:

(1) 'The putting of the bridge together.' It is significant that of this, the really important operation, he gives no account (§ 1).

(2) The securing of the bridge by anchors (§ 2).

(3) The stretching cables across to form the support of the roadway (§ 3).

(4) The making of the roadway (§§ 4, 5).

Cf. further Macan, ii, App. II, p. 142 f.

I τοῖσι . . . τιμή: a periphrasis for executioners; cf. ch. 39. 3, 238. 2; iii. 29. 2.

ἄλλοι ἀρχιτέκτονες. The bridge-builder is said to have been Harpalus (Diels, *Laterculi Alexandrini*, p. 8, Abh. Berlin. Akad. 1904).

συνθέντες (cf. § 2): not fastening the ships together as in a pontoon, but 'so placing them, that, while each of them was held in position by its own anchors, they lay in a line under the cables, near enough together to support them, and far enough apart to keep clear of each other in a high sea'. Arrian (*Anab.* v. 7) describes the operation as carried out by the Romans, contrasting their method with that described by H. The varying number of vessels used in the two bridges is due to the varying breadth of the straits (cf. 34 n.). H. does not mean that one bridge was built of triremes and the other of penteconters, but that both triremes and penteconters were used in both bridges, the triremes being used where the current flowed strongest, while differences in height above the water could be met by differences in loading.

ὑπὸ μὲν τήν (sc. γέφυραν). H. regards the cables with the roadway as the true bridge.

τὴν ἐτέρην: the bridge towards the Aegean as distinct from that nearer the Euxine.

ἐπικαρσίας (cf. i. 180. 3; iv. 101. 3 n.), 'at an angle', and properly at a right angle (L. & S.).

The passage is taken in two completely different ways:

(1) The whole of it is referred to both bridges (Grote, v. 362 f.; Rawlinson, Macan). 'The boats, which are parallel to the stream of the Hellespont (κατὰ ῥέον), are at a right angle to the Pontus.' The Hellespont in general is of course not at a right angle to the Euxine, or to the Propontis, if the Pontus includes that (cf. ch. 95 n.), though the portion between Abydos and Madytus (but not that between Abydos and Sestos) is. But H., who is often loose in his orientation, may well have believed the Hellespont to be at right angles to

the Pontus. (Schweig. thinking the Pontus too remote, conjectured *πόρον*.) On this interpretation H. states rather loosely an obvious fact.

(2) Stein (cf. also Grundy, p. 215; Hauvette, p. 295) takes *ἐπικαρσίας* as referring to the upper (NE.) bridge, and *κατὰ ῥόον* to the lower (SW.) one. He takes *ἐπικαρσίας* to mean 'athwart the current', and believes that H. has misunderstood or misreported his informants. He thinks the passage refers to the peculiarity of the local currents reported by Strabo (591). The current is not parallel to the banks, but a little south of Sestos, near the tower of Hero, runs right across the strait to Abydos (cf. Polyb. xvi. 29), so that if you want to cross from Sestos to Abydos you row down to the tower of Hero and then are carried across by the current; if from Abydos to Sestos, you row a mile along the Asiatic shore before crossing, so as to avoid meeting the current full. The landing-place near Sestos was called *Ἀπόβαθρα*, and here, by the *Ἀκτὴ Σεστίας καθ' ἣν τὸ Ξέρξου ζεύγμα*, was the end of the north-east bridge (Strabo 331, fr. 55). Hence the ships of the north-east bridge would have been 'oblique' to the direction of the straits, because their prows were turned to face the strong local cross-current, while those of the south-west bridge would be strictly parallel to the banks of the Hellespont.

The objections to this interpretation are (1) the inferior meaning given to *ἐπικαρσίας* and the extreme difficulty of separating it from *κατὰ ῥόον*; (2) the improbability that H., who ignores the current, should thus indirectly and obscurely allude to its action.

*ἀνακωχεύη* (sc. *ἡ γέφυρα*): so that the bridge (i. e. here the moored ships) might give the strained cables support (abstract for concrete; cf. § 4 and ix. 118. 1). Bähr, however, thinks the cables are those of the anchors mentioned in the next line, and that the current (*ὁ ῥόος*) was to 'keep these taut'.

- 2 *τῆς δὲ ἐτέρης*: short for *τὰς δὲ τῆς ἐτέρης*. Clearly each row of ships must have had anchors on both sides to keep it in place. H. is either stating this imperfectly or altogether omits these ordinary anchors in his anxiety to draw attention to those of special size and strength on the side of exposure. The north-east bridge would feel the gales from the Euxine, the south-west one those from the Aegean.

*ἐσπέρης*. The Hellespont just below Abydos runs north and south, but the opening to the Aegean is nearly due west, so H. here lays stress on this aspect, but rightly mentions the south as well as the west wind.

*διέκπλοον . . . ὑπόφασιν*, 'an opening or passage through,' clearly in both bridges available for small craft, which could ship their masts and pass under the cables.

*τριχού*: three openings are unlikely, though two might be useful. Hence the emendation *τριηρέων* (with or without *δικοῦ*) seems necessary.

- 3 ὄνοισι. They made and kept the cables taut 'by wooden capstans' on either shore. If H. means that the cables were all in one piece, he is of course wrong, as the weight would be too great; doubtless each was made in eight or ten pieces; the length of modern cables is 720 feet.

οἰκέτι, 'not again,' the failure of the first bridge being ascribed to the weakness of the cables.

κατὰ λόγον, 'proportionately' (i. 134. 2). The four byblos ropes were absolutely heavier than the two esparto-grass.

τάλαντον: probably the talent of commerce weighing 138/100 of the Attic coinage standard, i.e. according to Hultsch (Metrol.<sup>2</sup> 135) 36.15 Kilo, roughly 80 lb., or, according to Gardner, 37.7 Kilo nearly 84 lb. For the cubit cf. i. 178. 3 n.

- 5 κόσμῳ (cf. ii. 52. 1). 'They arranged the planks evenly so as to form a flat surface and then fastened them together above by cross-beams' (cf. ii. 96. 2).

ῥλην: probably brushwood, though Stein (on the ground of κόσμῳ θέντες) construes 'timber'.

37-43 *The march from Sardis to Abydos. The petition of Pythius and its punishment. The order of the march.*

- 37 1 κατεσκεύαστο. Xerxes' delay of a month at Abydos (viii. 51. 1) is most naturally explained by the supposition that the *second* bridge was not finished.

χυτοί = χώματα (iii. 60. 3), 'moles.' The neglect of these breakwaters would account for the silting up of the canal at its two ends.

ἄμα τῷ ἄρτι. Early in April, 480 B.C. Xerxes took three months to march from the Hellespont to Athens (viii. 54. 1). He probably reached Athens about the middle of September, and must have taken ten days at least to march from Thermopylae to Athens (about 100 miles), which agrees with the fact that the fighting at Thermopylae took place just after the Olympian festival (Aug. 17-20), that is in the last ten days of August. From Therma to Thermopylae (about 175 miles) Xerxes had marched rapidly in fourteen (or perhaps sixteen) days (vii. 183, 196). If we add the delay at Thermopylae (6-8 days), it follows that Xerxes left Therma at the beginning of August. He had halted there for a good many days (vii. 131), and at Abydos (viii. 51 and *sup.*) a month. A month is not too long to allow for the march from Sardis to Abydos (250 miles), nor a month and a half from Sestos to Therma (over 300 miles). This calculation agrees with H.'s three months from Sestos to Athens (viii. 51), and adding forty-five days for his return (viii. 115), with the seven months of the king's absence (Corn. Nepos, Them. 5).

- 2 According to the calculations of Zech and Hofmann (cf. Busolt, ii. 662, 715) five eclipses took place in the years (481-478):



- (1) Total, April 18, 481, visible on the Indian Ocean (and at Susa).  
 (2) Total, April 8, 480, visible from New Zealand to South America.  
 (3) Partial, October, 480, visible in Corinth and at Sardis; this eclipse is mentioned by H., ix. 10. 3. (4) Partial, Feb. 27, 479, visible in Siberia and the Polar Seas. (5) Annular, Feb. 16, 478, visible in Sardis. Since this is the only one visible in Sardis in spring it has usually been held that it was erroneously pre-dated in local tradition to connect it with the expedition, superstition naturally converting such phenomena into omens (cf. i. 74 and vi. 98). The chronology cannot be altered to suit the eclipse of 478, since its accuracy is guaranteed by the eclipse in the autumn of 480 (cf. ix. 10. 3), and by the fact that the expedition of Xerxes took place in an Olympic year (vii. 206. 2; viii. 26. 2, 72). Meyer (iii, § 205 n.) follows Judeich (Hist. Zeit. xlii, 148) in the probable suggestion that the error consists in the transference of the eclipse seen at Susa in 481 to Sardis in 480. If so the connexion with Pythius would be due to a false combination by H., but the error would be trifling compared with that of pre-dating the eclipse of 478.
- 3  $\delta$  θεός = ἥλιος. προδέκτωρ, coined from προδείκνυμι, 'one who fore-shows.' The declaration that the sun is the prophet of the Greeks might be justified to a Greek by the identification with Apollo, the god of oracles at Delphi, Branchidae, &c., but it cannot be a Persian view, since Mithra, the god of light, identified at least in the popular religion with the sun, is next in honour to Ormuzd (cf. ch. 54. 2). Cf. i. 131. n.
- 38 3 If Pythius was the grandson of Croesus (ch. 27. 1), he would probably be between seventy and eighty in 480 B. C.
- 39 3 For a parallel case of punishment by Darius cf. iv. 84. Gobineau (Hist. des Perses, ii. 195) remarks that it was a Persian custom to make those one wished to preserve from harm pass between two parts of a sacrificed animal (cf. Gen. xv. 10, 17; Jer. xxxiv. 18, 19); the more valuable the victim the greater the efficacy of the charm. Thus the slaughter of the son of Pythius might be a propitiatory sacrifice for the army. But the whole story has the look of a legend.
- 40 1 ἀναμίξ. The tribal levies marched one close upon another, not in well-marked orderly divisions (οὐ διακεκριμένοι). For διακεκριμένοι after στρατός cf. viii. 28. 1. n.
- 2 The guards preceding the king kept their spear-heads lowered as a sign of respect; cf. iii. 128. 4.  
 ἱποί: sacred to Mithra.  
 Νησαῖοι or Νισαῖοι. The Nesaean breed of horses (iii. 106. 2; ix. 20. 5) was famous throughout antiquity, but the position of the plain is not quite clear. Arrian (Anab. vii. 13, cf. Strabo 525; Diodorus, xvii. 110) clearly identified it with the great pastures (λειμὼν ἱππόβοτος, Strabo) on the road from Ispahan and Behistun to Hamadan (Egbatana), where in ancient, as in modern times,

great herds of thoroughbreds were kept. This, as H. says, is in Media, and might be the Median district Nisâya mentioned by Darius in the Behistun inscription (i. 13. 10). The region Nisâya in the Vendidad (i. §§ 8-26) is much further east, lying in the neighbourhood of Merv, i. e. Margiana; it might then be Nisaea, capital of Parthyene (Plin. vi. 113; cf. Isidor. Charax, p. 254. Miller), placed by Strabo (509, 511) near Hyrcania on the river Ochus.

- 4 Διός: i. e. Ormuzd (i. 131 n.). Xenophon, in a description of the train of Cyrus (Cyrop. viii. 3. 9 f.), adds a chariot of the Sun (Mithra) and another sacred to the element of Fire. These may be the customs of a century later.

παρεβεβήκεε, 'stood by his side' (cf. i. 181. 3). Of the charioteer here and Il. xi. 522 Ἐκτορι παρεββαῶς, but usually of the combatant (παρὰβάτης), e. g. Il. xi. 104.

- 41 I δίκως... αἰρέοι, 'when the fancy took him' (cf. i. 132. 3 n.; iv. 127. 3).

ἄρμα: a light chariot used by the Persian (e. g. Darius at Issus and Arbela; Arrian ii. 11; iii. 15) as by the Assyrian kings for war and the chase, as well as on occasions of state.

ἄρμάμαξαν: a covered wagon used mainly by women (ch. 83. 2; cf. Xen. Anab. i. 2. 16). Aeschylus, Pers. 1000 says Xerxes used σκηναῖς τροχηλάτοις. The practice is ridiculed by Aristophanes, Ach. 70 ἐσκηνημένοι ἐφ' ἄρμαμαξῶν μαλθακῶς κατακειμένοι.

κατὰ νόμον: i. e. upwards, as opposed to the troops mentioned ch. 40. 2, 41. 2.

μύριοι: the so-called 'Immortals' (ch. 83).

- 2 μῆλα (sc. χρυσῆα): so Athen. xii. p. 514 B ἐπὶ τῶν στυράκων μῆλα χρυσᾶ ἔχοντες. These troops were called μηλοφόροι, and seem to be represented on sculptures at Persepolis.

- 42 I The phrases ἐπὶ τε Κάϊκον . . . ἀπὸ δὲ Καΐκου, and the mention of Cane, imply that Xerxes took the longer but easier road down the Hermus, and along the coast by Cyme, Myrina, and Elaea, not that over the hills by Lake Gygaea to Thyatira and Germe, and then down the Caicus valley to Atarneus. Cane is the modern Karadagh, the cape opposite Mytilene, forming one extremity of the bay of Adramyttium, Lectum (ix. 114) being the other. For Atarneus cf. i. 160; vi. 28, 29.

Θήβης πεδίου. The beautiful and fertile plain, reaching from the head of the gulf of Adramyttium to Antandrus, is named after the Homeric Θήβη ὑποπλακίη (Il. vi. 396; xxii. 479), the birthplace of Andromache, of which city Strabo (612) saw ruins at the foot of Mount Ida. The chief town of the plain was Adramyttium, where the ejected Delians settled in the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. v. 1; viii. 108). For Adramyttium, Thebe, and Atarneus cf. Leaf, Strabo, pp. 318-29, and for Antandrus, *ib.* pp. 263-5.

Ἀντανδρον: cf. v. 26.

Πελασγίδα: because Pelasgians once dwelt there (Conon 41; Mela i. 18); cf. Myres, J. H. S. xxvii. 194. Alcaeus (Strabo 606) wrote

πρῶτα μὲν Ἀντανδρος Λελέγων πόλις, and Aristotle (Steph. Byz. s. v.) said of Antandrus Ἠδωνίδα διὰ τὸ Θράκας Ἠδωνοὺς ὄντας οἰκῆσαι ἢ Κιμμέριδα Κιμμερίων ἐνοικούντων ἑκατον ἔτη.

- 2 τὴν Ἰδην δὲ λαβὼν, ἐς ἀριστερὴν. With this stopping the meaning is that from Antandrus Xerxes turned inland, and after he had reached or occupied Ida, marched to the left, presumably down the valley of the Scamander to Troy. Xenophon, who marched along this route in the opposite direction from Ophryneum near Rhoeteum, past Troy to Antandrus, also speaks of going over Mount Ida (Anab. vii. 8. 7, 8). (See note, p. 416.)

πρῶτα. The second event is the panic (ch. 43. 2).

- 43 1 The bed of the Scamander (Mendere) is some 200 feet wide, but in the dry season the stream becomes a slender brook only three feet deep (Journal R. G. S. xii. 34).

τὸ Πριάμου Πέργαμον. The Homeric Πέργαμος ἄκρη, the acropolis of New Ilium, the modern Hissarlik, excavated by Schliemann and Dörpfeld.

- 2 ἐκείνων ἕκαστα, 'all the particulars of the events there' (cf. v. 13. 3).

τῇ Ἰλιάδι: the πολιοῦχος of Ilion to whom the Trojan women vainly prayed (Il. vi. 269, 297 f.). The worship continued at New Ilium (Xen. Hell. i. 1. 4; Timaeus, fr. 66, F. H. G. i. 207; Plut. Mor. 557 D), where Alexander the Great sacrificed to the goddess (Arr. Anab. i. 11. 7).

χοῶς . . . τοῖσι ἥρωσι. The Magi were little likely to pour libations to the dead heroes who fell before Troy. We must therefore suppose either that this sacrifice to Athena and the heroes was intended to conciliate the Asiatic Greeks (Hauvette, p. 303; cf. viii. 54, 133; ix. 42), or that H. has misunderstood some Iranian rites (cf. ch. 113. 2; Duncker, vii. 202, v. 175).

Γέργισ: the name of the tribe whose chief town (called Γέργις, Γέργιθα, Γέργιθος) lay on the east side of the Μαρκαῖον ὄρος (Steph. Byz.), possibly at Balydagh (Meyer, i, § 491 n.; cf. Klio ix. 10), not far from Lampsacus. In Xenophon's day still a πόλις ἐχυρά (Hell. iii. 1. 15), it had ceased to exist in the time of Strabo though the name was still preserved in the neighbourhood. The tribe may once have inhabited the coast as far as Miletus, since the name was preserved also on the river Caicus and near Cyme (Strabo 589, 616), and the subject population in Miletus was so called (Athen. 524 A). For the Teucris from whom they were believed to be sprung (v. 122. 2) cf. ch. 20. 2 n.

- 44-56 Review at Abydos. Dialogue of Xerxes and Artabanus. The Crossing of the Bridge.

- 44 κολωνοῦ. The spot indicated by H. is the hill Maltepe. It is the highest point of cape Nagara, which projects further into the Hellespont than the other promontories, and is admirably fitted to give a view of the Hellespont and its coasts.

προεξέδρη might be (cf. Pollux, ix. 46) like ἐξέδρη, a Loggia for

rest in a cool spot with a good view, but is here probably an elevated platform (so *προεδρίη*, iv. 88. 1) on which the king's throne might be placed (cf. Layard, *Nineveh and Babylon*, p. 150). So Strabo 625 *ὑπέρεκται τῶν Σάρδεων ὁ Τιμῶλος εὐδαιμον ὅρος ἐν τῇ ἀκρωρείᾳ σκοπὴν ἔχον, ἐξέδραν λευκοῦ λίθου, Περσῶν ἔργον*.

- 45 πάντα . . . Ἑλλησποντον : i. e. the whole outside the bridges (ch. 36), between Abydos and the Aegean.
- 46 3 For the mournful pessimistic tone cf. i. 31. 3 n., v. 4 n.; Bacchyl. v. 160; Aesch. Fr. 301 *ὡς οὐ δικαίως θάνατον ἔχθουσιν βροτοί, | ὅσπερ μέγιστον ῥῦμα τῶν πολλῶν κακῶν*.
- 4 γλυκύν . . . αἰῶνα. God himself, in the enjoyment of eternal happiness, gives man but a brief spell of pure pleasure, to make the succeeding pain more bitter (cf. i. 32 *ad fin.*, Plut. Mor. 1107 A). For the jealousy of God cf. Introd. § 36. Artabanus here, as elsewhere (iv. 83), plays the part of the chorus in tragedy, warning and dissuading the king in vain. But the views expressed are not in accordance with the Persian faith in the Zend-avesta (Darmesteter, Introd. lvi. f.): the true believer must not resign himself to fate with gentle pessimism, but fight on the side of Ormuzd in the battle with Ahriman.
- 49 2 οὔτε. There is no answering οὔτε, but the corresponding idea is given after an interruption in a different form καὶ δὲ . . . ἐρέων (§ 3, *ad fin.*).
- 3 ὑποδέξιος = ὑποδοχέως (Suidas), *capax*, able to hold; cf. ὑπόδεξις = ὑποδοχή, Hippocr. 25. 18, and ὑποδεξίη, Il. ix. 73. The apprehension is justified, vii. 188; viii. 12.
- 4 τὸ πρόσω αἰεὶ κλεπτόμενος : either passive, 'drawn on blindly,' or middle, 'stealing on further and further.' As the army advanced further from its base, the difficulties of supply would increase; cf. Aesch. Pers. 792 *αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ γῆ ξύμμαχος κείνοις πέλει . . . | κτείνουσα λιμῷ τοὺς ὑπερπόλλους ἄγαν*.
- 5 βουλευόμενος μὲν ἀρρωδίῳ. Cf. Ar. Eth. vi. 9. 2; Isocr. Demon. § 34; Sall. Cat. 1 *ad fin.*
- 50 3 ἀναρριπτιόντες : a metaphor from dice-playing; cf. Thuc. iv. 85, 95; v. 103.
- καταίρεισθαι, 'achieved, attained'; cf. vi. 29. 2, 3, ix. 35. 1; Thuc. i. 121. 4 *καθαίρειν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μελέτη*.
- 4 Xerxes here answers Artabanus' prediction of famine (49. 5), and also his lesson drawn from the failure of Darius in Scythia (10. a 2). ὥρην. For this accusative of time cf. ii. 2. 2 *ad fin.*; Hippocr. de Aere 83 *ἄμβροι δὲ αὐτοῦθι γίνονται πᾶσαν ὥρην*.
- 51 1 Ἴωνίην. Here rather an ethnographic than a geographical term. Athens claimed to be the mother-city of the Ionian race (§ 2, v. 97. 2; cf. i. 147 n.).
- 3 The fears of Artabanus, and the hopes of Themistocles (viii. 22), were not justified till Mycale (ix. 103 f.).
- 52 1 τῶν : i. e. the Ionians. The sign (γνώμα) is explained in the clause after οὔτι. The fidelity of the Ionian tyrants in the Scythian expedi-

tion was founded on self-interest (iv. 137), and was but a poor proof of the loyalty of their people when opposed to brother Hellenes.

- 53 2 **λελέγχασι.** The idea that the gods of a country or city were its owners (*γαιήοχοι, πολιούχοι*) as well as its protectors is common in Greek literature (cf. viii. 55); Plato, Crit. 109, Tim. 23 D Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν ἔλαχεν, Thuc. ii. 74 θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε. But though Ormuzd, &c., are 'gods of the Persians' (cf. an inscription of Darius at Persepolis), Zoroastrianism is essentially not a national, but a personal and therefore a universal religion (Meyer, iii, § 79; cf. i<sup>1</sup>, § 449).

- 54 1 **τὸν ἥλιον.** They waited for the rising of the sun because the appearance of the heavenly light was an auspicious moment for any great undertaking, e.g. for the choice of a king from among the seven (iii. 84. 3). The same observances are again ascribed to the Persians (viii. 99. 1), but the ceremonies are suspiciously Hellenic; cf. Aristoph. Wasps 860 ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα πῦρ τις ἐξενεγκάτω | καὶ μυρρίνας καὶ τὸν λιβανωτὸν ἐνδοθεν | ὅπως ἂν εὐξώμεσθα πρῶτα τοῖς θεοῖς.

The offerings of the Zend-avesta are holy meat (*myazda*), placed on the draona or consecrated cakes, holy water (*zaothra*, the Vedic *hotra*), prepared with certain rites, and the Haoma (*inf.*).

- 2 **σπένδων.** Since libations of wine were not customary in Persia (i. 132. 1) this libation must have been of the holy water *zaothra*, or more probably of the intoxicating juice of the golden Haoma (Darmesteter, *op. cit.*, p. xix). The drinking of this by the faithful was deemed acceptable to the gods. Though Mithra, the god of the heavenly light, is not invoked along with Ormuzd by any king before Artaxerxes II Mnemon (404–359 B. C.) [in an inscription where he is mentioned along with the goddess Anahita, with whom H. confuses him (i. 131)], yet since Mitra appears in the Veda, and Mithra in the older formulae of the Zend-avesta, we may accept the statement that Xerxes sacrificed to him.

For the infinitive *καταστρεψάσθαι* after *παύσει* cf. v. 67. 1. After *οὐ πρότερον ἢ* H. always uses the subjunctive without *ἂν* (Goodwin, § 653), as he usually does with *οὐ πρὶν ἢ*, following Homeric usage. Here the negative is implied only.

**ἀκινάκην**: as seen on sculptures at Persepolis and elsewhere, a short straight poniard about a foot long, used for thrusting rather than cutting. It was worn in a sheath hanging from a girdle, at the right side; cf. ch. 61. 1.

The somewhat similar offerings of Alexander on crossing the Hellespont (Arr. i. 11. 6) and on starting from the mouth of the Indus (Arr. vi. 19. 5) were to propitiate Poseidon (Macan).

- 55 2 For the order of march, &c., cf. ch. 40 f.  
οἱ μύριοι: both the foot and the horse (ch. 41. 2), unless H. has altogether forgotten this myriad of horse.  
3 ἡδὴ δὲ ἤκουσα gives a variant tradition discredited by the author; cf. iv. 77. 1 n.



- 56 1 ὑπὸ μαστίγων : cf. 22. 1 n.  
 2 The naïve exclamation, with which the oracle's words in ch. 220. 4 may be compared, was used by Gorgias in an oration with an attempt at pathos *Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεύς*, Longin. de Subl. 3. 2. πάντας : for similar exaggerations cf. ch. 157. 1 ; Aesch. Pers. 718 *Ξέρξης κενώσας πᾶσαν ἡπείρου πλάκα*. Cf. ib. 12.
- 57-60 *From the Hellespont to Doriscus. The numbering of the host.*
- 57 1 ἀγανρότατα (γαῦρος with intensive α cf. ἀσπερχές) suits the omen of the mare, γαυριάω being used of prancing chargers, Xen. de Re Eq. x. 16.  
 περὶ ἑωυτοῦ τρέχων : proverbial of the hare running for its life ; Zenob. iv. 85 λαγὼς τὸν περὶ τῶν κρεῶν τρέχει. Similar phrases viii. 74. 1, 102. 3, 140. α 4 ; ix. 37. 2.
- 58 ξέω . . . πλίων : with accusative ; cf. v. 103. 2 n.  
 2 πρὸς ἑσπέρην : westward to the Aegean, and then northward to Cape Sarpedon (now Cape Gremia or Paxi), the northern end of the gulf Melas (now Saros).  
 τὸν Ἑλλης Τάφον. The accepted tradition was that Helle fell into the Hellespont, but according to Hellanicus (fr. 88, F. H. G. i. 57) she died at Pactya, near which her tomb must have been.  
 Ἀγορή : at the northern end of the Chersonese (Dem. de Halon. § 40, p. 93), between Pactya on the Hellespont and Cardia on the gulf Melas (Scylax, 67 ; vi. 36, 41).
- 3 Αἶνον : cf. iv. 90. 2. Strabo 331, fr. 51 πρὸς δὲ τῇ ἐκβολῇ τοῦ Ἑβρου διστόμου ὅντος πόλις Αἶνος ἐν τῷ Μέλανι κόλπῳ κείται, κτίσμα Μυτιληναίων καὶ Κυμαίων. The Lake Stentoris must have been near Aenus and the mouth of the Hebrus, where there are still two considerable marshy lakes.
- 59 1 πεδίον. The plain watered and encircled by the Maritza (Hebrus) is still rich pasture land.  
 ἐπὶ Σκυθίας ἐστρατεύετο. The date given is general, the time of the Scythic expedition. Since Darius in his advance marched from the Bosphorus (iv. 89. 3) to the head of the Danube delta far to the east, the occupation of Doriscus is probably connected with his return to Sestos (iv. 143) and the ensuing conquest of Thrace by Megabazus (v. 2). The post may have been lost during the Ionic revolt (v. 98). *his reference is to*
- 2 Σέρρειον. The cape (now Cape Makri) and mountain had the same name (Plin. H. N. iv, § 43 ; App. B. C. iv. 101 f.), infamous through the murder of Orpheus by the Ciconian women. The Ciconians dwelt here in the days of the Trojan war (Il. ii. 846 ; Od. ix. 39 f.) ; pushed a little to the west in the time of Xerxes (ch. 108, 110), they subsequently disappear.
- 3 ἀνέψυχον : dried and refitted (Xen. Hell. i. 5. 10). Many of the ships had come far, so that their timbers would be foul ; they were now prepared for the actual campaign.

60 The enormous numbers, and the naïve and cumbrous method of counting, make this story as it stands incredible. Indeed the numbering and organization of the whole army cannot have been deferred so long, though such contingents as first joined Xerxes in Europe may have been mustered at Doriscus.

61-99 *List of the tribal contingents composing the army and fleet of Xerxes.*

61 This full list of the tribal contingents composing the army of Xerxes with their commanders, and the description of their equipment, not only gives us a graphic picture of that immense host, but also much new and interesting information about the inhabitants of the Persian Empire. Taken in conjunction with the list of Satrapies (iii. 90 f.) and the description of the Royal Road (v. 52 f.) it is our best authority for the ethnography of the Ancient East. The number of the peoples enumerated (including the name omitted in ch. 76 and the Sagartians, ch. 85) is sixty-one, and besides the obvious division into infantry (61-83) from forty-six nations, cavalry (84-8) from eight nations, and sailors (89-99) from twelve nations, a geographical arrangement is discernible. First, after the Medes and Persians, come the Eastern tribes from the Tigris to the Indus (62-8), secondly the Southern (69-71), thirdly the tribes of Asia Minor (72-9), and lastly the maritime peoples of the Levant (89-95).

Following Macan (ii. 167-76) we may distinguish seventeen or eighteen types of armour in the army and navy of Xerxes to be grouped in six classes.

I. (1) The Medo-Persian (ch. 61, 62; cf. ch. 80). Besides the bow and dagger this includes a short spear, and for defence a wicker shield (*γέρρον*) and in some cases a cuirass.

II. The Iranians rely on the bow and for hand to hand work on the dagger; they have no defensive armour. The varieties are (2) the Bactrians (ch. 64. 1 and 66), with short spears; (3) the Pactyans (ch. 67, 68; cf. ch. 85); (4) the Scythians, with axes (ch. 64. 2); and (5) the Sagartians, with lassos (ch. 85).

III. The Anatolians, whose most distinctive weapons are the small round targe and for offence the javelin, though most of them have also spear, dagger, or bow. The chief varieties are (6) the Paphlagonian (ch. 72, 73); (7) the Thraco-Bithynian (ch. 75); (8) the Moscho-Colchian (ch. 78, 79); (9) the Cilician (ch. 91; cf. 77); and (10) the Lycian (ch. 92).

IV. (11) The Assyrians (ch. 63), and (12) Egyptians (ch. 89), who have metal helmets, large shields, and quilted cuirasses, and for offence spears, daggers, and pikes or clubs. With these may perhaps be classed (13) the Phoenicians (ch. 89), though the character of their armour is eclectic.

V. (14) The Greeks (ch. 93-5) have metal helmets, greaves, and

cuirasses, shields, swords, and spears. To this type the Lydians (ch. 74), Pamphylians (ch. 91), Cypriotes (ch. 90), and Carians (ch. 93) conform.

VI. The outer barbarians, ill-armed for the most part with bows. Varieties are (15) the Indians (ch. 65; cf. ch. 70); (16) the African Ethiopians (ch. 69); (17) the Libyans (ch. 71); and (18) the Arabians (ch. 69) riding on camels (ch. 87).

In details and arrangement this list differs from that of the Satrapies (iii. 90 f.), but is not inconsistent with it. While it is impossible to say from what source H. derived these lists (Introd., § 21), in both cases the ultimate authority must be official Persian documents such as the king's scribes prepared (ch. 100). The authority H. followed gave the names of the tribes and their commanders, and a description of their equipment, but no numbers (ch. 60). As Meyer (F. ii. 231, 232) suggests, it probably also supplied information as to the march from Celaenae to Therma (ch. 26-131), as may be seen by a comparison of the account to this point with the vague and imperfect reports of the advance through Thessaly (vii. 196, 197), and of the retreat of Xerxes (viii. 113-20, 126-9) and of Artabazus (ix. 89). H. himself added notes (often erroneous) on the origin and early history of the peoples enumerated (cf. ch. 61. 2, 3, 62. 1, 74. 1, 75. 2), as he does in the case of the Greeks (viii. 43 f., 72, 73). He supplied numbers from conjecture (vii. 184 f.) or tradition (vii. 89); he inserted conversations of Xerxes with Artabanus and Demaratus, intended to explain the character and purpose of the great invasion; but there is no reason to suppose that he used any literary source except the Persae of Aeschylus, or drew much from the list of the host of Darius engraved at Byzantium (iv. 87), or the picture of it dedicated by Mandrocles in the Heraeum at Samos (iv. 88).

1 ὁ τιάρας (Att. ἡ τιάρα; i. 132. 1): a Persian word meaning a soft felt or cotton hat projecting at the top a little in front, as seen in the Persian sculptures at Persepolis.

ἄπαγείας: opposed to πεπηγώς (ch. 64. 2, 70. 2), unstiffened, soft. τιάρα ἐπνυγμένη καὶ προβάλλουσα εἰς τὸ μέτωπον, Schol. Arist. Av. 487. Only the king wore it stiff (Xen. Anab. ii. 5. 23; Arrian, Anab. iii. 25. 3).

κιθῶνας χειριδωτοὺς ποικίλους, 'sleeved tunics of many colours' can hardly be the same as cuirasses, nor can the words λεπίδος . . . ἰχθυοειδέος well refer to mere ornaments on a tunic. Hence it seems necessary to distinguish the tunic and the corselet as is done elsewhere (ix. 22. 2 ἐντὸς θώρακα εἶχε χρύσειον λεπιδωτόν, κατύπερθε δὲ τοῦ θώρακος κιθῶνα φοινίκεον ἐνεδεδύκει: cf. i. 135; viii. 113. 2; and Strabo 734 θώραξ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς φολιδωτός . . . χιτῶν δὲ χειριδωτός: Xen. Cyr. vii. 1. 2 ὡπλισμένοι δὲ πάντες ἦσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Κύρον τοῖς αὐτοῖς Κύρῳ ὅπλοις, χιτῶσι φοινικοῖς, θώραξι χαλκοῖς: cf. vi. 4. 1 and Anab. i. 5. 8, 8. 6). We must then insert some words, e.g. καὶ θώρακας. Such corselets of scale armour are represented on

Egyptian and Assyrian monuments, and at Nimrud Layard found a great quantity of scales which might well be sewed on a felt or quilted linen jerkin. Not all the Persians would have such a costly panoply (cf. viii. 113. 2), but H. describes the most characteristic armour. The sleeved tunics are well shown on sculptures from Persepolis (Perrot et Chipiez, Persia, fig. 192, p. 402, E.T.), and the many colours on the archer frieze from Susa now in the Louvre (*op. cit.* pl. xii, p. 500).

λεπίδος, 'made with iron scales like the scales of a fish.'

ἀναξυρίδας: cf. i. 71. 2 n.

γέρρα: cf. ix. 61. 3. Probably oval shields with holes at the side (as in the Boeotian), for some of the Persepolis guards carry shields of the kind. (See note, p. 416.) The spears represented on the monuments at Susa and Persepolis seem to be seven feet long, and the bows rather less than four feet; but the expressions 'long' and 'short' are relative to the corresponding Greek weapons.

ἐγχειρίδια: cf. ch. 54. 2 n.

- 2 No historical conclusions can be drawn from this confused jumble of myths and names. The Cephenees are a mythical people identified with the Eastern Ethiopians (Apollod. ii. 4. 3). Possibly H. means them to be Assyrians (vi. 54), and then by a further confusion connects the Assyrians with their successors in the lordship of Asia (cf. ch. 11. 4), the Medes and Persians. But the explanation of the whole matter is the likeness of the names Περσεύς and Πέρσης, which led the Greeks to make the eponymous Πέρσης son of Perseus (vii. 150. 2; cf. i. 125. 3; vii. 220. 4), and then, since Perses is related to Cepheus, to identify the Persians and the Cephenees. This genealogy is inconsistent with that given in i. 7, since Belus is grandfather (in-law) to Perseus, and Perseus great-grandfather to Heracles, and yet (in i. 7) Belus is grandson of Heracles. Cf. also vi. 54 n.

Ἀρταῖοι (a proper name; cf. 22. 2, 66. 2): derived from *arta*, high, noble, good. Cf. Artaxerxes (vi. 98. 3 n.), Artabanus, &c. Perhaps it is connected with Ἄριοι (E. Meyer in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1303). Hellanicus invented from it a region of Persia, Ἀρταία (Steph. Byz.).

- 3 αὐτοῦ. In the kingdom of Cepheus, which, however, is placed by the earlier mythographers on the coast of Palestine, or at Nineveh or Babylon, and by the later in African Ethiopia, and never, except here, in Persia.

- 62 1 τὴν αὐτήν (sc. στολήν): as in ch. 72, 84. For this dress cf. i. 135 n. Τηγράνης fell at the head of the Persian army at Mycale (ix. 96, 102). Ἄριοι. To be distinguished from the Ἄριοι or Ἀρειοί of ch. 66. 1 n. (cf. iii. 93. 3 n.). The word used here in Aesch. Choeph. 423 = Persian *ariya*, Zend *airya*, Sansk. *ārya* = the worthy, noble (cf. E. Meyer, i. 572 n.), and would apply to all Iranian races who thus distinguished themselves from the unclean barbarians (Zend *anairya*). So Darius calls himself on his tomb at Nak-shi-Rustam

'an Achaemenid, a Persian, the son of a Persian, an Arian of Arian race'. In Vend. i. 3. 6, Airyana-Vaego, the first land created is the garden of Eden and paradise of the Iranian religion.

Μηδείης. This legend, which arises from yet wilder etymological guesswork than that of Perses, seems to be old; cf. Hesiod, Theog. 1000 ἢ γε δμηθείς ὑπ' Ἰήσωνι ποιμένι λαῶν | Μηδεῖον τέκε παῖδα, and the use of Μηδεῖοι for Μηδοί in Pind. Pyth. i. 78. For its developed form cf. Paus. ii. 3. 8; Apollod. i. 9. 28.

The authority of the Medes can hardly vouch for more than the existence of the name Ἀριοι; but H. clearly believed that the Oriental nations claimed, or at least accepted, these mythical connexions with Greece, so the Persians (i. 1 n.; vii. 61, 150; vi. 54), the Egyptians (ii. 91, 98. 2, 113 f.), &c. Yet only Hellenized interpreters can have done so.

2 Κίσσιοι: cf. iii. 91. 4 n.

ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν πύλων: idiomatic for ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶναι πιλοφόροι. Cf. Arist. Poet. 4 ἀντὶ τῶν λάμβων κωμφοδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο.

μιτρηφόροι. The mitra seems to have been a kind of turban, covering the head from the forehead to the nape of the neck and the chin, under which it passed, as seen on a Persian in the Pompeian mosaic of Issus. Rawlinson, however, thinks it may have been a mere fillet, as seen on Assyrian bas-reliefs and on the frieze from Susa.

Ὀτάνεω. Stein distinguishes Otanes, father of Amestris (ch. 40, 61, 82), not only from the son of Sisamnes (v. 25, &c.), but also from the conspirator of Bk. III (cf. vi. 43). The latter would no doubt have been old for a command, as he must have been about eighty in 480 B. C., since he had a marriageable daughter in 522 B. C. (iii. 68). But probably Stein is wrong. The Otanes here must have been a person of great importance, since he was the king's father-in-law, and he may have been only nominally general of the Persians, like the colonels of English regiments. His sons, too, have high commands, and one of them, Anaphes or Onophas, has the same name as the son of the conspirator (cf. iii. 68 n.). Macan suggests that the fact that H. seems only to know of one Otanes in Bk. VII, as contrasted with the full knowledge in Bks. III and V, points to the earlier composition of Bk. VII.

Τρκάνιοι: cf. iii. 92. 2 n.

63 Ἀσσύριοι. For the extent, &c., of Assyria cf. i. 178. 1 n.

Crested helmets of round or conical shape may be seen on Assyrian bas-reliefs, but those found have been of iron, not of bronze.

πεπλεγμένα: probably made of leather thongs, cf. 85. 1; and for similar helmets 72. 1, 79, 89. 3. No such thing appears on the monuments.

τετυλωμένα: clubs studded with broad iron nails; cf. ch. 69. 1 ῥόπαλα τυλωτά, Strabo 776 τοῖς ῥοπάλοις καὶ τύλους προστιθέασι.



σιδηροῦς, Diod. iii. 33 ῥόπαλον τύλους ἔχον περισιδήρους. No such clubs appear on Assyrian monuments, though maces are represented.

Λινέους: cf. iii. 47. The monuments make much of Assyrian archers, but H. does not mention the bow among the national weapons.

Σύριοι: cf. i. 6. 1 n. Ἀσσύριοι: Semit. *Ashûr*, Pers. *Athurâ*.

The last sentence is clearly an interpolated marginal note of later date. Its want of connexion, the strange use of *μεταξύ* for *μετά*, and the inconsistency in the use of *Χαλδαῖοι* (cf. i. 181. 5 n.) betray this.

64 1 Βάκτριοι: cf. iii. 92. 2 n.

2 κυρβασίη = *τιάρα*. Compare v. 49. 3 *ad fin.* with vii. 61 *ad init.* and Arist. *Aves* 487.

ἐς ὃν ἀπηγγένας, 'rising to a point' (ii. 28. 2). ὀρθὰς . . . πεπηγυῖας, 'stiff, upright' (ch. 70. 2, *ad fin.*). The apparent inconsistency of this with the statement that the great king alone wore the upright tiara (ch. 61. 1 n.) is removed by the facts that the Sacae are not Persians, and that they naturally wore the high-peaked felt or sheep-skin caps of their country, as does the Sacan captive in the sculptures at Behistun. For Scythian dress cf. Minns, *Greeks and Scythians*, pp. 54 f., and for arms, pp. 66 f.

ἀξίνας in apposition to *σαγάρις* explaining the foreign word (cf. iii. 12. 4).

Ἀμυργίους with Σκύθας. The name is preserved by Hellanicus ap. Steph. Byz. Ἀμύργιον πεδῖον Σακῶν, while Amorges is king of the Sacae in the time of Cyrus (Ctes. Pers. § 3) or of Darius (Polyaen. vii. 12). Apparently (Meyer, i, § 578 n.) H. confuses *three* tribes distinguished by Darius in the inscription on his tomb at Nak-shi-Rustam, i.e. the Sakâ, Haumavarkâ, and the Saka tigrakhauda probably = Scyths with pointed caps (cf. iii. 93. 3). They are of course distinct from the Scyths of Europe, though, like them, nomads of the steppes. The Indians, like the Persians, called them *Cacâ*.

65 Ἴνδοί: cf. iii. 94. 2 n.

ἀπὸ ξύλων: i.e. cotton; cf. iii. 47. 2, 106. 3 n.

καλαμίνους: for the bamboo cf. iii. 98. 3 n.

66 1 Ἀριοι: cf. iii. 93. 3 and vii. 62. 1 n.

2 For these peoples cf. iii. 91. 4 n. and 93. 3 n., and on Artabazus, viii. 126 n.

67 Κάσπιοι: cf. ch. 86. 2; probably those of iii. 93. 3 (cf. n.), not of iii. 92. 2.

σισύρνas: cloaks of hide (iv. 109. 2).

Σαράγγαι (iii. 93. 2 n.) . . . ἐνέπρεπον. Their dyed robes made them conspicuous among their hide-clad companions.

Πάκτυες: cf. iii. 93. 1 n.

68 For these three tribes cf. iii. 92. 1 n. and 93. 2 n.

69 1 Ἀράβιοι: cf. iii. 88. 1 n.

ξερὰς (cf. 75. 1): apparently a Semitic word, means a long flowing

mantle held in by a girdle (*ἰπεζωσμένοι*), like the burnous of the modern Arab.

*παλίντονα*. In the ordinary Greek bow, as in the modern, stringing merely increased the natural curve; but there was also another form (*παλίντονα*), which when strung was bent backwards against the natural curve. This must have given it tremendous power. The bow of Odysseus, which is called both *παλίντονα* (Od. xxi. 11, 59) and *καμπύλα* (xxi. 359), was (xxi. 395) apparently made, like that of Pandarus, of two goat's-horns joined together by a straight stock in the centre (Il. iv. 105 seq.). Similar is the description of *Σκυθικά* . . . *παλίντονα* . . . *βέλη* (Aesch. Choeph. 160) given by Ammianus Marcellinus (xxii. 8. 37).

*πρὸς δεξιά*: at the right side, an unusual position.

*φοίνικος σπάθης*: a long strip of split palm-wood probably hardened in the fire (Strabo 822), not the stem of the palm-leaf (Rawlinson, L. & S.).

The length of the bow would make it unnecessary to bend it much, so small arrows would be appropriate.

*τυλωτά*: cf. 63 n. Wooden clubs made of acacia or ebony are still used by Ethiopians. These clubs and garments of skins loosely girt on (*ἐναυμένει*) characterize Ethiopians in Egyptian paintings. Cf. woodcuts in Rawlinson on iii. 97.

2 *τῶν . . . ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου*: the Nubian tribes just above Egypt. Cf. ii. 29. 4 f.; iii. 97. 2 f.; and iii. 17. 1 n. Arsames is said to be governor of Memphis by Aeschylus (Pers. 37).

70 For the division of Ethiopians cf. iii. 17. 1 n. For the Asiatic Ethiopians cf. iii. 94. 2 n.

2 *ὀρθὰ πεπηγότα*: cf. ch. 64. 2 n.

*προβλήματα*: cf. iv. 175. 1 *ad fin.*

71 *Λίβυες* (cf. iii. 13. 3) . . . *σκυτίνην*, 'made of goatskins'; cf. iv. 189.

72 1 *πεπλεγμένα*: cf. ch. 63. 1 n. and Xen. Anab. v. 4. 13 *κράνη σκύτινα οἷα περ τὰ Παφλαγονικά*. These Eastern *Λίβυες* are puzzling. Lycophron called Cytaea (mod. Kutais) in Colchis a Ligurian city, which leads many modern writers to identify them with Strabo's *Λήγαι* (p. 503), the modern Lesghians in the Eastern Caucasus (cf. the Sigynnae, v. 9 n.). But the tribes here connected with them belong to the middle and lower Halys, and this people might have disappeared from the Halys basin after the Gallic immigration (278 B.C.), as apparently do the Western Matieni (i. 72. 2 n.).

*Μαριανδυνοί*: cf. iii. 90. 2 n.

*Σύριοι*: cf. i. 6. 1 n., 72. 1; Cappadocians.

73 For this immigration cf. i. 7. 3 n.; App. I, § 8. The Macedonians, however, rather succeeded than dwelt with (*σύνοικοι*) Phrygians in Europe.

*Φρυγῶν ἄποικοι*. So Eudoxus ap. Steph. Byz. *Ἀρμένιοι δὲ τὸ μὲν γένος ἐκ Φρυγίας καὶ τῇ φωνῇ πολλὰ φρυγίζουσι*. This statement, long discredited, is more acceptable now that the primitive home of the

Aryans is held by many to be the steppes of Southern Russia, not the Asiatic plateau. In any case the relationship seems certain. So Gen. x. 3, Togarmah (Armenia) is brother of Ashkenaz (Phrygia; cf. the Phrygian hero Ascanius, and the lake and district Ascania). The name Armenia (Armina) appears first in the inscriptions of Darius; cf. i. 15 n.

- 74 I For the Maeonians cf. i. 7. 3 n. and App. I, § 3.  
2 ἀποικοι. In i. 171. 6 κασίγνητοι and ἀδελφείοι. For the 'Mysian' invasion cf. vii. 20 n.  
Ὀλύμπου. The Mysian Olympus is just south-west of the Propontis.

- 75 I Θρήκες: not exactly defined till 2 *ad fin.* as οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ; cf. ch. 69. I and 2.

ξείρας: cf. 69. I.

πέδιλα νεβρῶν, 'deer-skin buskins'; cf. iii. 9. I.

πέλτας. Apparently the first time this light shield, afterwards so famous, appears in history.

The European Thracians wore a similar costume suited to the rigour of the climate; Xen. Anab. vii. 4. 4 οἱ Θρᾶκες τὰς ἀλωπεκάς ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς φοροῦσι καὶ τοῖς ὤσι, καὶ χιτῶνας οὐ μόνον περὶ τοῖς στέρνοις ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῖς μηροῖς, καὶ ξείρας μέχρι τῶν ποδῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ χλαμύδας.

- 2 This Thracian invasion of Bithynia may be regarded as a later continuation of the Phrygian immigrations; cf. v. 13. 2; vii. 20. 2 n. and 73.

- 76 Obviously a name is lost at the beginning of this chapter. The older editors for the most part follow Wessling in supplying Χάλυβες from the spurious list in i. 28, but clearly a tribe in the immediate neighbourhood of the Cabalees and Milyae is required to complete the command of Badres. The hardiest warriors of that region were the Πισίδαι, whose name may have been left out by the scribe from its likeness to ἀσπίδας. As, however, H. never mentions these unruly mountaineers, who probably never as a people acknowledged Persian sovereignty (cf. iii. 90. I n.), it may be better to take from iii. 90 the name of one of the smaller tribes there mentioned, either the Λασόνοι (whose name seems to have been wrongly put into the text in ch. 77. I), or the Ὑτέννες, or both (Stein). (See note, p. 416.)

προβόλους: like προβόλαιον (ch. 148. 3) a variant of προβόλιον, a hunting-spear.

λυκιοεργίας: an emendation in Athenaeus, p. 486 e, for λυκοεργίας, 'wolf-destroying.' The sense 'made in Lycia' is supported by Ps. Dem. Timoth. 31 φιάλας λυκιουργεῖς, Arist. Pax 143 κάνθαρος Ναξιουργίης and κλίη Μιλησιουργίης (Critias 28); cf. τόξα . . . Λύκια (ch. 77 *ad fin.*).

The oracle of Ares is probably an indication of a northern origin; cf. v. 7; iv. 59, 62.

- 77 Καβηλάες: cf. iii. 90. I n. Perhaps Λασόνοι has been erroneously transferred to this passage from 76; cf. n. *ad loc.*

Κίλιξι : cf. ch. 91.

Μιλούαι : cf. i. 173. 2 n. ; iii. 90. 1.

ἐνεπεπορπέατο, 'had their cloaks fastened by brooches.' The retention of the plaid and fibula is the characteristic noted, appropriate to highlanders.

τόξα . . . Λύκια : cf. ch. 92 and 76 n.

- 78 For these tribes, independent in Xenophon's time (Anab. vii. 8. 25), and for the Mares (ch. 79) cf. iii. 94 n. Xenophon also (Anab. v. 4. 12, 13; cf. the Macrones, iv. 8. 3) gives the Mosynoeci lances 9 feet long, and adds steel battle-axes, leather helmets, and large wicker shields (γέρρα).

Ἀρταύκτης : cf. ix. 116 f.

- 79 πλεκτά : cf. ch. 63 n.

Κόλχοι (on Darius' inscriptions Karka) were a semi-independent tribe (iii. 97. 4).

Apparently a trade-route led from Persia through Media by Ecbatana and Lake Urmia to the upper Araxes and the Saspeirians, and thence over the mountains to Colchis and the Euxine (i. 104; iv. 37).

Ἀλαρόδιοι : cf. iii. 94. 1 n.

Μασίστιος : cf. ix. 20 f.

- 80 νήσων δέ : resume νησιωτικά (= ἐκ νήσων); cf. ix. 73. 1.

ἀνασπάστους : cf. iii. 93. 2 n.

δευτέρῳ ἔτει τούτων : the next year after this (vi. 46. 1), i. e. 479 B.C. For the facts cf. viii. 130. 2; ix. 102. 4 *ad fin.*

- 81 τέλος is a regiment, i. e. an organized body of troops of a particular kind (i. 103. 1), horse (ch. 87; ix. 20, 22. 1, 23. 1) or foot (ch. 211. 3). It is much the same as τάξις (cf. ch. 212. 2 with 211. 3; ix. 42. 1), and is contrasted with the ἔθνος or tribal contingent; cf. ix. 33. 1.

- 82 In all probability the words Σμερδομένης ὁ Ὀτάνεω should come after ἀνεψιοί, as otherwise we must suppose that Otanes (cf. ch. 40) was a brother of Darius, or married his sister, of which we hear nothing elsewhere. Further, the relationship of Mardonius to Xerxes noticed above (ch. 5. 1) would here be strangely omitted. ἀδελφεῶν would seem to include brother and sister, since Tritamaechmes was son of Darius' brother, and Mardonius of his sister.

Μασίστης : cf. ix. 107, 113.

Μεγάβυζος : cf. iii. 160.

Γέργης. The name of this otherwise unknown man comes in strangely here and in ch. 121 among members of the families of the king and of the Seven (iii. 84).

- 83 1 The whole army (excluding the guard) is divided into six corps, or perhaps into three divisions each commanded by a pair of generals; cf. ch. 121.

2 Golden ornaments were common among the Persians; cf. ix. 80; Xen. Anab. i. 2. 27, 5. 8, 8. 29, &c.

- 84 Ἰππεύει δὲ ταῦτα τὰ ἔθνεα. The natural meaning of this is that all the nations already named were accustomed to fighting on

horseback, though only those enumerated below furnished horse for this particular expedition (cf. 87. 1). Stein, however, thinks it impossible that all of them can have been horsemen, and would therefore make *ταῦτα* equivalent to *τάδε*, 'the following' (cf. i. 125. 1 n.). He believes H. to promise a complete account of all the horsemen of the Empire and then at once to correct himself by restricting the list to those who actually furnished cavalry on this occasion. For a similar naïve correction cf. v. 99. 2; and for *πλήν*, vii. 32.

*ποιήματα*: cf. iv. 5. 3; prob. helmets of beaten bronze and iron (*ἐξέληλαμένα*) and curious in shape (cf. ch. 63) instead of the *τιᾶραι* (ch. 61. 1).

85 1 *Σαγάρτιοι*: cf. iii. 93. 2 n.

*καὶ φωνῇ*. If these words are not a note later thrust into the text, something like *γένει τε* must have fallen out before them (van Herwerden), or *χρεώμενον Περσικῇ* after them (Stein).

*μεταξύ*: half Persian (ch. 61), half Pactyan (ch. 68). For *μεταξύ* cf. ii. 42. 4.

2 For the use of the lasso by Sarmatians cf. Paus. i. 21. 8 *σειραῖς περιβαλόντες τῶν πολεμίων ὅποσους καὶ τύχοιεν, τοὺς ἵππους ἀποστρέψαντες ἀνατρέπουσι τοὺς ἐνσχηθέντας ταῖς σειραῖς*. It is ascribed to the Persians by the Shahnahmeh, to the Parthians by Suidas, and is represented on Assyrian monuments (Macan). It was also practised by the Huns and Alans, as it still is by cowboys and Indians in America.

86 1 *ὄνοι ἄγριοι*. Wild asses are represented on bas-reliefs in Assyria and at Persepolis. They are still found in desert plains from north-west India and Baluchistan to Persia, Syria, and Arabia. The wild ass is, however, like the zebra, difficult to tame (cf. Job xxxix. 5).

*ἄρματα*. These war-chariots are never heard of in the actual fighting. Cf., however, for African war-chariots, iv. 193, and war-chariots in general v. 113 n.

*καὶ Κάσπιοι ὁμοίως*: read *καὶ Σάκαι* (Munro, J. H. S. xxii, p. 297), for (1) otherwise the Sacae who specially distinguished themselves as cavalry at Plataea (ix. 71. 1) would be omitted from the list of horsemen; (2) the Sacan infantry is brigaded with the Bactrians (vii. 64). *ΚΑΙ ΣΑΚΑΙ* might easily be corrupted into *ΚΑΣΠΙΟΙ* through reduplication of *καὶ* and the proximity of *Κάσπιοι* in § 2, where it may stand if emended in § 1. The emendations attempted in § 2 are all unsatisfactory, Laird's *Κασπίοισι* grammatically, Stein's *Πάκτυες* palaeographically, while *Κάσπειροι* (from Steph. Byz. *Κάσπειρος πόλις Πάρθων προσεχὴς τῇ Ἰνδικῇ* probably = Caspatyrus, iii. 102. 1) and *Κάσιοι*, a tribe from Cashmere (Ptol. vi. 15), are inadmissible, since the horse are said to be armed like the foot, so the tribe must have been already mentioned among the infantry (cf. ch. 67).

2 The speed of the best camels does not exceed ten miles an hour, but H. is consistent if wrong; cf. iii. 102. 3. Camels are mentioned ch. 83, 125; ix. 81.



87 For the effect of camels on horses cf. i. 80.

89 <sup>1</sup> So Aesch. Pers. 341 *Ξέρξῃ δὲ καὶ γὰρ οἶδα χιλιάς μὲν ἦν | ὧν ἦγε πλῆθος, αἱ δ' ὑπέρκοποι τάχει | ἑκατὸν δις ἦσαν ἑπτά θ'*, and cf. Appendix XIX, § 1.

*Σύροις*. The Philistines on the coast south of Mount Carmel; cf. iii. 5. 1 n.

For the linen corslets cf. ii. 182; iii. 47.

2 *οὔτοι δέ*. This does not distinguish these Phoenicians from others, but merely introduces the author's own ethnographical and historical additions to the official list of contingents; cf. esp. ch. 91 *ad init. et fin.*, 93. 1, 95 *ad fin.*, and in the Greek list, viii. 45, 46. 2.

For the Phoenician migration cf. i. 1. n.

3 The Egyptians, perhaps in consequence of their recent revolt (ch. 1), were not employed as land-troops till after Salamis; cf. ix. 32. 2. They are most effective (viii. 17) as marines, perhaps on account of their heavy armour, 'boarding-pikes and pole-axes.'

*χηλευτά* = *πλεκτά* (ch. 79. 1), 'plaited.'

*ἀσπίδας*. The Egyptians in the earliest times carried gigantic shields; in the time of the Theban empire moderate sized bucklers rounded at the top were substituted, but a concave shape or a large rim of metal is rare. Shield and lance are to Plato (Tim. 24 B) their national weapons.

*δόρατα ναύμαχα*: boarding-spears are represented in the sea-fight of Rameses III (monument at Medînet Habu).

*τύχους*: a pole-axe, with a single head and a shaft 2 to 2½ feet long, was often borne by officers.

*θωρηκοφόροι*: probably wearing quilted cuirasses; scale armour is, however, represented in the tomb of Rameses III at Thebes.

*μαχαίρας . . . μεγάλας*: large trowel-shaped daggers are borne by the troops of Rameses II.

90 *οἱ βασιλέες*: cf. v. 110 n.

*κιθῶνας*. de Pauw's conjecture *κιτάριας* is probable. The *κίταρις*, a kind of felt hat (cf. Pollux, x. 163 and esp. vii. 58), is contrasted with the *μίτρα* of the kings.

The population of Cyprus contained Anatolian, Greek, and Phoenician elements; cf. v. 104 n.

*Σαλαμῖνος*. Salamis is a Mycenaean centre and afterwards took the lead among the Greek settlements in Cyprus. The supposed connexion with the island of Salamis may be an inference from an accidental similarity of name. The Aeacid Teucer was said to have fled from home with some Trojan captives and settled in Salamis. Honours were paid to Teucer as their heroic ancestor by the Gergithes of the Troad (ch. 43. 2 n.), and the existence at Salamis of a class called *Γέργινοι*, who claimed to be Gergithes (Athen. pp. 255, 256) was held to prove the connexion.

*Ἀθηνέων*: because Salamis, like its Aeacid heroes, was treated as Attic.

**Ἀρκαδίας.** Agapenor, king of Tegea, was held to be the founder of Paphos (ch. 195 n.). The Cypriote dialect resembles the Arcadian, i. e. the oldest Peloponnesian (cf. v. 113 n.).

**Κύθον.** Fugitive Dryopes were believed to have emigrated from Cythnus, a small island among the Cyclades, to Cyprus; cf. viii. 46. 4; Diod. iv. 37.

**Αἰθιοπίας.** For conquests of Cyprus by Egypt cf. ii. 182 n. The statement here, however, seems to rest on a legendary genealogy connecting Cinyras, the founder of the temple at Paphos, with the Asiatic Aethiopia, i. e. Assyria. Cyprus submitted to Sargon of Assyria, 709 B. C., and paid tribute to Esar-haddon and Assurbani-pal (cf. v. 104 n.).

**91** ἀγχοτάτω . . . πεποιημένα = ὁμοιωμένα: hence with dative, whereas elsewhere in H. ἀγχοῦ, &c., are followed by the genitive.

**Ὑπαχαιοί:** probably a native name assimilated by the Greek settlers to the familiar Ἀχαιοί. The Greek colonies in Cilicia seem somewhat later than those in Pamphylia and Cyprus; Tarsus was ascribed to Argives led by Triptolemus, Mallus to Amphilochoi and Mopsus (Strab. 673, 676); Soli was Rhodian.

**Cilix,** son of Agenor, brother of Europa, Phoenix, and Cadmus, seems merely the mythical representation of Phoenician colonization in Cilicia. Cf. iv. 147. 4 (Thera) and vi. 47. 1 (Thasos). Cilicia Pedias was naturally connected with Syria, and was conquered by Sargon of Assyria; but the extent to which the Phoenicians settled in the land is very doubtful, though some names and cults would seem to show their influence.

Strabo, 668, seems to have had a fuller text of H. before him. φησὶ δ' Ἡρόδοτος τοὺς Παμφύλους τῶν μετὰ Ἀμφιλόχου καὶ Κάλχαντος εἶναι λαῶν μιγάδων τινῶν ἐκ Τροίας συνακολουθησάντων τοὺς μὲν δὴ πολλοὺς ἐνθάδε καταμῆναι, τινὰς δὲ σκεδασθῆναι πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς. For Amphilochoi cf. *sup.* and iii. 91. 1 n. In accordance with this legend most of the Greek settlements in Pamphylia were believed to be Argive, though Side was colonized from Cyme. The Greek settlers there forgot their own tongue and spoke a barbarous dialect (Arrian, Anab. i. 26). Cut off from Hellenism, they were gradually assimilated by the neighbouring Pisidian and barbaric tribes. So the legends on the (later) coins of Aspendus, Perga and Side are Pamphylian not Greek (Head, H. N. 700).

**92** πῖλους κτλ. The feathered cap is characteristic of the peoples of the sea (among them the Lycians) who invaded Egypt in the days of Menephtah and Rameses III; cf. App. X. 8; W. Max Müller, *Asien und Europa*, p. 362 f.

**δρέπανα:** the Carian weapon; cf. ch. 93; v. 112. 2.

For the Lycians and their origin cf. i. 173 n.

**93** κατὰ περ Ἑλληνες: cf. i. 171. 4 n.

**ἐν τοῖσι πρώτοισι τῶν λόγων:** i. e. i. 171. 2. For the meaning of the phrase cf. v. 36. 4 n.; Introduction, p. 51.

94 Ἀχαιῖν. For this tradition cf. i. 145 n.

Why Danaus, who settled in Argos, is here mentioned in connexion with Xuthus and the Ionians is obscure, especially as he would appear to be two generations later in date (cf. i. 98. 2 n.). For the legend of Xuthus cf. Paus. vii. 1. Xuthus, son of Hellen, driven from Thessaly by his brothers Aeolus and Dorus, fled to Athens, and there married Creusa, daughter of the king Erechtheus, and by her had two sons, Ion and Achaeus. After the death of Erechtheus Xuthus fled to Aegialus and died there; Achaeus regained the throne of Thessaly, while Ion married Helice, daughter of Selinus, king of Aegialus, and at his death succeeded to the throne.

Πελασγοὶ Αἰγιαλέες: as later Ἴωνες Αἰγιαλέες (Paus. vii. 1); for Αἰγιαλέες cf. v. 68. 2 n. For Pelasgi here and in ch. 95 cf. Appendix XV.

95 I νησιῶται, usually in H. a wide term, may here signify specially the Cyclades, the νησιωτικὸς φόρος of the Athenian Empire. The small number of the contingent must be explained by the fact that these recently conquered Greeks (cf. vi. 31, 49, 99) were far from loyal to Persia. Indeed some fought on the Greek side (cf. viii. 46, 66). Diodorus (xi. 3) puts the islanders' contingent at fifty ships.

Πελασγικόν. H. apparently forgets that many of the Aegean islands, e.g. Thera (iv. 147), Melos (viii. 48), were Doric. The islands close to Asia Minor are probably to be included in the Ionian, Dorian, and Aeolic, contingents.

ἕσπερον: while still in the Peloponnese.

κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, 'on the same grounds as.' The criteria that they came from Athens and celebrated the Apaturia (i. 147) applied to these islanders as much as the Ionians of the Dodecapolis, whose claims to be the only true Ionians H. vigorously disputes (i. 143 f.).

On the origin of the Aeolians cf. Apollod. i. 7. 3 Αἰῶλος δὲ βασιλεύων τῶν περὶ τὴν Θεσσαλίαν τόπων, τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας Αἰολεῖς προσηγόρευσε. The Aeolians are Pelasgic because Thessaly was reputed an ancient home of the Pelasgi; cf. Pelasgiotis, Pelasgic Argos, &c. Strabo (220) cautiously says τοὺς δὲ Πελασγούς, ὅτι μὲν ἀρχαῖόν τι φύλον κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ἐπιπολάσαν καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ τοῖς Αἰολεῦσι τοῖς κατὰ Θετταλίαν, ὁμολογοῦσιν ἅπαντες σχεδόν τι.

2 Ἑλλησπόντιοι: in the wide sense (cf. iv. 38. 2 n.; v. 1. 1); apparently ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου (inf.) includes only the same regions, viz. Bosphorus, Propontis, and Hellespont. The Ionic (Milesian) colonies were Abydos, Lampsacus, Paesus, Priapus, Cyzicus, Artace, Proconnesus, Perinthus; the Doric (Megarian) Selymbria, Byzantium, Chalcedon. The Aeolic (Sestos, cf. ix. 115 *ad fin.*, and Madytus) are not mentioned probably because they are included in the Aeolians (§ 1).

96 I ἐπεβάτευον: besides the ἐπιχώριοι ἐπιβάται (cf. 184 n.): The sen-

tence reads like a later insertion as it breaks the connexion; cf. *τούτων* and *τούτοις*.

*ἐξέργομαι*: naturally 'I am precluded from', negative, as apparently in ix. 111. 1, 'prevented from refusing by the custom,' has here positive force, 'I am constrained by' (cf. ch. 139), and is equivalent to *ἐξαναγκάζομαι* (ii. 3. 2, cf. ch. 99. 1).

*ἐς ἱστορίας λόγον*, 'for the purpose of my history.' Here only in H. does *ἱστορίη* bear the meaning history which later became common. To avoid this Macan would translate, 'I am not compelled by the necessity of my argument to give any account of my inquiries on that head.'

2 *ἐπάξιοι*, 'worthy of mention'; cf. 224. 1; ii. 79. 1 n. So the *στρατηγοί* of the whole army and the *ἄρχοντες* of the tribal contingents are distinguished in ch. 82.

97 On the four admirals and their squadrons cf. Appendix XIX. 2. For *Aspathines* cf. iii. 70. 1 n. Probably this Prexaspes is grandson of the executioner of Smerdis, who revealed the deceit of the Magi (iii. 74. 75).

*Μεγαβάτω*: cf. v. 32. *Ἀχαιμένης*: cf. iii. 124 and ch. 236.

*Ἀριαβίγνης* fell at Salamis (viii. 89). He is son of the daughter of Gobryas mentioned ch. 3. 2.

98 The numbers of transports and light vessels seem out of place here. For the Persian custom of ruling by vassal-kings of the old royal race cf. iii. 15. 2 n. These kings (cf. viii. 11, 67) appear elsewhere at the head of their contingents; under Conon at Cnidus, 394 B.C. (cf. Diodorus, xiv. 79), and in the Aegean, 332 B.C., under Pharnabazus and Autophradates (cf. Arrian, *Anab.* ii. 13).

*Τετράμνηστος*: a Phoenician name Hellenized on the analogy of *Ἀρίμνηστος* (ix. 64. 2, 72. 2), *Πολύμνηστος* (iv. 150. 2).

*Ματτήν* = Mattan = a gift, Hebrew and Phoenician (2 Kings xi. 18).

*Σιρώμον* = Hiram, LXX. *Χειράμ*, probably a shortened form of Ahiram = brother of the exalted one. Hiram III was a member of the ancient royal family of Tyre which had been taken captive to Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar. He succeeded his brother Merbâl on the throne of his fathers 551 B.C., and reigned as a vassal first of Babylon and then of Persia till 532 B.C.

*Μέρβαλος* = Merbâl, Latin *Maharbal*, 'gift of Baal.' Aradus (cf. Strabo 753, 754) lay on an island like Tyre and Sidon, next to which it ranked at this time.

*Σέννεσις*: cf. i. 74. 3 n. According to Aeschylus, *Pers.* 326-8, he fell with the greatest glory at Salamis.

*Κυβερνίσκος*. E. Meyer (iii, § 95 n.) reads *Κύβερνις Κοσσίκα*. The name *Κύβερνις* appearing on a later inscription (Hicks<sup>1</sup> 161) and KYB on early coins (Six), while *Κοσσίκας* = Lyc. *Cheziga*.

*Γόργος*: king of Salamis (viii. 11), who remained true to Persia when Cyprus revolted (v. 104, 115).

Ἰστιάιος: no doubt restored to the lordship of Termera (cf. v. 37) after the Ionic revolt.

Δαμασίθυμος: lord of the city Calynda (i. 172. 2; viii. 87. 2). For its site cf. J. H. S. xv. 97.

Two more leaders are mentioned in ch. 195, one Cypriot, the other Carian.

99 1 στρατευσαμένης. That Artemisia took part in the expedition was the more remarkable as she had a son of an age to serve (νεηνίης) and might have stayed at home to safeguard her throne. On the dynasty cf. Introd. §§ 1, 3.

2 Νίσυρος: a small volcanic island just south of Cos.

Καλυδνίων. The island Κάλυδνα or Κάλυμνα (the latter form is the commoner, e.g. in Inscriptions, perhaps to distinguish it from the town Κάλυνδα; cf. i. 172. 2; viii. 87. 2) is north of Cos, between Cos and Leros.

3 γνώμας ἀρίστας: cf. viii. 68 f., 101 f.

ἀποφαίνω, 'I declare' (cf. ii. 16. 1). As a Halicarnassian himself H. speaks confidently.

The ascription of the foundation of Halicarnassus to Troezen seems to rest on the family tradition of the Ἀνθεάδαι, who held by right of birth the priesthood at the Posidonion (C. I. G. 2655) and claimed descent from Anthes, son of Poseidon. Strabo (656) attributes the foundation to Anthes (οἰκίσται δ' αὐτῆς ἐγένοντο ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀνθης μετὰ Τροϊζηνίων); Pausanias (ii. 30. 9) to his descendants. Halicarnassus certainly honoured Troezen as its mother-city (Paus. ii. 32. 6), but the connexion does not prove Dorism, both cities being half Ionic.

A bond of connexion between Epidaurus and Cos may be found in their devotion to the worship of Asclepius, under the charge of the Asclepiads, among them Hippocrates (Plato, Phaedr. 270 C, Prot. 311 E). Apparently before the Dorian immigration Cos had already been colonized from Thessaly (Il. ii. 676 f.; Tac. Ann. xii. 61). Calymna and Nisyros were later occupied from Cos (Diod. v. 54).

100-8 *Xerxes talks with Demaratus. The feats of Bogen and Maces.*

The conversations with Demaratus illustrate the confidence of Xerxes (ch. 101, 209) and contrast the servile subjects of the 'great king' with the Greeks, whose watchwords, 'freedom under the law' and 'loyalty to death' (ch. 104. 4, 5), anticipate Thermopylae.

100 1 ἀπέγραφον οἱ γραμματισταί: cf. viii. 90. 4. That such lists existed is certain (cf. App.), but in supposing they were first made at Doriscus, H. sacrifices truth to picturesqueness.

2 νέα Σιδωνίην: cf. ch. 128. 2. The Sidonian ships and crews were the best in the fleet (ch. 44 *ad fin.*, 96. 1, 99. 3). Sidon at this time outstripped Tyre in trade (Meyer, iii, § 85); her king took precedence of the Tyrian in the council of war (viii. 67).



- 3 ἐντός : i. e. inside the line of ships between them and the shore.  
 101 2 μὴ ἐόντες = εἰ μὴ ἔησαν. Modifying the exaggerated statement of his irresistible power.  
 ἄρθμιοι, 'united, leagued together'; cf. vi. 83. 2; ix. 9. 2, 37. 4; Hom. Od. xvi. 427.
- 102 1 μὴ is used with ἀλώσεται because the relative has the force of a consecutive clause; cf. iv. 166. 1.  
 σύντροφος : specially of congenital diseases; cf. Hippoc. p. 307. 18 νοῦσος ἐκ παιδίου σύντροφος ἐνδημος, and Thuc. ii. 50. For σοφία cf. Eur. Fr. 641 πενία δὲ σοφίαν ἔλαχε διὰ τὸ σύγγενες, Theocr. xxi. 1 'Ἀ πενία, Διόφραυτε, μόνα τὰς τέχνας ἐγείρει' | αὐτὰ τῷ μόχθῳ διδάσκαλος.
- 103 1 τὸ πολιτικόν : the whole citizen body (L. & S.) rather than the 'constitution of the state' (Stein).  
 κατὰ νόμους. Xerxes, with a knowledge of improbable exactitude, alludes to the Spartan kings' double portion at feasts (vi. 57. 1 and 3); double service might therefore be expected of them.
- 3 Xerxes pictures a battle as a number of isolated combats in which each Spartan will be surrounded by a thousand Persians. But five million Persians is a great exaggeration on the author's own reckoning (ch. 185), unless the camp followers be included (ch. 186). For the Spartans' numbers cf. ch. 234. 2 n.
- 104 1 τὰ κατήκοντα : how it is with the Spartans; cf. i. 97. 2.  
 2 τὰ νῦν τάδε ἔστοργῶς ἐκείνους, as the text stands, must be sarcastic; 'how I now chance to love them,' ἐκείνους being governed by ἔστοργῶς (cf. ix. 113. 2) and τὰ νῦν τάδε adverbial. Stein, however, conjectures that a participle, e. g. ἀποστρυγέων has fallen out after ἐκείνους, and construes 'how well pleased I am with my present condition (cf. στέργειν μάλιστα *infra*). For τὰ νῦν τάδε cf. Arist. Pax 858 τὰ νῦν τάδε πράττει, Eur. Heraclid. 641 εὐτυχεῖς τὰ νῦν τάδε, Iph. Aul. 537.
- τιμήν, 'my rank and honours.' For the γέρεα cf. vi. 56 f., and for the deposition vi. 61-70.
- 5 οὐδὲν πλῆθος : object after φεύγειν; cf. Tyrtaeus, fr. xi μηδ' ἀνδρῶν πλῆθὲν δειμαίνετε μηδὲ φοβεῖσθε.
- 105 Δορίσκῳ τοῦτῳ. The preposition is justified because Doriscus, though not mentioned since ch. 59, is the scene of the review and of the conversation with Demaratus (cf. i. 120. 1; vi. 42. 1).
- 106 1 ἄνδρα τοιόνδε . . . γενόμενον. These words give not a reason for Xerxes' action, but a later reflection of the author 'Mascames, left in charge by Xerxes, so bore himself that', τοιόνδε being explained by the relative clause; cf. i. 202. 2.  
 πάντων : i. e. in Thrace and on the Hellespont as stated in § 2.  
 Μασκαμείοισι : a patronymic rare in Prose, but cf. Plato, Gorg. 482 A ὁ Κλεινίειος οὗτος.  
 Ἑλλησπόντου depends on πανταχῇ (cf. ch. 126) = in all the strong places such as Sestos (ch. 33).  
 ἐξαιρέθησαν, 'were driven out'; e. g. from Sestos (ix. 118) 478 B.C.

spring, Byzantium (Thuc. i. 94. 128) 478 B.C. autumn, Eion (ch. 107) 476-475 winter, and later, apparently after the battle of Eurymedon, from the Thracian Chersonese (Plut. Cim. 14; C. I. A. i. 432). The many attempts to drive out Mascames show the length of these operations. The whole passage indicates that Mascames died in possession of Doriscus, but that it was later lost to Persia. As there is no sign that it ever fell into the hands of Athens, Köhler (Hermes, xxiv. 89) conjectures that the Thracians took it. The fact that Artaxerxes sent the gifts to the descendants of Mascames shows that Mascames must have died after his accession (465 B.C.).

2 οἱ . . . πέμπεται. H. writes loosely in speaking as if the gifts were still sent to Mascames; really the gifts, originally sent to him, were continued to his descendants.

107 I Ἡρόνος: on the Strymon (ch. 25 *ad fin.*). The taking of Eion was the first achievement of the allied fleet under Athenian leadership (Diod. xi. 60; Thuc. i. 98). The siege began apparently in the summer of 476, and lasted to the spring of 475. Plut. Cim. 7 *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς μάχῃ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐνίκησε καὶ κατέκλεισεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν. ἔπειτα τοὺς ὑπὲρ Στρυμόνα Θρᾶκας, ὅθεν αὐτοῖς ἐφοίτα σῖτος, ἀναστάτους ποιῶν καὶ τὴν χώραν παραφυλάττων ἅπασαν, εἰς τοσαύτην ἀπορίαν τοὺς πολιορκουμένους κατέστησεν, ὥστε Βούτην (sic) τὸν βασιλέως στρατηγὸν ἀπογνόντα τὰ πράγματα τῇ πόλει πῦρ ἐνείκει καὶ συνδιαφθεῖραι μετὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἑαυτόν.* (For self-devotion by fire cf. i. 86 n.) This account is supported by the inscriptions on Hermae quoted by Plutarch and Aeschines in Ctes. 183. On the other hand, the division of the river, the stratagem ascribed to Cimon (Paus. viii. 8. 9), is probably a later invention, explaining the inscription (Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, A. and A., i. 156 n.; Meyer, F. ii. 61).

2 The region was rich in precious metals; cf. v. 17; vi. 46; vii. 112; ix. 75.

108-26 *The advance of the army and fleet from Doriscus to Therma. Anecdotes of the feeding of the host.*

108 I καὶ πρότερον: cf. v. 1 f.; vi. 44 f.

μέχρι Θεσσαλίας . . . δασμοφόρος. The country, including Macedon (cf. vi. 44. 1), was subject and tributary, though under native princes.

Μεγαβάξου: cf. iv. 143. 1.

2 τὰ Σαμοθηρικήα τεῖχεα: forts securing for Samothrace a strip of coastland opposite the island; cf. ch. 59. 2; similarly Thasos (ch. 109. 2 n.; vi. 46. 2 n.; vi. 33. 1) and in Asia, Chios (i. 160) and Lesbos (v. 94; Thuc. iii. 50, iv. 52).

Μεσαμβρία: perhaps at Tekieh, to be distinguished from the town on the Euxine (iv. 93. 1; vi. 33. 2).

Λίσος. The only river of any size passes through Dede-Agatch (Doriscus?), but there is a smaller stream near Cape Makri (Serreion), which may be the Lisus.

- 3 Γαλλαϊκή. Γαλαῖοι are mentioned in Thrace on the Athenian tribute lists (Hicks, 48, 64).  
 Βριαντική: Liv. xxxviii. 41 'Priaticus campus'; Plin. H. N. iv. 41 'Priantae'.  
 καὶ αὕτη: as well as Doriscus (ch. 59. 3) and Maroneia (ch. 109. 1).  
 Κικόνων. The 'just title' of the Cicones (cf. ch. 59. 3 n.) is no doubt the earliest mention of Ismarus in Homer, Od. ix. 39.
- 109 I Μαρώνεια: colonized by Chians (Scymnus Chius, l. 676), famous for its wine (Hom. Od. ix. 197; Plin. xiv. 53 f.), now Maronia.  
 Ἴσμαρίδα: named after the Ciconian town Ismarus (Od. ix. 40). There is now no lake between Stryme and Maroneia. Ismaris is placed by Kiepert in the marshes west of Maroneia.  
 Βιστονίδα, named after the Bistones (Scym. Ch. l. 674), is really a lagoon (Buru Gyul) connected with the sea.  
 Τραῦος: perhaps better Τραῦσος as the inhabitants are Τραῦσοι (v. 4), the Yardymly Dereh.  
 Κόμψατος: Ael. H. A. xv. 25 Κοσσίνιτος; in the Antonine Itinerary, Cosintus; it now reaches the sea a little west of the Buru Gyul.  
 Ἀβδηρα: cf. i. 168 n.; usually placed, after Ptolemy, ten miles east of the Nestus, though Scylax (Peripl. 68) and Strabo (331, fr. 46) imply a site just east of the river, as apparently does H. (ch. 126). There are now no ruins near the mouth of the river Nestus (Kara Su).  
 Θασίων (cf. ch. 118) must be read for the meaningless ἰών, otherwise τὰς is superfluous; cf. Scylax, 68 Οἰσύμη καὶ ἄλλα ἐμπόρια Θασίων.
- 2 τὰς ἡπειρώτιδας: not inland cities, as they are παραθαλασσίας (§ 2), but cities on the mainland in opposition to the islands, Thasos and Samothrace (cf. i. 151, of the cities of Aeolis).  
 Πίστυρος. The name is connected with Βίστονες; cf. 108. 3 n. for the change of β to π. The form Κυστίριοι appears on a quota list, C. I. A. i. 243. The place may be marked by a salt-lake ten miles from the Nestus.
- 110 For Xerxes' route cf. ch. 121 n.  
 The tribes are enumerated roughly from east to west.  
 Παῖτοι: near the mouth of the Hebrus; cf. Arrian, Anab. i. 11. 4.  
 Κίκονες: near Mount Ismarus; cf. 59. 3, 108. 3 n.  
 Σαπαῖοι (cf. Appian, B. C. iv. 105): east of Philippi (Daton) and opposite Thasos.  
 Δερσαῖοι (cf. Thuc. ii. 101): apparently an inland tribe north of the Sapaei.  
 Ἡδωνοί: reaching to the Strymon (v. 11. 2 n.; vii. 114. 1; ix. 75). They had once dwelt between the Axios and the Strymon in Mygdonia, but had been driven thence by the Macedonian kings (Thuc. ii. 99).  
 Σάτραι: in the hill country behind the Edonians between the Nestus and the Strymon.

III 1 *μόνοι Θρηίκων* is too strong, even though Darius nominally made the country subject (iv. 93), and the Odrysian princes dominated most of the tribes (Thuc. ii. 95-7). The Odrysae at least were free and powerful; cf. iv. 80.

2 *Διόνυσου*: cf. v. 7 n.

*τό*, 'the well-known'; cf. Eur. Hec. 1267 *ὁ Θρηξὶ μάντις εἶπε Διόνυσος τάδε*. The empire of Augustus over the world was fore-shown by a portent here, as had been that of Alexander (Suet. Aug. 94).

*Βησσοί*, or *Βεσσοί*, were, according to Strabo (318), a race of mountain robbers, stretching from Mount Rhodope to the Illyrian frontier. Livy (xxxix. 53) and Pliny (H. N. iv. 40) also regard them as a distinct race. They retained the custody of the oracle till it was transferred to the Odrysae by Crassus in 29 B. C. (Dio Cass. li. 25). Possibly (Macan) the name of the religious order (Bessi) superseded the tribal name, Satrae.

*οἱ προφήτευσσιν*: that is the class from whom the *προφήτης* came. The *προφήτης* is the interpreter of the meaning of the god; if the oracle be given by dreams or signs, he explains their significance; if by speech, he puts together as an ordered whole the cries which the *πρόμαντις* lets fall in her state of ecstasy. He stands between the god and the people (cf. Pind. fr. 118 *μαντεύο Μοῖσα προφατεύσω δ' ἐγώ*), and is the president and manager of the temple. Cf. viii. 36 *ad fin.*, 37, and for *πρόμαντις ad init.* vi. 66. 2; vii. 141. 2; i. 47 n. H. seems to use the two words indifferently in viii. 135. 2 and 3.

These priests living in retirement in caves seem to have received almost divine honours in Thrace, and to have had great political influence (Eur. Rhesus 970; Strabo 297; Dio Cassius, liv. 34; cf. iv. 96).

*οὐδὲν ποικιλώτερον*. The priestess gives answers just as at Delphi; there is nothing more extraordinary about it. Apparently there were exaggerated notions current in Greece about this oracle of Dionysus. H., jealous for the honour of Delphi (cf. i. 48), declares it is just an ordinary oracle, using the same means as Delphi, not dreams, omens or the lot.

II2 For Xerxes' route cf. ch. 121 n.

The Pierians, like the Edones (ch. 110) and the Bottiaei, were driven from their homes in Macedonia, just north of Mount Olympus (cf. ch. 131), by the Temenid kings (Thuc. ii. 99 *οἱ ὕστερον ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον πέραν Στρυμόνος ὤκησαν Φάγρητα καὶ ἄλλα χωρία κτλ.*). The name Pieria clung to their old home.

*Φάγρης*: the first place east of the Strymon's mouth (Scylax 68; Strabo 331, fr. 33), perhaps Orfana.

*τὸ Πάγγαιον ὄρος*: reaches the river Strymon, lying between its tributary the Angites and the sea; cf. v. 16. 1.

*Ὀδόμαντοι*: cf. v. 16. 1 n.

II3 *Δόβηρας*: west of the Sapaean pass, on the left bank of the Angites, between Philippi and Amphipolis, to be distinguished from

the larger Paeonian tribe in the land. Doberus, between the upper Axius and the Strymon (Thuc. ii. 98).

Παϊόπλαι: cf. v. 15. 3 n.

H.'s orientation is, as often, loose. He seems to conceive the Strymon as flowing from west to east, and the Angites as flowing into it from the north, but really the Strymon here flows from north-west to south-east and the Angites joins it from the north-east. H., by making the Angites flow into the Strymon not into a lake, implies that Lake Cercinitis did not then exist, or was of small importance; similarly Thucydides (ii. 98) ignores it, and only speaks of τὸ λιμνωδες τοῦ Στρυμόνος (v. 7). It is first clearly mentioned by Arrian (i. 11. 3), and has apparently increased in size greatly since ancient times (Kiepert, Map XVI, p. 4).

- 2 καλλιρέεσθαι: to offer sacrifice in order to learn the will of the gods (vi. 82. 2; vii. 167. 1); the active καλλιρέειν (impersonal in H.) is used of the sacrifice itself = χρηστὰ γίνεσθαι, vi. 76. 2; vii. 134. 2; ix. 19. 2, 38. 2, 96. 1.

The offering of a horse is genuinely Persian (i. 133. 1; Tac. Ann. vi. 37; Xen. Anab. iv. 5. 35), and water, especially running water, was sacred (i. 131. 2, 138. 2 n.); but Strabo (732) says that when the Persians come to a stream or spring, they dig a pit, and there sacrifice their victim, taking care that the pure water near them is not stained with the blood, since that would be pollution. It would seem then that if H. is right, the Magi were following not Persian but local custom (cf. vi. 97. 2; vii. 43. 2; viii. 133; ix. 37. 1). The Strymon received divine honours from Greeks; cf. C. I. G. 2008 (from Amphipolis) τὸ δ' ἐπιδέκατον ἱρὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἀγνὸς Στρυμόν (Aesch. Supp. 254; Pers. 497). For the worship of rivers cf. vi. 76; viii. 138. 1, and especially of the river Scamander cf. Hom. Il. xxi. 132 ζῶντας δ' ἐν δίνῃσι καθίετε μώνυχας ἵππους.

- 14 1 φαρμακεύσαντες: of the secret rites, spells, or incantations which accompanied the sacrifice (i. 132. 3), which made the Greeks use the word μάγος for 'wizard' (Soph. Oed. Tyr. 387); cf. App. VIII. 5. Ἐννέα ὁδοῖσι: twenty-five stades up stream from Eion, where the Athenians built Amphipolis in 437 B. C. For the bridge cf. ch. 24.

- 2 Περσικόν. Human sacrifice is certainly not Zoroastrian, nor does it seem to have been common in Persia, though there are the instances of Cambyses (iii. 35. 5), Parysatis (Ctes. Pers. 55, p. 77), and another of Amestris (Ctes. Pers. 41, p. 74). For human sacrifice among the tribes north of Thrace cf. iv. 62, 73, 93.

πυνθάνομαι. This note is clearly a later addition. It is usually dated very late, since Ctesias (Pers. 43, p. 75) puts the death of Amestris in extreme old age shortly before that of Artaxerxes (425 B. C.). This, however, proves nothing. Amestris (cf. ix. 112), as daughter of Otanes and chief wife of Xerxes, was probably born some years before 500 B. C.; hence she would be for an Eastern



woman old any time after 440 B. C. The story may have come from Zopyrus (J. H. S. xxvii. 37 f.).

τῷ . . . θεῷ: cf. ii. 122. 1. Ahriman, the opponent of Ormuzd, resembles Hades as being author of death, and dwelling in hell beneath with his legions.

- 115 1 Ἀργυλον. Like Stagirus and Acanthus an Andrian colony (Thuc. iv. 84, 88, 103).

Βισαλτιή. The Bisaltae, though conquered by Macedon (Thuc. ii. 99), preserved their nationality for centuries (Liv. xlv. 29, 30). They were famed for bravery; cf. viii. 116.

- 2 Συλῆος πεδίου. Apparently the valley through which the waters of Lake Bolbe reach the sea (Thuc. iv. 103); probably Xerxes marched up this valley and then by Lerigova, not along the coast (cf. W. F. Anderson in Papers of the University College, Sheffield, 1897). Syleus was a son of Poseidon (cf. Ποσειδῆιον), slain by Heracles for mishandling strangers (Apoll. ii. 6. 3).

Στάγιρον has been placed at Nisvoro (Bowen) and at Stavros (Leake), but the identifications are quite uncertain (Anderson, *op. cit.* p. 226).

Ἀκανθος: Hierissos; a most important station, as in the expedition of Mardonius (vi. 44. 2). It has an excellent harbour, giving shelter in all weathers, an advantage not found elsewhere on this coast (Anderson, *op. cit.* p. 221).

ἔμοίως . . . κατέλεξα: shortened for ὁμοίως καὶ ἐκάστου ἡγάγετο τῶν . . . κατέλεξα: the reference is to ch. 110.

- 3 This *vetus via regia* was still in use 185 B. C. (Liv. xxxix. 27). No doubt the well-made Persian road (cf. v. 52) was a precious possession to the inhabitants.

- 116 ξεινίην . . . προείπε: not here 'imperavit hospitia' (cf. ch. 119. 1, 120. 2), but declared them his sworn friends, as is shown by the context and by ch. 29. 2; viii. 120.

ἑσθήτη Μηδικῇ: cf. iii. 84. 1.

τὸ ὄρυγμα ἀκούων. Either (1) ἀκούων must be excised (Krüger) or emended (Hude), or (2) something must be inserted, e. g. (Gomperz Stud. Her. ii. 65) σπεύδοντας before ἀκούων. The Acanthians naturally took part in digging the canal (ch. 22).

- 117 Artachaees was eight feet high, the ideal height being but four cubits (Ar. Frogs, 1014; cf. i. 60. 4). Respect for mere size is an oriental characteristic (ch. 187. 2; 1 Sam. ix. 2); thus the Mamelukes wondered at Napoleon's shortness. Though the identification of the tumulus (Spratt, Journ. R. G. S. xvii. 149) is very doubtful, there is no reason to suspect the real existence of Artachaees. H. is not embodying a mythical figure (Winckler, Gesch. Israels, ii. 175), nor borrowing from Alcaeus (Diels, Hermes, xxii. 425).

- 2 ὥς ἤρωι: cf. v. 47. 2 n. ἐπονομάζοντες: iv. 35. 3.

- 118 ὅκου γε, 'seeing that,' causal; cf. i. 68. 2.

ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ: cf. ch. 109. 2, 108. 2.

ἀραιημένος: chosen to provide the banquet. In performing this 'Liturgy' he was probably expected to assist the State out of his own pocket. For the wealth of Thasos cf. vi. 46 n.

τετρακόσια. Athenaeus (iv. 146 C), quoting Ctesias (fr. 11, p. 227) and Deinon (fr. 19, F. H. G. ii. 93), gives the same estimate for the cost of the king's supper, and puts the number of his guests at fifteen thousand. Heraclides of Cyme (fr. 2, F. H. G. ii. 96; ap. Athen. iv. 145 B) says this seems very magnificent, but is really economical, since this maintenance is really part of the pay of the king's guards and retinue. For eating of the king's meat cf. Daniel i. 5, 8, 13 f., and of his salt Ezra iv. 24; Meyer iii, § 54.

119 These details as to 'Purveyance' in the Persian empire are very significant. Cf. the frequent complaints of this method of exaction in mediaeval England.

120 2 παρέχειν . . . ἄν: imperfect = παρεῖχεν ἄν. 'Otherwise the Abderites would have had to choose.'

121 1 Θέρμη. Perhaps a Greek colony, yet always, save for a few months (Thuc. i. 61; ii. 29), a Macedonian town. It became of great importance when Cassander founded there (in 305 B. C.) Thessalonica (Strabo 330, fr. 24), a city as great in Roman times (Liv. xlv. 30; Acts ch. xvii) as it still is as Saloniki. Kiepert (Map XVI, p. 3) would, however, place Therma six miles south-east of Thessalonica. ταύτη, 'because the way by this town was he learned the shortest'; cf. iv. 86. 3; v. 17. 2.

2 The division of the army of Xerxes into three columns (cf. ch. 131) and the account here given, imply a march by three routes, at least from Doriscus to Acanthus, and in all probability to Therma (ch. 124 n.). But it is not easy to find in the actual narrative more than two separate routes. In ch. 110 it seems clear that the centre under Xerxes went a little inland by the route later famous as the Via Egnatia, while the left column followed the coast. H., however, does not realize that the left column, unless it was ferried across Lake Bistonis, must have returned to the Via Egnatia at the head of the lagoon, and in any case must have done so at Neapolis. After Neapolis the left column clearly marched south of Mount Pangaeum, while another must have followed, as did the Via Egnatia, the valley of the Angites, north of Mount Pangaeum. The third column presents a difficulty. W. F. Anderson, Papers of the University College of Sheffield (1897), ingeniously accounts for its disappearance by suggesting (p. 250) that it had already marched from Doriscus right up the Hebrus, and that it only rejoined Xerxes at Therma by the valley of the Axios (ch. 124 n.). Macan, arguing that no third route is indicated by H. between Doriscus and Acanthus, suggests that the third division was on board the fleet. Thus Xerxes might march along the coast (ch. 113) and yet be with the centre column (ch. 121). On the other hand, the confusion of routes in ch. 124 makes it more probable that a part of the

army marched far inland by the Upper Strymon and Echeidorus. Clearly H. is right in his view that the Persian army marched by more than one route, but he has not succeeded in keeping the different columns and routes distinct. For the generals in command of the columns cf. ch. 82.

122 διέχουσιν, 'reaching through to'; cf. iv. 48. 2. On the canal and its completion cf. ch. 23 n.

\**Ἀσσα*: at the head of the gulf; on the Attic tribute lists \**Ἀσσηρα* (Hicks, 33, 48).

*Σίγγος*: the only important town mentioned gave its name to the gulf (Thuc. v. 18; Plin. iv. 37).

*ἀπήμενος . . . παραμέβετο*: apparently the main fleet after rounding Cape Ampelus, near Torone, sailed straight across (123. 1) the Gulf of Torone, leaving the cities on its right (cf. ch. 42. 1, 109. 1); but it may well have sent a detachment to pick up their contingents. H.'s statement, though loose, is quite intelligible.

*Τορώνη* lay near the mouth of the gulf and had an excellent harbour (Liv. xlv. 30), while Sermylia (now Hormylia) was near the inmost recess. This Galepsus, unless H. has blundered, must have been between the two, and cannot be the better known Thasian colony near the Strymon, for which cf. Thuc. iv. 107; v. 6; and Strabo 331, fr. 33.

*Μηκύβερνα* (Molivo) was taken by the Olynthians (Thuc. v. 39) and became their port (Strabo 331, fr. 29). For Olynthus cf. viii. 127 n.

123 1 συντόμων (sc. τὴν ὁδόν) (cf. v. 41. 2), 'taking the shortest way'; cf. τὰ σύντομα τῆς ὁδοῦ, i. 185. 7.

*Καναστραῖον ἄκρην*: Cape Paliuri, the promontory in which Pallene ends; Scylax, 67; cf. Thuc. iv. 110; Liv. xxxi. 45.

τό: referring loosely to *ἄκρην*; cf. iv. 23. 3; v. 92 a.

*Ποτιδαίης . . . Θεράμβω*. On the east side of Pallene, on the Gulf of Torone; only Potidaea on the Isthmus also had a harbour on the Thermaic gulf, and was of importance (Thuc. i. 56 f.). Aphytis is Phormio's base against Potidaea (Thuc. i. 64).

*Θεράμβω*. On Attic tribute lists *Θεράμβαιοι* is often coupled with Scione (cf. C. I. A. i. 227, 229, 237).

*Σκιώνης . . . Σάνης*: cf. Strabo 330, fr. 27; on the west side of the peninsula. Scione, a colony from Pellene in Achaia (Thuc. iv. 120), and Mende, an Eretrian colony just east of Cape Posideum (Thuc. iv. 123, 129), both suffered greatly in the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. iv. 130 f.; v. 32). On Sane cf. ch. 22. 3.

*καλεομένην*: i.e. in epic it was taken as the site of the battle between the gods and the giants, *Φλέγγρα* being connected with *φλέγειν*, as were the *Campi Phlegraei* in Campania (Polyb. iii. 91. 7), and for the same reason, the volcanic character of the country.

2 *Αἶνεια* is the only town of any importance (Liv. xlv. 10. 32).

*Κροσσαίη*: elsewhere *Κροῦσις* (Thuc. ii. 79; Strabo 330, fr. 21; Steph. Byz.).

- 3 Μυγδονίην: east of the Lower Axios as far as Lake Bolbe (Thuc. i. 58; ii. 99).

Σίνδον: prob. at the mouth of the Echeidorus.

Χαλέστρην: elsewhere Χαλάστρα, at the mouth of the Axios (Strabo 330, fr. 21).

Βοττιαίς, or Βοττία, a land called after its earlier inhabitants, driven by the Macedonians into Chalcidice (viii. 127. 1; Thuc. ii. 99); it lay between the lower courses of the Axios and the Haliacmon (ch. 127. 1). The small wedge-shaped plain coming down to the sea was divided between Ichnae and Pella. The latter, under Philip capital of Macedon, lay 120 stades from the sea (Strabo 330, fr. 22).

- 124 τὴν μεσόγαιαν τάμνων τῆς ὁδοῦ, 'taking the short way across the land.' This curious phrase, repeated in ix. 89. 4, is perhaps colloquial. Both τάμνειν μέσῃν ὁδὸν and μέσῃν γῇν would mean to take the shortest way; hence phrases like τὰ σύντομα τῆς ὁδοῦ (i. 185. 7; iv. 136. 2) are natural, as again is vii. 121. 3 ἦτε . . . τὴν μεσόγαιαν. Here we seem to have a confusion of the two expressions; cf. iv. 12. 3 ἐς μεσόγαιαν τῆς ὁδοῦ τραφθέντες.

Παιονικῆς. The Siriopaeones (v. 15 n.) lived just above Lake Cercinitis on the Strymon and other Paeonians near the source of that river. Crestonia or Grestonia (Thuc. ii. 99, 100) is the hilly country round the source of the Cheidorus, or Echeidorus (now Galliko), and the upper valley of that river. This, of course, is far from the shortest route from Acanthus to Therma. H. probably distorted the whole lie of the country, exaggerating the size of Chalcidice and shortening the inland distances by a misconception as to the direction of the rivers (ch. 113 n.). He also confused the route of the three columns. In fact only a detachment can have gone with Xerxes to Acanthus which is off the line: one column doubtless marched along the road by Apollonia and Lake Bolbe (cf. Aesch. Pers. 494 for the return), another probably went inland by the Upper Strymon and the sources of the Echeidorus, and so down the Axios (ch. 121 n.).

- 126 βόες ἄγριοι: since their horns are described as immense, these would seem to be the *uri* of Caesar (B. G. vi. 28), the aurochs. Though these long-horned oxen were found chiefly in Western Europe, they are represented as caught in nets on the Vaphio cups. Again, Trajan dedicated to Jupiter Casius the horn of an *urus* which formed part of the booty won from the Getae (Anth. Pal. vi. 332). The Bonasus of Aristotle (H. A. ix. 45, 630 a), the bison of Seneca (Phaedr. 69; Plin. H. N. viii. 38, 40; Paus. x. 13), &c., had comparatively short horns, and a long shaggy mane of hair on its neck and breast; it was found in Paconia as well as Western Europe (cf. Keller, *Thiere des klassischen Altertums*, pp. 53-65).

φοιτέοντα: coming as articles of commerce, iii. 115. 1; vii. 23. 4. For H.'s interest in trade cf. Introduction, § 15.

τοῖσι λέουσι. The view that lions existed at that time in Europe has been ridiculed by Colonel Mure (Lit. of Greece, iv. 402), but H.'s statement is precise, and is repeated by Aristotle, a native of the district (H. A. vi. 31, 519 a), and by Pliny (H. N. viii. 45; cf. also Paus. vi. 5. 4, 5), while Dio Chrysostom (Orat. xxi, p. 269 c) says that by his time (A. D. 120) lions had disappeared from Europe. Fossils of lions are found in Europe, but they are of prehistoric date.

δ' Ἀβδήρων : for the site of Abdera cf. ch. 109. 1 n., but H. may mean only the territory of Abdera; cf. i. 15 ἐς Μιλητόν τε ἐσέβαλε : so Paus. vi. 5. 4 Νέστου ποταμοῦ τοῦ ῥέοντος διὰ τῆς Ἀβδηριτῶν.

τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἡῶ : adverbial, 'eastwards' (iv. 99. 1; vii. 20 *ad fin.*).  
ἐμπροσθε. To speak of the east as the front of Europe would only be natural to an Asiatic, but H. might use the expression (1) from early associations, or (2) because he is following an Asiatic source. The expression does not prove that he was actually writing in Asia.

127 1 Λυδίας (also Λουδίας and Λοιδίας) is the Karasmak or Mavronero flowing from Almopia through lake Borborus.

Ἀλιάκμων is the Vistritza, rising in Orestis. At present the Lydias joins the Axios (Vardhar) near its mouth. From the time of Scylax (550 B. C.) to that of Ptolemy (A. D. 140) all three streams seem to have had distinct mouths (Scylax, Periplus 67; Strabo 330, fr. 20; Ptolemy, iii. 12 f.). In alluvial plains and marshes (as e.g. Babylonia) such changes in the courses of rivers are frequent.

οὐ οὐρίζουσι : i. e. after their union; further up the Lydias was the boundary.

Μακεδονίδα : the supposed original home of the Macedonians, to be distinguished from the wider term Μακεδονίη (v. 17. 2, &c.). It includes only the original principality of the Temenid house (cf. viii. 138. 2), i. e. the plain between the Haliacmon and the Axios with the spurs of Mount Bermius; its capital is Edessa or Aegae. With Pieria and Bottiaea it is called (ch. 173. 1) ἡ κάτω Μακεδονίη in contrast with ἡ ἄνω Μακεδονίη (ch. 128. 1, 173. 4), yet apparently this upper country was the home of the true Macedonians (cf. Thuc. ii. 99).

128-30 The king's visit to Tempe.

128 1 With Xerxes' desire to see the vale of Tempe we may compare Darius' visit to the Cyanean rocks (iv. 85). His march would not bring him into the neighbourhood of Tempe (cf. *infra*). There are three roads from lower Macedonia into Thessaly. (1) East of Mount Olympus along the coast to the mouth of the Peneius, and up that river to Gonnus through the pass of Tempe; (2) through the depression between western Olympus and the Pierian hills, called the pass of Petra, leading to the sources of the river Europus or Titaresius, and down that river through Perrhaebia; (3) making a much longer circuit round the mountains up the valley of the



Haliacmon, and then turning south-east through a deep cleft in the Cambunian Mountains (the pass of Volustana or Servia) to the upper valley of the Titaesius. There is also a difficult mountain path over southern Olympus from Heracleum to Lake Ascuris near Lapathus, descending thence to Gonnus, the key of Tempe; cf. Livy xxxiii. 10; xxxvi. 10; xlii. 54. 67. H. would appear to have imagined there was only one pass besides Tempe (cf. 173. 4), but if so his account is confused. The repeated emphasis on *παρὰ Γόννον πόλιν* (128. 1, 173. 4), and the great labour involved in cutting a road (ch. 131), point to the mountain path (cf. Liv. xlii. 3 'ardua et aspera et confragosa via fuit'; cf. ib. 5), but it is hard to see how a route so difficult and easily blocked could be described as *ἀσφαλίστατον* (cf. *inf.*), or could possibly have been used by the whole Persian army (ch. 151. 1, 173. 4). Again, the expressions *ἐς Περραιβούς, διὰ Περραιβῶν* (131. 1, 173. 4), though possible of the mountain path, are more appropriate of the two other passes, since after crossing the passes of Volustana and Petra a force coming from Macedonia to Oloosson (Elassona) has still to traverse the lower passes of Perrhaebia, i. e. the region between Mount Pindus and the Peneius, south of Tripolis, to which in 480 B.C. the Perrhaebi were confined. Again, the phrases *οἱ Μακεδόνες οἱ κατ' ὑπερθε οἰκημένοι, ἡ ἄνω Μακεδονίη* (cf. 127 n., 173. 4) apply properly to the mountain regions of Orestis, Lyncestis and Elimia. The Persians would not reach even the nearest of these districts Elimia unless they went round by the pass of Volustana (cf. Liv. xlii. 53 'Perseus) postero die in Elimeam ad Haliacmona fluvium processit. Deinde saltu angusto superatis montibus, quos Cambunios vocant, descendit ad Azorum Pythium et Dolichen: Tripolim vocant incolentes'). Further, if Xerxes intended to march by the mountain path which led to Gonnus close to Tempe, why did he make a special excursion to it from Therma? On the whole it would seem almost certain that Xerxes must have used the easier passes of Volustana and Petra for his main force, though a detachment may have gone by the mountain path. The mountain path as the shortest circuit would naturally be used in turning the position of a force holding Tempe (cf. ch. 173), as the Anopaea path was at Thermopylae, and would therefore be the best known. Its fame may have obscured the existence of the more distant passes.

*ἀσφαλίστατον*, 'the safest way.' The way along the marshy strip of coastland and through the narrow cleft of Tempe could be easily held by an enemy (Livy xlii. 6), and presented many difficulties for a large army even if undefended (cf. ch. 173). Even if the mountain path were also used, the exit from it and from Tempe might be closed by holding Gonnus (Livy xxxvi. 10; xlii. 54, 67).

2 πέντε . . . δοκίμων, 'the five most important.' H. omits the Titaesius or Europus, the most important tributary of the Peneius on its left side, either from forgetfulness or because it belongs to Perrhaebia (ch. 128 n.), and inserts the obscure Onochonus (196) between the

Apidanus and Enipeus, which certainly belong together (ch. 196 n.). The Pamisus is the modern Phanari, or Piliuri, flowing from Southern Pindus, the Peneius, the main river, is the Salammbria. Probably H. knew well the lower course of the river through Tempe, but not the upper courses of the tributary streams.

H. wishes to emphasize the fact that all these streams pour their waters through one narrow outlet (the vale of Tempe) into the sea, and at first speaks as if they still retained their separate names till they reached Tempe; he then (§ 3) corrects this by pointing out that they lose their individual names when they join the main stream of Peneius.

- 3 Βοιβήϊδα: the modern lake of Karla, on the western boundary of Magnesia, in a deep depression closed on three sides by hills; it is fed chiefly by overflow from the Peneius. When that river is much swollen, its waters find their way by a channel below Larissa into Lake Nessonis (now Karatjair), and thence by the river Asmak to the lake of Karla.

- 4 οἰκότα: the view is consistent and reasonable (cf. iii. III. I; vii. 167. 1), but H. leaves the intervention of the Deity an open question, he does not himself adopt the opinion of the pious believers in Poseidon (cf. Introduction, §§ 26, 32).

τὴν γῆν σείειν. Hence the Homeric titles ἐνοσιχθών, ἐννοσίγαιος, &c., and in Thessaly πετραῖος (Pind. Pyth. iv. 138).

Philostratus (Imag. ii. 17) finds the best proof that the cleft was made by an earthquake in the zigzag shape of the cliffs. The ups and downs on either side the valley correspond closely to each other, and the rocks are of the same kind and appearance. Modern geologists would agree with H., except that they might substitute a series of volcanic movements for a single earthquake. H. is at his best in such questions of geology and physical geography (cf. ii. 10-12).

- 130 2 ταῦτα. Lest it should be thought that the conformation of their land was the only reason for the Thessalians' submission, καὶ τὰλλα (e.g. my might) is added, and then ταῦτα ἄρα is resumed and explained by ὅτι χάρην ἄρα. For ἄρα cf. ch. 35. 2).

πρὸ πολλοῦ: as a matter of fact the Thessalians had only finally 'come to a better mind' at the very last moment, when deserted by the other Greeks (ch. 172, 174), but Xerxes believed that they had been the first to invite his intervention (§ 3).

ἐπεῖναι: *immittere*; cf. ch. 176. 4. The whole anecdote gives a striking picture of the geography of Thessaly, with its flat central plain walled in by mountains.

- 131-7 *Return of the Heralds. List of the Greeks who Medized. Story of Sperchias and Bulis.*

- 131 Πιερίην. The small strip of coastland between the mouths of the Haliacmon and Peneius, with the well-wooded hill country on the

right bank of the Haliacmon below the Cambunian Mountains, and the northern and eastern slopes of Mount Olympus, was called Pieria after its early inhabitants (Πίερες, cf. ch. 112), though later included in lower Macedonia (ch. 127. 1). Hence the Pierian hills are here called ὄρος Μακεδονικόν. Its chief towns were Methone, Pydna, and Dium.

ἔκειρε: compare the road made by Sitalces (Thuc. ii. 98).

τριτημορίς: for the triple division cf. ch. 121.

32 I Θεσσαλοί: in the narrow sense, the tribe that, migrating from Thesprotia (ch. 176. 4), seized the valley of the Peneius, and compelled the peoples round about to acknowledge its suzerainty, so that the whole country within the limits given in ch. 129 was called Thessaly.

Δόλοπες: an ancient people living in the mountain region on both sides of Mount Pindus, from the upper Achelous (Thuc. ii. 102) to Lake Xynias. They are known as early as Homer (Il. ix. 484), and remained distinct till the Roman conquest (Liv. xxxviii. 3 f.; xli. 22). South-east of them, at the north of Mount Oeta in the upper valley of the Spercheius (ch. 198. 2), were the Ἐπιήνες (so also Il. ii. 749) or Aenianes (Thuc. &c.), while the Malians (Μηλιέες, cf. ch. 198. 1) lived round the mouth of the Spercheius, at the western end of the Maliac Gulf, reaching as far as Thermopylae. On the coast, to the east of Thermopylae, were the Locrians (Epicnemidian and Opuntian), while in Pthiotis round Mount Othrys to the north dwelt the Ἀχαιοί (ch. 173. 1, 196 f.), the old Hellenic stock who followed Achilles, surnamed Φθιώται to distinguish them from the Achaeans of Peloponnese. All these tribes belonged to the Pylaic Amphictyony (ch. 213. 2).

2 ἔταμον ὄρκιον: Homeric, probably from the cutting up of the victim; cf. iv. 201. 2, and in middle iv. 70. This famous oath, said by Diodorus (xi. 3) to have been taken by the σύνεδροι assembled at the Isthmus, must either have been general in its terms, and have been directed against οἱ μηδίζοντες without naming them individually, or must be placed after the battle of Thermopylae. Thebes was not openly on the Persian side till that time (ch. 205), and the Opuntian Locrians seem to have resisted stoutly till after Artemisium (ch. 203. 1; viii. 1. 2; ix. 31. 5); even the Thessalians did not Medize till Tempe was evacuated (ch. 172). Yet the indicative ὅσοι ἔδοσαν (not ὅσοι ἀν δῶσι) would seem to refer to a definite list of states, such as that given just above. Abicht would therefore identify this oath with that said to have been sworn before the battle of Plataea (Polyb. ix. 39) and given by Diodorus (xi. 29) and Lycurgus (in Leoc. 81). But this oath before Plataea seems to be a later invention. (1) It is not mentioned by H. (2) It is attributed by Diodorus (xi. 29) to the Greeks assembled at the Isthmus, whereas the Athenians did not join the army till it reached Eleusis. (3) Theopompus (fr. 167,

F. H. G. i. 306) declared it to be an Athenian invention, an assertion supported by the fact that its formula seems borrowed from the ephebic oath at Athens. (4) The clause forbidding the restoration of temples destroyed by the barbarians is most improbable. It seems better therefore to hold that the oath of the confederates, whose reality is supported by the proverbial phrase τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον δεκατευθῆναι Θηβαίους (Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 20, 5. 35), was taken just before the invasion as H. and Diodorus (xi. 3. 2) state. H. may have committed a slight anachronism in giving at this point a definite list of Medizing states, and not a general formula, or possibly the Thebans and Locrians were added later to the list of the 'proscribed' made just before the invasion.

If we could believe Diodorus (xi. 3), the hill-tribes—i.e. the Aenianes, Dolopes, Malians, Perrhaebians, Magnetes—Medized while the Greek force was still at Tempe (and so caused its withdrawal), whereas the Achaeans, Opuntian Locrians, Thessalians (proper, cf. § 1), and Boeotians only Medized when the Greeks withdrew. But the silence of H. shows that this was unknown to him.

δεκατεῦσαι cannot mean merely to exact a tithe from (Abicht, Bähr), as even if a tenth of the population was dedicated to the god, as Strabo relates of the Mysians (572) and of the Chalcidian colonists of Rhegium (257), as well as of their property, the penalty would be far milder than was usual in such cases. No doubt the original meaning of a δεκατεῦειν is to 'tithe' exact a tenth of goods, revenue, or produce (Xen. Anab. v. 3. 9 f.), and the most usual occasion for exacting such a tithe was the dedication to god of a tenth of the booty won in war (cf. v. 77. 4; viii. 27. 5; ix. 81. 1). Here, however, the meaning is surely the total destruction of the cities, involving the sale of the population into slavery and the confiscation of all goods and lands: from the proceeds a tenth would be dedicated to the god. This was the doom of traitors at Athens (cf. the Hermokopids, Hicks, 72; the generals condemned after Arginusae, Xen. Hell. i. 7. 10, 20); this is the procedure of Camillus at Veii (Liv. v. 21, 23, 25), and is implied in the tale of the capture of Sardis (i. 89). This seems a better way of accounting for the total confiscation implied than merely to take δεκατεῦσαι in the vague sense = 'dedicate' (Stein). And that total destruction was vowed against the traitors can hardly be doubted; in the case of Thebes it became proverbial; cf. Polyb. ix. 39. 5; Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 20, 5. 35 νῦν ἐλπίς τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον δεκατευθῆναι Θηβαίους. This is also supported by the proposal to evict the Medizers and take their lands for the Ionians (ix. 106). Doubtless it was not carried out as most of them could shelter themselves under the proviso μὴ ἀναγκασθέντες, and the Aleuadae saved themselves by bribery (cf. vi. 72).

τὸ βάραθρον : Bekker, Anecd. 219 Ἀθήνησι ἦν ὄρυγμά τι ἐν Κεριαδῶν δῆμῳ τῆς Οἰνίτιδος φυλῆς εἰς ὃ τοὺς ἐπὶ θανάτῳ καταγνωσθέντας ἐνέβαλλον.  
 2 ἀνεθέλητον = ἄχαρι : cf. ch. 88. 1. Later tradition supplied this omission in H. ; cf. Paus. iii. 12. 7 ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ ἐς ἐνὸς οἶκον ἀνδρὸς κατέσκηψε (τὸ μήνιμα), Μιλτιάδου τοῦ Κίμωνος. ἐγεγόνει δὲ καὶ τῶν κηρύκων τοῖς ἐλθοῦσιν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ὁ Μιλτιάδης ἀποθανεῖν αἴτιος ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. But this, as well as the tradition (Plut. Them. ch. 6) that Themistocles was responsible for the death of the interpreter Arthmius of Zeleia (cf. ix. 3. 1 n.), are clearly later embellishments of the story, due to the desire to connect famous men with a famous (or infamous) act.

H. perhaps thought that Athens was destroyed as a punishment for the burning of Cybebe's temple at Sardis (v. 102).

134 I That it was the wrath of Talthybius which showed itself in the unfavourable omens may have been guessed from his function as protector of heralds, or declared by an oracle. For Talthybius cf. Hom. Il. i. 320, and for the adoption in Dorian Sparta of traditional glories from the Epics v. 67 n.

ἱρόν : an ἡρώων such as Talthybius also had in Achæan Aegae (Paus. iii. 12. 7 ; vii. 24. 1). The Achæan clan of the Talthybiadae must have been admitted into the Spartan community like the Cadmeian Aegidae (iv. 149. 1). For these hereditary state-heralds and other similar positions cf. vi. 60 n.

2 ταῦτα : the murder of the heralds.

καλλιερῆσαι : cf. ch. 113. 2 n.

ἀλῆς : any public assembly (v. 29. 2 n.) ; here the Spartan Apella.

3 ἀπέπεψαν. The departure of Sperchias and Bulis from Sparta seems to have been celebrated in song ; cf. Theocr. xv. 98 (of a singer) ἄτις καὶ Σπέρχιν τὸν ἰάλεμον ἀρίστευσε.

135 I For Hydarnes cf. vi. 133. 1 n., and for his office v. 25. 1 n.

2 ἕκαστος . . . ὑμέων : not ἐκάτερος, because ὑμέων, like ὑμεῖς above, refers not only to the envoys but to all Spartiates present.

3 Cf. Democritus in Stobaeus xliii. 42 ἢ ἐν δημοκρατίῃ πενίη τῆς παρὰ τοῖς δυνάστησι καλεομένης εὐδαιμονίης τοσοῦτο ἐστὶ αἰρετωτέρη ὁκόσον ἐλευθερίῃ δουλείης.

136 I For this prostration cf. i. 134 n.

ὠθεόμενοι ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν : cf. Virg. Aen. i. 116 'pronus . . . | volvitur in caput', Plat. Rep. 553 B ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, Hdt. iii. 35. 5, 75. 3.

2 μεγαλοφροσύνης. For other instances of magnanimity cf. ch. 27 f., 146 f.

137 2 That the vengeance should fall on ambassadors was natural enough since the offence had been committed against ambassadors, but that it should fall on the sons of the very men who had taken the guilt of the community on themselves, but had not been allowed to expiate it, was a striking fulfilment of the law that the children must suffer for the sins of the fathers (Ezekiel, ch. xviii ; St. John



ix. 2, 3), and that the divine Nemesis, which had apparently slept, must in the end manifest itself against the guilty race; cf. vi. 86 and Introduction, § 36.

ὁς εἶλε. The feat was the more remarkable as Aneristus had only a merchantman. Halieis was a small port on the southern point of the Argolic Acte, in the territory of Hermione, opposite the island now called Spetzia. Its capture must have occurred after the destruction of Tiryns by Argos (after 468 B. C., cf. vi. 83. 2), as τοὺς ἐκ Τίρυνθος would naturally refer to refugees from the fallen city, and in 468 an Olympic victor is still styled Τίρυνθιος (Ox. Pap. ii, pp. 89 and 93 n.), and before the second year of the Peloponnesian war, when Halieis was allied with Sparta (Thuc. ii. 56) and Aneristus was seized and put to death (*inf.*). Presumably it would fall in the years when Athens and Argos were allied against Sparta, 461–50 B. C. *1 after 461 when Athens was in a base.*

- 3 For the facts cf. Thuc. ii. 67. He adds three other victims—a Spartan Stratodemus, a Tegean Timagoras, and an Argive Pollis—whom H. omits, lest they should spoil the moral of the story of retribution, already weakened by the inclusion of Aristeus the Corinthian (for whom cf. Thuc. i. 60 f. and *Intro.* § 30 (c)). Thucydides further ascribes the treacherous arrest of the envoys, not to Nymphodorus and Sitalces (for whom cf. iv. 80 n.), but to his son Sadocus. Nevertheless the intervention of Nymphodorus is quite probable, since he as Athenian Proxenus induced his brother-in-law Sitalces to make alliance with Athens, and obtained Athenian citizenship for Sadocus (Thuc. ii. 29), and in any case Sadocus must have gained his father's consent.

It would seem probable that this striking example of the doctrine of Nemesis drew H.'s attention in 430 B. C. to the fate of the Persian heralds, and led him to insert the story in the part of his history which he was then revising, and not in its proper place (vi. 49). Though there are suspicious points in it (e. g. that the barathron and the well would supply earth and water, Wecklein, *Sitz. der Bayer. Akad.* 1876, p. 230) there seems no sufficient reason for rejecting the whole story (as Macan, *Herod.* iv–vi, vol. ii, pp. 98–100), or even for denying that Athens emulated Sparta's violation of the sanctity of heralds (Wecklein, *loc. cit.*; Duncker, vii. 108; Busolt, ii. 571). It does not seem incredible (*pace* Macan) that even after the rejection by Athens of Persian demands for earth and water (v. 73) and for the restoration of Hippias (v. 96), and even after the burning of Sardis (498 B. C.) and the anger caused by it (v. 102, 105), Darius should have in 492 B. C. given Athens a last chance of repentance, when he was sending heralds round Greece (vi. 48), even though the mission of Mardonius (vi. 44 f.) and the levying of a fleet (vi. 48) show that he expected war. It is difficult to see when or why this story of the maltreatment of heralds should have been invented, and there is nothing incredible in it, especially if (Hauvette, p. 231) they were

Greek interpreters, who might be regarded by an angry people as traitors. The Spartans at least, as Macan admits, had something on their conscience, or we should hardly have had this story of the wrath of Talthybius.

Βισάνθη: a Samian colony (later 'Ραιδεστόν, now Rodosto) on the Propontis, here included in the Hellespont (cf. iv. 38 n.).

138-44 *The services of Athens to Greece. The Delphic oracle and the 'wooden walls'. Themistocles and the building of the fleet.*

139 I ἐξήγομαι: cf. ch. 96. I n.

This apologia was probably written soon after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. The charges prompted by fear and envy of Athens, and the pleas she urged in her own defence, are admirably summarized in the speeches of the Corinthian and the Athenian before the Spartan assembly in 432 B.C. (Thuc. i. 68-78). H. is conscious that his opinion will be unpopular in Hellas; cf. viii. 144.

3 τειχέων κιθῶνες: poetical, perhaps taken from a verse of an oracle, but cf. i. 181. I, vii. 223. I, and Demades, ap. Athen. iii. 99 D τὸ δὲ τεῖχος ἐσθῆτα τῆς πόλεως: and of a house Xen. Symp. iv. 38 πᾶν μὲν ἄλεινοι χιτῶνες οἱ τοῖχοί μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πᾶν δὲ παχείαι ἐφ' ἐστρίδες οἱ ὄροφοι. For the facts cf. viii. 40. 71 f.; ix. 7 f. H. is surely right in maintaining that no permanent defence of Peloponnese was possible if the command of the sea was lost; cf. ix. 9; Thuc. i. 73 ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ξυνναυμαχῆσαι, ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων ἂν ὄντων πρὸς ναῦς πολλὰς ἀλλήλοισι ἐπιβοηθεῖν.

4 ἐπ' ἀμφότερα: rather 'in either case' (Abicht, Krüger) than 'both by land and sea' (Stein).

5 ἐπεγείραντες: Busolt (ii. 654) wrongly infers from this that Athens must have summoned the congress; her initiative, if a fact, must have been informal. Sparta is throughout the leader (Macan, ii. 219).

μετά γε θεούς. The salvation of Greece is to the pious historian primarily the work of Heaven (cf. viii. 109).

140 I H., though in this part of his work rather regardless of chronological order (Hauvette, p. 323), clearly places these gloomy oracles before the expedition to Tempe (ch. 172-4), in the spring of 480 B.C., and apparently even before the first meeting of envoys from the patriotic Greek states at the Isthmus (ch. 145. I) in the autumn of 481. But both the tone and the substance of the oracles point to a date when the hope of holding Thessaly has been abandoned, when Delphi has despaired of the Greek cause, and when Attica is menaced by immediate invasion, i.e. between the abandonment of Tempe and the resolution to hold Thermopylae (Hauvette, p. 327; Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 306). After the loss of Thermopylae (*pace* Macan, ii. 232) Athens would have no time for a *double* consultation of the oracle. The authenticity of the first oracle is proved by the fact that

no one would later have invented gloomy predictions and advice falsified by the event, as well as by the adaptation in Aesch. Pers. 83 f.

τὸ ἱρόν: not the temple itself, but the whole precinct (vi. 19. 3) with its varied contents. Here the inquirers, after lustration with water from the Castalian spring and coronation with laurel, prayed and sacrificed, and unless they possessed the right of προμαντιή (i. 54. 2 n.) waited for the turn assigned them by lot. They then were taken into the sanctuary (ἄδυτον, μέγαρον), in which was a golden statue of the god, and in the dark background the tripod on which the Pythia sat (cf. i. 47. 2 n.).

- 2 The plural κάθησθε as well as the dual ἴτον (§ 3) refers to the *two* θεοπρόποι, whereas the singular φεύγε applies to the people they represent. The style and words as in other oracles are derived from the old Epic, e.g. λιπὼν φεύγ', Hesiod, fr. 144 οἶκον ἀποπρολιπὼν φεύγ' Ἄργεος ἱπποβότοιο, but here λιπὼν goes with δώματα. For ἔσχατα γαίης cf. Hesiod, Theog. 732. The god counsels a general migration, perhaps to South Italy (cf. viii. 62. 2), such as Bias had recommended to the Ionians (i. 170 n.; cf. i. 164-8).

τροχοειδέος. The old wall was nearly circular like a wheel, and even after the extension of the city by Themistocles the term κύκλος is still applied to the wall (i. 98. 5).

ἄκρα κάρηνα: cf. Il. ii. 117 πολίων κατέλυσε κάρηνα.

μένει ἔμπεδον: cf. Il. xvii. 434; v. 527.

πόδες νέατοι: imitating Il. ii. 824 πόδα νεάτοιν Ἰδῆς = 'the feet beneath'.

μέσσης agrees with πόλιος, as below μιν = τὴν πόλιν.

ἄζηλα = ἄδηλα. As the form is strange, and elsewhere unknown, Lobeck and others correct to αἰδηλα, but the oracle-maker may have coined a form on the analogy of ἀρίζηλος. Hesiod, Ἔργα 6 ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει.

Cf. Aesch. Pers. 83 f. (of Xerxes) πολύχειρ καὶ πολυνναύτας Σύριόν θ' ἄρμα διώκων, | ἐπάγει δουρικλύτοις ἄνδρασι τοξοδάμνον Ἄρη 'Syrian' = Assyrian (cf. ch. 63) here stands for Asiatic in general, the Assyrians having been, like the Persians, masters of Asia. Very probably the Persian chariot (ch. 40, 41) was modelled on the Assyrian.

- 3 οἱ: perhaps the temples (cf. i. 15); in Delphi the roof of a temple, in Sybaris the pavement ran with blood (Heraclides, F. H. G. ii. 199), so too an altar of Neptune sweated (Liv. xxviii. 11). Or it may be the gods themselves, i.e. their statues, which often ran with sweat or blood. Cf. Apollon. Rhod. iv. 1285 ἥ ὅταν αὐτόματα ξόανα ῥέῃ ἰδρώοντα | αἵματι, with the scholiast; Diodor. xvii. 10; Liv. xxii. 1; xxiii. 31; xxvii. 4; Virg. Georg. i. 480; Milton, Ode on the Nativity, 'The chill marble seems to sweat.'

δείματι παλλόμενοι: so Hymn. Demeter 293.

ὀρόφοισι: dative for genitive, 'down from.' Cf. Il. xx. 282 κάδ δ' ἄχος οἱ χύτο μυρίον ὀφθαλμοῖσι.

ἐπικίδνατε = 'spread your mind on evils', i.e. steep your souls in woes (Stein, Abicht, Macan), seems the meaning rather than 'bear a brave heart amidst your evils' (L. & S., Bähr, &c.). The tone of the oracle is throughout despairing.

141 1 προβάλλουσι, 'in utter despair.' The idea comes from the action of throwing themselves on the ground in despair; cf. Cic. Tusc. ii. 54 'Qui doloris speciem ferre non possunt abiciunt se atque ita adflicti et exanimati iacent'.

2 For the threat of self-starvation cf. Eur. Iph. Taur. 972, and sitting *dharna* (Maine, Early Institutions, p. 40), Macan.

3 For the intercession of Pallas cf. Hom. Il. viii. 30 f., and for the identification of Fate with the will of Zeus i. 91 n.

πελάσσας: masculine because the god speaks through the Pythia. For the phrase 'make as of steel' cf. Hesiod, Έργα 431 γόμφουσι πελάσσας, Aesch. Prom. Vinc. 155 δέσμοις ἀλύτοις | . . . πελάσσας, Pind. Pyth. iv. 227, Ol. i. 78.

Κέκροπος οὔρος: not the Acropolis (cf. c. 142), though it is called Κεκροπία πέτρα (Eur. Ion 936) and Cecrops (viii. 44. 1) was buried in the Erechtheum, presumably in the Cecropeum, but the 'border of Attica', of which the hollow of Cithaeron is roughly the Western boundary (cf. ix. 39; v. 74. 2). The Pythia quite naturally names the boundary towards Delphi.

Τριτογενεῖ: cf. iv. 180. 5 n.

4 Δημήτηρ: like Ceres = corn. 'When the corn is scattered or gathered,' i.e. in seed-time or harvest; but there may be also an allusion to Eleusinian ritual; cf. viii. 65 Macan. The last two lines have been generally regarded (e.g. by Busolt, Meyer, and even by Hauvette) as an *ex post facto* addition to the oracle, but in their favour it may be urged (1) they follow naturally the promise ἔτι τοί ποτε κἀντίος ἔσση, (2) they admit of a double interpretation (cf. i. 53. 3), (3) the time is vague; only the place is definite. Delphi must have known that the Peloponnesians wished to defend the Isthmus, and that Salamis would be a natural port for the fleet (cf. Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 306).

142 1 διζημένων τὸ μαντήιον, 'seeking for the meaning of the oracle'; cf. i. 71. 1 ἀμαρτῶν τοῦ χρησμοῦ, and iv. 133. 1 τὰ δῶρα εἵκαζον, viii. 51. 2 δοκέοντες ἐξευρηκέναι τὸ μαντήιον: cf. also iii. 22. 2.

συνεστηκυῖαι, 'opposed' as combatants; cf. i. 208. 1; iv. 132. 2.

ῥηχῶ: probably 'palisade'; cf. the gloss φραγμός. Pausanias (ii. 32. 10) says the Troezenians gave the name to the wild olive; the name of the tree might be transferred to a fence made of it; cf. 'oak' in Oxford. Others (L. & S.) take it as 'thorn-hedge', the ancient equivalent of modern wire-entanglements.

2 ἔσφαλλε, 'perplexed'; the same idea reappears with a different metaphor in συνεχέοντο, *confundebantur*. The soothsayers interpreted the last two verses of a naval defeat at Salamis; how then



could salvation be found in the fleet, how could that be the wooden wall which was to escape destruction?

χρησμολόγοι: cf. ch. 6. 3 n. It was the official interpreters who clung to the letter of the oracle; cf. ch. 143. 3.

- 143 As Munro (Cl. Rev. vi. 333) has pointed out, there seem to have been two distinct systems of chronology for the life of Themistocles, differing by ten years. The confusion may have been caused by the fact that the two Persian invasions were just ten years apart, and the two Athenian expeditions to Cyprus and Egypt were also ten years apart. The fixed points in both are that Themistocles died at the age of sixty-five, and that he was archon *suo anno*, i.e. at the age of thirty. The better chronology runs as follows:

523 B.C. Themistocles born. He belonged to the old Attic family of the Lycomidae, but his mother was a Thracian or Carian (Plut. Them. 1).

493 B.C. Themistocles archon eponymus (Dion. Hal. vi. 34) begins the building of Piraeus (Thuc. i. 93; Paus. i. 1. 2).

490 B.C. Fought in command of his tribe at Marathon (Plut. Arist. 5).

483 B.C. Carried through the decree for the building of a great navy (ch. 144; Ath. Pol. 22); his chief rival Aristides (cf. viii. 79; Ath. Pol. 22) ostracized.

471 B.C. Ostracism of Themistocles (Diodorus, xi. 55; Cic. de Amicis. xii. 42; Meyer, iii. § 286 n.).

467 B.C. Flight from Argos, since he goes up to Susa when Artaxerxes has just become king (*νεωστὶ βασιλεύοντα*, Thuc. i. 137), i.e. in 465 B.C. Later writers say Themistocles was introduced to Xerxes by Artabanus (Plut. Them. 27; Diod. xi. 56, following Ephorus). This mistake is best explained if Themistocles reached Asia while Xerxes was still alive, and Susa after his death, while Artabanus was still in power.

459-458 B.C. Death of Themistocles (Thuc. i. 138). The early tradition that he poisoned himself (Ar. Eq. 83. 4; Thuc. i. 138), because he could not fulfil his promise of subduing Hellas, points to some such crisis as the Athenian expedition to Cyprus and Egypt. On the other hand, Plutarch (Them. 31; Cim. 18) connects the death of Themistocles with Cimon's expedition in 449, and since he gives his age at sixty-five, presumably placed his archonship in 483-482, a date modified by Busolt (ii. 642 n.) to 482-481, and the Ath. Pol. (ch. 25) represents him as still at Athens in 462 B.C., and presumably placed his ostracism in 462-461. But this date for Themistocles' ostracism has been proved impossible (Walker, Cl. Rev. vi. 95 f.), and that for his death is most unlikely.

The only difficulty in the chronology preferred, apart from *νεωστὶ παριών* (inf.), is the long separation between the fortification of Piraeus (493) and the building of the fleet (483). But we must remember that little may have been done at Piraeus for a time,

While JHS 1964, sets this flight in 466 early (the puts Persian's) with then... he had 3 sons, the elder, Pleistomenes, who had been been by... 470 is at end... c. 475.



since between 493-483 Athens had much to engage her energy and resources. Indeed, though Hippias had made a beginning at Munychia (Ath. Pol. 19), Phalerum was still the port of Athens in 490 B.C.; cf. vi. 116. In any case it is clear that a better port and dock than that open roadstead was a necessary preliminary to the creation of a great navy.

- I νεωστὶ παριών: the participle is an imperfect, 'who had but lately come to the front'; cf. Dem. Phil. iii. 24 παρελθούσιν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν δυναστείαν. The word νεωστὶ has been used as an argument for bringing down the archonship of Themistocles to 482 B.C., but the expression cannot be pressed in H. (cf. vii. 148. 2), or, if it were, it might refer to the recent triumph of his naval policy and the ostracism of Aristides.

εἶχε . . . εἰρημένον: according to Stein = εἴρητο; cf. iii. 48. I ὕβρισμα γὰρ καὶ ἐς τούτους εἶχε ἐκ τῶν Σαμίων γενόμενον. The expression seems to mean 'that if the verse had been spoken of and really applied to', unless with Krüger we bracket εἰρημένον.

μιν: neuter, referring to τὸ ἔπος (Stein); cf. vi. 82. I.

- 3 ἀλλά (sc. ἐκέλευον, ch. 104. 5). The official interpreters tried to harmonize the two oracles by supposing that the second also recommended flight (e.g. to Siris, cf. viii. 62), only particularizing the ships as the means of flight and promising eventual safety. Very possibly this was the meaning primarily intended by the Delphic priesthood (Hauvette, p. 326), but the oracle could also be interpreted in Themistocles' sense, and was thus safe in either case.

- I44 I ἑτέρη . . . γνώμη ἐμπροσθε ταύτης. Dated in Ath. Pol. ch. 22 to 483-482 B.C. Though this date may be connected with the later chronology for Themistocles' life (cf. *sup.*), it is confirmed by other notices in H. The creation of the navy is clearly later than the expedition to Paros (490-489 B.C.), for which Miltiades has but seventy ships (vi. 132), even if that number be accepted; it is also later than and due to the war with Aegina (probably 488-486 B.C.), in which the Athenians had but fifty ships of their own (cf. vi. 89 n.).

ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, 'in the treasury'; cf. ix. 87. 2.

Laurium (on which see Ardaillon, Les Mines du Laurion) is the name given by the ancients to the whole hilly and metalliferous region ending in Cape Sunium, and bounded on the north by a line from Thoricus to Anaphlystus (cf. iv. 99 n.). The mines produced silver and lead in abundance. They had been worked from time immemorial (Xen. de Vect. iv, § 2), and from them Pisistratus (i. 64 n.) drew great wealth, as did Nicias and Hipponicus later (Xen. de Vect. iv, § 14). They were still important in the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. vi. 91 *ad fin.*), but were less productive, though by no means exhausted, in the time of Xenophon (Vect. iv. 35. 25 f.; Mem. iii. 6. 12). They had been long abandoned in the days of Pausanias (i. 1. 1). Since 1860 much ore has been extracted from the stones and slag formerly thrown aside, an operation

already attempted in the days of Strabo (399). The workings, in which only slaves were employed, consisted of shafts and galleries, whose roof was supported by columns (Ardaillon, *op. cit.* 25 f.). The mines were the property of the State, but were leased to individuals (usually for three years, Ath. Pol. 47), a net sum being paid down (often a talent), and also one twenty-fourth of the produce annually.

ὄρχηδόν: in a row, *viritim*; cf. εἰλαδόν, i. 172. 1; ἡβηδόν, i. 172. 2; vi. 21. 1.

δέκα = *denas*. If the citizens be reckoned at 30,000 (v. 97. 2 n.) this would amount to fifty talents, but that sum would only suffice to build a fleet of fifty ships (cf. *inf.*).

τῆς διαίρεσιος . . . παυσαμένους. H. leaves it uncertain whether this distribution was exceptional or regular. Plutarch (Them. 4) speaks of a regular, and Cornelius Nepos (Them. 2) of an annual, distribution; this was the custom at Siphnos (iii. 57. 2), and perhaps at Thasos (vi. 46. 3). The Atthis, which is followed by Ath. Pol. 22 and Polyaeus, i. 30, spoke, probably rightly, of an exceptional surplus amounting to one hundred talents, due to the discovery of a fresh mine at Maroneia, a village in the district of Laurium. This sum was handed over to one hundred rich citizens, that each of them might build a trireme.

δηκοσίας. This is H.'s figure for the full strength of the Athenian navy (viii. 1 and 14, 44 and 46, 61; cf. Justin, ii. 12), and should not therefore be struck out. He apparently forgot that the navy already amounted to at least fifty ships (vi. 89 n., 132). The later writers, quoted above, while increasing the sum spent to one hundred talents (Ath. Pol. 22; Polyaeus, i. 30), all reduce the number of *new* ships to one hundred. Macan (ii. 214), combining the different versions, suggests an annual increase of fifty ships for two or three years.

τὸν πρὸς Αἰγινήτας λόγῳ. Thucydides (i. 14) also gives this war as one of the motives for the creation of the navy, though he evidently thinks the expected Persian invasion more important. Probably Themistocles really looked forward to naval supremacy and empire in the Aegean (τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς συγκατασκεύασε, Thuc. i. 93), but wisely preferred in his speeches to the Athenians (Plut. Them. 4) to insist on the need of the moment, rather than on less pressing dangers or more distant hopes. H.'s next words probably mean that it was the Aeginetan war which induced the Athenians to listen to Themistocles, while Thucydides (i. 14) insists more directly on Themistocles' foresight.

- 2 ἔδεε (cf. viii. 6. 2). These ships were intended to form a reserve to take the place of those lost or damaged. Thus, in spite of losses at Artemisium (viii. 16, 18), the Athenian fleet is still reckoned as two hundred strong at Salamis. But was there time to build more ships? The figures can be explained otherwise (cf. App. XIX, § 1).

## 145-7 Congress of patriotic states. Dispatch of spies to Sardis.

145 1 ἐς τῷτό. Though Pausanias speaks of a meeting at the Hellenium in Sparta (iii. 12. 6), this meeting of delegates in the autumn of 481 B. C. was probably held at the Isthmus, where in the spring of 480, both the council and the forces were gathered together (cf. ch. 172. 1, 173. 4, 175. 1). Plutarch (Them. 6) makes Themistocles the author of this wise resolution, supported by Chileus (cf. ix. 9). The statement is not improbable, but may well be a mere guess.

ἐγκεκρημένοι: cf. v. 124. 1 ἐγκερασάμενος πρήγματα μεγάλα, vii. 151 φιλίην συνεκράσαντο, and iv. 152. 5.

2 μετὰ δέ: probably in the autumn of 481 B. C., since Xerxes is in Sardis still when the spies reach him (ch. 146). Macan (ii. 219) points out that the congress was summoned (as H. realizes) for the purpose of creating a new Pan-Hellenic Unity, and complete co-operation among the loyal members of the race.

οὐδαμῶν . . . τῶν οὐ = πάντων, on the analogy of οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ (iii. 72. 3; v. 97. 2), οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν being assimilated to the case of the relative.

146 The treatment of the spies, whether dictated by policy or by magnanimity, reveals the nobler side in Xerxes' character. Cf. the similar story of Scipio and the spies of Hannibal before Zama (Polyb. xv. 5; Liv. xxx. 29).

147 1 ἰδίην implies that freedom is peculiar to the Greeks, other nations being already subject, or prepared to be so (ch. 8 γ).

2 ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου. From the Tauric Chersonese and the south coast of Scythia the Greeks (and especially Athens) imported corn largely (cf. iv. 17, and for later times Dem. Lept. ch. 31 f.; Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 13). This made the Hellespont and its trade so important (cf. Grundy, Thucydides, pp. 71-9, 159-61). Aegina, a small and populous island with a barren soil, must always have imported corn, but even as early as 480 B. C. Attica would have been a more natural destination for Pontic corn ships, though complete control of the route was only won by Athens after the formation of the Delian league (Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 76, 77).

## 148-52 Negotiations with Argos.

148 1 συνωμόται . . . ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ, 'the confederates bound together by oath against the Persian'; for the phrase cf. ch. 235. 4, and for the facts ch. 132. 2, 145. 1.

2 νηωστί: probably about the year 494 B. C.; cf. vi. 76. 1 n., and App. XVII, § 3.

τῶν δὴ εἵνεκα. The Argives were evidently anxious to absolve themselves of the charge of Medism. Hence they allege that they were only led to consult the oracle at all by the deplorable straits to which they had been reduced through their defeat by Cleomenes. They then were expressly warned to remain neutral, but nevertheless were willing to join the alliance, if Sparta would grant a peace for

thirty years, and recognize their claim to an equal share in the leadership. There is no sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of the oracle, which was in H.'s opinion given about 482 B. C. (*αὐτίκα κατ' ἀρχάς*, cf. ch. 220. 3), but may really date back to the earlier Persian invasion, and sending of heralds in 491–490 B. C. (vi. 49), for had it been an Argive fiction it would have been disowned at Delphi after the defeat of Xerxes. The attitude of the Delphic priesthood, whether from fear or treachery, was before the war one of hostility to the league of patriots. Again, the negotiations with Sparta are a very pretty piece of diplomacy. Argos knew that Sparta would not concede equality, and could therefore safely use the demand to cover her Medism and justify her neutrality. H. does not explicitly reject the special pleading of Argos because he is influenced by Athenian tenderness for a city which later became a useful ally (cf. *Introd.*, § 30 *e*).

- 3 *εἶσω . . . ἔχων*, 'with spear drawn in,' i. e. remain at home on the defensive.

*προβόλαιον*: rare form = *προβολή*, *πρόβολος* (ch. 76. 1), as an adjective *δούρατι δὲ προβολαίῳ*, *Theocr.* xxiv. 125.

*κεφαλὴν πεφύλαξο*, 'guard thy head'; perhaps the remnant of the ruling class, the *σῶμα* being the mass of the population of semi-servile origin; cf. vi. 83. 1.

- 4 *κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον*. In the days of the Trojan war Agamemnon had a widely extended suzerainty, and Argos claimed to succeed to the hegemony held by the Mycenaean king. Further, when the three sons of the Heraclid Aristomachus cast lots for the lands of the Peloponnese, Argos fell to the eldest son Temenus. For similar claims founded on legendary history cf. v. 43, 94, and above all the dispute between Athens and Tegea, ix. 26 f. Pheidon (cf. vi. 12–7. 3 n.) had revived the ancient claim of Argos to hegemony. The hope of reasserting it still lived at Argos in the Peloponnesian war (*Thuc.* v. 27, 28), and made the Argives constantly ready to ally themselves with the enemies of Sparta, e. g. Athens in 461 and 420 B. C. (*Thuc.* i. 102, v. 44–7).

- 149 1 *τὴν βουλὴν*. This council which decides the foreign policy of Argos cannot well be the later democratic *βουλὴ* (cf. *Thuc.* v. 47), but must be some smaller, more aristocratic body, perhaps the mysterious 'eighty' mentioned by *Thucydides* (*l. c.*).

*ἀνδρωθένωσι*: the plea is specious if the defeat occurred within fifteen years (494 B. C.), hardly intelligible if it be placed thirty-five years before (before 515 B. C.).

*ἐπιλέγεσθαι* depends on *λέγουσι*: it is followed by *μή* because it implies fear lest; cf. iii. 65. 3.

- 2 *τῶν δὲ ἀγγέλων τοῦς*. The Spartans come forward from among the other envoys, because the demands of the Argives affect Sparta most.

*ἀνοίσειν ἐς τοὺς πλεῖνας* = *ἐξενεῖκαι ἐς τὸν δῆμον*, ix. 5. 1; cf. v. 79. 1.

τοὺς πλεῦνας (cf. Thuc. viii. 73, 89) = τοὺς πολλοὺς, τὸ πλῆθος (iii. 81. 1, 80. 6). The ultimate decision lay with the Apella (called ἀλήη, ch. 134. 2). Cf. App. XVII, § 2.

According to Pausanias (ii. 19. 2) the Argive kings in the second generation from Temenus lost all real power [Pheidon's reassertion of royal power later being regarded as a Tyranny], and ten generations later, Meltas, the last Heraclid, was deposed. Plutarch (Mor. 340 C) says that Aegon was ~~made~~ king after the ~~fall~~ of the Heracleids. Presumably the monarch only retained the old royal right to priesthood and other formal honours, perhaps presidency of the Boule.

Since the law said to have been passed in the days of Cleomenes I (cf. v. 75), that only one king should go with the army, was observed in practice, the Spartan reply is a mere evasion. H. would seem to have forgotten his earlier statement.

50 I ἔστι . . . λεγόμενος, 'is current'; cf. ii. 48. 3; iv. 179. 1; vii. 167. 1; viii. 118. 1.

That there was some truth in this story is proved not only by the reception of the Argive embassy at Susa (ch. 151), but also by the message to Mardonius (ix. 12), which distinctly implies that Argive co-operation had been promised. Indeed, the vain excuses put forward by the Argives cannot cloak their Medism; cf. viii. 73. 3 εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἔξεστι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατημένοι ἐμῆδιζον. Cf. *Intro.* § 30 *e*.

2 ὑμέτεροι ἀπόγονοι. This mythical connexion between the Argive Perseus and the Persians is no doubt a Greek fiction. It has appeared already in various forms; cf. vi. 54 n.; vii. 11. 4 n., 61. 3 n.

3 πρῆγμα ποιήσασθαι, 'to make much of, value highly'; cf. vi. 63. 2, and for πρῆγμα i. 79. 1.

οὐδέν goes both with ἐπαγγελλομένους and μεταίτεειν; cf. v. 39. 1. Because they valued the king's offer the Argives at first neither offered anything (i.e. alliance to the confederate Greeks) nor made any demand (i.e. for a share in the leadership), but only afterwards made what they knew to be an inadmissible demand.

151 συμπεσεῖν, 'to agree with, confirm'; cf. vi. 18 *ad fin*.

λόγον: the story is an historic fact (cf. i. 21. 1), hence γενόμενον.

Μεμνονίοισι: cf. ii. 106. 5 n.

ἐτέρου πρῆγματος εἵνεκα. There is no reason to doubt that Callias went to Susa to negotiate for a peace about 448 B. C. (Aristodemus, xiii. 2; F. H. G. v, p. 16; Diodorus, xii. 4; Demosthenes, *de Fals. Leg.* 273; Paus. i. 8. 2; Plut. *Cim.* 13). Nor is there any question that after the death of Cimon peace in fact existed between Athens and Persia, as is shown by the regular trade with Phoenicia (Thuc. ii. 69; viii. 35) and with other parts of the Persian Empire (Ps. Xen. *Pol. Ath.* ii. 7 ἢ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἢ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἢ ἐν Λυδία), and by the fact that H., a subject of the Athenian empire, travelled freely in the East.



Indeed, the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war have hopes of help from the Persian king (Thuc. ii. 7), and repeatedly send envoys to him (Arist. Ach. 61 f.; Thuc. iv. 50).

The question whether a formal peace was concluded is more doubtful. The earliest distinct mention of it is by Isocrates, Panegyricus, §§ 117-20, circ. 380 B.C., who repeats the terms in the Areopagiticus, § 80 (355 B.C.) and the Panathenaicus, § 59 (340 B.C.). It is mentioned also in the Menexenus (242 A) and twice by Demosthenes (pro Rhod. 29 and de Fals. Leg. 273), as well as by Lycurgus (in Leoc. 73). Its omission by Thucydides in his brief account of the period has been deemed by many fatal to its reality. But it should be noticed that the indignant rejection in 411 B.C. by the Athenians (who were prepared to give up Ionia) of the demand that the Persian should be allowed to sail where he would along his own coasts (Thuc. viii. 56), proves the existence of some convention excluding the Persian fleet from the Aegean. Further, it appears almost certain that a treaty was made with Darius II soon after his accession (circ. 423 B.C.), since not only does Andocides state that Epilycus, his own first cousin, made peace and eternal alliance with the king (Andoc. de Pace 29), but on a contemporary inscription, Heraclides of Clazomenae is thanked for his help in securing the success of the embassy to the king (C. I. A. (vol. iv.) ii. 5 c). It would be extraordinary that Thucydides should omit all mention of this, unless it was a mere renewal on the accession of another king of an older convention. It may therefore be argued that Thucydides indirectly confirms the fact of an understanding with Persia about 448 B.C. The fact which led Theopompus (fr. 168, F. H. G. i, p. 306) to question the existence of a peace, viz. that the inscription recording it was in Ionic letters, indicates at most that the record was not contemporary (though some Attic inscriptions even before 403 B.C. were written in Ionic letters (Hicks 36, 50, 73)); in any case it was accepted as genuine by Craterus, who gave a copy in his collection of Inscriptions.

For the terms we are unfortunately dependent on the fourth-century orators and late historians who are undoubtedly guilty of gross exaggerations. The limits fixed for ships of war, the Cyanean rocks (Dem. de Fals. Leg. 273; Aristodem. xiii. 2; Lycurg. in Leoc. 73; Diod. xii. 4. 5) and Phaselis (Isoc. Panegr. 118; Areopag. 80; Panath. 59; Diod. *l. c.*; Lycurg. *l. c.*, supported by the fact that Phaselis was a member of the Delian league), are probably correct, though Demosthenes (*l. c.*) and Plutarch (Cim. 13) substitute for Phaselis the more conspicuous landmark of the Chelidonian isles. On the other hand, the stipulation that the king's armies should not come nearer the coast than one day's march for cavalry (Dem. Plut. *l. c.*) or three days for infantry (Diod. *l. c.*) 'if ever made' must often have been broken, and Isocrates' limit, the Halys, is a gross and foolish exaggeration.

Finally, the notion that the peace secured autonomy for all Greek cities (Lycurg. *l. c.*; Diod. xii. 4, 5. 26. 2) is clearly a later invention designed to heighten the contrast with the peace of Antalcidas. It is contradicted by the abandonment of Cyprus to the Persian, and by contemporary evidence that the great king never formally relinquished his claims even to Ionia (Hdt. vi. 42 n.; Thuc. viii. 5). This is the reason why H. makes no mention of the peace here, covering it over with the vague phrase *ἐτέρου πρήγματος ἕνεκα*. In the fifth century it was discreditable to Athens to relinquish Cyprus and Egypt, to give up the crusade against Persia and turn her arms against other Hellenes (Thuc. iii. 9. 4), and to obtain from the great king only a grudging recognition of undeniable facts, but in the fourth century this same convention could be elevated by contrast with the base betrayal of Greece by Sparta at the peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.) into a triumphant assertion of Greek liberties and Greek empire.

On the peace of Callias cf. further E. Meyer, F. ii. 71–82; Busolt, iii. 346–58.

*ἐμμένει* (sc. *ἡ φιλία*): cf. i. 74. 4; Thuc. ii. 2. The question gains point if it be remembered that Argos had been since 462 B.C. in alliance with Athens, the enemy of Persia (Thuc. i. 102). About 450, however (Thuc. v. 14, 28, 40), Argos made a thirty years' peace with Sparta, and apparently aimed at returning to her old position of neutrality.

52 2 For the form of this *γνώμη* cf. iii. 38. 1. The attempt to excuse the Argives by the suggestion that others, perhaps the Thebans, were yet more guilty is not convincing. While H. anxiously disclaims all responsibility for the stories which implied most clearly the guilt of the Argives, he seems to condemn them in his heart; cf. viii. 73. 3; Intro. § 30 c.

Since *οἰκῆμα κακά* should mean misfortunes (i. 153. 1; iii. 14. 10; vi. 21. 2), whereas *αἰσχροί* implies misdeeds, Macan suggests that H. has confused two ideas. Peoples constantly believe that their own troubles are worse than their neighbours' and as often that their neighbours' vices are worse than their own; more careful study might in each case convince them of error; but the two cases are distinct, though H.'s doctrine that wretchedness is the natural result of sin may account for his confusion between them. Stein would identify *κακά* with *αἰσχροί*.

3 For this principle of Herodotean criticism cf. ii. 123. 1; iv. 195. 2; Intro. § 28 (4). Disbelief is implied of the story that the Argives originally invited Persian intervention.

53–67 *Negotiations with Gelo of Syracuse. His origin and rise to power* (153–6); *his interview with the Greek envoys* (157–62); *the mission of Cadmus* (163–4); *and the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily* (165–7).

53 1 *οἰκῆτωρ ὁ ἐν Γέλῳ*, 'he who became a settler at Gela,' in apposition

to πρόγονος. This ancestor of Gelo was probably named Deinomenes, who is said to have joined Antiphemus in founding the colony (Etym. M. Γέλα, Schol. ap. Pind. Pyth. ii. 27), since the name is borne by Gelo's father (ch. 145. 2) and by his nephew, the son of Hiero (Pind. Pyth. i. 58, 79).

Τῆλος: half-way between Cnidus and Rhodes, now Dilos or Episkopi. Τριοπίω: cf. i. 144. 1 n.

κτιζομένης Γέλης. Cf. Thuc. vi. 4 Γέλαν δὲ Ἀντίφημος ἐκ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἐντιμος ἐκ Κρήτης ἐποίκουσ ἀγαγόντες κοινῇ ἔκτισαν, ἔτει πέμπτῳ καὶ τεσσαρακοστῷ μετὰ Συρακουσῶν οἴκισιν (i. e. 690 B. C.). καὶ τῇ μὲν πόλει ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέλα ποταμοῦ τοῦνομα ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ χωρίον οὗ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἐτειχίσθη Δίνδιοι καλεῖται, and for a commentary on it, Freeman, Sicily, i. 400 f.

- 2 τῶν χθονίων θεῶν: Demeter and Persephone (cf. vi. 134. 1). In their worship at Eleusis the Hierophant conducted the ceremonies and showed the sacred objects to the initiated (cf. ii. 171 n.).
- 3 ἡ αὐτὸς ἐκτήσατο: or possessed himself of the sacred symbols without help from others, i. e. by direct inspiration or by his own inventive powers, cf. ii. 49. 2. According to the scholiast on Pindar, Pyth. ii. 27, Deinomenes (cf. *sup.*) brought the rites from the Carian Triopium.

It would seem that the position of Hierophant must of necessity belong to the holder of the *ἱρά* and his descendants; probably what had been a mere family worship was raised to the rank of a mystery recognized by the state, the priesthood remaining hereditary in the family of Telines (cf. iii. 142. 4; iv. 161. 3), as at Eleusis it was confined to the Eumolpidae. The priestly office was held by Gelo and Hiero (Pind. Ol. vi. 95 with schol.), the former building from the spoils of his victory over Carthage two temples in one precinct to the goddesses in Syracuse (Diod. xi. 26; xiv. 63). There was a great oath by the goddess described by Plutarch, Dion. c. 56; cf. Diod. xix. 5.

- 4 καὶ τοῦτο. The second cause for wonder is that a man of so weak a character should have accomplished so great a deed (cf. viii. 37. 2); the first, apparently that any one should have produced a great political result by the mere display of sacred emblems; cf. H.'s remarks on the restoration of Pisistratus by sacred means (i. 60).

πρὸς goes with τῶν οἰκητόρων. The Greek settlers in Sicily are meant. Not only this story of the rise of Gelo (cc. 153-6) but those of Cadmus (c. 163 f.) and of the battle of Himera (165-7) are clearly drawn from local Siceliot sources, probably while H. was at Thurii. The traditions followed are not favourable to the great house of Deinomenes, and need not be Syracusan. They are of the greatest importance, since our only full and connected version of Sicilian history is the late and stupid compilation of Diodorus, who apparently made most use of the fantastic and arbitrary Timaeus.

- 54 1 Cleandrus deprived the oligarchs restored by Telines of power and made himself tyrant with the help of the people, *circ.* 505 B.C. (Ar. Pol. v. 12, 1316 a 35 f.).

Παντάρης. To him would seem to belong a dedicatory inscription found at Olympia, I. G. A. 512 a Παντάρης μ' ἀνέθηκε Μενεκράτιος Διὸς ἄθλον Ἄρματι νικήσας πέδου ἐκ κλει]τοῦ Γελοαίου.

Γέλων: son of Deinomenes (ch. 145. 2), the eldest of four brothers, Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus, Thrasybulus (Simon. fr. 142), tyrant of Gela 491, of Syracuse 485-478 B.C., was succeeded by his brother Hiero first at Gela and then at Syracuse.

- Αἰνησιδήμου τοῦ Παταίκου. Clearly he is singled out for mention because he was a prominent man connected with Gelo. He may therefore probably be identified with the father of Thero, afterwards tyrant of Acragas and ally of Gelo (ch. 165). Some words, perhaps Θηρώνος δὲ πατρός, have fallen out of the text. The genealogy of Thero, however, given by the scholiasts on Pind. Ol. ii. 16 and 82, does not contain the name of Pataecus, calling Aenesidemus son of Emmenides. It would seem from Ar. Rhet. i. 12 that Aenesidemus too dreamed of tyranny at Gela but was forestalled by Gelo; he may well be the tyrant of Leontini (Paus. v. 22. 7), established by Hippocrates. The family of the Emmenidae traced their origin back to Theras (cf. iv. 147 n.). One of Thero's ancestors came from Lindus in Rhodes to Gela, and thence to Acragas, where Telemachus, his grandfather, overthrew the tyrant Phalaris in Ol. 57.
- 2 Callipolis, a Naxian settlement, not far from its mother-city, perished before Strabo wrote (273).

Naxos, said to have been the earliest Greek colony in Sicily, founded 735 B. C. by Thucles from Chalcis in Euboea (Thuc. vi. 3). Possibly Naxians joined in the colony and gave it its name (Hellanicus, fr. 50, F. H. G. i. 51; cf. Freeman, S. i. 570). It lay on a headland a little south of Tauromenium (Taormina), and was razed to the ground by Dionysius. A stream of lava has overspread the site.

Ζαγκλαίους: cf. vi. 23 n.

Λεοντίνους: founded from Naxos, *circ.* 729 B. C. (Thuc. vi. 4). Two hills or acropoleis rise from the famous plain; these are still covered with ruins. For a description cf. Polyb. vii. 6.

πρός, 'besides'; adverbial. Cf. v. 20. 4; vii. 166. 1.

- 3 Corinthians, under Archias, had founded Syracuse, 734 B. C. (?). Corcyra joined Corinth once again to save Syracuse by the dispatch of Timoleon (Plut. Tim. 3). On this occasion Hippocrates had occupied the Olympieium (Diod. x. fr. 28; cf. Freeman, S. ii, pp. 117 f.).

Ἐλώρω: also Helorus (now Tellaro), with a town of the same name near its mouth, is a river whose deep valley (Pind. Nem. ix. 40 βαθυκρήνοισι δ' ἄμφ' ἅκταις Ἐλώρου) was spanned by a bridge over which passed the Helorine coast road from Syracuse (Thuc. vi. 70; vii. 80).

Καμάρινα : near the mouth of the Hipparis on the south coast between Gela and Cape Pachynus. The lake has become a marsh and the city on the hill lies desolate. For its history cf. ch. 156, and Thuc. vi. 5 καὶ Καμάρινα τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ᾤκισθη, ἔτεσιν ἐγγύτατα πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ Συρακουσῶν κτίσιν (i. e. 599 B. C.)· οἰκιστὰὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς Δάσκων καὶ Μενέκωλος. ἀναστάτων δὲ Καμαριναίων γενομένων πολέμῳ ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων δι' ἀπόστασιν (c. 550 B. C.), χρόνῳ Ἰπποκράτης ὕστερον Γέλας τύραννος λύτρα ἀνδρῶν Συρακοσίων αἰχμαλώτων λαβὼν τὴν γῆν τὴν Καμαριναίων, αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς γενόμενος κατόκισε Καμαρίναν. καὶ αὖθις ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνάστατος γενομένη τὸ τρίτον κατόκισθη ὑπὸ Γελῶν. Cf. also Philistus, fr. 8 and fr. 17, F. H. G. i. 186, 187. In the Peloponnesian war it played a hesitating part; cf. Thuc. vi. 75, 88; vii. 33. Its history is a typical example of the jealousy of great cities against their neighbours; cf. Thebes and Plataea, and in mediaeval times Milan and Pavia.

155 I ἴσα ἔτεα : for seven years, 498-491 B. C.

There were in Sicily three towns called Hybla all originally Sicel. The first was superseded by the Greek colony Megara (Strabo 268), on the coast ten miles north of Syracuse; the Sicel town stood on a little height north of the hill of Megara. Thucydides calls the town Megara (vi. 49, 94), and H. its citizens Megarians (ch. 156. 2); both record its destruction by Gelo in 483 B. C. (ch. 156; Th. vi. 4). The second, called by Thucydides (vi. 62) Γελᾶτις, was in his time still a Sicel town (vi. 94); it is called by Pausanias (v. 23. 4) Γερεᾶτις, and by Steph. Byz. s. v. and Cicero (de Div. i. 20, 39) apparently Γαλεῶτις. It lay in the territory of Catana (Paus. l. c.), between Catana and Centuripa (Thuc. vi. 94), and may be placed at Paterno, where an inscription has been found, 'Veneri victrici Hyblensi.' The third, called Ἡραία, on the road between Gela and Syracuse (Itin. Anton. p. 89), may be placed at or near Ragusa; almost certainly it is the place here meant. Cf. further Holm, G. S. i. 363, 365; Freeman, S. i, pp. 512 f.

Σικελούς : cf. ch. 170. i.

2 γαμόροι. The name, Doric in form, clearly comes from local Sicilian sources. Like the γεωμόροι of Samos (Thuc. viii. 21), they were a land-holding aristocracy. Probably the earliest settlers secured for themselves exclusive possession of the full rights of citizenship, and especially of holding land (ἐγκτησις γῆς). Their holdings were cultivated by serfs (δοῦλοι), probably the relics of the old native population reduced to a position of villeinage.

The Κυλλῦριοι or Καλλικύριοι, who drove out their masters the Γαμόροι (Timaeus, fr. 56; F. H. G. i. 204), were compared by Aristotle in his Syracusan constitution to the Helots, the Penestae in Thessaly, and the Clarotae in Crete (F. H. G. i. 170). The γαμόροι formed a high court of justice like the comitia at Rome (Diod. viii. 11). The fall of the γαμόροι is connected by Aristotle (Pol. v. 4. 1, 1303 b 20) and Plutarch (Mor. 825 c) with a private



feud. It probably took place but a few years before Gelo mastered Syracuse, perhaps only after the defeat of the Syracusans on the Helorus (ch. 154). Clearly the excluded Demos, the town population mainly of Greek origin, joined with native serfs against their masters (cf. Dionys. Hal. vi. 62; Ar. Pol. v. 3, 5, 1302 b 32; and in general Freeman, S. ii, pp. 11-15, 436-9).

**Κασμίνης**, or Casmenae, founded from Syracuse in 645 B. C. (Thuc. vi. 5); it is to be placed probably at Spaccaforro (Freeman, S. ii. 25, 26).

**ἔσχε**. Gelo reigned seven years (Ar. Pol. v. 12, 1315 b 36); probably 485-478 B. C. He is still called Geloan on his offering for victory at Olympia in 488-487 B. C. (Paus. vi. 9. 4). Hence Pausanias' statement that he became lord of Syracuse in 491 B. C. is a confusion between the beginning of his rule at Syracuse and his first attainment of tyranny at Gela (cf. Busolt, ii. 779 n. 3).

156 I **ἥσάν οἱ πάντα**, 'was everything to him'; cf. iii. 157. 4 and less exactly i. 122. 3. Syracuse was the centre and capital of his dominion which extended over eastern Sicily, and since to the Greek mind city and state were inseparable, he increased the city at the expense of other communities (§§ 2, 3). The creation of this greater Syracuse, henceforward the chief city in Sicily, probably saved the island from Punic domination.

2 **τὸ ἄστυ**: the town as opposed to the citadel, v. 64. 2; viii. 51. 2; i. 14. 4.

**Μεγαρέας**: cf. c. 155. 1 n.

**παχέας**: a popular term for the well-to-do oligarchs; cf. v. 30. 1, 77. 2; vi. 91. 1.

The harsh treatment of the Demos is probably to be explained by the fact that it was in part at least of non-Hellenic origin, but the military Sicilian tyrants are throughout less favourable to the people than the tyrants of Greece proper (cf. App. XVI, § 1).

**ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ**: sold to slave-traders 'for export abroad'; cf. v. 6. 1.

3 **Εὐβοέας**: cf. Strabo 449 ἦν δὲ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Εὐβοία Χαλχιδέων τῶν ἐκεῖ (i. e. in Leontini) κτίσμα, ἣν Γέλων ἐξανέστησε καὶ ἐγένετο φρούριον Συρακουσίων. The site is unknown.

**διακρίνας**: distinguishing as at Megara between the nobles and the commons.

**συνοίκημα**: unpleasant to live with; so Aesch. Supplices 267 (of dragons) *δυσμενὴ ξυνοικίαν*. These wholesale deportations are characteristic of Sicilian history; cf. Hiero's transference of the men of Naxos and Catana to Leontini, his foundation of Aetna, and the later case of Leontini (Thuc. v. 4).

57 I That there were negotiations with Gelo is almost certain, but the account here given is clearly unhistorical, whether we trace its origin to some Syracusan satirist (Freeman, S. ii. 515 f.) or to some funeral oration in the Ceramicus with its customary laudations of Athens. Cf. ix. 26 f., and Meyer, F. ii. 219 f. Nor are matters

mended by transferring the scene to Corinth and rationalizing H.'s account, as seems to have been done by Timaeus (Polyb. xii. 26 b; fr. 87; F. H. G. i. 213). The essential points, the debate about hegemony and the self-laudations of both sides, remain the same.

πάσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα: the whole of Hellas including the colonies. There is some exaggeration here as in πάντα just above.

- 2 ἦκεῖς μεγάλῃς. Most editors read *μεγάλως*, while others insert *εὖ*, as an adverb is wanted in these phrases; cf. *ὁμοίως ἦκειν*, i. 149. 2, and *εὖ ἦκειν*, i. 30. 4, &c.

ἀρχοντί γε Σικελίης: cf. ch. 163. 1. Gelo's alliance with Thero (c. 166) served to extend his influence in the west of Sicily. The title is given to Dionysius by the Athenians in official degrees, 393–368 B.C.; cf. Hicks 91, 108, 112.

- 158 1 πολλὰς ἐνέκειτο, 'attacked them vehemently'; so Thuc. iv. 22 (of Cleon); Dem. de Cor. 199; Theocr. xxii. 90. For πολλὰς cf. i. 98. 1.

- 2 νεῖκος. (1) Many writers (e.g. Abbott, ii. 446) follow Holm (G. S. i. 416) in identifying this strife with the great campaign which culminated at the Himera, placing that battle in 481 B.C.; but this is absolutely opposed to the clear meaning of H. (Freeman, ii. 478). Again, the synchronism between the Persian and Carthaginian invasions seems well established (cf. 166 n.); H. makes the Himera coincide with Salamis (ch. 166), and is followed, though more cautiously, by Aristotle (Poet. 23); Diodorus (xi. 24) places it on the last day of the fighting at Thermopylae. Further, there is a high probability that there was some concerted arrangement between the Persian and the Carthaginian (Ephorus fr. 111; F. H. G. i. 264; Diod. xi. 1; ch. 166 n.). (2) Others (e.g. Meltzer, Karthager, i. 495; cf. Busolt, ii. 790 n.) see in this earlier war a mis-dating of the great invasion by some writer anxious to deprive Gelo of all excuse for refusing his aid to the mother-country, but if so, H. is strangely careless. (3) Freeman (ii. 479), feeling it difficult to find room for the war after Gelo became tyrant (i.e. after 491 B.C.), holds that he refers to some fighting in which he took part as a subordinate of Cleandrus or Hippocrates, but this is surely an impossible interpretation of Gelo's words. Most probably, Gelo and Thero attempted to conquer the Carthaginian strongholds in Western Sicily, Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, with their Elymian ally Segesta, *circa* 483 B.C., and so provoked the great Carthaginian expedition of 480 B.C. (ch. 165 f.). It is true that Diodorus (xi. 1) assigns *three years* to the Carthaginian preparations, but these are probably only an inference from Xerxes' three years of preparation (vii. 1).

Δωριεύς. The story of Dorieus (v. 42–6) contains no reference to this effort of Gelo, and seems to be drawn from an independent source.

τὰ ἐμπόρια: probably the ports of Western Sicily held by the

Carthaginians (cf. *sup.*), but Gelo may well have had wider schemes of opening the trade of the further West, and especially Spain (i. 163; iv. 152), to Hellenic commerce and colonization, breaking the Phoenician and Punic monopoly. He may have thought of a great pan-Hellenic alliance to meet the Semite in the West, and then the Persian in Eastern Greece.

- 4 *δικοσίας κτλ.* The numbers are suspiciously uniform, though not perhaps incredibly large. Similar numbers appear in Polyb. xii. 26 b, schol. Pind. Pyth. i. 146; from Ephorus (fr. 111), or Timaeus (fr. 87; v. *sup.*). At the battle of Himera Diodorus (xi. 21) makes Gelo command 50,000 foot and over 5,000 horse.

*ἱπποδρόμους ψιλοῦς*: probably light infantry who fought interspersed among the cavalry like the Boeotian *ἀμιπποι* (Thuc. v. 57; Xen. Hell. vii. 5. 24). Caesar adopted at Pharsalia (B. C. iii. 84) this device, which he found in Gaul (B. G. vii. 18, 36, 80), and which seems to have been a regular practice among the Germans (B. G. i. 48, vii. 65, viii. 13; Tac. Germ. ch. 6). The large proportion of light-armed troops and cavalry shows the higher level of military science in the West. The Sicilian tyrants, making large use of mercenaries, can put in the field a well-equipped force of all arms, not the mere hoplite-phalanx and ill-armed light troops mustered to meet Xerxes.

- 159 Borrowed from Il. vii. 125 *ἣ κε μέγ' οἰμώξειε γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεΐς*. In Homer Agamemnon is of course king of Mycenae, though brother of Menelaus of Sparta. But just as Aeschylus transferred the scene of his play from destroyed Mycenae to Argos (Aesch. Ag. 24, 503, 810), while Euripides wavers between the two, Stesichorus and the Lyric poets, under Dorian influence, made Agamemnon live and die at Amyclae or Sparta (Schol. Eur. Orest. 46; Pind. Nem. viii. 13; Pyth. xi. 32). The grave of Agamemnon was shown at Amyclae (Paus. iii. 19. 6) as well as at Mycenae (Paus. ii. 16. 6); there were cults of Agamemnon in Laconia, especially of Zeus Agamemnon at Sparta. For the parallel transference of Orestes cf. i. 67 n. Sparta as head of 'Pelops' isle' naturally claimed the race of Pelops for her own.

- 60 1 *ἀπαστραμμένους*: *aversos*, hostile; cf. *προσάντης*, § 2.

- 2 The comparison is with the Spartans only, and is justified if the numbers in ch. 158 be accepted.

- 161 1 *ὦ βασιλεῦ*. To H., speaking in his own person, Gelo is *τύραννος* (156. 3, 163. 1), though Scythes is *βασιλεὺς* (vi. 23. 3 n.), but the Sicilian tyrants like Polycrates (iii. 42. 2) would be flattered by being addressed as 'king' (cf. Pind. Pyth. i. 60, iii. 70; Ol. i. 23). The 'salutation of Gelo as king' (Diod. xi. 26, 38) was in any case after the battle of Himera, and may well have been, in spite of Diodorus' statement, informal. Probably the official position held by Gelo, as by Dionysius, was that of *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* (Diod. xiii. 94; Polyae. i. 27. 1). This is confirmed by the fact that Bacchylides

(v. 2) addresses Hiero as *στραταγέ*; cf. Bury, Cl. R. xiii. 98; Freeman, S. ii, note 1; Jebb, Bacch. 465.

2 For the alleged claim of Athens to naval hegemony cf. viii. 2 n.

3 *πάραλον*, unparalleled in the sense of *ναυτικόν*, is perhaps poetic, as the sentence can be scanned as an iambic.

*μετανάσται*, 'land-loupers'; cf. Il. ix. 648; xvi. 59.

It was a frequent ground for self-laudation among the Athenians that they, unlike most other Greeks, had always inhabited the same country and could claim to be autochthonous. It forms a regular topic in funeral orations (cf. 157 n.), e. g. that of Pericles (Thuc. ii. 36); cf. Plat. (?) Menex. 237 B; Lys. Epitaph. § 17; Ps. Dem. Epitaph. § 4; Hyperides, Epitaph. col. 5, and in other panegyrics; cf. Eur. Erechth. fr. 362, and especially Isocr. Paneg. § 24 οὕτω καλῶς καὶ γνησίως γεγόναμεν ὥστ' ἐξ ἧσπερ ἐφύμεν, ταύτην ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον διατελοῦμεν, αὐτόχθονες ὄντες . . . καίτοι χρηὶ τοὺς . . . περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας δικαίως ἀμβισβητοῦντας . . . τοιαύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ γένους ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι. The belief is accepted in substance by Thucydides (i. 2) and by H. (i. 56 n.), though the latter considers the Arcadians and Cynurians also autochthonous (viii. 73).

Ὅμηρος: cf. Il. ii. 552 Μενεσθέως. | τῷ δ' οὐ πῶ τις ὁμοίος ἐπιχθόνιος γένητ' ἀνὴρ | κοσμησάι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας.

ὄνειδος, 'we cannot be reproached for saying this.' Gelo had treated the Greek claims as insulting (160. 1).

162 1 οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτε, 'you could not be too soon in,' i. e. the sooner the better, a polite but emphatic exhortation; cf. Arist. Plut. 874 and 1133 ἀποτρέχων οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, Eur. Alc. 662, Troades 456. (Cf. Goodwin, § 894.)

The simile is twice ascribed by Aristotle to Pericles in a funeral oration (cf. Plut. Per. 8, 28), probably that over those who fell in the Samian war 440 B. C. (Meyer, F. ii, pp. 221, 222); cf. Ar. Rhet. iii. 10 and i. 7, 1365 b 31 οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λέγων τὴν νεότητά ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνηρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ξάρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη. That H. took the figure from Pericles is rendered probable by the other resemblances to funeral orations in this passage (cf. 157. 1 n.; 161. 3 n.). Even if the simile be older H. may well have been reminded of it by the striking application of it in Pericles' oration. Here it is far less appropriate, as seems to have been felt by the reader who appended the clumsy explanation which has since been interpolated in the text. Gelo might, however, compare the youthful vigour of the colony, Sicily, to the spring, and the effete mother-country to the later duller months of the year.

163 1 Σικελίης τύραννος. Here and elsewhere (ch. 157. 2) Gelo is regarded as suzerain of all (Greek) Sicily.

2 Scythes is probably the lord of Zancle, driven out by Hippocrates, who had found asylum with Darius and died at his court at an advanced age (vi. 24). The friendly relations of Scythes with the Persian court would make his son a most suitable envoy. The

special information and favourable verdict of H. on both father and son may be explained by the close connexion between Cos and Halicarnassus.

ἐς Δελφούς. Delphi was at the time for submission to Persia as seems proved by the oracles (ch. 140, 148, 169). Grundy (pp. 247-56) suggests that Gelo had no sufficient motive for buying off Persia, and sent the treasure to Delphi (if it was sent) for security; the baser motive was subsequently attributed to him by patriotic Greeks who hated tyranny. But is it incredible that Gelo should try to purchase Persian neutrality by a nominal submission?

164 παρὰ Σαμίων: the reading of the better MSS. must be adopted, for if μετὰ be read Cadmus is made to take a part in the treachery of the Samians through which Scythes (presumably his own father) lost his city and for a time his liberty (cf. vi. 23, 24 n.). But with the reading παρὰ an intelligible reconstruction is possible. Scythes, leaving the lordship of Cos, bestowed on him by Darius, to his son Cadmus, went to Sicily and made himself ruler of Zancle, becoming apparently (*circ.* 495 B.C.) a vassal of Hippocrates. In 494 B.C. Samians (and some Milesians) came on his invitation to colonize Kale Acte (vi. 22, 24; Thuc. vi. 4), but on the suggestion of Anaxilas of Rhegium treacherously seized Zancle. Hippocrates, who came as suzerain to aid Zancle, ended by selling it to the Samians. Then Anaxilas, still hoping to make himself supreme in Zancle, stirred up Cadmus to take the city from the Samians (for ἔσχε cf. v. 46. 2; vi. 23. 2, 36. 1, &c.). Cadmus came from Cos with a number of followers (among whom we are told by Suidas (*s. v.*) was Epicharmus as a baby in arms), and with the aid of Anaxilas recovered Zancle (*circ.* 490 B.C.). He must, however, have been a mere subordinate of the tyrant of Rhegium, since in all other accounts Anaxilas alone is mentioned (Schol. Pind. Pyth. ii. 34; Diod. xi. 48, 66); cf. especially Thuc. vi. 4 τοὺς δὲ Σαμίους Ἀναξίλας Ῥηγίων τυράννος οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς ξυμμείκτων ἀνθρώπων οἰκίσας Μεσσήνην ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πατρίδος ἀντωνόμασεν. The supremacy of Anaxilas over Zancle-Messana is fully confirmed by its coinage. Further, it would seem that Cadmus must have been driven from Messene by Anaxilas before 481, otherwise he could hardly have been the trusted envoy of Gelo, the chief foe of the Rhegine tyrant.

τὴν . . . μεταβαλοῦσαν. The change of name apparently took place when Anaxilas first put the Samians in possession of Zancle (494-493 B.C.), not as Thucydides implies when he ejected them. This seems proved by the fact that coins on the Euboic-Attic standard, with a lion's head Samian in style on one side, and a calf's head on the other, are inscribed with the word Μεσσηνίων (Holm, G. S. iii, p. 574; further, Hill, *Hist. Greek Coins*, 29-35, and C. H. Dodd in J. H. S. xxviii. 56-76). These, which resemble closely the contemporary coins of Rhegium (Head, H. N. 108), must belong to the

see J. Baum, The Silver Coins of Samos (1967),



time when Anaxilas was on friendly terms with the Samians, while those with a running hare and the inscription *Μεσσηνίων* on one side and a mule-chariot on the other were introduced by Anaxilas from Rhegium later (Holm, G. S. iii. 576). These types, according to Aristotle (Jul. Pollux, v. 75), commemorated a victory at Olympia, and the introduction of the hare into Sicily (Hill, *op. cit.* p. 33).

Macan prefers the reading *μετὰ Σαμίων*. He thus makes Cadmus co-operate with the Samians in depriving his own father of the lordship of Zancle. He suggests that there may have been a deep laid plot between the father, the son, and Hippocrates, Scythes being anxious to return to the Persian court and his imprisonment at Inyx (vi. 23) a pretence. Hippocrates certainly behaved strangely in making a bargain with the treacherous Samians at the expense of Zancle (vi. 23), but there is not sufficient evidence of the alleged plot. Subsequently on this supposition Cadmus was driven out along with the Samians by Anaxilas, and then found refuge with Gelo.

165 τῶν ἐν Σικελίῃ οἰκημένων : i. e. the Greeks ; cf. 153. 4. The story was doubtless told H. in Sicily.

Thero became tyrant 488, died 472 B.C. On his descent cf. 154. 1 n. His daughter Demarete married Gelo, and he himself the daughter or sister of Polyzelus, Gelo's brother (Schol. Pind. Ol. ii). Agrigentum (Girgenti) was founded from Gela *circ.* 582 B.C. (Thuc. vi. 4). For descriptions of the site cf. Polyb. ix. 27, and Freeman, S. ii. 224-31, and for the temples id. ii. 79-81 and 402-7.

The Carthaginian army here, as elsewhere, is composed mainly of mercenaries (Polyb. i. 67). The Phoenicians are native Carthaginians, the Libyans their African subjects. Spaniards and Ligurians recur frequently in the Punic armies (Diod. xiii. 44, xvi. 73 ; Polyb. i. 17, 67, &c.). Diodorus mistakenly adds (xi. 1) Italian mercenaries, troops not employed by Carthage before 409 B.C. (Diod. xiii. 44, &c.), and Celts who are first really used in 343 B.C. (Diod. xvi. 73).

Ἑλισύκων : reckoned by Hecataeus (fr. 20 ; F. H. G. i. 2 ; Steph. Byz. s. v.) a Ligurian tribe, a view confirmed by his statement that Massilia was Ligurian, inhabited the coast from the Pyrenees to the mouth of the Rhone, until they were destroyed by the Celtic incursion (third century B.C.). Narbo was their capital (Avienus, Ora Marit. 586). The Ligurians (cf. v. 9. 3) had once also stretched from the mouth of the Rhone to that of Arno (Scyl. 41 ; Polyb. ii. 16. 2 ; Nissen, It. i. 470. 1).

The number, 300,000, though repeated by Diodorus (xi. 20) following Timaeus (?), may be only an effort of Siceliot patriotic imagination unwilling that Hamilcar should have less troops than Mardonius (H. ix. 32), as the 3,000 transport-ships equal in number those of Xerxes (vii. 97, 104), though 200 triremes are likely enough (cf. Meltzer, Karthager, i. 193).

τὸν Ἄννωνος. According to Trogus Pompeius (Justin xix. 1) Hamilcar was the son of Mago.

βασιλεία: i. e. suffete. Aristotle distinguishes 'the kings' from the generals (Pol. ii. 11), but the offices seem to have been held together in great emergencies (Diod. xiii. 43; xiv. 54). He compares the suffetes to the Spartan kings, save that the office was not hereditary, but elective (cf. κατ' ἀνδραγαθίην, ch. 166). Nepos distinctly declares (Hann. 7) there were two suffetes elected annually, and this is confirmed by their comparison with the consuls (Liv. xxx. 7) and the parallel case of Gades (Liv. xxviii. 37). For full details cf. Meltzer, *op. cit.* ii. 64-72, 482-7.

166 Both H. and Aristotle speak as if the coincidence was accidental; cf. Poet. 23 ὥσπερ γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ἢ τ' ἐν Σαλαμίνι ἐγένετο ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καρχηδονίων μάχη, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσai τέλος, but Diodorus, who (xi. 24) dates the battle of Himera to the same day as Thermopylae, asserts there was an alliance between Persia and Carthage (xi. 1; Timaeus?). ὁ δὲ Ξέρξης . . . διεπρεσβεύσατο πρὸς Καρχηδονίους περὶ κοινοπραγίας, καὶ συνέθετο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὥστε αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας στρατεύειν, Καρχηδονίους δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις μεγάλας παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμεις, καὶ καταπολεμῆσαι τοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντας. This is supported by Ephorus (fr. 111 ap. Schol. Pind. Pyth. i. 146; F. H. G. i. 264). Ἐκ δὲ Περσῶν καὶ Φοινίκων πρέσβεις πρὸς Καρχηδονίους (παραγενέσθαι) προστάσσοντας ὡς πλείστον δέοι στόλον· εἰς Σικελίαν δὲ βαδίζειν καὶ καταστρεφάμενους τοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φρονοῦντας πλεῖν ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον. Though neither of these two versions of the alliance can be traced back beyond the fourth century, their divergence in language is rather in their favour as suggesting an independent origin. Nor is the language of Ephorus unsuitable. The great king would very probably treat the colonists of his Phoenician subjects as though he were their sovereign, and the Carthaginians might not care to dispute the form so long as they secured the real advantages of an alliance. We cannot safely argue from the silence of H. and Aristotle that they were ignorant of any co-operation, much less that it did not exist in fact. The enemies of the Greeks would naturally plan a simultaneous attack, and in concerting their plans the Phoenicians would be useful intermediaries. The alliance may then be accepted (with Meltzer, Freeman, Busolt, E. Meyer, and Grundy) as against the doubts of Duncker, Beloch, Hauvette, and Macan.

ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ. H. is equally vague in 167. 1. The battle was near Himera (Pind. Pyth. i. 79).

167 According to Diodorus (xi. 20 f.), Hamilcar, after losing through a storm his cavalry and chariots on his voyage, landed at Panormus. Thence he marched to Himera and, after a victory, besieged the town, which was defended by Thero. Gelo coming to its aid with 50,000 foot and 5,000 horse, surprised and captured many

Carthaginian stragglers. Then hearing that Hamilcar expected a force of cavalry from Selinus, he sent his own horsemen to personate them. These troops slew Hamilcar at the beginning of the action, while he was sacrificing, threw the Carthaginian army in the sea-camp into confusion and set fire to the fleet. Meanwhile Gelo fell on the main Punic army near the land-camp, and after a stubborn fight slaughtered the enemy to the number of 150,000. This account (given in detail by Grundy, pp. 422-5) is irreconcilable with H. as to the time and manner of Hamilcar's death (cf. Freeman, ii. 186-99, 518-22), and shows clear signs of rhetorical exaggerations in the number of the slain and in the account of Gelo's stratagem, which is compared with that of Themistocles. On the other hand, the two camps and the burning of the fleet (cf. Polyæn. i. 27) look like genuine local tradition. Probably Timaeus overlaid such a tradition with his own rhetoric. The account is regarded as untrustworthy by Meltzer, E. Meyer, Beloch, and Busolt, though accepted by Curtius, Duncker, Holm, and Grundy.

- 1 οἰκότι χρεωμένων (sc. λόγῳ): cf. iii. 111. 1 λόγῳ οἰκότι χρεώμενοι. σώματα ὅλα. The practice of burning the whole body of the victim was originally common to the Phoenicians and Jews (Porphyr. de Abst. iv. 15; Lev. vi. 23); later the Carthaginians, like the Greeks, burnt only certain parts (cf. Meltzer, *op. cit.* ii. 147-9), but the older ritual might naturally be followed on so great an occasion.

- 2 For the Oriental self-immolation of the Punic version cf. i. 86 n. οἱ θύουσι. Hero-worship seems to have been as unknown to the Phoenicians as it was to the Egyptians (ii. 50. 3); nor even if Hamilcar's self-sacrifice was regarded as heroic could it account for a cult in all colonies. Hence Movers and Meltzer suggest that H. has confused Hamilcar=Abd-Melqart, servant of Melcarth, with the Phoenician god Melcarth, whose worship is closely connected with such passing through the fire. Compare Moloch, and the story of Dido.

μνήματα: probably pillars like that in the temple of Melcarth at Tyre (ii. 44. 2).

168 71 *Fruitless embassies to Corcyra and Crete (with excursus on Minos in Sicily).*

- 168 3 δύναμιν οὐκ ἐλαχίστην: so in 433 B.C. The Corcyrean orator at Athens says ναυτικὸν τε κεκτήμεθα πλὴν τοῦ παρ' ὑμῖν πλείστον (Thuc. i. 33; cf. i. 14). They had 120 ships in 435 B.C. (Thuc. i. 25).

- 4 The Etesian winds (cf. ii. 20), which are said to blow very hard off Cape Malea from the north-east (cf. vii. 188; viii. 12), lasted for about forty days in August and September. The battle of Salamis took place about Sept. 25.

It is remarkable that the Corcyreans are not taunted by the Corinthians (in Thuc. i. 37-43) with this instance of selfishness

and double-dealing. But the dislike and suspicion felt by the rest of Greece for the western island is patent. The Corcyrean envoys themselves admit that their traditional policy of splendid isolation has proved a failure. Thuc. i. 32 *περιέστηκεν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη, τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳ τῇ τοῦ πέλας γνώμῃ ἐυκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαινομένη*. Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 323) charitably suggests that the Corcyreans may never have promised to do more than protect the southern Peloponnese from attack, if the Persian admirals detached a squadron for the purpose; then their subsequent neutrality caused their absence from the line of battle to be misinterpreted. But it seems more likely that Corcyra did aim at avoiding compromising alliances, and was loth to send her navy to resist the Persian, when she might so soon need it for her own defence against the Carthaginian.

169 I *κοινῇ*. The island was divided between a number of city-states. *ἄμεινον . . . γίνεταί* : the regular form of inquiry; cf. i. 187. 2, iv. 15. 3, &c.; Thuc. i. 118 *ad fin.*

2 'Fools, do ye find ought to complain of in the woes brought on you by Minos in his wrath for the help ye gave Menelaus?' The god by an ironical question (for *μέμφομαι* ironically used cf. viii. 106. 3 *ad fin.*) reminds them how they had suffered in the past for similar conduct. The words *τιμωρημάτων Μίνως ἐπέμψε μηνίων δακρύματα* seem to have been taken as they stand from the oracular response (cf. iv. 163. 3; v. 79. 1 n.; vii. 178. 2). Stein and Busolt (ii. 658 n. 6) suspect it of being a later forgery, like the response to the Cnidians (i. 174. 5), mainly because it is in iambic metre. H. clearly believed it genuine, and probably for that reason does not blame the Cretans for refusing help. Doubtless the lying Cretans would have had no scruple in inventing later an oracle to exculpate their conduct; but that here given is of the same tenor as the better attested response to Argos (ch. 148), and may well be in substance genuine.

170 I *Σικανίην*. While Beloch (i. 178) and Nissen (i. 548) maintain, after Niebuhr, that Sican and Sicel are mere variants of one name and one race, Freeman (i. 472 f.), who has converted Holm (Cl. R. v. 423), strongly argues that Thucydides (vi. 2) and Philistus (ap. Diodor. v. 6; fr. 3, F. H. G. i. 185) are right in saying that the Sicans are Iberians, though they claimed to be autochthonous (Thuc. *l. c.*; Timaeus; fr. 2, F. H. G. i. 193). It seems clear that the Sicels were later immigrants from Italy who drove the Sicans to the west of Sicily, and were in turn pressed by the Greeks into the centre and north of the island.

Minos found Daedalus in Camicus, the city he had built for Cocalus the Sican king. He was hospitably received by Cocalus, but enticed into a warm bath and there slain by the king or his daughters. Of Sophocles' play the *Καμίκιοι* but two small fragments remain. For later versions cf. Diod. iv. 79; Strabo 279.

Πολίχνη: a small place near Cydonia in Western Crete on the north coast; cf. Thuc. ii. 85.

Πραῖσος: high on the central plateau near the east end of Crete. Two 'Eteocretan' inscriptions have been found there in recent excavations (J. H. S. xxi. 340). That these two cities took no part in the expedition is no historical tradition, though it may have been derived, like the notice of the newer colonists, from Praesus (cf. 171. 1), but merely an inference from the fact that their inhabitants belonged to the pre-Hellenic 'Minoan' race (Hom. Od. xix. 176; Strabo 475, 478), and therefore presumably had not been affected by the migration preceding or following the death of Minos. The words στόλω μεγάλῳ imply a large migration which left Crete empty (cf. 171. 1); this hypothesis explained the disappearance of the 'Minoan' people, and the existence as early as Homer of Achaeans, Pelasgians, and Dorians in Crete. For other Minoan traditions cf. i. 171-3; iii. 122 nn.

Καμικός (Strabo 273, 279) may perhaps be placed at Caltabelotta (cf. Freeman, i. 503), if that stronghold on the hill be within the territory of Acragas (Diod. iv. 78).

Later writers (Paus. vii. 4. 6; Steph. Byz.) inaccurately substitute Ἴνυξ or Ἴνυκον (cf. vi. 23. 4 n.). Freeman (i. 113, 502) believes that this whole legend grew up in Acragas, the existence of Minoa (cf. v. 46. 2 n.) suggesting the presence of Minos (but cf. iii. 122. 2 n.). Thero is said to have sent back to Crete the supposed remains of Minos (Diod. iv. 79).

- 2 Ὑρίην. Probably the Uria of Strabo (282) (modern Oria), on a ridge between Tarentum and Brundisium, still containing in his day the palace of an early king, not Veretum, close to the heel of Italy, cape Leuca; cf. Nissen, Ital. ii. 875, 884. Iapygia (cf. iv. 99) is the promontory south of Tarentum and Brundisium, the Messapii being the tribe nearest Tarentum (Nissen, *op. cit.* i. 539-40).

Other accounts make these Cretans found Brundisium (Strabo 279, 282) and even cross the Adriatic and Illyria, to settle on the Thermaic gulf as Bottiaeans (ch. 123. 3).


- 3 This disaster is dated by Diodorus (xi. 52) to the year 473 B. C. It was to some extent balanced by a Tarentine victory over Messapians and Peucetians (Paus. x. 13. 10). Probably Miccythus made alliance with Tarentum in the hope of opposing a barrier to the growing power of Syracuse.

φόνος Ἑλληνικὸς μέγιστος. The phrase makes it certain that H. did not live to see the destruction of the Athenians in Sicily which Thucydides (vii. 85) describes in similar terms; πλεῖστος γὰρ δὴ φόνος οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο.

τῶν ἀστῶν: partitive genitive with οἱ; 'so many of the citizens,' as vi. 58. 2 *ad fin.*; ix. 94. 1; i. 67. 5.

- 4 οἰκέτης... ἐπίτροπος: translated by Pausanias (v. 26. 4) δοῦλος καὶ ταμίας τῶν Ἀναξίλα χρημάτων (cf. vi. 137. 3; viii. 75. 1) and by







Justin 'servus spectatae fidei', but though this might be the meaning of the word, *οἰκέτης* is certainly in the plural used for the whole *familia*, free-born as well as slave (viii. 4. 2, 44. 1, 106. 2, 142. 4), and is distinguished from *δοῦλος* by Plato in the *Laws*, &c. It is unlikely that a slave (or even a freedman) should add his father's name on his offerings at Olympia (*v. inf.*) and call Rhegium and Messana his fatherland (Paus. *l. c.*). Probably he was a low-born dependant of Anaxilas (cf. Maeandrius, iii. 142). For *ἐπίτροπος* cf. the case of Aristagoras at Miletus (*v. 30. 2*), and again Maeandrius (iii. 142. 1) *ἐπιτροπαῖν παρὰ Πολυκράτεος λαβὼν τὴν ἀρχήν*, and Theras. iv. 147. 2. Micythus was clearly regent of Rhegium and Messana for the young sons of Anaxilas.

*ἐκπεσών.* Paus. *l. c.* ἀπὼν οἴχοιτο. According to Diodorus (xi. 66), after Micythus had been regent nine years (476–467), his wards, instigated by Hiero, demanded an account of his stewardship. Through this, his honesty was so strikingly proved that they begged him to keep on the administration, but Micythus, preferring to retire, lived in honour at Tegea till his death. This is a little inconsistent with H.'s *ἐκπεσών*.

The offerings of Micythus at Olympia seen by Pausanias (*v. 26*) were in three groups, comprising in all fifteen figures (besides some removed by Nero) by Argive sculptors, Glaucus and Dionysius. Fragments of pedestals have been found bearing inscriptions restored by Roehl, I. G. A. 532, 533, and better by Kaibel (Hermes, xxviii. 60), showing that the offerings were made for the recovery of his son from sickness.

[Μίκυθος ὁ Χοίρου Ῥηγίν]ος καὶ Μεσσή]νιος Φοικέων ἐν Τεγέῃ  
[τὰγάλματα τάδε θεοῖς ἀ]νέθ[ηκε πᾶσι]ν καὶ θεαῖς πάσαις  
[παιδὸς δὲ νόσον φθινάδα νοσέοντος καὶ χρημάτων ὅσσα Φοι πλείστα  
ἐγένετο δυνατόν]  
[ἰητροῖς δαπνηθέντων, ἐς Ὀλυμπίην] ἐλθὼν ἔπειτα εὐξάμεν-  
[ος, ὥς Φοι ὁ παῖς ἐσώθη ἀνέθηκεν]

171 I τρίτη γενεῇ. In Homer (Il. xiii. 451 f.; Od. xix. 178 f.), Idomeneus, the leader of the Cretans before Troy, is the son of Deucalion the son of Minos. For his exploits cf. Il. xiii. 330–539.

2 λιμόν τε καὶ λοιμόν. This alliterative jingle is found in Hesiod, *Ἔργα* 243 λιμόν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν: cf. Thuc. ii. 54. For such visitations cf. iii. 65. 7 n.

τρίτους: this third population must be the Dorians.

172–4 Failure to hold the pass of Tempe hands over Thessaly to the Persian.

172 I ὑπὸ ἀναγκαίης, 'under compulsion at first'; afterwards (174) ἐμυθίσαν προθύμως, but they showed by their summons to the loyal Greeks that they did not approve of the intrigues of the Aleuadae. For these cf. ch. 6, 130, and for H.'s attitude towards the Thessalians *Introd.*, § 30 e.

πρόβουλοι (cf. vii. 145 n.). Presumably these Probouloi settled the general plan of campaign, which was determined by political as well as by military considerations. They are distinct from the separate councils of admirals (at Salamis) and of generals (at Plataea), which are merely advisory to the Spartan commanders-in-chief (cf. Macan on ch. 145).

- 3 οὐδαμὰ γὰρ ἄδυνασίης: for the γνώμη cf. viii. 111.
- 173 1 Ἀχαιίης (sc. τῆς Φθιώτιδος); cf. 132. 1 n. and 196-8.
- 2 ἐστρατήγεε. The command in war was a royal prerogative (vi. 56 n.; Ar. Pol. vi. 14. 2 f., 1285 a), but on distant or less important expeditions, it was at times given to private Spartans, e. g. Anchimolius (v. 63) and Brasidas in Thrace. Possibly the number of Spartans sent to Tempe was not great, for Sparta was unwilling to send large forces so far from home (ix. 8-10). For Εὐαίνετος Diodorus (xi. 2) reads Σύνετος, surely by a clerical error (J. H. S. xxii. 305 n.). The polemarchs were, next to the king, the highest Spartan officers (Thuc. v. 66), commanding the λόχοι at Mantinea in 418 B.C. (Thuc. v. 71), and later the μόραι (Xen. Hell. v. 4. 46). Plutarch (de Mal. 31; Mor. 864) adds 500 Thebans under Mnemias.
- 3 For Alexander cf. v. 17-22 nn.; viii. 136-40; ix. 44, 45.
- 4 ἄλλην: on the passes leading into Thessaly cf. ch. 128. 1 n. Had there been only the mountain path over southern Olympus the Greeks could very well have held it as they did Anopaea (ch. 217), but Xerxes might and probably did use the more distant passes of Petra and Volustana. Cf. App. XX, § 4.
- 174 ἐν Ἀβύδῳ. Xerxes would seem to have been at Abydos during May (ch. 37. 1 n.).
- χρησιμώτατοι. The Thessalians were useful as guides (viii. 31 f.) and fought at Plataea (ix. 31 f.).
- 175-8 *The position of the Greeks at Thermopylae and Artemisium described.*
- 175 1 στεινотέρη. In two places Thermopylae is ἀμαξίτος μούνη (176. 2). The average breadth of Tempe between Mount Ossa and the Peneius is about 150 feet, but in many places the river leaves so little room that the modern road has been cut through the rocky slopes of Mount Ossa. The way must have been very rough though not impassable in 480 B.C. Herodotus clearly means to insist on three points of advantage at Thermopylae: (1) there was only one pass (cf. 173. 4), and that was both (2) narrower than Tempe, and (3) nearer home.
- 2 γῆς τῆς Ἰσθμιαώτιδος depends on Ἀρτεμίσιον. The north of Euboea is the territory of Histiaea (viii. 23. 2). The name Histiaeotis was also given (cf. i. 56. 3 n.) to the land of the Perrhaebi in N. Thessaly (ch. 128. 1 n.).
- ταῦτα: i.e. Thermopylae and Artemisium. The fleet at Artemisium guarded not only the Euripus (ch. 183. 1; viii. 15. 2), but

'the only landing-places which give practicable access to the interior of the country north of Marathon' (J. H. S. xxii. 304). Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 312) further brings out admirably not only that 'Thermopylae could not have been held without Artemisium, for it would have been at once turned by the enemies' fleet, but also that Artemisium was useless without Thermopylae, for the Persians would never have attacked the Greek fleet but simply sailed past it outside Euboea, if the land road to the Isthmus had been open. All they wanted was to get their army and fleet to the Peloponnese at the same time'. Cf. also App. XX, §§ 1, 3, and 5.

176 I τοῦτο μὲν, 'firstly,' answered by ἡ δὲ αὖ (2); cf. iii. 106. 2.

τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιον. The construction is loose, Ἀρτεμίσιον being put forward as the main subject of the following description. It was a beach looking northwards towards Olizon. The name no doubt comes from the temple of Artemis Proseoa (cf. *inf.*, Plut. Them. 8).

2 Τρηχίς is used by H. for the city elsewhere (ch. 199, 201, and probably 203. 2), but here for the country Trachinia (ch. 199, 201; viii. 31), as also in viii. 21. 1, 66. 1; and Thuc. iv. 78, v. 12, 51.

τῆς ἁλλης. By an idiomatic compression the 'narrowest part' is included in the rest of the country with which it is really contrasted. Cf. Tac. Agr. 34 'ceterorum Britannorum fugacissimi' and Milton's 'fairest of her daughters Eve'. Though there is a verbal contradiction in saying 'the pass through Trachis where narrowest is fifty feet broad, yet this is not the narrowest point but before and behind where it is only some six feet', the meaning is pretty clear. Herodotus is first describing the best known and most defensible part of the pass, 'the Middle Gate,' near the Phocian wall (*inf.*), and the little hill where the last stand was made (ch. 225), which was about fifty feet wide; and then inconsistently adds further statements as to the western and eastern gates, in front of and behind the pass proper, where there was in his day but just room for the road.

[Macan's suggestion that H. meant by ἡ διὰ Τρηχίνος ἔσόδος the entirely different pass up the gorge of the Asopus into Doris (cf. viii. 31 n.; vii. 199 n.) is impossible.]

H. here gives us in broad outline a general description, reserving details for ch. 198-200, chapters which should be studied in connexion with this. But the main points are here. The pass between mountain and sea has at either end an extremely narrow gate; the western gate, however, near Anthela, could be easily turned by crossing a projecting spur of the mountain, the eastern near Alpeni (ch. 216) is clearly behind the Greek position. In the three miles between them lay a double amphitheatre contracting about half-way at the Middle Gate; this is the true Thermopylae where are the hot springs and the Phocian wall (cf. 241 n.). For a full description cf. Grundy, p. 284 f.

3 Clear and good as is this description in general, the direction of the coast is wrongly given. H. evidently thought that the road



through the pass ran from north to south, since he here describes various features on either side as lying east or west of it, and later (ch. 199, 200. 1, 201 *ad fin.*) speaks of points on the road as lying north or south of each other. In reality the coast and road bend to the east near Trachis. But the error is natural if, as appears likely from the route-map given (ch. 198-200), and from the expression 'before' and 'behind' Thermopylae (§ 2), H. visited Thermopylae while on a journey from the north to Greece, since the road from Lamia runs due north and south across the plain, and the bend in the ancient road may have been more gradual than that in the modern. Macan is surely wrong in doubting whether H. had been at Thermopylae (cf. Grundy, *Quart. Rev.*, vol. ccii, p. 136).

The head of the Maliac gulf has now receded about four miles, and the pass itself is now separated from the sea by a tract of marshy ground a mile or more in width formed of the alluvial deposits brought down by the rivers and encircled by the precipitous sides of Mount Oeta and Callidromus (cf. ch. 198; Strabo 428). Even now, however, between the Asopus and the Middle Gate of Thermopylae the ground to the left of the road is impassable marsh. For H.'s sea and marsh cf. Liv. xxxvi. 18 'loca usque ad mare invia palustri limo et voraginibus'.

θερμὰ λουτρά. The hot springs, which are copious and over 120° F. in temperature, rise on the side of Callidromus, a great cliff mounting almost sheer to a height of 3,000 ft. and on the edge of a great fan-shaped mass of stream débris. The stream, which is of a bright clear green (cf. Paus. iv. 35. 9), first enters the baths and then turns two mills (cf. Grundy, p. 286).

Χύτροι: two 'cauldrons' or baths devoted in ancient times one to male and the other to female bathers; cf. Paus. iv. 35. 9 γλαυκότατον μὲν οἶδα ὕδωρ θεασάμενος τὸ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις οὔτε πού πᾶν ἄλλ' ὅσον κάτεισιν ἐς τὴν κολυμβήθραν ἦντινα ὀνομάζουσιν οἱ ἐπιχώριοι Χύτρον γυναικείον.

Warm springs were usually Ἡράκλεια λουτρά (Aristoph. *Nub.* 1051), being created by Athene or Hephaestus, according to different myths, to refresh the weary hero. So Peisander, ap. Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 1050 τῷ δ' ἐν Θερμοπύλῃσι θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη ποιεῖ θερμὰ λουτρά παρὰ ῥηγμῖνι θαλάσσης.

The whole district was the scene of many incidents in the life of Heracles and of his death (cf. ch. 193. 2, 198. 2, 216; and Sophocles, *Trachiniae*).

For the wall cf. ch. 208, 223, 225.

The existing remains of wall foundations on the neck by which the first mound is attached to the mountain side are believed by Grundy (pp. 288, 289) to be relics of a wall identical, at least in site, with the one which the Phocians built. It lies a little east of the Middle Gate and of the springs. It seems clear that the Phocians used the springs to channel (§ 4) the road in front, i.e. west of the wall, and so to hinder the Thessalian cavalry.

- 4 At this period Phocis no longer extended to the pass; the Malians who dwelt west of it were dependents of Thessaly, and east of the pass the Locrians dwelt (cf. 216. 1). But in old days the Phocians may have reached the Spercheius, as the names Anticyra and Trachis occur both in this region and in Phocis proper. Later the Phocians were driven out by Malians and Locrians, losing even their northern coasts except round Daphnus.

Cf. Thuc. i. 12 Βοιωτοὶ τε γὰρ οἱ νῦν ἐξηκοστῷ ἔτει μετὰ Ἰλίου ἄλωσιν ἐξ Ἀρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν τὴν νῦν μὲν Βοιωτίαν, πρότερον δὲ Καδμηίδα γῆν καλουμένην ᾤκισαν.

Αἰολίδα: cf. 95. 1 n., 132. 1 n.

- 177 Πιερία: cf. ch. 131 n.

Ἰσθμοῦ. The contingents sent by the various Greek states to the allied army and fleet, as well as their representatives at the council of war, seem to have assembled at the Isthmus; ch. 173. 4; viii. 71. 2; vii. 145 n.

- 78 1 διαταχθέντες, 'to their two posts,' i.e. Artemisium and Thermopylae.

The oracle is said to have been (Clem. Alex. Stromateis, p. 753, Potter) ὁ Δελφοὶ λίσσεσθ' ἀνέμους καὶ λώιον ἔσται. For a similar oracle cf. ch. 189, and for their fulfilment ch. 188 f.; viii. 12 f.

- 2 The words ἐξαγγείλαντες χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο, making a hexameter, are probably a reminiscence of some poetical narrative of this event, or of a dedicatory inscription on a thank-offering at Delphi to the winds. For similar reminiscences cf. ch. 169. 2 n.; Verrall, Cl. Rev. xvii. 98 f.

Θυίη: daughter of Cephissus (or according to Delphic legend of Castalius; cf. Paus. x. 6. 4) and mother by Apollo of Delphus. She was believed to have been the first to sacrifice to Dionysus, hence the Attic and Delphic women who served that god with orgiastic rites were called Θυῖαι or Θυιάδες (distinguished by Rapp from the purely mythological Maenads); cf. Paus. x. 6. 4. The name means 'stormy' (cf. θύελλα); hence she is naturally connected at Delphi with the winds.

- 9-95 *First naval operations. Advance of the Persian fleet to Sepias (179-83). Estimate of the Persian forces (184-7). The three days' storm (188-91). The Greek fleet returns from Chalcis (183) to Artemisium, the Persian moves to Aphetae (192-3). The Greeks take a squadron of fifteen ships under Sandoces (194-5).*

- 179 παρέβαλε: intransitive, 'crossed over'; cf. Thuc. iii. 32 *ad fin.* H. writes as if the whole fleet had taken the course followed, in fact, by the vanguard (ch. 183) of ten ships. One of these vessels is declared to have been Sidonian (viii. 92), and they were the best sailors (vii. 96. 1).

ἐνθα: not close to the island but further north, on the line between Therma and Sciathos, opposite the mouth of the Peneius (ch. 182), unless indeed (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 308; cf. Blakesley) the

Phoenician squadron kept well outside Sciathos at first, and then approaching the channel between it and Magnesia from the south, drove the Greek look-out ships northwards.

- 180 διαδίδιον : best taken as a strong form of δεξιόν (αἴσιον), *laetissimum omen captantes* (Blakesley). They may have gone on the maxim 'Who spills the foremost foeman's life, that party triumphs in the strife' (Scott), cf. Tacitus, Germ. 10; but the act is more probably simply a sacrifice of the first-fruits of victory such as Procopius ascribes to the Scandinavian Thulitae (de Bell. Goth. ij. 15) τῶν ἱρείων σφίσι τὸ κάλλιστον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὄνπερ ἂν δοριάλωτον ποιήσαιτο πρῶτον. For human sacrifices among the Phoenicians cf. ch. 167, and among the Persians ch. 114. 2 n.

τάχα δ' ἄν, 'perhaps he may have had his name to thank in part for his fate.' For the construction cf. ix. 71. 4. For the importance of the name as an omen vi. 50; ix. 91; and among the Romans, e.g. in a *delectus*, *lustratio*, or other ceremony, Cic. de Div. i. 45, 102 f.; Tac. Hist. iv. 53.

- 181 2 σινδόνος βυσσίνης : cf. ii. 86. 6. These appliances for the treatment of wounds appear remarkable to Greeks, whose own surgery was crude.

- 183 1 For fire signals cf. ix. 3. 1 n.

ἡμεροσκόπους : look-out men stationed on heights to observe the enemy's movements, which was of course only possible by day (cf. ch. 192. 1, 219. 1).

- 2 ἔρμα : a sunken reef; cf. Thuc. vii. 25 and Anacreon (fr. 39, ap. Hesych.). ἀσήμων ὑπὲρ ἐρμάτων φορεῦμαι. The Murmex or 'ant-reef' is now called λίθари or Leftari, 'the stone.' The forethought of the Phoenicians in setting up a stone pillar on the reef as a danger-signal, is worth noting as a proof of careful reconnaissance. Clearly it was one of the duties of this squadron to make the way safe (cf. καθαρὸν) for the main body.

- 3 Scyros, an island about twenty-three miles off the east coast of Euboea, was then inhabited by the semi-barbarous piratical Dolopes, later driven out by Cimon.

Cape Sepias is generally and rightly identified with the modern Cape St. George opposite Sciathos. Mr. Wace prefers Cape Pori, but his reasons are not convincing (J. H. S. xxvi. 143-8). If Cape Sepias be Pori, then Casthanaea, which lay north of it, under Mount Pelion (Strabo 443), must be Keramidhi (Tozer, Highlands of Turkey, ii. 104); but if it be Cape St. George, Casthanaea may more probably be placed at Zagora or Khorefto (Tarn, J. H. S. xxviii. 211).

The voyage would seem to be 90-100 miles direct across the sea, or, if we allow for coasting, perhaps 120 miles (Cl. R. xxiii. 186). Such a distance would not be beyond the powers of a single ship on a long summer's day, e.g. 15-16 hours. We are told that a trireme could be *rowed* from Byzantium to Heraclea (150 miles) in a long day (? 18 or 24 hours; Xen. Anab. vi. 4. 2), and the second Athenian

trireme sent to Mitylene must by extraordinary exertions have accomplished the voyage of 210 miles in something like 24 hours (Thuc. iii. 49). Further, a merchant ship (*ναὺς στρογγύλη*) could, with an absolutely favourable wind, do some 150-160 miles in 24 hours, e.g. from Abdera to the mouth of the Ister (nearly 600 miles) in four days and nights, i.e. a little more than 6 miles an hour (iv. 86; Thuc. ii. 97). So, again, the voyage round Sicily (510 miles) takes not much less than 8 days (Thuc. vi. 1), while that from Thasos to Amphipolis, or rather Eion (50 miles), is reckoned at half a day's sail (Thuc. iv. 104). These instances seem to prove that a single merchantman could do 6 miles an hour and a warship something more, say 8 miles an hour. But single-ship voyages are no evidence for fleets, since the pace of a fleet is that of its slowest member. Now (Xen. Hell. i. 1. 13) Alcibiades took a whole autumn night and up to *ἄριστον* next morning (i.e. 16-18 hours) to sail with 86 ships from Parium to Proconnesus (not 35 miles), while Agathocles (Diod. xx. 5) took 6 days and nights from Syracuse to Cape Hermaeum (circ. 300 miles). Similarly, the voyages of Caesar's fleet from Lilybaeum to Ruspina (Bell. Afr. 34) and from Utica to Caralis (ch. 98) work out at 2 miles an hour or less, while those of Scipio (Liv. xxix. 27) and of Caesar (Bell. Afr. 2) from Lilybaeum to Africa, though regarded as quick and good voyages, work out under 3 miles an hour. The Athenian fleet in Sicily sailed 36 miles from Catana to Syracuse during the night (7-8 hours; Thuc. vi. 65), and Philip V's fleet of swift Illyrian lembi when panic-stricken fled (Polyb. v. 110) from the mouth of the Achelous to Cephallenia (circ. 180 miles) in about 36 hours; these fleets in a great hurry do something like 5 miles an hour. It is true that Aemilius Paulus states (Liv. xlv. 41) that he sailed from Brundisium to Corcyra in 9 Roman (i.e. 11½ English) hours, and that if Corcyra be the town this would mean 10 miles an hour, and if the nearest point of the island 8 miles an hour; but this isolated and doubtful record time does not justify us in ascribing so high a rate of speed to the unwieldy Persian armada. Cf. Grundy and Tarn, Cl. Rev. xxiii. 107 f. and 184 f.

184 For a discussion of the numbers of Xerxes' army and fleet cf. App. XIX. 2 f. Here we may remark that the moment chosen by H. for his enumeration is appropriate. The great host had now gathered to itself contingents from Europe, and had not yet suffered loss either in storm or battle. The separation of the description of the forces (ch. 61-99) from the estimate of their number indicates that H. found no numbers in the official Persian lists (cf. ch. 60. 1, 61. 1 n.). For the number of the triremes he relied on tradition (ch. 89), as also for that of the Asiatic land forces (ch. 60), but the enormously exaggerated numbers of the forces from Europe rest on mere conjecture (185. 1 and 2); the over-estimate of the crews of the smaller vessels (184. 3) is a rough guess from the supposed number of such

vessels, and the addition to the armed force of an equal number of attendants (ch. 186) is a purely gratuitous assumption. H. is clearly dominated by the popular belief (c. 228. 1) that Xerxes led three million warriors against Greece. He makes no allowance for losses through sickness or desertion on the march.

- 1 After πλήθος ἦν (sc. τοῦ στρατοῦ, ix. 96. 2) the numbers would naturally be given in the nominative, but the words τὸν μὲν . . . ὁμιλον, &c., which repeat the idea, are put in the accusative as though dependent on the verb of the parenthetical clause ὡς . . . εὕρισκω. For similar usages cf. i. 65. 4; 134. 1.

τὸν μὲν, answered by τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ (§ 4), gives the division into land and sea forces. The latter are then subdivided into native contingents (§ 1) and Persian marines (§ 2).

ἀρχαῖον (cf. iv. 99. 2): the original native crew in contrast to the added Persian Epibatae.

διηκοσίους: 200 was the regular complement of a Greek trireme (viii. 17; Xen. Hell. i. 5. 3-7).

- 2 ἐπιχωρίων ἐπιβατέων. The most conspicuous instance is furnished by the Egyptians (ix. 32), but in most cases there would be native leaders and their body-guards aboard (ch. 98). They are not separately reckoned since they are included in the crew of 200. Since the primitive method of fighting at sea was by boarding (cf. ix. 98. 2; viii. 90. 2; and especially Thuc. i. 49), every trireme carried a large number of marines, each Chian ship at Lade 40 (vi. 15. 1), each trireme here 30 Persians, Medes, or Sacae (the best troops in the army, cf. viii. 113. 2), besides the native levies, though, if we may believe Plutarch (Them. 14), the Athenians at Salamis had only 14 hoplites and 4 archers on each ship. Later sea captains aimed at sinking the enemy by ramming, after disordering them by the διέκπλους (vi. 12 n.). Accordingly the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war reduced the number of Epibatae on each ship to 10 (Thuc. ii. 92 compared with ii. 102; iii. 91 with iii. 95; iv. 76 with iv. 101).

- 3 ποιήσας, 'putting them at' (cf. § 4, and ch. 186. 2).

ὅ τι πλέον = *plus minus*, i.e. on the average.

πρότερον: cf. 97 *ad fin.* The three thousand vessels there mentioned included, besides penteconters, thirty-oared galleys, light boats, and horse transports; now though a crew of eighty may be a reasonable assumption for a penteconter, counting in officers, sailors, and marines, it is far too large a number for the smaller galleys and boats.

- 5 ἐμπλέειν and ἐρεῖναι are used of the crew, especially of the rowers in the hold of the ship; ἐπιπλέειν and ἐπεῖναι of the marines on deck; cf. viii. 119.

- 185 1 ἐκ τῶν νήσων: i. e. Thasos and Samothrace. The number of men rests (1) on the assumption that all the ships were triremes; (2) on the conjectural and exaggerated number of ships (120).



2 Παίονες : cf. ch. 113 ; viii. 115 ; v. 1. 2 n.

Ἐορδοί once dwelt in the region Eordaea (Liv. xxxi. 39, 40 ; xlii. 53) above Pella, west of Mount Bermius, near the sources of the Lydias, and Lake Begorrites (Ostrovo). Those who survived the Macedonian conquest were settled near Physca (Thuc. ii. 99) in Mygdonia, between the Axios and the Strymon.

Βοττιαῖοι (cf. 123. 3 n.), in Western Chalcidice round Olynthus ; cf. viii. 127.

Χαλχιδικὸν γένος : cf. viii. 127 n. Βρύγοι : cf. vi. 45. 1 n.

Πίερες : apparently a remnant who remained in the older Pieria, since the Pierians east of Strymon are included among the inhabitants of the Thracian coast (*inf.*) ; cf. Thuc. ii. 99 ; ch. 112 n.

Περραιβοί : cf. ch. 128. 1 n. Ἐνιήνες : cf. 132. 1 n., and for the rest 132 f.

δοῖ . . . νέμονται : according to ch. 110, 115. 2, these should come under the naval forces.

186 1 ἀκάτοισι : 'boats or cutters' could hardly be used as corn-ships, more properly (191. 1) they are styled ὀλκάδες.

In a Greek army (cf. ix. 29. 2) each hoplite was accompanied by an attendant (ὑπηρέτης, ch. 229. 1), who carried his baggage, provisions, and shield (hence ὑπασπίστης, Xen. Anab. iv. 2. 20 ; Hell. iv. 5. 14, 8. 39), and each horseman by a groom to look after his horse. Thus the addition of an equal number of non-effectives was the rule for a Greek force. Nor need we doubt that the Persian king and grandees brought with them large trains of servants. But to suppose that all the barbarous tribesmen enumerated in Xerxes' host brought each an attendant is absurd. The doubling of the sailors is based on the assumption that the crews of the transport ships were as numerous as those of the triremes.

Ξέρξης ὁ Δαρείου. The patronymic is added here not to distinguish this Xerxes from others of the same name, but to emphasize the dignity of the master of the great host just enumerated ; cf. iii. 66. 2, 88. 1 ; vi. 137. 1 ; vii. 1. 1 ; ix. 41. 1, 64. 1 ; and Thuc. ii. 19, 34, 47, 71, &c.

187 1 Similarly the Athenians took with them to Sicily σιτοποιούς ἐκ τῶν μυλῶνων . . . ἡναγκασμένους ἐμμίσθους (Thuc. vi. 22 ; cf. Thuc. ii. 78).  
κυνῶν Ἰνδικῶν : cf. i. 192. 4 n.

2 χοίνικα πυρῶν : a minimum allowance for a man, as is shown by the words καὶ μηδὲν πλεόν : cf. Hom. Od. xix. 27 οὐ γὰρ ἀεργὸν ἀνέξομαι ὅς κεν ἐμῆς γε | χοίνικος ἄπτηται. It is the allowance given to the Helots on Sphacteria, though the Spartans have twice as much (Thuc. iv. 16) ; cf. vi. 57. 3 n.

H., who has been wonderfully accurate in his calculations hitherto, here makes a blunder in dividing. A choenix a day given to each of 5,283,220 men amounts (at 48 choenices to the medimnus) not to 110,340 medimni but to 110,067½. He divided the 528 myriads correctly, getting the result 1,100, but in dividing the 3,220 by 48 he

put his penultimate remainder 340 in place of the true quotient  $67\frac{1}{2}$ , as may be seen by doing the sum.

$$\begin{array}{r} 48)5283220(110067\frac{1}{2} \\ \underline{528} \\ | 3220 \\ \underline{288} \\ | 340 \\ \underline{336} \end{array}$$

For other errors of calculation cf. i. 30 n.

- 188 Tarn (J. H. S. xxviii. 212-15) regards the whole account of the storm as a blend of two irreconcilable stories. In one, the Persian fleet is rightly regarded as strung out along the little beaches of Magnesia, and the loss fell chiefly on the supply-ships driven ashore at many places from Meliboea to Cape Sepias (188. 3, 191. 1); in the other, a poetical invention, Homer is closely imitated. The whole fleet comes to a harbour too small for it, and is drawn up, *more Homericō* πρόκροσσαι, and defended with a bulwark (ἔρκος) of wreckage (188. 1, 191. 1). Further, the losses are greatly exaggerated. Even if we reject this hazardous analysis, we must recognize the patent imitation of Homer, and the evident exaggeration in the account of the storm and of the losses caused by it.

- 1 πρὸς γῆ and ἐπ' ἀγκυρέων are opposed, the innermost row of ships was moored to the land, the outer rows swung at anchor.

πρόκροσσαι: probably 'with beaks turned seawards'. κρόσση = κόρη head (cf. κόρυς, κόρυμβος) is used apparently for battlements (Hom. II. xii. 258, 444; and cf. H. ii. 125. 1). Thus in iv. 152. 4 the griffin-heads encircling the bronze bowl in the Heraeum stood out in relief. Here the ships are in eight rows, and the high prows turned seawards stand out like battlements; cf. II. xiv. 33 f. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' εὐρύς περ ἔων ἐδυνήσατο πάσας | αἰγιαλὸς νῆας χαδέειν, στείνοντο δὲ λαοί | τῷ ῥα προκρόσσας ἔρυσαν, καὶ πλῆσαν ἀπάσης | ἡμόνος στόμα μακρόν, ὅσον συνέεργαθον ἄκραι, which, as Eustathius observes, is completed and interpreted by this passage. The Achaean ships were drawn up in parallel rows on the beach, row behind row landwards, just as the Persian ships here lay at anchor in eight rows off the shore. Aristarchus takes κρόσσαι as 'ladders', and explains that the ships in the Iliad were drawn up on the shelving beach one above the other, like the audience in a theatre, but the explanation is inapplicable here. Schweighäuser, however, would construe 'in quincuncem dispositae'.

- 2 ἀπηλιώτης: east. Καϊκίης (north-east) would be more exact (cf. Plin. N. H. ii. 121 'Caecian aliqui vocant Hellespontiam'). The icy-cold north-easter blowing from the steppes of Russia over the Euxine is meant. The Athenians living further south call it Boreas (north wind); cf. vi. 44. 2; vii. 189.

- 3 Cf. Strabo 443 εἰς Ἰπνοὺς τόπον τραχὺν τῶν περὶ τὸ Πήλιον . . . τραχὺς

δ' ἐστὶν ὁ παράπλους πᾶς ὁ τοῦ Πηλίου ὅσον σταδίων ὁγδοήκοντα τοσούτος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοιοῦτος ὁ τῆς Ὀσσης. μεταξὺ δὲ κόλπος σταδίων πλείονων ἢ διακοσίων ἐν ᾧ ἡ Μελίβοια. Ipnī is directly under Pelion, Meliboea, a considerable city (Hom. Il. ii. 717) in a shallow bay (Strabo) at the foot of Ossa (Liv. xlv. 13). It is proved by inscriptions to be Thanatu, where there is a long stretch of beach (J. H. S. xxviii. 210).

189 I ἄλλου : besides the two already given (ch. 140, 141).

γαμβρόν : here in its original meaning a relation by marriage, κηδεστής, *affinis*. Erechtheus, father of Oreithyia, was ancestor as well as king of the Athenians. The legend was that Boreas seized her, as Hades did Persephone, while she strayed in the fields picking flowers, and carried her off to his home in wintry Thrace, where she bore him two sons, Zetes and Calais, the Argonauts. For the rationalization of the myth cf. Plato, Phaedrus, and Ruskin, Queen of the Air.

2 Oreithyia evidently became a wind-goddess as Persephone became chthonic. The ordinary derivation from ἔρος and θυίειν (cf. ch. 178. 2 n.) = *montivaga* is improbable. Miss Harrison (Myth. and Mon. Athens, lxxiv–ix) declares her originally a Nereid (as in Hom. Il. xviii. 48–9), daughter of the old sea-king Poseidon-Erechtheus. Boreas courting the sea-nymph is the wind sporting among the waves. Later both she and her father become Attic. The popularity of the myth just before and after the Persian war is shown by its appearance on nine archaic vases (Paul. Wiss. iii. 727) and by its frequency on red-figure vases.

περὶ Ἀθων : cf. vi. 44. 2, 3.

3 οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν. This touch of scepticism is noteworthy (cf. ἡ ἄλλως . . . ἐκόπασε, ch. 191. 2). H. is only sure of the Athenian belief.

Ἴλισσόν. A field by the Ilissus was the scene of the rape of Oreithyia, though others said the Areopagus. Plato (Phaedr. 229 B) speaks of an altar to Boreas near Callirhoe ; cf. Paus. i. 19. 6 ; Strabo 294 ; Harrison, *op. cit.* 224–6.

190 νῆας (sc. μακράς) = triremes ; cf. viii. 1. 2.

καὶ τοῦτον : for no man must hope for uninterrupted good fortune ; cf. i. 30 n.

ἄχαρις συμφορῇ λυπεῖσα παιδοφόνος. Since Dionysius of Halicarnassus (iii. 21), in obvious imitation of this phrase, speaks of the victorious Horatius who slew his sister (Liv. i. 25, 26) as falling εἰς ἄχαριν συμφορὰν ἀδελφόκτονον, we may suppose that the phrase (for which cf. i. 41. 1) refers darkly to the involuntary murder of his son (so Plut. de Mal. Her. 30, Mor. 864 C).

191 I ἐπὶ ἄριθμός : cf. 170. 3. Stein points out that the consecutive clause ὥστε κτλ. must refer, not only to the words *σιταγωγῶν* . . . ἄριθμός, but also to the loss of war-ships and crews specified in ch. 190. 1. It looks as if the story of Ameinocles, noted in the margin by the author (or some early reader), had later been thrust into the text.

2 For such sacrifices to appease the winds cf. ii. 119. 2, 3 ; Verg.

Aen. ii. 116 f.; Xen. Anab. iv. 5. 3; Aesch. Ag. 1417 ἔθυσεν αὐτοῦ παῖδα, φιλτάτην ἐμοὶ | ὠδὴν, ἐπὶ δὲ Θρηκίων ἀημάτων and Paus. ii. 12. 1 (ἐν Τιτάνη) βωμός ἐστιν ἀνέμων, ἐφ' οὗ τοῖς ἀνέμοις ὁ ἱερεὺς μὴ νυκτὶ ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος θύει. δρᾶ δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀπόρρητα ἐς βόθρους τέσσαρας, ἡμερούμενος τῶν πνευμάτων τὸ ἄγριον, καὶ δὴ καὶ Μηδείας ὡς λέγουσιν ἐπὶ δὲ ἐπάδει. Frazer (*ad loc.*) distinguishes absolutely between these attempts to appease the wind by sacrifice and prayer, and attempts to subdue it by force or by magic (Paus. ii. 34. 2 n. and Golden Bough, i. 220 f.); but surely there are in many of these cases, and especially here, clear traces of magic. If γόησι be retained it must mean 'by wizards', while βοῆσι means presumably *sacro ululatu*, and καταεἰδόντες (followed by the dative ἀνέμῳ) would seem equivalent to ἐπαεῖδω, 'to sing a spell to'. Again, the Magi as early as H. have begun to acquire in western eyes the character of sorcerers (cf. *φαρμακεύσαντες*, 114. 1 and App. VIII. 3). How deep-rooted this belief became may be seen from the use of the word and its derivatives, magic, &c., in Greek, Latin, and modern languages. Once more the words αὐτὸς ἐθέλων rather suggest as an alternative the compelling force of magic.

τετάρτη ἡμέρη. It was proverbial that even a winter storm in that region never lasted three days; cf. Ar. Prob. xxvi. 9, 941 α 20 οὗ ποτε νυκτερινὸς βορέας τρίτον ἔκετο φέγγος.

Thetis was unwilling to marry a mortal, but Peleus, taught by Chiron, held her fast, while, like Proteus, she took all manner of strange forms, among them that of a cuttle-fish (*σηπία* whence ἀκτὴ Σηπιάς), until she resumed her proper shape and yielded, finding it was the will of Zeus.

192 The clause Ποσειδέωνος . . . νομίζοντες reads like a marginal note, thrust later into the text. The name 'Saviour' is given to many Olympian deities (e.g. Apollo), but most often to Zeus.

193 1 ἀκρην. The south-west corner of Magnesia, Cape Aeantium (Plin. H. N. iv. 32), Τισαίη ἀκρη, Ap. Rhod. i. 568.

2 Aphetae is generally placed just inside the Gulf of Pagasae near Cape Aeantium and opposite Cape Posidium, but Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 310) and Wace (J. H. S. xxvi. 145) would put it outside near Olizon. Pagasae was near the inmost recess of the gulf.

The commoner tradition was that Heracles was left behind in Mysia on the Propontis, seeking for his darling Hylas, who had been carried off by the Naiads.

ἀφήσειν. The name Aphetae probably gave rise to the legend that the Argonauts put off from there. But since tradition was strong that the expedition started from Pagasae, a reason (ὑδρευσάμενοι) must be found for putting in at Aphetae. H. regards the putting out into the high sea as the true ἄφesis, not the voyage down the Pagasae gulf; Hellanicus (St. Byz.) naïvely assumed a double ἄφesis, Strabo (436) loosely calls Aphetae near Pagasae.

194 1 ὁ ἀπὸ Κύμης. Stein argues from the title ὑπαρχος that Cyme must

have been in 480 B.C. the capital of the Ionic satrapy, which included Aeolis (iii. 90. 1), but there is no clear evidence for a satrap of Ionia, independent of the satrap of Sardis (v. 25 n.). The title ὑπαρχος, though it often represents satrap (iii. 70, 120, 126; iv. 166; ix. 113), is also used for the commandant of an island (v. 27), a city, or fortress (vii. 105, 106, and perhaps vii. 33, 78; ix. 116), and for an under-governor (Thuc. viii. 16; e.g. of Aeolis, Xen. Hell. iii. 1. 10) cf. Meyer, iii, § 29 n. Further, Cyme, at the time of the Ionic revolt, was ruled by a Greek tyrant, Aristagoras (v. 37), who commanded its fleet in the Scythian expedition (iv. 138). Probably, therefore, Sandoces was only governor of the town Cyme or of the district Aeolis.

2 For a similar anecdote of Cambyses cf. v. 25.

ἐς οἶκον: cf. v. 31. 4 n., and for the Persian law cf. i. 137.

195 Alabanda is on the Carian Marsyas (v. 118. 1 n.) south of the Maeander. There are considerable ruins of it at Arab-Hissar, identified by coins found there.

Πάφου. Old Paphos and the temple of Aphrodite stood a little way from the sea at the modern Kuklia. For its history and antiquities cf. J. H. S. ix. 175 f., and for the temple i. 105 n.; J. H. S. ix. 193 f.

Ἰσθμόν: cf. 145. 1 n.

196-8 *Xerxes in Thessaly and at Halus.*

196 Θεσσαλίας: in the narrower sense defined ch. 132. 1 n.

καὶ δὴ (= ἤδη, iv. 102. 1) τριταῖος cannot mean on the third day after he entered Thessaly (Abicht; cf. vi. 120), nor does the sense 'three days before' (Schweighäuser, Stein) seem satisfactory. It surely means 'on the third day after the arrival of the fleet in Thessaly', i.e. at the Sepiad shore; cf. Diary in App. XX.

Thessaly was famous for its horses (cf. v. 63), an emblem often used on the coins of its cities; cf. Schol. to Il. ii. 761 ἵππον Θεσσαλικὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν τε γυναῖκα. Theoc. xviii. 30 ἄρματι Θεσσαλὸς ἵππος.

Ὀνόχωνος (vii. 129. 2 n.). Ἠπιδανός (129. 2), like the Enipeus, rises in Mount Othrys. They join together in the Thessalian plain and then fall into the Peneius. The united stream, now the river of Pharsala, was called by the ancients sometimes Enipeus, sometimes Apidanus. H. names the western branch, now Sophaditiko, Apidanus, and the eastern, now Phersaliti, Enipeus. Further, since he limits the Apidanus to Achaia, he must have called the united stream the Enipeus. Thucydides (iv. 78) calls the western stream the Enipeus, as does Strabo 432.

97 1 Ἄλος or Ἄλος, an ancient city (of the Myrmidons, Hom. Il. ii. 682) to the north-east of Mount Othrys, on the river Amphysus near the Pagasaeon gulf (cf. 173. 1), was said to have been founded by Athamas (Strabo 433). Xerxes no doubt led his detachment from Larissa by Pherae to Phthiotian Thebes. If he marched



thence along the coast to Lamia, he must have passed Halus, if he turned inland by Itonus, he would go within 60 stades of it (Strabo, *l. c.*).

ἐπιχώριον λόγον, 'a local legend.' The story of Athamas, a tradition of pre-Hellenic Minyan origin, is associated with both the homes of the race, Orchomenus in Boeotia and the shores of the Pagasaeon gulf (Iolcus). In Boeotia,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Coronea, stood the shrine and statue of Zeus Laphystius, where legend said Phrixus had been saved by a ram from being sacrificed (Paus. ix. 34). Mount Laphystius stood over against Orchomenus, and on the opposite (eastern) side of Lake Copais there was, near Acraephia (viii. 135. 1 n.), a πεδίων Ἀθαμάντιον (Paus. ix. 24. 3), while Mount Ptoon was named after Ptoos son of Athamas (Paus. ix. 23. 6). Near Halus, too, there was a πεδίων . . . Ἀθαμάντιον (Apoll. Rhod. ii. 514 and schol.).

Λαφύστιον, 'the devourer,' from λαφύσσειν: cf. Ἄρτεμις Λαφρία, Paus. iv. 31. 7; vii. 18. 12. Human sacrifices were regarded by the Greeks as impious and only practised by barbarians (cf. iv. 103); so pseudo-Plato, Minos 315 B-D ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους θύειν ἀλλ' ἀνόσιον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὄσιον καὶ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν νιείς τῷ Κρόνῳ. Plato, however, admits as exceptions 'the sons of Athamas' and the worshippers of Zeus Lycaeus in Arcadia; cf. Paus. viii. 38. 7. At Orchomenus in Boeotia the priest of Dionysus Laphystius every year at the festival of the Agrionia pursued the young women of Minyan descent, known as Oleae, with a drawn sword, and within Plutarch's memory had slain one (Plut. Mor. 299 F; Quaest. Gr. 38). Again in Chios and Tenedos in early times a man was torn in pieces as a sacrifice to Dionysus Omestes (Porph. de Abstin. ii. 55), and for Attica cf. § 3 n. Human sacrifices were frequent among the Carthaginians (cf. ch. 167 n.; Plato, *l. c.*). The burning of their children in honour of Baal and Moloch was common among the Canaanites (Deut. xii. 31; xviii. 9, 10), and the Israelites frequently relapsed into the abominable practice (2 Kings xvii. 17; Jer. vii. 31; xix. 5; xxxii. 35). The kings themselves, Manasseh and Ahaz, made their children pass through the fire in the valley of Hinnom (2 Chron. xxviii. 3; xxxiii. 6), while the king of Moab when hard pressed 'took his eldest son and offered him for a burnt-offering (2 Kings iii. 27). Frazer (Golden Bough, pt. iii (the dying God), ch. 6), argues from this and from Micah vi. 6, 7; Ezek. xx. 26, 31, as well as from the consecration of the firstborn among the Israelites (Exod. xiii. 1, 12; xxxiv. 19) and the feast of the Passover, that the Semitic custom was to sacrifice the firstborn as here, but that the custom was mitigated by the permission to redeem the child (Numb. xviii. 15; iii. 44 f.), or by the vicarious sacrifice of a lamb (cf. also Gen. xxii. 1-13). In the legend here the ram that saved Phrixus points to the substitution of a ram for the human victim. So at Salamis in Cyprus an

ox took the place of a man, and at Syrian Laodicea a deer that of a maiden (Porphry, de Abstin. ii. 54-6). At Potniae goats were substituted for boys (Paus. ix. 8. 2), and in a sacrifice to Munychian Artemis for a girl. But the man rescued must henceforth be treated as under God's ban and flee from his home ; cf. the Italic *ver sacrum* Festus, p. 158, and especially 379. The legend here is an explanation of the ancient ceremony, and an attempt to find a reason for an abhorrent worship in the wickedness of men (cf. *inf.*).

Φρίξω. Apparently his sister Helle was unknown in the earliest form of the myth. Again in the later writers it is Ino, the wicked step-mother, who by getting the seed-corn roasted secretly caused a famine in the land ; she then bribed the messenger sent to inquire of the Delphic oracle to say that the children of Nephele, the first wife of Athamas, must be sacrificed ; but they were saved by the ram with the golden fleece who bore Phrixus to Colchis (Apollodorus, i. 9. 1).

ἀέθλους. The word implies there was some feat to be performed (cf. i. 126. 2 ; iv. 10. 2), but H. writes obscurely here and elsewhere in the chapter, perhaps from sacred reserve. Possibly undetected entrance into the Prytaneion established the claimant's right to the enjoyment of the consecrated land (τέμενος, § 4).

2 λήιτον (town hall) = δημόσιον, from λέως, λαός : so λειτουργία, *munus publicum*.

ἦν δὲ ἐσέλθῃ : more exactly ἦν δὲ ἐσερχόμενος ἀλίσκηται (cf. *inf.*). H. seems only to give us an account of the penalty involved in failure. The representative of the old Minyan house, if taken in the act of entering the town hall, was shut up there till the feast of the god came round, when he was led to the altar ; but apparently he was as a rule allowed to escape and a ram sacrificed in his stead. Henceforth, however, he must live in exile under the ban of the god, and if he returned, the ceremony was repeated, and in times of calamity the human sacrifice really offered (cf. *sup.* § 1 n.).

ὥς τ' (sc. ἔλεγον, as with μετέπειτα δ' ὥς, § 1). The natural order would be ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τοῦτοις (ἔλεγον) ὥς.

If the text be sound ἐξηγέοντο takes up the ἔλεγον already understood in the previous sentences, while the resumption of the singular instead of the plural fixes attention on the single victim in each particular case.

3 In Hesiod's Eoae, Phrixus married Iophassa, daughter of Aeetes, with whom he took refuge, and had four sons, Argos, Phrontis, Melas, Cytisorus (Schol. Apollon. Rhod. ii. 1122).

καθαρμόν : an expiatory offering or scapegoat, as at Athens (Schol. Arist. Eq. 1136) at the festival of the Thargelia two men worthy of death were offered as φαρμακοί, i. e. to make atonement for the people. The ceremony was annual, though perhaps the victims were only put to death in time of plague or famine. Athamas in this local legend is himself about to be offered, and so Sophocles in

his Ἀθάμας στεφανήφορος represented him as led to the altar, a victim to the vengeance of Nephele, but saved by Heracles (Schol. Arist. Nub. 257). But in the local myth it would seem that he was to suffer not for his wrongful treatment of Phrixus (a motive apparently borrowed by Sophocles from the Epic poets), but for a famine or plague due to the wrath of Zeus with the whole house, since he is saved by the son of Phrixus, Cytisorus, who thus brings down the wrath of heaven on himself and his posterity. This return of Cytisorus is an expedient necessary in this form of the myth to make Athamas, who had lost all his children, the ancestor of the race. In the ordinary form of the legend, Athamas after the escape of Phrixus goes mad, shoots one son Learchus, and forces Ino to throw herself and her other son Melicertes into the sea. Then he wanders over the earth till he finds a home in Thessaly in the Athamantian plain.

Ἀχαιῶν: the men of the Thessalian Achaia; in the days of the myth the Minyae.

Αἴης (cf. i. 2. 2; vii. 193. 2). The land of Aeetes whose city was Κύτα or Κύταια (hence Cytisorus).

- 4 τὸ ἅλσος: the sacred precinct of the shrine mentioned above (§ 1).

# 198—201 *Topography of Thermopylae.*

- 198 1 ἄμπωτις: cf. ii. 11. 2, of the Red Sea. In the Mediterranean generally there is little or no tide, but in the narrowest part of the Euripus 'at Chalkis, it causes so strong a current that the Greek steamers have at times to wait several hours before they can get through the narrow passage. At the head of the Malian gulf, where the shore is very low and flat, the phenomenon is peculiarly remarkable' (Grundy, p. 277). For the topography in general cf. c. 176. 3 n.

Τρηχίναι πέτραι: cliffs west of the Asopus ravine, forming the face of Mount Oeta near Trachis.

- 2 πρώτη . . . Ἀντικύρη. Lamia is in Achaia. Anticyra (to be distinguished from the better known Phocian city on the gulf of Corinth) was apparently at the place where the road crossed the Spercheius, but not at the mouth, the muddy marshy shore being unfit for habitation.

ξῆ Ἐνιήνων: cf. 132. 1 n. H. here gives us a route-map from the point of view of a traveller from Achaia (cf. ch. 176 n.; Grundy, 280), but we cannot test its accuracy as the coast-line and the courses of the rivers have changed since his day. The Dyrras must be identified (Leake, Northern Greece, ii. 25. 6) with the Gourgopotamo, and the Melas with the Mavra Neria (Black water). Now the two streams join in the middle of the plain and together fall into the Spercheius. In ancient times they were 2½ miles apart where the road, which must have made a wide détour to avoid the swamps at the head of the gulf, crossed them (Grundy, p. 281).

καιομένῳ. Heracles was burnt to death on a pyre on Mount Oeta; cf. ch. 176. 3 n.

- 199 Τρήχis. On Heraclea Trachis cf. Thuc. iii. 92; Liv. xxxvi. 22-4; Strabo 428; Paus. x. 22; Leake, N. Greece, ii. 24-31. Apparently the lower town lay on the Thermopylae road (Grundy, p. 282), five stades from the Melas, west of the Asopus ravine. Thucydides (*l.c.*) makes it clear there was no real change of site, but apparently in Roman times (Strabo, Paus. *l.c.*) the name Heraclea was confined to the fortified hill (cf. Liv. *l.c.*) and the ruins of the lower town, six stades away (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 313), were called Trachis.

We should expect a measure of length after εὐρύτατον, but if so the numeral is corrupt, as 22,000 plethra = 420 miles. Hence Leake, Stein, and others take it as a measure of the surface of the plain of Trachis (over 5,000 acres), in which the king pitched his camp (ch. 201).

πρὸς μεσαμβρίην: really east; cf. 176. 3 n. 'The defile of the Asopus issues abruptly on to the Malian plain nearly four miles west of the Western Gate of Thermopylae. Its bottom is merely formed of the stony river bed, at first some fifty yards wide, but rapidly contracting, until a little farther up the chasm it is only twelve feet wide between absolutely sheer cliffs from 700 to 900 feet high. This winding rift in the mountains continues for some three and a half miles from the entrance and then suddenly broadens out into a wide upland valley' (Grundy, p. 261). The Asopus (or Karvunaria) still flows through the plain at the foot of the hills (τὴν ὑπώρειον) which bound it to the south, but now falls into the Spercheus, which has turned south through the alluvial deposit below Thermopylae.

- 00 I The Phoenix is 'a little stream which issues from the rocks of the west gate, whose bed is of a ruddy-brown colour, owing no doubt to its being impregnated with oxide of iron' (Grundy, p. 284). It now joins the Spercheus rather more than half a mile below the point where that stream receives the Asopus. It is almost exactly fifteen stades from the Middle Gate and principal hot-springs at Thermopylae.

δέδμηται. The word implies an artificially constructed road, probably as now on a causeway (cf. ii. 124. 3 n.), contrasted with ὁδὸς τετρημένη (iv. 136. 2 n.).

- 2 Anthele was placed by Leake on a great accumulation of debris brought down by the stream which issues from the great ravine about half a mile west of the hot springs. But this site is impossible, for it is traversed in every direction by ever-shifting branches of the torrent, so that anything built on it would soon be carried away, and it would be excessively malarious. It should be placed on the fairly level piece of land just inside the West Gate, under the old Turkish cavalry barracks. The temples and the seats of the Amphictyons may have been above the village on the projecting shelf of hill, where the barracks stand. (Grundy, p. 284.)

Ἀμφικτύοσι : cf. c. 213. 2 n.

- 201 ἐν τῇ διόδῳ : near Thermopylae proper (ch. 176. 2 n.), i.e. the Middle Gate, with their camp behind the restored Phocian wall (ch. 176. 3 f. n., 208. 2). The fighting took place in defence of this Middle Gate (ch. 223), though on the last day the Greeks at first advanced into the broader part of the pass (ch. 223. 2), and finally fell back to the mound just behind the wall (ch. 225. 2).

βορῆν. The points here given as north and south should be east and west; cf. 176. 3 n.

202-7 *The Greek army under Leonidas at Thermopylae.*

- 202 H. enumerates only 3,100 Peloponnesians. Elsewhere (viii. 25. 1) he mentions Helots and seems to imply (vii. 229. 1) that each Spartan was attended by one Helot. But it is unlikely that the 4,000 Peloponnesians of the epigram (vii. 228. 1) are to be made up by adding Helots, whom neither the inscription nor the historian would be likely to include. Diodorus (xi. 4 = Ephorus) adds 1,000 Lacedaemonians, a number given also by Isocrates (Paneg. 90; Archid. 99), while Ctesias (Pers. 25, p. 70) blunderingly assigns that number of Perioeci, along with 300 Spartans, to *Pausanias at Plataea*. On the whole the addition of 900 or 1,000 Perioeci seems probable (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 307).

There was no connexion between Tegea and Mantinea, which, though lying near together on the upland plain of Tripolitza (i. 66. 2 f.), were always opposed to each other. On Mantinea cf. Paus. viii. 8 f. with Frazer, iv. 201 f., and on Tegea (i. 66. 2 n.) Paus. viii. 45 f. with Frazer, iv. 422 f. On Arcadian Orchomenus (to be distinguished from the Boeotian, viii. 34, ix. 16) cf. Paus. viii. 13 with Frazer, iv. 224 f.; on Phlius Paus. ii. 12, 13 with Frazer, *ad loc.*; on Mycenae vi. 83 n.

- 203 I ἐπικλητοὶ ἐγένοντο = were summoned (cf. ἐπεκαλέσαντο *inf.*); for the periphrasis cf. v. 63. 2.

Ὀπουντιοί. H. only distinguishes, in Greece, Locri Ozolae (viii. 52. 2) and Locri Opuntii (viii. 1. 2), including in the latter the so-called Epicnemidii who lived nearest the pass.

πανστρατιῇ : as immediately threatened (cf. Thuc. v. 57). Pausanias (x. 20. 2) absurdly estimates them at 'not more than 6,000', Diodorus (xi. 4) more sensibly at 1,000. On the attitude of the Locrians cf. c. 132. 1 n.

- 2 ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινομένη : *statim nascenti*. For the sentiment cf. i. 31. 3 n.; v. 4. 2 n.; vii. 46. 3 n.; Pind. Pyth. iii. 81; Soph. Ant. 610-25.

Τρηχίνα : cf. 199. 1 n. Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 313) most ingeniously suggests that the Locrians (of whom we hear nothing after this muster at Trachis) remained there as a garrison. We are told (ch. 201) that Xerxes commands all north of Trachis. Again he argues that the defensible road up the gorge of the Asopus into Doris



(199 n.; viii. 31; ix. 66. 89) must have been held to prevent Xerxes turning Leonidas' position at Thermopylae. He concludes that the citadel of Trachis was for this purpose held by the Locrians since, as Grundy (pp. 262-4 n.) has shown, the defence of Thermopylae on later occasions against Brennus in 279 B.C. (Paus. x. 20 f.) in 224 B.C. (Polyb. ii. 52), in 208 B.C. (Polyb. x. 41, 42), and against the Romans in 191 B.C. (Liv. xxxvi. 15. 23, 24), regularly included the occupation of Heraclea.

- 204 The full genealogy is given as a mark of the honour; so of Leotychides (viii. 131), Alexander of Macedon (viii. 139), and Pausanias (ix. 64), while that of Xerxes is introduced dramatically (ch. 11). For this ancient mark of honour cf. Homer, II. x. 68 *πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον*, and H. vi. 14. 3 n. For the genealogy cf. Paus. iii. 1-3, who for Eurycratides substitutes a second Eurycrates (iii. 3. 5). Eusebius (Chron. vol. i, pp. 221-5, ed. Schöne) extracts from Diodorus a dated list from Eurysthenes to Alcamenes, said to be due to Apollodorus.

Λεωνίδης. An Ionic form (cf. Ἀρχελέω, Ἠγησιλέω, Λεωβατέω, for the Doric *Λανιδάς*; *Λās* = *λαός* or *λεώς*).

- 05 1 For Anaxandrides' double marriage and two families cf. v. 40. 2, and in general v. 39-48.

- 2 τοὺς κατεστειώτας: not 'of mature age' (Bähr, Grote, &c.) but assigned him by law; cf. i. 67. 5 n. The usual number was sent, but in this case the king selected men who had children, so that even if they perished, no family might become extinct. For other 300's cf. i. 82; ix. 64.

λογισάμενος, 'whom I mentioned (ch. 202) when reckoning up the total' (cf. 187. 2).

- 3 μούους. The other allies were merely summoned (ch. 203); to Thebes Leonidas went in person and brought its contingent with him more or less under compulsion. On the Theban contingent cf. ch. 222 n., 233 n.

ἄλλα φρονέοντες: with other thoughts (i.e. Medism) in their hearts; cf. c. 168. 2; ix. 54. 1. *ἄλλοφρονέοντες* would mean they were mad (v. 85. 2).

- 06 1 ὑπερβαλλομένους, 'delaying'; cf. iii. 76. 2 *ad fin.*

Κάρνεια. For this festival cf. vi. 106. 3 n.; viii. 72. This year it took place just before the Olympic festival, which at that time lasted four whole days, i.e. in 480 Aug. 16-19 or 17-20, ending with the full moon Aug. 19 or 20. Leonidas' march was apparently just before the Carneia, and the fighting at Thermopylae near the end of August (Busolt, ii. 673-4).

- 207 H. here as elsewhere represents the Peloponnesians as selfishly indifferent to the fate of Greece north of the Isthmus. But he does not represent the panic, which may have been real enough among the men, as infecting the general. Still less does he, as in the case of the fleet, speak of actual retreat (vii. 183; cf. viii. 4. 9; App. XX. 7).

- 208-9 *The Persians before Thermopylae. Xerxes and Demaratus.*
- 208 3 Is this contemptuous disregard of the scout the counterpart of Xerxes' dismissal of the Greek spies, ch. 146?
- 209 3 For this adorning of the hair (208. 3) and other preparations for battle as for a festival cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. xi. 3, xiii. 8.
- 210-12 *The first two days' fighting at Thermopylae.*
- 210 2 πολλοὶ . . . ἄνδρες: cf. viii. 68. a 1. The remark seems inapposite of troops which fought on stubbornly all day through without success. Stein suggests it is a later addition by the author inserted in an inappropriate place. Gomperz (Her. Stud. ii. 85-6) would transfer it to the end of ch. 212, where it would be more suitable.
- 211 2 βραχυτέροισι: cf. v. 49. 3 n.; vii. 61. 1 n. Diodorus (xi. 7) ascribes the success of the Greeks to the greater size of their shields, and H. elsewhere (ix. 62) brings out the superiority of their defensive armour.
- 3 φεύγεσκον δῆθεν. The pretended flight of the Spartans drew the Persians on, and thus made their losses heavier than if they had been merely kept at bay.
- 212 1 θεούμενον. No doubt the king had a throne on the Trachinian heights as above Salamis (viii. 88, 90).  
ἀναδραμεῖν, 'leapt up' (ch. 15. 1), a sign of fear (Hom. Il. xx. 62) and of astonishment (iii. 155. 1).
- 2 κατὰ τάξιν . . . ἔθνεα, 'by tribes and regiments'; cf. ix. 33. 1; and κατὰ τέλεα, ch. 211 *ad fin.*, ch. 81 n.  
τὴν ἀτραπὸν: mentioned ch. 175. 2, described ch. 216.
- 213-25 *The third day at Thermopylae. Hydarnes' flank march led by the traitor Ephialtes (213-18). Retreat of most of the allies (219-20). Final combat (223-5).*
- 213 1 Μηλιεύς from Trachis (cf. ch. 214. 2).
- 2 Πυλαγόρων. The representatives of the various states or tribes which composed the Amphictyony were charged with the whole jurisdiction of the League. They, along with the Hieromnemones, who administered the Delphic temple, met twice a year, in spring and autumn, at Thermopylae and Delphi (Hyperides, Epitaph. 8; Aesch. in Ctes. § 126; Strabo 420). The Pylagorae seem to have been replaced after 280 B.C. by ἀγορατροί (C. I. A. ii. 551). That Thermopylae was the original meeting-place is shown by the names Pylagorae, Pylaea, which are applied to the deputies' meetings at both places, and by the existence of a shrine there to the eponymous hero Amphictyon (ch. 200 *ad fin.*). It is also confirmed by the geographical position of the twelve 'surrounding' (Ἀμφικτιόνες = περικτιόνες) tribes who belonged to the Amphictyony. To the incomplete list in Herodotus (vii. 132. 1 n.) we may add from Aeschines (de Fals. Leg. 116) Dorians, Ionians, Phocians (cf. Paus. x. 8. 2; Diod. xvi. 29; Busolt, i. 681 f.). As the Amphictyons

were primarily concerned with religion, the treachery of Ephialtes may have been regarded as an offence against the gods; it may, however, be the earliest instance of Amphictyonic intervention in politics, later so ruinous. A meeting may possibly have been held immediately after the battle of Plataea (Bukatios, August–Sept.) 479 B. C., but the spring meeting of 478 B. C. is probably the one meant. For a full account of the Amphictyonic Council cf. Busolt, *Griech. Staats.* ii. 1292–1310.

κατήλθε: returned home (v. 30. 4; cf. i. 60. 5), since Anticyra was a Malian city (ch. 198. 2 n.).

- 3 The omission to fulfil this promise is the strongest argument for the view (Stein, Curtius, Kirchhoff) that H. intended to continue his work beyond 479 B. C. E. Meyer has, however, shown (F. i. 189 f.; cf. ii. 217) that a continuation beyond the transference of hegemony is impossible, and even one so far as this unlikely, in spite of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, A. and A. i. 26 f.; Wachsmuth, *Einl.* 513. The omission is due not to any incompleteness but to forgetfulness; cf. *Introd.* § 14; Hauvette, p. 56 f.; Busolt, ii. 614.

- 214 If there was a traitor, the proclamation of the Amphictyons makes it probable Ephialtes was the man, and so later authors held (Paus. i. 4. 2; Diod. (Ephorus) xi. 8), but the path must have been known to Thessalians (cf. ch. 215) in Xerxes' train. Cf. *Ctes. Pers.* 24, p. 70 Θώραξ δ' ὁ Θεσσαλὸς (cf. ch. 6. 2 n.) καὶ Τραχινίων οἱ δυνατοὶ Καλλιάρχης τε καὶ Τιμαφέρνης παρήσαν στρατιὰν ἔχοντες. Καλέσας δὲ Ξέρξης τούτους τε καὶ τὸν Δημαράτον καὶ τὸν Ἥγιαν τὸν Ἐφέσιον ἔμαθεν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἡττηθεῖεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εἰ μὴ κυκλωθείσαν ἡγουμένων δὲ τῶν δύο Τραχινίων διὰ δυσβάτου στρατοῦ Περσικὸς διελέλυθε μυριάδες τέσσαρες καὶ κατὰ νότον γίνονται τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

The argument seems to be; 'one might further urge against this view that Onetes was no Malian and so would not know the path, but this objection would have no weight, since he might have learnt of it if he had often visited the district.' For εἰδείη... ἂν cf. i. 70 *ad fin.*

- 215 περὶ λύχνων ἀφάς, 'the lighting of the lamps.' For Greek notes of time cf. iv. 181. 3 n.

ἀτραπὸν. The track is rough and narrow, and often steep and rocky (Plut. Cato 13; Grundy, pp. 301–3).

οὐδὲν χρηστή = *χρησίμη*; cf. iii. 78. 2. A meiosis for 'pernicious', so long ago (cf. v. 88. 3 n.) had the path's capabilities for mischief been discovered by the Malians. Stein would, however, take οὐδὲν *χρηστή* with ἐσβολή, 'the uselessness of the pass for defence.'

- 216 ἀρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ ποταμοῦ. For the Asopus and its ravine cf. ch. 199 n. It is generally assumed that Hydarnes began by ascending the Asopus ravine, and these words, though they should not be pressed (as by Grundy, p. 299), favour that assumption. If so, Trachis must have been previously captured by the Persians (cf. ch. 203. 2 n.). But Pausanias (x. 22. 8) gives a different account: ἀτραπὸς ἐστὶ διὰ τοῦ ὄρους τῆς Οἴτης, μία μὲν ἢ ὑπὲρ Τραχίνο

ἀπότομός τε τὰ πλείω καὶ ὄρθιος δεινῶς, ἑτέρα δὲ ἢ διὰ τῆς Αἰνεάνων ὁδεῦσαι στρατῷ ῥήων, δι' ἧς καὶ Ὑδάρνης ποτὲ Μῆδος κατὰ νότου τοῖς περὶ Λεωνίδην ἐπέθετο Ἕλλησι. In the 'steep and abrupt path starting above Trachis' Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 313) recognizes the original of the modern high road. But the other was the path by which Hydarnes, and afterwards Brennus, turned Thermopylae (Paus. x. 22. 1 and 8). It was easier for an army and led through the territory of the Aenianes, i.e. round the western end of the Trachinian cliffs. Presumably it passed behind Trachis and connected with the Anopaea path in the valley of the Asopus above the gorge. The expression τὸν Ἀσωπὸν διαβάντες (ch. 217. 1) in Herodotus distinctly supports Pausanias' view given above, which is adopted by Munro (*l.c.*). Munro explains his views on the path taken by Hydarnes and on the position and conduct of the Phocians in C. A. H. iv. 293-7 with map.

Ἀνόπαια, 'upwards'; cf. Hom. Od. i. 320. Later writers call the mountain Callidromus (Plin. H. N. iv. 28; Strabo 428; Liv. xxxvi. 15) after one of its peaks (Liv. xxxvi. 16). It is now named Saromata, while the path is said to be called Μουνοπάτι.

Ἀλπηνὸν πόλιν. More properly a village (κώμη, ch. 176. 5) by name Ἀλπηνοί (ch. 176. 2, 229. 1). It is suitably identified by Grundy (p. 290) with the remains of a walled acropolis on a hill which stands out into the plain . . . about half a mile beyond the East Gate. If this were captured, the defenders of Thermopylae would be cut off from supplies (ch. 176. 5) and all hope of retreat.

Μελαμπύγου . . . Κερκώπων. The Cercopes were two thievish mischievous dwarfs who stole the arms of Heracles while he slept on the rock here named and attacked him with them. But Heracles seized them and hung them head downwards from a pole he carried on his shoulders. In that position they jeered at the hinder parts of the hero tanned with exposure, and recognized in him the μελάμπυγος against whom their mother had warned them. Heracles amused at their droll way of telling this tale released them. The story is very old, appearing in a poem ascribed to Homer by Suidas (ψεύστας, ἡπεροπῆας, ἀμήχανα τ' ἔργ' ἀνύσταντας, ἐξαπατηγῆρας), on an early metope from Selinus, and on archaic vases; cf. Lobeck, Aglaophamus, 1298. Probably some curious rocks fixed the place of the legend. For Heracles cf. 176. 3 n.

τὸ στεινότατον: cf. 176. 2 n.

217 I τὰ Οἰταίων . . . τὰ Τρηχινίων. These geographical terms, as well as the phrase ἡ περίοδος τε καὶ ἀνάβασις (ch. 223. 1), are more natural if Hydarnes made the détour described by Pausanias (cf. ch. 216 n.). If he went right up the Asopus ravine, the heights held by the Oetaeans must be those above the left bank, and the Trachinian mountains must belong to the range of Mount Callidromus (Leake, N. Greece, ii. 55).

ἄκρωτήριον τοῦ ὄρεος. Grundy (p. 303) confidently places the

Phocians 'at an old *φρούριον* which evidently guarded the pass in former days. . . . It is at the true summit of the pass . . . and accords with the little H. tells us of the scene, save that the trees hereabout are not oaks but firs.' 'When the Persians reached that point . . . they would have traversed two-thirds of the whole distance' (p. 311 n.). He would thus explain H.'s statement (ch. 223. 1) that the descent is much shorter than the way round and the ascent (but cf. *sup.*). Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 314), however, argues forcibly that this and similar expressions (*ράχιν τοῦ ὄρους*, ch. 216 ; *τὸν κόρυμβον*, ch. 218) cannot be pressed, since H., though he had doubtless travelled along the coast road, only refers vaguely to the Anopaea path. He thinks the Phocians (*ῥυόμενοι τὴν σφετέρην*) must have defended Pausanias' 'steep path' (ch. 216 n.) as well as the Anopaea. He would therefore post them near the intersection of these paths, not far from the monastery Panagia. He holds that this is confirmed by the large number of oaks (ch. 218) in the forest just above it (Grundy, p. 302).

- 218 The Phocian apology given by H. is but a lame one. At best they allowed themselves to be surprised and retired in confusion, leaving the way clear for Hydarnes. 'At worst they bartered away the safety of Hellas and the lives of their allies for the security of Delphi and its treasures' (Munro). H., here perhaps inspired by Delphi, does his best for them ; he parades their spirited reply to the Thessalians, and their resistance in the fastnesses of Parnassus (viii. 29 f.), and vindicates their bravery even in the camp of Mar-donius (ix. 17-18). Clearly all this is an answer to current charges of Medism and cowardice (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 314; cf., however, viii. 30 n.

- 219 I τὰ ἱρά = *extis inspectis* ; cf. c. 221.

ἐπὶ δέ : probably temporal, 'and afterwards' ; cf. ix. 35. 2.

οὔτοι : i. e. Megistias and the deserters as opposed to the ἡμερο-σκόποι, for whom cf. ch. 183. 1 n.

- 220 I Loose as is the construction of the sentences in this chapter it seems impossible (with Stein) to make ἔχειν εὐπρεπέως (§ 1) depend on λέγεται, or καλῶς ἔχειν (§ 2) on τὴν γνώμην πλείστος εἰμι. We must rather (Abicht) supply some word like ἐνόμιζε from κηδόμενος (§ 1), and φάναι from κελεύσαι (§ 2).

- 2 τὴν γνώμην πλείστος εἰμι, 'I am rather inclined to think.' Cf. i. 120. 4; v. 126; Thuc. iii. 31 *ad fin.* τὸ πλείστον τῆς γνώμης εἶχεν. The idea is of a division in which the greater part of the mind inclines one way.

- 3 κατ' ἀρχάς : cf. ch. 239. 1.

- 4 ὑμῖν δ'. If there were several applicants the god gave his responses in a connected form, the δέ marking that he now comes to the Spartans in their turn ; cf. i. 47. 3 n.

The synzesis ἄστν ἐρικυδές is intolerable. Read δῶμ' ἐρικυδές, ἄστν being a gloss, H. Richards, Cl. Rev. xix. 345.

Περσείδῃσι : cf. i. 125. 3 n.; vii. 61. 3 n.

Λακεδαίμονος οὔρος, 'the land of (the hero) Lacedaemon' ; cf. ch. 141. 3 n.



τόν is the Persian invader. Λεόντων plays upon the name Leonidas.

Ζηνός: cf. c. 56. 2.

σχήσεσθαι: cf. II. xvii. 502 οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε | Ἔκτορα Πριάμίδην μένεος  
σχήσεσθαι δ' ὦ, | πρὶν γ' ἐπ' Ἀχιλλῆος καλλιτέρχε βήμεναι ἱππῳ.

διὰ . . . δάσσηται (tmesis for διαδάσσηται). The foe is portrayed as a devouring monster (ch. 140. 3). There may be an allusion to the mutilation of the corpse of Leonidas (ch. 238).

221 For Acarnanians as seers cf. i. 62. 4 n.

τάνεκαθεν: cf. v. 55 n. Μελάμποδος: cf. ii. 49; ix. 34.

Doubtless H. regarded the epitaph (ch. 228. 3) as good evidence of the constancy of Megistias, in face of his own prediction of disaster. The idea that he might have escaped is confirmed by the escape of his son. But the incident is slender evidence for the inference drawn by H., that all who retreated did so by the king's orders (cf. *inf.*).

It is clear that H. in these chapters aims at excusing the allies for deserting Leonidas by explaining that his death was fated by heaven and foretold by the oracle. This official explanation that Leonidas, like Decius Mus (Livy viii. 10; x. 28), devoted himself to save his country, was designed to make his defeat and death an omen of future victory. At the same time it was a convenient excuse for all concerned, for the Athenians who had urged pushing forward the line of defence to Artemisium and Thermopylae, for the Spartans who had sent but inadequate support to their heroic king, and for the Peloponnesian allies who had failed him in the hour of trial. But the oracle is plainly a *vaticinium post eventum*. It is inconsistent with the account of Leonidas' expedition previously given (ch. 202-7; for even 205. 2, καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἔόντες, if not a later adscript (cf. J. H. S. xxii. 316 n.), only implies danger not self-immolation): it assigns no reason for the resolve of the Thespians to share his doom, and false or inadequate reasons for the Thebans' action, and even for that of Leonidas himself, since it was no disgrace for a Spartan commander to retreat when sound strategy demanded it (cf. Eurybiades, Pausanias), although perhaps his bodyguard were bound to remain with him to the last (cf. Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 317). Diodorus (xi. 4) carries out consistently the view here indicated in the oracle, but this completion of a process begun in H. shows us that the explanation is an afterthought gradually perfected by later ages.

222 Grundy (*op. cit.* 306-9, 315-17; improving on a suggestion made by Bury in the *Annual of the British School of Athens*, ii. 102) argues strongly that the 2,800 allies dismissed were really detached to meet Hydarnes on the Anopaea, but failed to perform this duty. His great point is that otherwise the conduct of the Thespians (and of the Thebans) is inexplicable; cf. App. XX. 10, and for another suggestion Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 317-19.

Θηβαῖοι. Diodorus (xi. 9) omits the Thebans, as does Pausanias (x. 20. 2), who adds the Mycenaeans.

ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ. Plutarch (de Malign. Her. 31, Mor. 865) rightly attacks the view that the Thebans could have been detained as hostages, a course which would only have added to Leonidas' own danger. Further, Plutarch here makes an effective apology for his countrymen; he urges that they sent 500 men under Mnemias to Tempe and the contingent demanded by Leonidas to Thermopylae, treating Leonidas with special honour. And with reference to the tradition that Leontiades and the other Theban captives were branded by Xerxes, Plutarch remarks (1) that Anaxandrus and not Leontiades was in command, (2) that branding would be a proof not of Medism but of fidelity to the Greek cause, (3) that the story was unknown before H. On the whole, in spite of Grundy's doubts (pp. 294-6) and Hauvette's rather half-hearted defence of H. (Herodote, pp. 360-4), we must admit that H. has been misled by malignant Athenian gossip, and that Leontiades, like Adeimantus, has suffered for the sins of his son (vii. 233 n.; Introd. § 30 c, d; J. H. S. xxii. 317). E. Meyer (F. ii. 211) holds the Thebans remained in order to desert with more effect, but it may well be that the Medizing oligarchy at Thebes furnished as their contingent men of the opposite party (Diod. xi. 4 τῆς ἐτέρας μερίδος) loyal to the Greek cause. The existence of such a party at Thebes seems proved (in spite of H. ix. 87) by the Theban orator's speech against Plataea (Thuc. iii. 62). For the dispatch of political opponents to the front to get rid of them, we may compare the attempt of the Corcyrean democrats to enlist their opponents for naval service (Thuc. iii. 75), the sending of 300 oligarchic knights to Thibron by the restored Athenian democrats (Xen. Hell. iii. 1. 4), and of oligarchs to Cambysses by Polycrates (H. iii. 44. 2 n.). Boeotian loyalists were doomed if Thermopylae was lost, and so would be likely to fight to the last. Cf. also M. Müller, Geschichte Thebens, pp. 25-45.

23 2 ἀνὰ τὰς προτέρας ἡμέρας refers to both clauses taken together and is opposed to τότε. Previously the Greeks had held the Phocian wall (ch. 176. 3 n.), at the Middle Gate, as their base, and, whenever pressed, had drawn back into the Narrows just in front of it; now they boldly attacked in the open ground further in front of the Middle Gate by the modern baths.

2 (*bis*) The anacoluthic change of subject here and in § 3 (for τότε δὲ συμμίσγοντες is opposed to ἀνὰ . . . ἐμάχοντο (sc. ἡ)) and must refer to the Greeks, to whom we again return abruptly, § 3 *ad init.*) has caused suspicions of a lacuna or dislocation in the text (Stein, Macan). Others would justify it as expressing the confused nature of the fighting and the excitement of the narrator.

μάστιγας: cf. ch. 22. 1 n.; Ctes. Pers. § 23, p. 70; Ar. Eth. iii. 8. 5.

θάλασσαν: cf. ch. 176. 3 n. Two centuries later the water was still so deep that Athenian triremes could, though with difficulty, come close enough for the discharge of bolts and arrows at the attacking Gauls (Paus. x. 21. 4).

- 3 παραχρῶμεναι, 'recklessly'; iv. 159. 6; viii. 20. 1.  
ἀτέοντες, 'madly' = λυσσῶντες (ix. 71. 3); cf. Hom. Il. xx. 332.
- 224 1 In the year 440 B.C. the remains of Leonidas were removed to Sparta, and on his tomb there a stele was set up inscribed with the names of the three hundred. There Pausanias (iii. 14. 1), and probably H., read their names. The stele may, however, be older than the hero's tomb (cf. Kirchhoff, *Entstehungszeit*, &c., 52 f.). The passage illustrates H.'s interest in mighty deeds (i. 1), and shows that he had reserves of knowledge besides the facts inserted in his history.
- 2 Φραταγοῦνη: translated by Ctesias and later authors to 'Ροδογοῦνη, *Vrad* being Persian for ῥόδον. Probably 'Αβροκόμης and 'Υπεράνθης are similar translations of Persian names.
- 225 1 Cf. the struggle over the body of Patroclus, Il. xvii. 274 f.  
παρεγίνοντο: no doubt by the Eastern Gate, left undefended, in rear of the Spartans. They may also have been on the heights above the pass; cf. Liv. xxxvi. 18 'ni Porcius ab iugo Callidromi . . . super eminentem castris collem apparuisset'.
- 2 ὁ κολωνός is the mound or hillock just behind the Phocian wall. 'The position was well designed for a last desperate stand. The rear was protected by a small but deep valley,' Grundy, p. 312 n.; cf. 289.  
Λίων: at once the symbol of royal power (v. 92. β 3) and a play on the name Leonidas. A lion was later set up over the Thebans who fell at Chaeronea (Paus. ix. 40. 10 with Frazer, v. 209-10, and v. 141). There Pausanias interprets it of their ill-fated valour.  
ἐπὶ Λεωνίδῃ, 'in honour of Leonidas'; cf. Hom. Il. xxiii. 274, 776; Od. xxiv. 91.
- 226-33 *Individual exploits. Epitaphs over the fallen. The coward Aristodemus. Surrender of the Thebans.*
- 226 H., who tells us of the heroic death of Leonidas with a simplicity which is the highest art, is rightly sparing in the record of exploits. For this wise reticence Plutarch (de Mal. Her. 32; Mor. 866) reproaches him with lack of patriotism.
- 228 1 The epitaph might naturally be taken to mean that 4,000 Peloponnesians fell and were buried at Thermopylae, and so H. elsewhere (viii. 25. 2) assumes. It only says, however, that 4,000 Peloponnesians fought there, and this is true, if we add to the numbers he gives 1,000 Perioeci (202 n.). H. may have carelessly included the 700 Thespians (cf. τοῖσι πᾶσι and viii. 25. 1); but they were not Peloponnesians and had a separate stele with an epigram by a Megarian, Philaidas, Anth. Pal. Append. 94 'Ἄνδρες τοί ποτ' ἔναιον ὑπὸ κροτάφοις Ἐλικῶνος, λήματα τῶν αὐχεῖ Θεσπιάς εὐρύχορος. So did the Opuntian Locrians, since Strabo (425) quotes as the inscription on one of the five stelae at Thermopylae, Τοῖςδε ποθεῖ φθιμένους ὑπὲρ Ἑλλάδος ἀντία Μήδων | Μητρόπολις Δοκρῶν εὐθυνόμων Ὀπούεις. For the 300 myriads cf. c. 185. 3; 186. 1 n.

2 Quoted by later authors *πειθόμενοι νομίμοις* (cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 42. 104), but *ρήμασι* = *ρήτραῖς* is right.

4 *ἔξω ἥ* (cf. ii. 3. 2) = *πλὴν ἥ* (ii. III. 3).

*ἐπιγράψας*. Doubtless Simonides composed all three inscriptions, but he only had one inscribed at his own cost.

229 1 *κοινῷ λόγῳ* = *ὁμοφρονήσαντες* (*inf.*; cf. i. 141. 4, 166. 1; v. 63. 3, 91. 3, &c.).

*ὀφθαλμιῶντες*. The reed-cutters in the marsh near Thermopylae now suffer from ophthalmia (Grundy, p. 313).

*τὸν εἴλωτα*. Each Spartan was attended by a Helot, who carried his baggage and his shield (hence *ὑπασπιστής*, Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 14, and 8. 39). They were also employed as light-armed troops (ix. 10. 1, 28. 2, 29), and for menial duties (vi. 80. 1; ix. 80. 1). There is no reason to suppose there was a large number at Thermopylae, though some fell there (viii. 25. 1). The 4,000 slain (viii. 25. 2) are better explained as a misunderstanding (cf. ch. 202 n., 228. 1 n.), and light-armed Helots would be useless at Thermopylae owing to the nature of the ground, even if their fidelity were above suspicion.

*ὅκως . . . ἤγαγε* = 'when he had led him'; cf. ix. 66. 2. Elsewhere it is iterative, as a rule with optative (i. 11. 1).

*λιποψυχέοντα* elsewhere (Thuc. iv. 12; Xen. Hell. v. 4. 58; Paus. iv. 10. 3) means 'swooning', hence *φιλοψυχέοντα*, 'showing a faint heart' (cf. *inf.*), is better (cf. vi. 29. 1 and Tyrtaeus, Fr. x. 18 *μηδὲ φιλοψυχεῖτ' ἀνδράσι μαρνόμενοι*).

2 *ἀλγήσαντα*, 'if Aristodemus alone had been ill (cf. iv. 68. 2; ix. 22. 1) and had returned to Sparta,' i.e. but for his comrade. The infinitive of the apodosis (*προσθέσθαι*) depends on the parenthetical *δοκέειν* (Krüg. *δοκέει*; cf. ch. 3. 4; ii. 56. 1); and is by a usage common in H. (cf. i. 24. 7) extended to the protasis.

*προσθέσθαι*, 'vented their wrath'; cf. iv. 65. 2; but it applies rather to the penalty imposed. Cf. vii. 11. 1; Eurip. Hec. 742 *ἄλγος ἂν προσθήμεθα (αὐτῷ)*.

*τῆς . . . αὐτῆς . . . προφάσις*, 'he had only the same excuse as his comrade might have offered.'

231 *πάσχων . . . τοιάδε*. The denial to Aristodemus of the commonest form of neighbourly good will ('*pati de igne ignem capere*,' Cic. Off. i. 52) shows that his Atimias involved the loss of all rights, and the infliction of the many slights and penalties detailed with gusto by Xenophon (Pol. Lac. ix. 4-6) and Plutarch (Agesilaus, ch. 30). The Spartans who surrendered at Sphacteria were much more lightly punished (Thuc. v. 34); those who lost the battle of Leuctra escaped scot-free (Plut. *L. c.*).

*τρέσας*, 'a runaway or coward' (Il. xiv. 522; Tyrt. xi. 14 *τρεσσάντων δ' ἀνδρῶν πᾶσ' ἀπόλῳλ' ἀρετῇ*), became a regular technical term at Sparta for *οἱ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καταδειλιάσαντες* (Plut. *loc. cit.*).

*ἀνέλαβε*, 'retrieved,' 'made good.' Cf. v. 121 n.; Soph. Phil. 1248 *τὴν ἁμαρτίαν αἰσχρὰν ἁμαρτῶν ἀναλαβεῖν πειράσσομαι*. For the facts cf. ix. 71.

- 233 1 ἐν πρώτοισι : among the first of the Greeks : for the phrase cf. viii. 94. 4 ; ix. 86. 1, for the facts ch. 132. 1 n.
- 2 ἔστιξαν ... βασιλῆα. For branding cf. ch. 35. 1 n. It is clear that the Thebans here are branded in the forehead with the king's mark as slaves (cf. δραπέτης ἐστιγμένος, Arist. Av. 760), the idea that they are, as it were, dedicated to a god (for which cf. ii. 113. 2) being here far-fetched. Cf. Gal. vi. 17 ἐγὼ γὰρ τὰ στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματί μου βαστάζω, and Curt. v. 5 'Captivi Graeci . . . quos Persae . . . inustis barbarorum litterarum notis', and for the placing of the arms or crest of the city on captives enslaved : Plut. Per. 26 οἱ δὲ Σάμιοι τοῖς αἰχμαλώτους τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀνθυβρίζοντες ἔστιζον εἰς τὸ μέτωπον γλαῦκας καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι σάμαιναν, Plut. Nic. 29 τούτους ὡς οἰκέτας ἐπώλουν στίζοντες ἵππον ἐς τὸ μέτωπον. We find the Samaena or galley-prow figuring on coins of Samos about the date of its capture by Athens (440 B.C.), and the free horses on a Syracusan coin, struck soon after the Athenian expedition to Sicily, while the owl is the regular arms or crest of Athens. It would seem, however, that the Athenians would brand with an owl, the Samians with the galley (so Aelian, V. H. ii. 9 ; Duris, fr. 59 ; F. H. G. ii. 483).

Thucydides (ii. 2-6) gives us a fuller and more correct account of the Theban surprise of Plataea in the spring of 431 B.C. (March or April). He corrects H. on the following points. (1) The number of the Thebans was not 400, but rather more than 300, of whom 180 were taken captive and executed. (2) Eurymachus was not in command (though he planned the coup) but two Boeotarchs, Pythangelus and Diemporus. For the animus of this passage cf. *Introd.* § 30 *a*, and ch. 222 n.

A later Leontiades betrayed the Cadmea to Phoebidas and was slain by the conspirators who freed Thebes, 379 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 25, 4. 7).

- 234-9 *After Thermopylae. Plans of campaign advised by Demaratus and Achaemenes. Treatment of the corpse of Leonidas. Secret message of Demaratus.*

- 234 2 If Messenia and Cynuria are included in Laconia there are said to have been about a hundred Lacedaemonian cities ; cf. Strabo 362 ἔξω γὰρ τῆς Σπάρτης αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλιναι τινές εἰσι περὶ τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν· τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν ἐκατόμπολιν φασιν αὐτὴν καλεῖσθαι. The names of some sixty are known.

Λακεδαιμόνι : i. e. Laconia ; cf. vi. 58. 2.

ὀκτακισχιλίων. This estimate (defended by Macan (*ad loc.*) ; cf. Grundy, *Thuc.* 213 f.) agrees with the tradition that Lycurgus assigned 9,000 lots to Spartiates (Plut. *Lyc.* 8) ; cf. Ar. *Pol.* ii. 9, 1270 a 36 καὶ φασιν εἶναι ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίους (ὀπλίτας). It also accords with H.'s statement (ix. 10. 1, 28. 2) that 5,000



Spartiates fought at Plataea. But in 371 B.C. there seem not to have been more than 1,500 (Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 1, 4, 15, 17; Ages. ii. 24), and in Aristotle's time (cf. *l. c.*) not 1,000. Hence most modern writers, following Beloch (*Bevölkerung*, p. 131 f.; cf. Klio vi. 58-73), regard H.'s numbers as exaggerated. In the Peloponnesian war at Mantinea, 418 B.C. (Thuc. v. 68), and at the battle of Corinth, 394 B.C. (Xen. Hell. iv. 2. 16), Spartiates and Perioeci together amounted to some 6,000. Isocrates puts the number of Spartiates in early times at only 2,000, and contrasts Sparta with *μυρίαδροι πόλεις* (Panath. 255 f.).

ἄλλοι: i.e. Perioeci, who contributed at least half the hoplite force of Sparta, e. g. 5,000 at Plataea (ix. 11. 3, 28. 2).

235 2 The value of Cythera as a naval base of operations against Laconia is obvious, and Tolmides is said to have seized the island in 455 B.C. (Paus. i. 27. 5; Bus. iii. 325 f.). Hence it is quite unnecessary to suppose that this passage was written after, or even shortly before, the Athenians occupied it in 424 B.C. (Thuc. iv. 53); cf. further, Introd. § 9. For Chilon cf. i. 59. 2 n.

3 οἰκηίου, 'a war of their own close to their own doors'; cf. v. 24. 2 n.; Thuc. i. 118.

236 2 τῶν: some emendation, such as Bähr's, is necessary.

3 The maxims of strategy put forward by Achaemenes are puerile; but his speech represents fairly enough the obvious reluctance of the Persian leaders to divide their forces; cf. App. XX. § 1.

ἀκεῖνται: contracted future = ἀκέσονται, 'they shall not heal or make good'; cf. the warning given to King Agis before Mantinea (Thuc. v. 65).

237 2 τῇ σιγῇ: often taken as 'secretly'; it should, however, mean 'shows his enmity by his silence (where he should warn and dissuade), and when his fellow citizen asks for advice does not give him of his best'.

ἐόντος ἐμοὶ ξείνου. The genitive is used, not the accusative in apposition, to show that a reason for the command is given; cf. iv. 97. 6.

238 With the treatment of the body of Leonidas (cf. ix. 78) we may compare that of the corpse of Amasis by Cambyses (iii. 16). Artaxerxes similarly maltreated that of his brother, the younger Cyrus (Xen. Anab. i. 10. 1; iii. 1. 17), and the Parthian general or Suren, that of M. Crassus (Plut. Crass. 32). Though the story is in marked contrast with the generous treatment of Pytheas (vii. 181; viii. 92), these parallels make it unlikely that it is a Greek invention as contended by Wecklein (Ber. Bayer. Akad. (1876), p. 285) and Duncker (vii. 258).

239 The whole chapter is with reason regarded as an interpolation by Krüger, followed by Abicht, Gomperz, Van Herwerden, and Macan. There is no proper transition to Bk. VIII, a fact which leads Stein to suspect an omission in the text. The formula introducing the

digression is strange, but as Macan points out, this anecdote is not intended to be a resumption of the main thread of the story but to supply an omission, and the words mean 'I will here return to a place in the story where before I was guilty of an omission'. The author is excusing himself for putting in the story here, where the only ground for its appearance is its connexion with Demaratus, instead of in ch. 220, where it was required to explain how the Spartans had early information of the intended Persian invasion. Krüger also regards as suspicious the postponement of the actual story in favour of a disquisition on Demaratus' motives and the author's assertion that the motive was ill-will, and subsequent willingness to leave it an open question. Such hesitation, however, may be easily paralleled from the genuine work of H. (cf. ii. 123. 1; v. 45. 2). Krüger's arguments from language are stronger. The asyndeton ἐπύθοντο is intolerable, τὸ ἐς Δελοφους χρηστήριον is hardly justified by (ii. 150) τὴν Σύρτιν τὴν ἐς Λιβύην; δελτίον δίπτυχον is queer Greek, as δίπτυχα in this sense is late, and elsewhere H. uses δέλτος (viii. 135); ἐπέτηξε and ἐκκνᾶν do not reappear till Aen. Tact. ch. 31, nor συμμαχεται (middle) till Xenophon, or ὁδοφύλαξ till Eustathius. It may be said that some of these strange words are quoted by Pollux (Onom. x. 58) from H., and that the story, though without names, goes back at least to (350 B. C.) Aeneas Tacticus (*l. c.*), but these stylistic peculiarities and late words surely betray a forger. The existence of an anonymous version of the story in Aeneas, and a variant in Trogus Pompeius (Justin, ii. 10. 12-17), in which 'a sister of Leonidas' figures, and Demaratus' motive is patriotic, really discredit the story, as suggesting that the narrative as here given is a gradual and relatively late fabrication (Macan). It is inferior to the similar stories of Harpagus (i. 123. 3, 4) and Histiaeus (v. 35) on which it may have been modelled. Finally, the extremely unfavourable impression given of Demaratus seems un-Herodotean. It appears highly probable that some part of the text connecting Books VII and VIII was early lost, and into the gap this chapter was thrust by an interpolator. Even if it be a genuine fragment it is misplaced here.

## BOOK VIII

1-23 *The story of Artemisium.* 1-3 *The fleet and its leadership.* 4, 5 *Bribery of Themistocles.* 6-11 *First engagement.* 12, 13 *Storm, wreck of Persian squadron off Euboea.* 14-17 *Second and third days' fighting.* 18-23 *Retreat of the Greek and advance of the Persian fleet.*

I Throughout there is a close parallel and connexion between the accounts of the operations on sea and on land and of the forces at Thermopylae and Artemisium. First, we have the description of



that Athens should lead at sea and Sparta on land (vii. 157 n., 161 n.) belongs to the years after 478 B.C. The magnanimity of Athens in yielding up the command is lauded by Isocrates (Paneg. 72), Lycurgus (in Leoc. 70), Aristides (Panath. i. 217, Dind.); it is ascribed to the wise advice of Themistocles (Plut. Them. 7). The claims of Athens were asserted later by her orators, especially in the funeral orations in the Ceramicus, of which we have echoes in vii. 161; ix. 27 (Meyer, Forsch. ii. 219 f.). But at the time it must have been clear that to divide the command would be dangerous from a military point of view.

- 3 I κατ' ἀρχάς: probably 481 B.C., autumn. For the embassy cf. vii. 157, and for Athenian recognition of Spartan hegemony vii. 161.

ὀρθὰ νοεῦντες. Verrall (Cl. Rev. xvii. 99) points out that H. has consciously or unconsciously reproduced two hexameters from a gnomic poet (cf. ix. 16. 5 n.) running ὀρθὰ νοεῦντες· εἰρήνης γὰρ ὅσῳ πόλεμος, τοσσηδε κάκιον ἔμφυλος πολέμου στάσις ἐστὶν ὁμοφρονέοντος. Thus only can we account for the poetic style and vocabulary, e.g. ὀρθὰ νοεῦντες.

- 2 μέχρι ὅσου, 'so long as the Athenians stood in sore need of the Peloponnesians' they gave up all claim to leadership to secure their help. This implies that Athens was actuated in part by selfish motives.

τῆς ἐκείνου: i.e. the coastland of Asia subject to Persia.

ἡγεμονίην. For the change of hegemony cf. Thuc. i. 95; Diod. xi. 45 f. The date is 478–477 (Ath. Pol. 23. 5), probably 477 B.C., early spring (Busolt, iii. 69). H. implies that he did not mean to carry his work so far (Introd. p. 16).

- 4 I καί: either a reference back to the Greeks gathered at Thermopylae (vii. 202, 207) or = 'actually' (i. 75. 6) present, as opposed to the reserves mustering at Pagon (ch. 42).

Ἀφέτας: cf. vii. 193. 2 n.

παρὰ δόξαν . . . ἢ ὥς . . . κατεδόκειον: i.e. they expected few had survived the storm; cf. vii. 192. 2. For the phrase cf. i. 79. 2.

The idea that the Greek fleet repeatedly meditated flight from Artemisium (vii. 183, 192; viii. 4, 9) is contradicted by their bravery in the actual fighting. No doubt the Peloponnesian sailors may have grumbled, but Eurybiades could not leave Leonidas in the lurch. Cf. App. XX, § 6; Grundy, p. 329; Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 311.

Ἑλλάδα: in the narrow sense; cf. vii. 176. 2 n.

- 2 οἰκέτας: the whole household or *familia*, including wives, children, and slaves (cf. vii. 170. 4 n., viii. 44. 1, 106. 2, 142. 3). The children as specially mentioned (cf. ch. 41. 1) as the hope of the house.

ἐπὶ μισθῷ: cf. v. 65. 2. This story is repeated with additions from Phanias by Plutarch (Them. 7), though attacked in de Herod. Malign. 34. It is in accord with the charges made against Themistocles (ch. 112) elsewhere, but is probably an invention of the time

when Themistocles had fled to Persia and had been proclaimed a traitor. Such stories necessarily rest on scanty evidence and are quite unverifiable. The bias of H. (i. e. of his sources) against him, as against Adimantus, is patent (Introd. § 31). Themistocles is the master of craft and wiles (ch. 110, 124), Aristides the true patriot (79, 95). Special reasons for suspecting this story may be found in the improbability of the Euboeans squandering so large a sum as thirty talents on a subordinate when they might have bought the commander-in-chief cheap (five talents) (cf. Bauer, Them. p. 25); in the fact that Adimantus, who is supposed to have been bribed by Themistocles, continues to be his chief opponent (ch. 59 f.), and that Eurybiades (cf. § 1 n.) must surely have intended to hold his position at Artemisium whether bribed or not (Munro, *l. c.*); and finally in the fact that the Euboeans made no use of the opportunity they are supposed to have bought so dearly (ch. 19).

5 1 ἥσπαιρε: here only 'resisted': the literal meaning (i. 111. 3; ix. 120. 1) is 'struggled convulsively'.

2 There is an implied threat that Adimantus might be accused of treachery and corruption; cf. ix. 41. 3. For a more elaborate story of the same kind cf. Plut. Them. 7; Bauer, Them. p. 134.

πληγίντες is supported by Plut. Dem. 25 *πληγείς ὑπὸ τῆς δωροδοκίας*.

6 For the parallel diary of the campaigns of Thermopylae and Artemisium given by H., and for its correction, cf. App. XX, § 5 f.

1 πυθόμενοι . . . ἰδόντες. The Persians had heard of the Greek fleet from the captured look-out ships (vii. 179 f.) and had no doubt seen them on their way to the anchorage at Aphetae, but their station there was eighty stades from Artemisium (ch. 8. 2).

2 καταλαμβάνη: here and in iii. 139. 2 in a favourable sense 'might come on and shelter them', elsewhere of some unlooked-for or unlucky chance; e. g. ch. 109. 5; ix. 60. 3.

ἐκφεύξεσθαι, 'it seemed to all appearance likely that the Greeks would escape.'

πυρφόρος. In a Spartan army (Xen. Rep. Lac. xiii. 2) the 'torch-bearer' took the sacred fire from the altar of Zeus Agetor and kept it always alight for use in the sacrifices for the army. His person was by Hellenic custom inviolable, hence the proverb οὐδὲ πυρφόρος ἐλείφθη (Zenob. v. 34, &c.) signified utter destruction.

7 1 ξῆσθαι Σκιάθου. Bury and Munro urge that to send the ships from Aphetae outside Sciathus in the afternoon could not prevent the Greeks at Artemisium from seeing them. On this and other grounds they argue that they were dispatched from the Sepiad strand. Cf. Appendix XX, § 6.

Caphereus (Cape Doro) and Geraestus (Cape Mantelo) are the south-east and south extremities of Euboea (Plin. H. N. iv. 63).

2 ἀριθμόν, 'muster' (vii. 59). The great losses caused by the storm would make reorganization necessary. Here, therefore, Busolt and Grundy insert two days. Cf. Appendix XX, § 5.



- 8 I Pausanias (x. 19. 1) says the Amphictyons erected statues to Scyllis and his daughter at Delphi for loosening the anchors of the Persian ships during the storm and so doing them great damage; cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 296; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 139; Athen. vii. 296 E. Many other legends were told of him which are judiciously suppressed by H. For Scione cf. vii. 123. 1 n., and for salvage vii. 190.
- 3 ὥς γένοιτο: not merely the fact of the disaster, which was already known, but the manner and the extent of it.
- 9 ἐνίκα, 'the opinion prevailed'; vi. 101. 2 n., 109. 2. This resolution is regarded by most recent critics as incredible: the story is believed to have arisen from the dispatch of a detachment to meet the Persian squadron sent round Euboea (Bury, Munro; cf. App. XX, § 6 (2)), or from the fact that the Greek fleet ran before the storm for shelter (Grundy, G. P. W., p. 324-5).
- αὐλισθέντας. They bivouacked on shore to deceive the enemy as to their intentions.
- φυλάξαντες. They waited till evening that night might cover their retreat if they were beaten. Diodorus (xi. 12) ascribes the resolution to attack to Themistocles, who saw that thus the united Greek fleet could assail in detail the scattered Persian squadrons, which lay in several harbours (cf. Grundy, *op. cit.* p. 334).
- διεκπλόου: cf. vi. 12. 1 n.; Grundy, *op. cit.* p. 333 n., and Thuc., p. 295 f.
- 10 I πάγχυ . . . μανῆν: cf. vi. 112. 2 n.
- ἄμεινον πλεούσας. This is confirmed by Themistocles' speech, ch. 60 a.
- 2 For the feelings and conduct of the Ionians cf. ch. 85; vii. 51.
- II I A similar formation was adopted by the Peloponnesian fleet against the smaller but more efficient squadron under Phormio in 429 B.C. Thuc. ii. 83 ἐτάξαντο κύκλον τῶν νεῶν ὡς μέγιστον οἰοί τε ἦσαν μὴ διδόντες διέκπλουν, τὰς πρῶρας μὲν ἔξω, ἔσω δὲ τὰς πρύμνας. Since, however, they did not attack the Attic ships as they sailed round them, they fell into disorder and were routed. H. hints (*inf.*) at the disadvantages of the formation which are definitely pointed out by Phormio (Thuc. ii. 89).
- κατὰ στόμα: going to work 'prow to prow', a sign of indifferent seamanship later (Thuc. vii. 36), here perhaps explained by the confined space (ἐν ὀλίγῳ).
- 2 Γόργου: cf. vii. 98 n.; v. 104, 115.
- Plutarch (Them. 15) erroneously transfers this exploit of Lycomedes to Salamis.
- 3 ἐτεραλκίως: cf. ix. 103. 2 n.
- χωρον ἐν Σαλαμῖνι. Athens apparently had 'ager publicus' in Salamis, and assigned a κληρος to Antidorus, but whether he ranked with the Athenian cleruchs or with the original inhabitants we cannot tell.
- 12 I ἦν μὲν . . . θέρος, 'though it was midsummer, yet there fell.' Storms were rare at that season (and even at the true date, the end of

August; cf. Busolt, ii. 674), and therefore must be due to divine intervention.

ἀπὸ Πηλίου. The storm comes from Pelion (i. e. from the north), like the great storm of vii. 188 (if indeed the two storms be not one; cf. App. XX, § 6 (4)), yet the wrecks drifted north to Aphetae. Probably this was due to tide and current, though it is possible that a thunderstorm from the north came up against the wind.

τὰς πρῶρας. The ships lay ashore with their prows pointing seaward.

2 στρατιῶται: the crews (cf. 10. 1), or perhaps the marines, encamped on land.

13 τὰ Κοῖλα. The deep hollow bays with jutting promontories north of Cape Geraestus (ch. 7. 1) towards Chalcis (Strabo 445), between Carystus and a point opposite Rhamnus (Val. Max. i. 8. 10). They had a bad name among sailors (Eur. Troad. 84; Liv. xxxi. 47). The Persian squadron was probably wrecked before it reached Geraestus (cf. App. XX, § 6 (4)).

For the working of divine intervention cf. vii. 10. ε; Introd. § 36.

14 1 These fifty-three Attic ships had probably been detached to guard the Euripus against the Persian squadron sent round Euboea, and returned with the news of their destruction (J. H. S. xxii. 311).

2 Κιλίσσῃσι. Grundy (p. 336) finds a probable explanation of the isolation of the Cilicians in the scattered nature of the anchorage at Aphetae (ch. 9 n.). For a more elaborate hypothesis cf. J. H. S. l. c.

15 The synchronism of the three days' fighting was not, as H. seems to think, fortuitous. While he emphasizes the parallelism between Artemisium and Thermopylae, he insufficiently recognizes their interdependence (cf. ch. 21 and Appendix XX, § 4).

16 1 παραπλήσιοι: nearly equal, not in numbers, but in fighting strength, as the issue showed.

17 The success of the Egyptians may have been due to their heavy-armed marines (cf. App. XX, § 7). Diodorus (xi. 13) substitutes the Sidonians, whose naval skill is elsewhere (vii. 44, 100) affirmed. Plutarch (de Malign. Her. 34; cf. Them. 8) would claim Artemisium as a victory, quoting Pindar, fr. 196 ὅθι παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἐβάλοντο φαεννὰν | κρηπὶδ' ἐλευθερίας, and an epitaph on a stele set up near the shrine of Artemis Proseoa (cf. vii. 176. 1 n.) at Artemisium which ran παντοδαπῶν ἀνδρῶν γενεᾶς Ἀσίης ἀπὸ χώρας | παῖδες Ἀθηναίων τῷδε ποτ' ἐν πελάγει | ναυμαχίῃ δαμάσαντες ἐπεὶ στρατὸς ὤλετο Μήδων | σήματα ταῦτ' ἔθεσαν παρθένῳ Ἀρτεμίδι. H. is clearly right in saying that the battle was indecisive, that is in effect a defeat for the Greeks, but Plutarch's quotations confirm H.'s statement that the Athenians distinguished themselves.

Κλευνίης married Deinomache, a daughter of the Alcmaeonid Megacles, and was father of the famous Alcibiades. He fell at the battle of Coronea, 447 B. C. (Plut. Alc. 1).

οἰκήγη : cf. v. 47. 1 and Plut. Alc. 1 ἰδιοστέλῳ τριήρει. As a rule the state supplied the ship, with (Arist. Eq. 911 f.) or without (Thuc. vi. 31) the necessary outfit, and also pay and rations for the crew. The trierarch had only to keep the ship in good condition and the crew efficient. Many voluntarily did more than this (Thuc. vi. 31), but to undertake the whole expense was a proof of great wealth and liberality.

δηκοσίοισι : i. e. the whole crew ; cf. vii. 184. 1.

- 18 νεκρῶν . . . ἐπεκράτεον : this was regarded as a sign of victory (i. 82. 5 f. ; Thuc. iv. 97 f.).

δρησμόν δή, 'at length they resolved'; for the phrase and previous resolution cf. ch. 4. 1 n. The later writers (Isocr. Paneg. § 92 ; Diod. xi. 12 ; Plut. Them. 9 ; de Malign. Herod. 34) put the final resolution of the Greeks to retreat after the arrival of news from Thermopylae. Probably they are right, since the actual retreat did not begin till after the news had come (ch. 21. 2), and the sea-fights had not been so unsuccessful as to justify flight ; whereas when Thermopylae fell, it was useless and dangerous to remain at Artemisium.

- 19 I τοῦ βαρβάρου : from τὸ βάρβαρον ; cf. i. 60. 3 ; iii. 115. 2, &c.

Ἴωνικόν . . . καὶ . . . Καρικόν. The Ionians must be supposed to include other Hellenes of Asia. The Carians had resisted Harpagus (i. 174) and joined in the Ionic revolt (v. 103, 118—21).

H. breaks off his account of Themistocles' device for detaching the Ionians (§ 1 ; cf. ch. 22) to insert his plan for securing an unmolested retreat (§ 2), with a note on the fate of the Euboeans' flocks, which interested him as an illustration of the truth of prophecy.

ἐλαυνόντων : a mark of time. The inhabitants of the lowlands along the coast drove, as they still do, their herds up to the mountain pastures every morning and down again every evening.

- 2 πῦρ ἀνακαίειν. They were to light fires in their camp on the shore to deceive the enemy and so get away unmolested. The fires would also serve to roast the sheep which were to provide food for the fleet.

- 20 I Βάκεις : originally not a proper name but = 'prophet', *vates*, as Sibyl = prophetess (Rohde, *Psyche*, ii. 64) ; cf. Ar. Probl. 30. 1, 954 a 36 ὅθεν Σίβυλλαι καὶ Βάκιδες καὶ οἱ ἐνθεοὶ γίνονται πάντες, ὅταν μὴ νοσήματι γίνωνται ἀλλὰ φυσικῇ κράσει. There were at least three prophets called Bacis, one being Attic and one Arcadian (Schol. Arist. Pax 1071), but the most famous and oldest, said to have been inspired by the nymphs (Arist. Pax 1071 ; Paus. iv. 27. 4 ; x. 12. 11), came from Eleon (v. 43 n.) in Boeotia. A collection of oracles, similar to those ascribed to Laius (v. 43 n.), Orpheus, and Musaeus (vii. 6. 3 n.), passed under his name from the end of the seventh century, and was carefully edited under the Pisistratidae. Nevertheless many later forgeries and interpolations were inserted in it (ch. 77. 1 n.,

96. 2; ix. 43). Bacis was parodied by Aristophanes (ch. 77. 1 n.), but held in reverence by Pausanias (*l. c.*) and Cicero (Div. i. 18. 34).  
 προσάξαντο (*sc. σίτια καὶ ποτά* (i. 190. 2; v. 34. 1) for a siege): cf. v. 34. 1 n.

The Euboeans suffered as much from their friends as from their foes, since the Persians, after plundering the villages on the coast of Histiaeotis (23. 2), sailed straight from Histiaea to Athens (ch. 66)

βύβλινον: cf. vii. 25. 1, 34. 1, 36. 3.

2 παρῆν, like the double use of χρᾶσθαι, is ironical; 'since they made no use of the oracle, they might,' &c.

21 1 For Trachis cf. vii. 176. 2 n., and for Anticyra vii. 198. 2 n.

κατῆρες, 'fitted with oars' (Plut. ἐνήρης), otherwise poetical.

παλήσειε, from πάλη, 'wrestle,' is here an euphemism for 'if they were hard pressed' (so ποιοῦν, Thuc. v. 73).

Ἀβρώνυχος: he two years later went with Aristides and Themistocles to Sparta to negotiate the rebuilding of the walls of Athens (Thuc. i. 91).

2 οὐκέτ' ἐς ἀναβολάς (cf. Thuc. vii. 15; Eur. Hel. 1297; Heracleid 270): adverbial like οὐκ ἐς μακρὴν (ii. 121. a 3).

22 1 τὰ πότιμα ὕδατα: i.e. on the coast of Histiaeotis, to which the Persian fleet crossed next day (ch. 23). With this appeal (rhetorically worked up by Justin, ii. 12. 3) cf. the fears of Artabanus and Xerxes' reply (vii. 51-2). It was more successful in causing suspicion of the Ionians (ch. 90) than in securing actual desertion (ch. 85.)

23 1 σκιδναμένῳ: of rays of light; cf. Hom. Il. vii. 451, and especially xxiii. 227 κροκόπεπλος ὑπεῖρ ἄλλα κίδναται ἥως.

2 Ἑλλοπίης: the old name for the whole northern half of Euboea, of which the territory of Histiaea or Oreus (vii. 175. 2), comprising the northern coastland, formed a part.

24-6 *Stories of Xerxes and the dead at Thermopylae and of the Olympic games.*

24 1 φυλλάδα κτλ. Hysteron-Proteron. Clearly he first had the trenches filled with earth and then covered them over with leaves. It is most unlikely that such an obvious fraud was ever attempted: the story is a Greek invention intended to bring Xerxes into contempt.

25 The Greek dead, according to the story, were all gathered together, probably on the hillock where the last stand was made, the barbarians left scattered about the pass. The number 4,000 (if genuine) must be derived from that given by the inscription for the Peloponnesian combatants (vii. 228. 1 n., 202 n.): since most of these had retired in safety, H. brings in Helots (vii. 229. 1 n.) to make up his erroneous total.

26 1 αὐτόμολοι. These Arcadians have been identified with the inhabitants of Caryae on the borders of Laconia, who are said to have been all killed or enslaved for Medism (Vitruvius, i. 1. 5, explain-

ing 'Caryatides' in architecture). They would seem, however, to be a band of adventurers seeking service as mercenaries; the Arcadians, like the Swiss at the end of the Middle Ages, often earned a livelihood thus (Thuc. iii. 34; vii. 57, 58).

- 2 Ὀλύμπια ἄγουσι. The anecdote, whether true or false, goes to prove that the fighting at Thermopylae took place at the time of or just after the Olympic games, i.e. the end of August; cf. vii. 206. 1 n.; Busolt, ii. 673-4 n.

τὸν . . . στέφανον (sc. κείσθαι), 'that the wreath was the prize.' In early days, as in the Homeric games (Il. xxiii), more substantial prizes were given, but at this time the four national festivals were all ἀγῶνες στεφανίται. The victor, however, received more material rewards from his own city, e.g. a sum of money, or the right to maintenance for life in the Prytaneum, as well as Proedria.

Tritanaechmes (cf. vii. 82, 121. 3) speaks in the same spirit as his father Artabanus (iv. 83; vii. 46. 4 n.). The dramatic warning resembles that given to Croesus (i. 71).

## 27-30 The feud between Thessaly and Phocis.

- 27 1 For Thessalian enmity to Phocis cf. vii. 176. 4, and for Thessalian allies vii. 132. 1 n. The date of this war cannot be fixed, but is probably after 510 B.C. Plutarch (Mor. 244) implies that the Thessalians had previously subdued the Phocians and set up tyrants in their cities; these the Phocians slew when they revolted. The Thessalians in revenge stoned 250 Phocian hostages and then invaded Phocis through Locris.

Pausanias (x. 1) makes the war begin with (1) the disaster to the Thessalian cavalry described in ch. 28, and end with the stratagem of Tellias given here (4). Between the two he inserts (2) the destruction of a picked Phocian force of 300 by the Thessalian horse, and (3) a desperate resolve of the Phocians to conquer or to die themselves, and to devote their wives and families to the flames, which leads up to a brilliant victory (cf. Plut. Mor. 244). Though Pausanias is a little confused, these stories seem to belong to this war, and not to an earlier struggle before 570 B.C., when the Thessalians were defeated near Thespieae by the Boeotians (Plut. Camillus 19; cf. de Mal. Her. 33). For full criticism and reconstruction cf. Macan, *ad loc.*

- 3 ἐς τὸν Παρνησσόν: cf. ch. 32. 1.

Τελλίην: probably of the family of the Telliadae (ix. 37. 1; cf. ix. 33. 1 n.).

- 4 Abae, too, was an oracle of Apollo; cf. i. 46. 2; viii. 33 n., 134. 1.

- 5 ἡ δεκάτη: the customary tithe; cf. v. 77. 4 and c. 26. 2 τὸν διδόμενον στέφανον.

συνεστεῶτες: probably like περί local, 'standing face to face,' but with the implied sense of hostility, which the word bears elsewhere in H. For a full description cf. Paus. x. 13. 7. Heracles and

under Thessaly, & revolted & won 2 gr battles, but the war should begin 480. P.Q. in 514 Delphi was still free, she supported the Alc. after Persia & Thessaly revolted. Thess. did not have for them time a subject Phocian.



Apollo were struggling for the tripod, Leto and Artemis trying to calm Apollo, and Athena Heracles. The struggle for the tripod was represented also in the gable of the Cnidian or Siphnian treasury at Delphi (Frazer, Paus. v. 274), in relief at Lycosura (Paus. viii. 37. 1), and is frequent on vases (Baum. i. 463). Pausanias also tells us (x. 1. 10) of other offerings for the victory numbered (3) above.

- 28 πολιορκέοντας governs *ἑωυτοὺς* and agrees with *πεζόν* (collective); cf. vii. 40. 1, 196, and especially Thuc. vi. 61 *στρατιὰ Λακεδαιμονίων . . . πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς τι πράσσοντες* (Stein).

Hyampolis (on which cf. Frazer, Paus. v. 442–5) was founded by the pre-Hellenic Hyantes when expelled from Boeotia (Strabo 401, 424). It lay near Abae on the road leading from Thessaly through Opuntian Locris to the valley of the Cephissus near Parapotamii. The festival Elaphebolia there celebrated to Artemis was believed to commemorate the victory here described. With the Phocian device we may compare the pits dug by Bruce at Bannockburn to keep off the English horse.

- 29 1 γνωσιμαχέετε: apparently 'change your minds and acknowledge that'; cf. iii. 25. 5.

- 2 πλέον . . . ἐφερόμεθα, 'had more weight than you'; cf. vii. 168. 3, 211. 2. The Thessalians refer to their position in the Amphictyonic council, and perhaps to the part they played in the first sacred war under Eurylochus, and to their dominion in Phocis (27. 1 n.).

τὸ πᾶν ἔχοντες: having every opportunity of vengeance; cf. Dem. de Cor. § 96 τῶν τότε Ἀθηναίων πόλλ' ἂν ἐχόντων μνησικαῆσαι Κορινθίοις.

- 30 The Greek usually hated an over-powerful neighbour more than a foreign master, yet Plutarch (de Mal. Herod. 35) attacks H. fiercely for this judicious remark. The historian, in spite of his tenderness for the Phocians (vii. 218 n.), is not blind to their failings.

### 31–4 *Advance of the Persians through Doris, Phocis, and Boeotia.*

- 31 H. writes as if the whole Persian army used this road through the Asopus ravine (vii. 199 n.), which, 'after winding through the mountains some three and a half miles, suddenly broadens out into a wide upland valley behind the range of Oeta, from which there is a long but not difficult passage to the Dorian plain (Grundy, p. 261).

[Probably this approach from Malis is the 'narrow strip' of Doris.] Thence this route, which entirely avoids Thermopylae, passes along the valleys of the Pindus and the Cephissus to Phocis and Boeotia.

But it may be deemed certain that Xerxes also used the coast-road through Thermopylae, which turns inland near Atalanta in Locris and reaches Parapotamii by Hyampolis (ch. 28). This is the only route suitable for a force of cavalry and a large baggage train. It would take the invaders to Hyampolis and Abae (ch. 33), which lie off the Doris route, the only one mentioned by H. Pro-

bably he regarded the use of the main coast-road as an obvious sequel of the capture of Thermopylae, which need not be explicitly stated in his narrative. Two other rough routes, which lead from Alpeni and Thronium on the Locrian coast to Elateia and the valley of the Cephissus, may possibly have been used by the Persians.

For the connexion of Dryopis (Doris) with the Dorian invasion cf. i. 56 nn.

- 32 1 Tithorea H. seems to regard as merely a mountain peak above the city Neon, and so Pausanias (x. 32. 8) understood him. But the heights in the immediate neighbourhood can easily be scaled from Daulis, and Plutarch (Sulla 15) distinctly declares that Tithora was a hill-fort, *φρούριον ἀπορρῶγι κρημνῷ περικοπτόμενον εἰς ὃ καὶ πάλαι ποτὲ Φωκίων οἱ Ξέρξην ἐπιόντα φεύγοντες ἀνεσκευάσαντο καὶ διεσώθησαν*. The fort on the slopes of Parnassus expanded into the city Tithora, shown by late inscriptions to be the modern Velitsa, which is still surrounded by fine Greek walls. This town seems to have superseded the older Neon (perhaps *Παλαιὰ Θήβα* in the plain three and a half miles away), which was destroyed after the Phocian war (Paus. x. 2. 4, 3. 2). For a full description cf. Frazer, v. 402-7.

- 2 Amphissa (Salona), the chief town of the Locri Ozolae (Thuc. iii. 101; Paus. x. 38. 4), lay at the north-west end of the Crisaean plain. Remains of Greek towers, walls, and gateways may still be seen in the extensive Frankish fortifications of Salona (Frazer, Paus. *l. c.*).

- 33 Δρυμός: called Drymaea (Paus. x. 33. 12), on the south face of a small hill projecting from the chain bounding the valley of the Cephissus on the north, with well-preserved walls and towers, five miles north-west of Amphiclea; cf. Frazer, *ad loc.*

Τεθρώνιον (Paus. *l. c.*): Moulki, in the plain north of the Cephissus, defended on three sides by its tributary the river of Dernitsa; cf. Frazer, *ad loc.*

Ἀμφίκλεια: Amphiclea (Paus. x. 33. 9; cf. Frazer), now Dadi, at the foot of an outlying spur of Parnassus. H., giving (ch. 33-5) fifteen names, seems to have mentioned every town in the district: indeed *Πεδίεας* and *Τριτέας* are otherwise unknown names, and Plutarch only speaks of thirteen cities laid waste (de Malig. Herod. 35).

Abae stood on a nearly isolated rocky hill over 500 feet high a mile south-west of Hyampolis (28 n.). The scanty remains of the temples of Apollo are about a quarter of a mile to the north-west of the hill; cf. Paus. x. 35. 1-3; Frazer, *ad loc.* Though the burning of the temple is affirmed also by Pausanias, who adds that it was not restored, it is difficult to see how such complete destruction can be reconciled with the preservation of the statues, apparently dedicated earlier (viii. 27) but seen by H. after this time, or with the consultation of the oracle by the Carian Mys (viii. 134). Probably the gold and silver were carried off and the woodwork

burned, but the Greek temple had no arched vault to spread destruction in its fall. Its walls and pillars would suffer comparatively little from fire and could be easily restored.

- 34 **Parapotamii** lay on a low hill above the defile leading from Phocis to Boeotia. The pass through which the Cephissus flows is about a mile and a half long and a quarter of a mile in width (Frazer, v. 419).

Near the southern end of the pass lay Panopeus (Paus. x. 4. 1; Frazer), the border town of Phocis, only twenty stades from Chaeronea, and like that town on the southern edge of the plain. The road running south-east leads thence to Chaeronea and the territory of Orchomenus, that westward to Daulis and thence by the Schiste (ch. 35. 1 n.) to Delphi.

**διατεταγμένοι** : 'dispositi per urbes'; cf. vii. 178. 1. For Alexander cf. v. 17 n., 22, and ch. 136-40.

**τῆδε** : explained not over clearly by the participial clause (cf. v. 16. 3). The presence of the Macedonian agents was intended to prove the Medism of the Boeotians, and thus to save them from molestation.

### 35-9 *The miraculous preservation of Delphi.*

- 35 1 **ἀπέρχοντες** (cf. vii. 43. 2). From Daulis (Paus. x. 4. 7, with Frazer) the road skirts Mount Parnassus for about five miles. Where it turns west it is met by the road from Thebes; these with the road to Delphi form the famous 'Schiste or Triodos' (Soph. O. T. 730, 733) where Oedipus slew Laius. Thence it ascends a deep valley enclosed by the steep and rocky slopes of Mount Parnassus (north) and Mount Cirphis (south). Near the top of the pass are the ruins of a Greek fortress, perhaps Aeolidae. Thence one road leads down the valley to Cirrha and Amphissa, another to the right along the steep slopes of Parnassus to Delphi (Paus. x. 5. 3 f., with Frazer).

2 **τὰ Κροίσου . . . ἀναθήματα** : cf. i. 50 f., 92.

- 36 2 From the stadium at the north-west end of Delphi an ancient steep and rugged path, 'the evil staircase,' ascends in a zigzag cut in the rock, including more than a thousand steps, over a ridge to a small upland plain. On the east are the upper slopes of Parnassus, on the north a lower line of hills. In the face of the most easterly of these next Parnassus is the Corycian cave, about 500 feet above the plateau, perhaps eight miles (three hours) from Delphi. It was sacred to Pan and the Nymphs (Paus. x. 32. 7; Inscr.). The great chamber is some 200 feet long, 90 feet broad at the widest point, and 20 to 40 feet high. Dripping water has formed a grove of stalagmites and stalactites. It must have provided an admirable refuge, being connected by a narrow passage with an inner cave.

**τοῦ προφήτεω** : cf. vii. III. 2 n.

- 37 **ἀπὸρων**, 'saw from afar' (ix. 69. 2). They only reached the temple of Athene Pronaia (§ 3, ch. 39 n.) near the eastern entrance of the

town, while the temple of Apollo stood on a high terrace beyond a valley in the north-western part of Delphi.

For the portent of the arms cf. those of Heracles at Thebes before Leuctra (Xen. Hell. vi. 4. 7; Diod. xv. 53; Polyæn. ii. 3. 8).

- 39 In the repulse of the Gauls (279 B. C.) besides Phylacus, Pyrrhus son of Achilles and two Hyperborean heroes played a part (Paus. x. 23. 2). For similar appearances cf. Frazer, *ad loc.*, and App. XVIII. 1. 3 (Marathon). The road is the sacred way coming from Daulis, the modern road from Arachova. The temple of Athene Pronaia is the last of the five at the Marmaria just outside the sanctuary (Paus. x. 8. 7; Dem. in Aristogit. 34). It is now identified with a temple *in antis* built of local limestone. For the epithet Pronaia cf. i. 92. 1 n. The pool of Castaly is in a rock cut basin 36 feet long by 10 feet wide, to the right of the road near the mouth of a gorge in the rocks. Among the olives in the glen below are some large masses of reddish-grey rock, which might be those said to have come hurtling from the cliffs above. Facing each other across the gorge rise two perpendicular cliffs with peaked summits (Phaetriades; cf. Diod. xvi. 28), the eastern being called Hyampeia, the western Nauplia.

H.'s account of the deliverance of Delphi is obviously a temple legend told the author by the Delphic priests (cf. 35. 2, 39. 1, 2), who would also have furnished the inscription recorded by Diodorus (xi. 14). That the legend was widely accepted is shown by its repetition with minor variations when the Gaul attacked Delphi, 279 B. C. (Paus. x. 23). The stories in Ctesias (Pers. 25, 27, p. 70) of an attempted sack by Mardonius who fell there (after Plataea but while Xerxes is marching to Athens) and of actual spoliation by the eunuch Matacas dispatched by Xerxes after his return to Sardis deserve no credit. Even H.'s story is open to grave suspicions. The oracle had certainly shown strong signs of favouring the Mede (cf. vii. 140, 148, 169), and the bulk of the tribes forming the Delphic Amphictyony (cf. vii. 132 n.) had now joined Xerxes; it would therefore be impolitic (cf. Meyer, iii. p. 384) for the Persians to plunder Delphi. This fact they seem themselves to recognize though perhaps not till a year later (ix. 42). The certain fact seems to be that the Persians could have plundered Delphi and did not do so; tradition strongly supports the view that a Persian force marched on Delphi. Three interpretations have been given of this difficult problem.

1. Xerxes, seeing that Delphi, tempted perhaps by the promised tithe (vii. 132), wavered (cf. the encouragement to the Greeks vii. 178, 189), and the second answer to Athens (vii. 141-3), sent a detachment to take it, which was repulsed on the difficult mountain-road by the Phocians aided by a storm and some manifestations held to be supernatural. Since the priests forbade any defence (cf. 36) and Delphi was an open town, Xerxes might have sent quite a small force expecting no resistance (Duncker vii. 276 n.; Grundy, pp. 349,

350). Afterwards the Persians saw how impolitic any attack on Delphi was.

2. The Persians who attacked Delphi were a mere band of disorderly plunderers acting without orders (Pomtow, *Jahr. kl. Philol.* cxxix. 227f.). This is, however, opposed to H.'s statement, ch. 34, 35.

3. The force was sent to protect Delphi from casual plunderers (Munro, *J. H. S.* xxii. 320), but was perhaps harassed by Phocian zealots from Mount Parnassus.

This view assumes that Delphi had come to a definite agreement with Xerxes (Curtius, Wecklein, Meyer), and afterwards put out the legend to cloak its Medism. Casson (*C. R.* xxviii. 145–51, xxxv. 144) suggests that Xerxes sent a force to Delphi to make an inventory of the temple treasures.

40–9 *The Greek fleet at Salamis. Evacuation of Attica* (41). *The navy list* (42–8). *Council of war* (49).

40 2 ὑποκατημένους: transitive here only, 'awaiting'; cf. vii. 27. 1. E. Meyer (iii, § 222) holds that this idea only grew up after the campaign of Plataea, and that immediately after Thermopylae no one would have contemplated a pitched battle in Boeotia with Xerxes (cf. App. XX, § 2). The Spartans had no doubt promised that Attica should be defended, but they meant to fulfil their promise at Thermopylae and not on Mount Cithaeron. And whatever the 'man in the street' at Athens may have expected, the leaders must have known that resistance in Boeotia was out of the question, and must have ordered the evacuation of Attica as soon as they heard that Thermopylae was lost, since the people had time to emigrate *en masse* before Xerxes reached Attica.

41 I Τροιζήνα. Plutarch (Them. 10) adds φιλοτίμως πάνυ τῶν Τροιζηνίων ὑποδεχομένων. καὶ γὰρ τρέφειν ἐψηφίσαντο δημοσίᾳ, δύο ὀβόλους ἑκάστῳ διδόντες, καὶ τῆς ὁπώρας λαμβάνειν τοὺς παῖδας ἐξείναι πανταχόθεν, ἔτι δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν διδασκάλοις τελεῖν μισθοὺς. We may note that the places of refuge were all commanded by the Athenian fleet, so that the refugees would not become hostages in the hands of the Peloponnesians (Grundy, 353).

2 τῷ χρηστηρίῳ. The advice to flee given vii. 140. 2, 141. 4.

This snake was known as οἰκουρὸς ὄφης (Arist. *Lys.* 758; Hesych. οἰκουρὸν ὄφιν τὸν τῆς Πολιάδος φίλακα δράκοντα. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἓνα φασίν, οἱ δὲ δύο ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἑρεχθέως). In the earliest form of the legend Erichthonius (Erechtheus) was the sacred serpent (Paus. i. 24. 7; *J. H. S.* xxi. 329); later he becomes the child of Earth and foster son of Athena hidden in a chest, being half-man, half-serpent (Hyginus, fab. 166), or a child guarded by serpents (Eur. *Ion* 20 f., 267–74; Apollodorus iii. 14. 6). For further discussion of the myths of Erichthonius cf. Frazer on Paus. i. 18. 2; Harrison, *Mythology of Athens*, xxvi–xxxvi; and on the deity as a snake Harrison, *Prolegomena to Greek Religion*, pp. 17–21, 325 f.

ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ: probably the Erechtheum; cf. ch. 55; v. 72. 3 n.



ὡς ἰόντι. H. will not pledge himself to the existence of the snake, which was believed to be concealed in a secret chest or chamber of the temple, and to prove its existence by the disappearance of the honey-cake offered every new moon (τὰ ἐπιμήνια, cf. vi. 57. 2). Cf. i. 181. 5 n. Plutarch (Them. 10) declares that Themistocles suggested to the priests the interpretation of the portent that the cake on this occasion remained untouched.

- 3 τῆς θεοῦ: i.e. Athena Polias (v. 82. 3 n.). The snake was the symbol of her foster-child, Erichthonius, and sacred to the goddess herself. For gods deserting a doomed city cf. Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. 304 f.; Eur. Tro. 25; Virg. Aen. ii. 351; Hor. Odes ii. 1. 25; Tac. Hist. v. 13.

- 42 I The haven of Pogon lies between the island of Calauria and Troezen. The spacious bay sheltered by the island, with a broad entrance from the north-east giving access to the largest ancient ships, formed an ideal meeting-place.

πολλῶ πλεῦνες. There were fifty-four more ships at Salamis than at Artemisium, and nine new states (Hermione, Ambracia, Leucas, Naxos, Cythnos, Seriphos, Siphnos, Melos, Croton) were represented, while only one, Opuntian Locris, has meanwhile gone over to the enemy (Macan).

- 2 οὐ μέντοι γένεος (cf. vii. 173. 2): added because a king or regent might naturally be expected to hold so important a command, as Leotychides did next year (ch. 131 f.).

ἄριστα πλεούσας. The speed and handiness of the ship depended even more on the skill of the oarsmen than on the build of the hull; cf. vii. 44, 96. 1, 99. 3.

- 43 πλήρωμα, used in other authors of a single ship, means 'crew', but of a squadron (here and ch. 45) 'total', for the Corinthians forty, and for the Megarians twenty as at Artemisium.

Here, as in other lists of peoples forming a host, the author appends ethnographic remarks (vii. 61 f., viii. 73; cf. Thuc. vii. 57 f.). On the Dorians and on Dryopis cf. i. 56 n.

- 44 H.'s figures, 180 as against 198 from all other states, compare favourably with those of the Attic orator in Thucydides (i. 74), a little less than two-thirds of 400, and with those of Demosthenes (de Cor. § 238), 200 out of 300.

μοῦνοι. At Artemisium the Plataeans had helped to man the Athenian ships (ch. 1); now the Athenians are said not only to have made good their heavy losses there (ch. 16 and 18), but to have filled the places of the Plataeans. According to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. ch. 23; cf. Cic. de Off. i. 22. 75) the Areopagus enabled the fleet to be fully manned by providing eight drachmas for each man; Cleidemus (fr. 13, F. H. G. i. 362) ascribed this, too, to a stratagem of Themistocles, but his story deserves little credit (Plut. Them. 10).

- 2 Κραναί, 'dwellers on the rock, or on the height' (κρα (= κάρ, head) and ? ναίω). αἱ Κραναί = Athens (cf. Pind. Ol. vii. 82 Κραναῖς ἐν Ἀθήναις,





and Arist. Av. 123 *μείζω τῶν Κραναῶν ζητεῖς πόλιν*), and so Κραναὰ πόλις (Arist. Ach. 75) and with special reference to the Acropolis, the πόλις proper (cf. Thuc. ii. 15; Paus. i. 26. 6); Arist. Lysist. 481. No doubt early Athens and its citadel is to H. Pelasgic (for Πελαργικὸν τεῖχος cf. v. 64. 2; vi. 137. 2, and on Attic Pelasgi i. 56. 2, 57. 3, and App. XV). Hence he does not make the earth-born Cecrops founder of the Acropolis and first king of Athens (Thuc. ii. 15), as do most Attic antiquaries, and Cranaus his successor (Paus. i. 2. 6), but apparently reverses the order. On these old Attic genealogies cf. Harrison, *Mythology and Mon. of Athens*, xxi f.

Ἐρεχθεός: cf. ch. 55. We might expect Ἐρεχθεῖδαι (cf. Pind. Isth. ii. 19, &c.), instead of Ἀθηναῖοι, but the name Ἀθηναῖοι might well be given to the people of Erechtheus (Erichthonius), the foster son of Athena (Hom. Il. ii. 548).

στρατάρχῃω: to Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 3. 2; cf. Paus. i. 31. 3) he was polemarch and (Philoch. fr. 33; F. H. G. i. 389; Strab. 383) gained the victory for the Athenians in the war between Erechtheus (his grandfather) and Eumolpus of Eleusis. The accepted tradition represented him as of foreign origin, the son of Xuthus or Apollo and Creusa daughter of Erechtheus, and king of the Aegialees (v. 68. 2; vii. 94). Yet his sons give their names to the four old Attic (Ionic) tribes (v. 66. 2 n.). Clearly Ion played too important a part in old Attic mythology to be altogether ignored, but he could not be fitted into the received genealogy of the Attic kings, which ran in unbroken line from Cecrops to Theseus. Hence his ambiguous position (Strabo, Pausanias, *l.c.*) and foreign origin, which is strongly affirmed by Euripides.

45 The Bacchiadae of Corinth are said to have claimed suzerainty over Megara till Orsippus headed his countrymen in a successful revolt a little after 720 B. C. (Paus. i. 44. 1, with Frazer, Hicks, No. 1). Leucas and Ambracia, as well as Anactorium, were founded by sons of Cypselus, and Potidaea by a son of Periander (Appendix XVI), but the theory that there is a separate list of Corinthian allies either here or on the inscription at Delphi (ix. 81. 1 n.) is untenable (cf. Hicks, No. 19).

I After ἄλλαι van Herwerden (cf. Stein) supplies δύο καὶ δέκα, because the contingents enumerated only amount to 366 ships, not to 378 as stated by H. (ch. 48; cf. ch. 82. 2). The additional twelve ships would make the Aeginetan contingent (42) second to the Athenian, as Pausanias (ii. 29. 5) states, bringing it above the Corinthian squadron (40). Munro, however, prefers Cobet's ἄλλαι ἰ' νέες, partly on palaeographical grounds, partly because the special squadron in Aeschylus (Pers. 340) is one of ten ships. The addition of ten ships would make the Aeginetan contingent equal to the Corinthian, and H. may have inadvertently reckoned the two deserters (ch. 82. 2) twice over; cf. J. H. S. xxii. 322.

ἀπὸ Ἐπιδαύρου: cf. v. 83 n.

Οἰνώνη is the name of the desert island to which Zeus carried the nymph Aegina (cf. v. 80 n.); there she bore Aeacus its first inhabitant (Paus. ii. 29). Pindar (Isth. vii. 21) in telling this story calls the island Oenopia, though elsewhere (Nem. iv. 46; v. 16; viii. 7) Oenona. Oenone seems to be connected with οἶνον, and may be, like Calliste (iv. 147), rather a descriptive epithet than an earlier name.

2 ἀπὸ Ἀθηνέων: cf. vii. 95. 1 n.

3 For Democritus cf. Simonides, fr. 136 (Plut. de Mal. 36) Δημόκριτος τρίτος ἦρχε μάχης ὅτε παρ Σαλαμίνα | Ἑλλήνες Μήδοις σύμβαλον ἐνπελάγει | πέντε δὲ νῆας ἔλεν δῆϊων, ἔκτην δ' ὑπὸ χειρὸς | ῥύσατο βαρβαρικῆς Δωρίδ' ἄλικομένην. Perhaps the six ships ascribed to the Naxians by Hellanicus and the five of Ephorus (Plut. l. c.) come from an imperfect recollection of this epigram. Plutarch makes H. speak of only three Naxian ships.

4 Thucydides (vii. 57) is probably wrong in reckoning the men of Styra as Ionians, since Pausanias (iv. 34. 11) confirms H.

Ceos, Cythnos, Seriphos, Siphnos, and Melos are the most western Cyclades nearest Greece.

47 The Thesproti (cf. ii. 56; vii. 176. 4) occupied the coast of Epirus as far south as the gulf of Ambracia (Strabo 323). The river Acheron (cf. v. 92. η 2) flows through their land (Thuc. i. 46).

Φάυλλος: cf. Plut. Alex. 34 and especially Paus. x. 9. 2 Φαύλλῳ δὲ Κροτωνιάτῃ (Ὀλυμπιάσι μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ νίκη, τὰς δὲ Πυθοὶ πεντάθλου δύο ἀνέλετο καὶ σταδίου τὴν τρίτην ἐνανμάχησε δὲ καὶ ἐναντία τοῦ Μήδου ναῦν τε παρασκευασάμενος οἰκίαν καὶ Κροτωνιατῶν ὁπόσοι ἐπέδημον τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀνεβίβασε), τοῦτον ἔστιν ἀνδριάς ἐν Δελφοῖς. Aristophanes twice (Ach. 215; Vesp. 1206) alludes to Phayllus as a noted runner of the olden time, and probably refers to the hero of the Persian wars, though if so the scholiast is wrong in calling him Ὀλυμπιονίκης. The epigram (Anth. Pal. App. 297) ascribing to him a jump of 55 feet and a discus throw of 95 feet appears to be late, and is worthless as an authority (N. Gardiner, J. H. S. xxiv. 77–80). It is noticeable that but one trireme came from Greater Greece, and that furnished by a volunteer who had a special connexion with the mother country through his athletic victories.

48 Melos was believed to have been colonized from Lacedaemon at the time of the Dorian invasion (Thuc. v. 84. 112) before 1100 B. C.; cf. the colonization of Thera, iv. 147 f.

On the numbers cf. 46. 1 n. and App. XIX. 1.

49 1 τῶν = τουτέων ὧν: the antecedent depends on ὅκου. The fleet might meet with defeat, in which case it was vital that the shore behind should be in the hands of friends; cf. § 2, ch. 76. 2; Thuc. vii. 36.

2 συνέξιπτον, 'were agreed in' (cf. i. 206. 3), imperfect because the final decision (ch. 63) was to the opposite effect; cf. ch. 123. 2 of voting which led to no result.



For the anacoluthon ἐπιλέγοντες after λεγόντων cf. iii. 16. 3, &c. The construction is κατὰ σύνεσιν, since in sense the previous clause = οἱ δὲ λέγοντες πλείστοι ἔγνωσαν.

ἐξοίσονται : middle in passive sense as in ch. 76. 2 ; cf. πολιορκήσονται, *sup.* v, 34. 1 ; viii. 70. 2.

50-5 *Xerxes wastes Attica and seizes Athens. Storming of the Acropolis. Portent of the sacred olive.*

0 2 Ἀθήνας = Attica ; cf. v. 57. 2 n.

Θέσπειαν : so Hom. Il. ii. 498, though Thespieae is commoner. On its scanty remains cf. Frazer on Paus. ix. 26 ; so too Πλάταιαν is singular here only in H., elsewhere Πλαταιαί. For similar variations cf. i. 82. 1, 2.

51 For the chronology of Xerxes' march cf. vii. 37. 1 n.

Καλλιαδέω ἀρχοντος Ἀθηναίοισι. Though the regular dating by archons is believed by many to go back to the institution of the annual archonship, 683 B. C., and almost certainly extends as far back as Solon, no trace of its use is found in the fragments of historians earlier than H. H. employs it here only, and Thucydides twice (v. 25, ii. 2) Πυθοδώρου ἔτι τέσσαρας μῆνας ἀρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις ; cf. Appendix XIV. 1.

2 τὸ ἄστυ : the lower town as opposed to the Acropolis, i. 14. 4, &c.

τῷ ἱρῷ. Here and elsewhere (cf. ch. 55 n. ; v. 72. 3 n.) most naturally taken of a double temple of Athena and Erechtheus on the site of the later Erechtheum (D'Ooge, Acropolis, 43 f. ; Frazer, Paus. vol. ii, Appendix). Since, however, no traces exist of any building there older than that erected during the Peloponnesian war (420-408 B. C.), Dörpfeld and his followers (including in this case E. A. Gardner, Ancient Athens, 76-83) interpret this of the old Hecatompædon ; cf. v. 72. 3 n.

ταμίαις . . . τοῦ ἱεροῦ. These officials had charge of the temple property, especially of the costly offerings and treasures kept in the temple. From 434 B. C. the lists of the treasures of Athena and inventories of the treasures in their charge are preserved on Inscriptions (Hicks, 49, 66, &c.). The treasurers (in H.'s days *ten* in number) were taken from the time of Solon from the richest class, Pentacosiomedemni (Ath. Pol. 7. 3, 8. 1 ; Gilbert, G. C. A. 241 n.).

φραξάμενοι. This barricade must have been at the western end where the Propylaea were later built ; the other sides were protected by precipitous rocks and the old Pelasgic wall. Possibly the old gateways (cf. τὰς πύλας, ch. 52. 2) of the Pelargicon or ἐννεάπυλον (v. 64. 2 n.) still remained and were barricaded (D'Ooge, Acropolis, 27 f.).

2 1 καταντίον : i. e. north-west and nearly opposite the principal entrance of the Acropolis which is on the west. The Amazons attacking Theseus are said to have seized this hill (Aesch. Eum. 688 f.).

53 I H.'s description of this way up as in front of the Acropolis but behind the gates has caused some confusion (e. g. Leake, *Top. Athens*, p. 264, thinks it implies that H. regarded the north side as the front). The entrance, however, to the subterranean passage (cf. *inf.*) faces west, the same direction as the main entrance (πύλαι), and is about seventy yards to the rear of it (ὑπισθε). Thus H.'s description is both accurate and obvious (E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, p. 47 ff.).

ἀνέβησαν . . . κατὰ τὸ ἱρόν. Pausanias (i. 18. 2) repeats this, adding the myth of Aglauros (Agraulos) and her sisters who opened the chest in which Erichthonius was hidden (cf. ch. 41. 2 n.) and then cast themselves down from the rocks above the precinct of Aglauros. 'It has generally been supposed that the escalading party either climbed up in the open, where they could hardly have escaped notice, or else ascended by the direct but narrow staircase that may still be seen above the grotto of Aglauros; but so obvious a way if not strongly barricaded, could hardly have been left unguarded. Recent excavations have shown a much more likely route. A natural cleft in the rock runs under or within the northern wall of the Acropolis; its western entrance is in the projecting face of rock just to the west of the cave of Aglauros; it has also an outlet at the eastern end, nearly opposite the west end of the Erechtheum. Where this cleft is within the wall of the Acropolis, it has an opening at the top which gives access to the plateau above it; but there is a sheer drop of about twenty feet, which might well lead the defenders to regard it as needing no guard; and an attacking party, once within the cleft, could ascend at their leisure with scaling ladders or ropes' (E. Gardner, *l. c.*).

Bury (*Cl. Rev.* x. (1896) p. 416) argues that the defence of the Acropolis was undertaken by a regular garrison at the command of the Athenian generals. He lays stress on the length of the defence (συχρὸν χρόνον, 52 *ad fin.*), reckoned by Busolt (ii. 695) at about a fortnight, on the desirability of satisfying both the rival interpretations of the wooden wall (c. 51 2; vii. 142), and above all on the consternation caused at Salamis by the capture of the Acropolis (ch. 56).

Munro (*J. H. S.* xxii. 321) accepts this view, though he admits that a fortnight's siege is hard to reconcile with the movements of the Persian fleet (ch. 66, 70), and the regular occupation of the Acropolis inconsistent with the decree recorded in Plutarch (*Them.* 10), τοὺς δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ πάντας ἐμβαίνειν ἐς τὰς τριήρεις: cf. *Thuc.* i. 73 ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς πανδημεί, *Aristides*, ii. p. 256 (*Dind.*). Moreover, the terror in the Greek fleet may be discounted as prevailing among the Peloponnesians always anxious to retreat to the Isthmus, and the συχρὸς χρόνος may only mean a long time under the circumstances (cf. *Grundy, op. cit.* 358, 359); so it seems better to accept H.'s account. Ctesias (§ 26, p. 70), who otherwise agrees with H., makes

the defenders escape by night, a suggestion uncritically accepted by Wecklein (Ber. Bayer. Akadem. (1876), p. 272).

2 τὸ μέγαρον cannot be distinguished from τὸ ἱρόν (ch. 51. 2 n., 55 n., and v. 72).

54 Artabanus was regent during the king's absence (vii. 52 *ad fin.*). ἐνθύμιον: whether he felt remorse for; cf. ii. 175. 5; Thuc. vii. 50. Possibly the real motive was a desire to conciliate the Attic exiles, his future subjects.

55 Erechtheus the earthborn, though by genealogists made the son or grandson of Erichthonius, is really his double, the son of Earth and Hephaestus, and foster-child of Athene (cf. ch. 41. 2 n., 53. 1 n.). For the ἱερός λόγος cf. Apollod. iii. 14. 6 and II. ii. 547 δῆμον Ἐρεχθῆος μεγαλήτορος, ὃν ποτ' Ἀθήνη | θρέψε Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ζείδωρος ἄρουρα, | καὶ δ' ἐν Ἀθίης εἶσεν, ἑὼ ἐν πίονι γηῶ | ἔνθα δέ μιν ταύροις καὶ ἄρνεσι ἰλάονται | κουροὶ Ἀθηναίων. Traditionally he is an ancient king of Athens (cf. 44. 2), founder of the worship of Athena, conqueror of Eumolpus of Eleusis, &c., but he is also identified with Poseidon. [For arguments against the identification cf. Farnell, G. C. iv. 47-54.] So a seat in the Dionysiac theatre (Block E. 1; C. I. A. iii. 276) belongs to the priest Ποσειδῶνος Γαιόχου καὶ Ἐρεχθέως, cf. the altar of Poseidon in the Erechtheum, 'on which they sacrifice also to Erechtheus' (Paus. i. 26. 5), and a dedication to Poseidon Erechtheus found there (C. I. A. i. 387). Butes, brother of Erechtheus and worshipped in his shrine (Paus. l. c.), is the son of Poseidon and Oreithyia, the daughter of Erechtheus, originally a sea-nymph (cf. vii. 189. 2 n.).

ἐλαίη. For the sacred olive as the life-tree of the state cf. Harrison, Cl. Rev. ix. 89, 90. As round the world-ash in the Edda twines the great snake Igdrasil, so the Attic serpent may have coiled round the sacred olive (Macan). The sacred olive (Paus. i. 27. 2 (cf. Frazer); Apollod. iii. 14. 2) stood in the Pandroseum just west of the Erechtheum proper (Philoch. ap. Dionys. Hal. de Dinarcho, 3; F. H. G. i. 409).

θάλασσα: the well of sea-water which, when the south wind blew, gave forth the sound of breakers (Paus. l. c.), is believed to be the large cistern beneath the Erechtheum proper, i. e. the western division. H. certainly speaks as if both olive and sea were in an actual shrine of Erechtheus presumably ruined by the Persians, but the olive seems to have been outside the later Erechtheum, which was not begun till about 420 B. C.; cf. also v. 72. 3 n.; viii. 51. 2 n. The myth (cf. Apollod. iii. 14. 1) was that Poseidon came first, and, striking with his trident, created the salt well on the Acropolis (*sup.*), then Athena made the olive (*sup.*); cf. μαρτύρια θέσθαι (*inf.*); and the land was adjudged to Athena by the witness of Cecrops. The scene was represented on the west gable of the Parthenon (Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 293 f.; Collignon, S. G. ii. 34 f.) at the moment of Athena's triumph. There seems no earlier authority for the legend, which

may be a reminiscence of a struggle between the worshippers of Poseidon and of Athene (cf. Farnell, *op. cit.* i. 270).

56-65 *Greek councils of war at Salamis ending in a decision to remain there. Anecdotes of Themistocles, Mnesiphilus, Eurybiades, and Adimantus. Invocation of the Aeacidae, and portent of the Eleusinian procession.*

56 τὸ προκέκμενον. The matter laid before the council of war, i.e. the place where they should fight (cf. *inf.* and ch. 49). Since the same council appears to have received the news that Xerxes had entered Attica (ch. 50), and also that he had taken the Acropolis, though the siege took some time (52 *ad fin.*), H. must have merged into one two councils of war (cf. Appendix XXI, § 1). The proposal to leave Salamis and retire to the Isthmus attributed to the first council (ch. 49) is far more probable after the fall of the Acropolis, but the panic of the Greeks is as usual exaggerated.

57 In the suggestions that the absolute necessity of fighting at Salamis was seen first by Mnesiphilus, and that Themistocles adopted his plan without acknowledgment (ch. 58. 2), we may see the prejudice of H.'s Attic informants (cf. ch. 4. 2 n.; *Introd.* § 31). We may set against the story Themistocles' reputation for matchless wisdom immediately after Salamis (ch. 124), and his dedication after the battle of a shrine to Artemis Aristoboule (Plut. Them. 22; de Mal. Herod. 37), and above all Thucydides' insistence on his originality (i. 138) φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο. The dispute whether statesmanship was innate or acquired became a favourite topic in philosophic circles (Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 2; Symp. viii. 39; Plat. Men. 93 B, 99 B), and Themistocles was a leading instance (Bauer, Them. p. 72). We may see the result of this in Plutarch, who by silence (Them.) or explicitly (de Mal. I. c.) rejects the intervention of Mnesiphilus on this occasion, and yet retains him as the pupil of Solon and teacher of Themistocles in politics (Them. 2; Moral. 154, 795 C). The anecdote here is surely apocryphal (cf. Busolt, ii. 641 n.; Meyer, iii. § 223 n.).

59 All the later writers (Plut. Them. 11; Aelian, V. H. xiii. 40; Aristid. ii. p. 258, Dind.) except Pseud. Plut. Mor. 185 B represent the scene as taking place between Eurybiades and Themistocles, thus unduly emphasizing the rivalry between Sparta and Athens and obscuring the hostility of Corinth. They add more picturesque detail, e.g. Plut. Them. 11 ἐπαρμένον δὲ (Εὐρυβιάδου) τὴν βακτηρίαν ὡς πατάξοντος, ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔφη, πάταξον μὲν, ἄκουσον δέ.

προεξανιστάμενοι: probably of a race: 'those who start before the signal,' and 'those left at the post'. Themistocles should have waited till the president called on him.

ῥαπίζονται are beaten by the ῥαβδοῦχοι (constables) at the orders of the stewards (ἀγωνοθέται). Thus Lichas was beaten for a breach

of the rules at Olympia (Paus. vi. 2. 2; Thuc. v. 50; Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 21).

50 α 'Εν σοί. This recalls the address of Miltiades to Callimachus (vi. 109. 3).

ἀναξεύξης: in Attic intransitive, in H. (cf. ix. 41. 2, 58.3) transitive. Here an expression proper only for an army and its baggage train is transferred to a fleet.

βαρύτερας, 'of heavier build,' is quite suitable to the argument here, and should not be emended (as by Stein) to βραδυτέρας in deference to Plutarch's description of the Greek ships as lower and lighter, and the barbarian as heavy and unwieldy, with lofty decks and poops (Them. 14). This description is not borne out by anything in H. (cf. viii. 10. 1) and may have been taken from some later battle, e.g. Actium.

β In the open sea the enemy could surround the weaker Greek fleet (ch. 16), in the narrows their very numbers would be against them as well as their ignorance of the fairway. The Greek ships were inferior to the enemy in manœuvring (ch. 10. 1). Only the great superiority in this acquired by the Athenians between 480 and 430 B.C. (cf. Thuc. i. 49) justified the opposite tactics of Phormio (Thuc. ii. 90).

γ Without a fleet Xerxes would be driven to retreat by lack of supplies, as well as by the fear that he might be cut off from his kingdom.

λόγιον: cf. vii. 141. 4.

H., after a clear statement of the arguments for fighting at Salamis, makes Themistocles end with a piece of proverbial wisdom similar to that ascribed to Artabanus, vii. 10. 8 2.

61 ἐπιψηφίζειν ἀπόλι ἀνδρί means 'to take a vote on the motion of a man without a city' (cf. Thuc. vi. 14), the point being that Themistocles, no longer representing a city, has no right to make a motion (*sententiam dicere*). For γνώμας συμβάλλεσθαι cf. v. 92. α 2.

2 2 Siris, fabled to be of Trojan origin (Strabo 264), was on the river of the same name half-way between Sybaris and Tarentum. Apparently it was colonized from Colophon and imitated Sybaris in wealth and luxury (Athen. 523). Probably it also resembled Sybaris in the possession of an overland trade, since we find alliance coins with the names of Siris and Pyxus on them (Hill, G. and R. C., p. 104). It is said to have been conquered by its Achaean neighbours, Sybaris, Croton, and Metapontum (before 510 B.C., Justin xx. 2; cf. Pais, *Ancient Italy*, pp. 67–86). Later, after 440, Siris was refounded by Thurii and Tarentum jointly, though accounted a Tarentine colony. Finally, 433–431 B.C., most of its inhabitants removed to Heraclea, Siris remaining the port of that colony.

ἡμετέρη . . . ἐκ παλαιοῦ. The claims of Athens to Siris seem shadowy, resting only on her headship of the Ionic race. But that the idea of westward expansion, afterwards so popular at Athens, had



occurred to Themistocles is suggested by the names of his daughters Italia and Sybaris (Plut. Them. 32), by his supposed relations with Hiero (Plut. Them. 24, 25), if they be not fictions of Stesimbrotus and Theophrastus (Schaefer, Philol. xviii. 187), and by his interest in Corcyra (Plut. Them. 24; Thuc. i. 136). It is, however, possible that Themistocles, following the oracle, only threatened westward emigration vaguely, and that the precise spot was fixed on later, when Athenian interest had become centred on New Sybaris (450 B.C.) and Thurii (445 B.C.). At that time there would be many old oracles, real or spurious, encouraging colonization there. The idea of emigration *en masse* had been mooted more than once in Ionia (i. 170), but would have been hard to carry out in this case.

- 64 ἀκροβολισάμενοι: a metaphor from 'skirmishing', as λόγων ὁπισμός (78) from hand-to-hand fighting. For this summons to the Aeacidae cf. v. 80. The idea clearly is that the coming of the image would ensure also the spiritual presence and aid of the heroes; cf. the coming of the ark to the camp of Israel (1 Sam. iv. 3).

Apparently only Aeacus and Phocus were regarded in legend as inhabitants of Aegina, and possibly the images are of these two heroes, but their descendants in Thessaly (Peleus, &c.) and Phocis (Paus. ii. 29. 2) would have a share in their honours.

- 65 I The Eleusinian plain lies south-west of Mount Parnes, being divided from the Attic plain by Mount Poikilon and Daphni, and bounded on the north and west by Cithaeron and the highlands of Megara. It is called Thriasian (ix. 7. β 2; Thuc. i. 114, ii. 19-21) from the important deme of Thria, which lay probably at Kalyvia, three miles east-north-east of Eleusis. The regular route from Thebes, by which the Persian infantry would naturally come, led to the Thriasian plain a little north of Eleusis. Plutarch (Them. 15) puts this vision on the day of the battle, which would thus be on the 20th Boedromion (Plut. Phocion 28, Camill. 19). It is, however, evident that Plutarch derived all the details of his account, except 'a great light that shone from Eleusis', from H., and that the historian believed that Dicaeus saw the portent at least a day, and perhaps several days, before the battle. Busolt (ii. 703-4) argues that the battle took place a few days after the 20th Boedromion (= Sept. 22) and some days before the eclipse (Oct. 2, 480), which prevented Cleombrotus from molesting the retreat of Xerxes (ix. 10), probably Sept. 27 or 28.

τρισμυρίων. The number is the conventional estimate for the Athenian citizen-body in the days of H. (v. 97. 2 n.), since citizens were expected to accompany the procession *en masse* (Plut. Alc. 34). The old temple or hall of initiation destroyed by the Persians was, as is shown by excavations, only about 82 feet square, and could not hold any such number; indeed, even the larger hall begun by Pericles (about 170 feet square) only seems to have provided seats

for some 3,000 on the eight tiers of steps round it (Frazer, Paus. ii. 503). Of course, many Athenians were not initiated.

- 2 The poetical words, ἀδαήμονα, σίνος, ἀρίδηλα, may be derived from the source used by H. They clearly suit the tone of the story.

- 4 The great procession from Athens to Eleusis along the sacred way took place on the 20th Boedromion (Eur. Ion 1076, cf. *sup.*). It bore the name Iacchus because in it the statue of the child Iacchus, with his cradle and playthings, was borne, escorted by Ephebi and followed by the Mystae bearing torches and singing hymns (Arist. Ran. 398-413). Frequent sacrifices and ceremonies on the road made the procession last from daybreak till late at night. All through the day there was constant invocation of the god (Ἰαχχ' ὦ Ἰαχχε, Arist. *l. c.*).

For the worship of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis cf. Farnell, Greek Cults, iii. 126-98; Harrison, Prolegomena, ch. iv *ad fin.*, ch. x *ad fin.*

- 6 Δίκαιος ὁ Θεοκίδεος. This isolated anecdote was surely preserved by oral tradition. It gives no support to P. Trautwein's hypothesis that Dicaeus left memoirs from which H. drew freely (Hermes, xxv. 527-66).

66-9 *Persian fleet at Phalerum. Council of War. Decision to fight against Artemisia's advice.*

- 1 This resumes the diary of the Persian fleet, broken off in ch. 25, and takes it from Aphetæ to Phalerum in nine days, six given here, one spent in going from Aphetæ to Histiaea (ch. 23), one at Thermopylae, and one in returning to Histiaea (ch. 25) (Macan).

- 2 The reinforcements which reached the land army, which H. (ix. 32. 2) estimates at 50,000, may well have balanced the losses. Accordingly Tarn (J. H. S. xxviii. 204 n.) would save H.'s credit by taking him to refer not to ships or crews, but solely to fighting men, including marines. For the fleet the idea of compensation is absurd. H. has reckoned the loss from storms (vii. 190; viii. 13) at 600 ships, besides mentioning losses in battle amounting to perhaps a hundred more (vii. 194; viii. 11, 14, 16), thus reducing his grand total of 1,327 (cf. vii. 89. 1, 184. 1, 185. 1) to some 600 (cf. Diod. xi. 19, 27). He then found himself confronted with Aeschylus' computation of the fleet at Salamis (1,207; Pers. 341), which he had used earlier (vii. 89. 1) and reverted to it, setting against the enormous losses (cf. *sup.* and especially ch. 13 *ad fin.*) the scanty contingents of a few islands of doubtful loyalty (§ 2; cf. vii. 95).

καὶ μάλα, 'and further'; cf. i. 134. 3. H. here turns to those who furnished ships.

τῶν πέντε πολιῶν. Six states (i.e. islands, cf. iii. 139. 1) are mentioned in ch. 46. Ceos, Naxos, Cythnos, Seriphos, Siphnos,

Melos. The one here forgotten (Ceos according to Stein and Melos according to Macan) is most probably Seriphos, which is not found on the Delphic offering (ix. 81 n.).

67 I ἐκαπαδόκεον: cf. vii. 163. 2, 168. 2. Neutrality did not save Paros (ch. 112), which had already suffered at the hands of Miltiades (vi. 133-5).

2 προΐετο. The king sat as πρόεδρος on a raised seat or throne (iv. 88. 1; vii. 44). Elsewhere H. uses προκατίζειν (i. 14. 3, 97. 1) or προκατίεσθαι (v. 12. 2).

ταξίαρχοι: here and in vii. 99. 1 of sea captains, elsewhere more properly of army officers.

For Sidonian precedence cf. vii. 100. 2 n. The absence of all mention of the four Persian admirals (vii. 97) and the prominence of Mardonius are suspicious features in this council; cf. App. XXI.

68 a εἰπεῖν. For infinitive in imperative sense cf. iii. 134. 5; II. xiv. 501. εἶδον: true; cf. i. 30. 3, 95. 1, &c. The δέ emphasizes the contrast between the feigned assent of the majority and Artemisia's own frank opinion.

ἄνδρες γυναικῶν. This shrewish saying is remembered by Xerxes (ch. 88. 3); for its bitterness cf. ix. 107. The land forces are not rated much higher, vii. 210 n. (Macan).

γ Cf. Aesch. Pers. 728 ναυτικός στρατός κακῶθεις πεζὸν ὤλεσε στρατόν. Artemisia does not here venture to decry the Phoenicians, but cf. ch. 100. 4.

69 I τετιμημένης. We should expect the dative agreeing with αὐτῇ, but the genitive shows that H. is giving us not a mere motive for the envy felt but a real fact, cf. ch. 90. 1; i. 3. 2, &c.

ἀνακρίσι, 'objection'; cf. ἀνακρίνεσθαι, 'wrangle' (ix. 56. 1) compared with ix. 55. 1, &c. So Plato, Charm. 176 C and Phaedr. 277 E.

70-82 *The day before the battle of Salamis. First movement of the Persian fleet (70). Fortification of the Isthmus with digression on the ethnology of the Peloponnese (71-3). Greek council of war and stratagem of Themistocles (74-5). Second movement of the Persian fleet and occupation of Psyttaleia (76). Oracle of Bacis (77). Debate of Greek generals. Arrival of Aristides and of the Tenians (78-82).*

70 I παρεκρίθησαν, 'were drawn up in order of battle'; cf. ix. 98. 2. H. here seems to place the movement of the main Persian fleet from Phalerum the afternoon before the battle (cf. however ch. 76); Aeschylus clearly puts it after nightfall (Pers. 377 f.); cf. App. XXI. 3.

71 I ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον. The Persian army never reached even Megara (cf. ix. 14). Doubtless its advance was connected with the projected encircling movement of the fleet (ch. 76).

Possession of the Attic shore (as of Psyttaleia; cf. ch. 76. 2) would enable the Persians to save their own stranded ships and shipwrecked men and to destroy those of the enemy.

- 2 συγχώσαντες. The word implies an artificially constructed way (cf. vii. 115. 3), but there was no carriage road till Hadrian made one, of which some traces remain (Paus. i. 44. 6), though according to Megarian legend, Sciron made a footpath for travellers. Now there is a highway and railroad, but fifty years ago the path still deserved its modern name, Kake Scala. It was indeed the shortest of the three ways across Geranea into the Peloponnese, but 'for six miles it ran along a narrow crumbling ledge half-way up the face of an almost sheer cliff at a height of six to seven hundred feet above the sea. . . . Nothing was easier than to make such a path impassable' (cf. Frazer, Paus. ii. 547; Strabo 391).

οικοδόμεον . . . τεῖχος (cf. Diod. xi. 16). This wall, from the materials and haste with which it was built, would seem to have been a temporary field-work. Neither Thucydides nor Xenophon alludes to any such impediment to the march of troops across the Isthmus. In 369 B.C. (Diod. xv. 68) an ineffectual attempt was made to bar the Isthmus against Epaminondas by making a palisade and trench from Cenchreae to Lechaem. A wall seems to have protected the Peloponnese against the Gallic invasion, 279 B.C. (Paus. vii. 6. 7), and more certainly in the days of Valerian (253 A.D.) there was a wall, repaired later by Justinian, and last used by the Venetians in 1463 and 1696. It may still be traced from sea to sea running along a line of low cliffs, a little south of the modern canal, and is best preserved near the Isthmian sanctuary; cf. Frazer, Paus. iii. 5-6.

ἦνετο: the work does not seem to have been finished till the following summer; cf. ix. 7. The wood would be for palisades, the sand for mortar, and also for filling up along with other rubble the spaces between the outer faces of the walls.

- 72 πάντες goes with Ἀρκάδες, implying that all their cities and cantons took part; cf. vii. 202 n.

Ὀλύμπια . . . Κάρνεια. These had previously prevented (or at least excused) the Peloponnesians from gathering their full force; cf. vii. 206.

- 73 For a similar ethnographic summary cf. iv. 37 f. H. is followed by Pausanias (v. 1). For further information on the peoples of Peloponnese cf. ch. 43, and on the Dorians and the Dorian conquest i. 56 nn.

Ἀρκάδες: held to be Pelasgi (cf. i. 146. 1), being autochthonous (ii. 171. 3), as was generally agreed in Greece.

τὸ Ἀχαιικόν. For the conquest of the north coast of Peloponnese by the Achaeans when driven out by the Dorians cf. i. 145. 1, vii. 94, and Paus. v. 1; Strabo 383.

- 2 Αἰτωλῶν: cf. Strabo 354; Paus. v. 3. 5.

Δρυόπων: cf. ch. 43 and i. 56 n.

Ἑρμιῶν: commonly called 'Hermione'. A maritime city opposite the isle of Hydra with two excellent harbours (Paus. ii. 34 f.).

**Ἀσίνη.** The old Asine was on the coast (Paus. ii. 36. 4) near Nauplia (Strabo 373), probably at Tolon, five miles south-east of Nauplia. It was destroyed by the Dorian Argives during the first Messenian war, and its Dryopian inhabitants taking refuge with the Spartans were given a new home in the conquered Messenian land on the west coast of the Coronaeon Gulf near its southern headland Acritas (cf. Paus. iv. 14. 3, 34. 6 f.). This is the city here meant, Cardamyle lying just across the gulf on the Laconian coast.

**Παρωρηῆται:** in Triphylia (cf. iv. 148. 4 n.); they were Minyan immigrants from Lemnos (iv. 145 f.).

- 3 The meaning seems to be: 'The Cynurians being autochthonous, appear to be Ionians, and the only ones left in the Peloponnese' (the Aegialians having been driven out). Pausanias (iii. 2. 2 λέγονται δὲ οἱ Κυνουρεῖς Ἀργεῖοι τὸ ἀνέκαθεν εἶναι, καὶ οἰκιστὴν φασιν αὐτῶν Κύνουρον γενέσθαι τοῦ Περσέως) would derive them from the pre-Dorian inhabitants of Argos. It is probable that they belong to the aboriginal population, but there seems no special reason for holding them to be Ionic. H. here as elsewhere (cf. i. 56) makes Ionians a branch of Pelasgi.

Apparently the town Ornæae (about thirteen miles north-west of Argos) was reduced by Argos to a status similar to that of the Laconian Perioecic towns under Sparta. ~~Hence all the other Perioeci of Argos were termed Orneatae; cf. the Caerites at Rome.~~ Stein holds that καὶ περίοικοι is an adscript, on the grounds that Cynuria had belonged to Sparta at least since about 550 B. C. (i. 82; Thuc. v. 41), and that the Argive Perioeci, some of whom are said to have been enfranchised (Ar. Pol. 1303 a 8), and who were all, including the Orneatae (Thuc. v. 67), treated as σύμμαχοι (Thuc. v. 47, 77) had been united with Argos (Paus. viii. 27. 1). But περίοικοι may well be an explanation of Ὀρνέαι.

ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατέατο: cf. 22. 2. This implies a condemnation of the Argives; cf. vii. 148 f.

- 74 1 ὁμος: although they knew of their unremitting work at the wall.  
2 ἐξεργάγη, 'broke out'; of ill temper hitherto restrained (vi. 129. 4), here impersonal; cf. iii. 71. 1, 82. 3. This disorderly meeting, which is apparently the council of generals (ch. 75, 78. 1), debated the same subjects as before (ch. 49); cf. App. XXI. 1.  
οἱ μὲν . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δέ: as if πολλὰ ἔλεγον, not ἐλέγετο, had gone before; cf. Aesch. P. V. 203; Thuc. iv. 23; Soph. Ant. 259.
- 75 1 ἔσσοῦτο τῇ γνώμῃ: opposed to γνώμῃ νικᾶν (i. 61. 3) = 'that his view would be defeated.'

**πολήτας.** Losses at Thermopylae and elsewhere (vii. 222; ix. 30) had so much diminished the number of Thespians that the city was glad to welcome immigrants (ἐποίκους). That Sicinnus was a Greek is stated by Aeschylus (Pers. 355) and supported by his enfranchisement. Plutarch (Them. 12) must be wrong in calling him a Persian, though he may have been an Asiatic Greek (Grote).



- 2 Aeschylus (Pers. 353 f.) rightly attributes the king's resolution to advance on Salamis to this message. On its purport and on the differences between Aeschylus and Herodotus cf. App. XXI. 3.
- 76 On the occupation of Psyttaleia and the other movements cf. Appendix XXI. 4 f.
- I Κέον . . . καὶ . . . Κυνόσουραν. These names cause a difficulty. They seem to be taken from the oracle of Bacis (ch. 77). That oracle may well have had reference originally not to Salamis but to Artemisium; if so, Ceos would be the well-known island, Cynosura the promontory near Marathon, and the temple of Artemis that at Brauron (cf. Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 306 n.). Afterwards the prophecy was applied to Salamis and the temple of Artemis identified with that at Munychia. Blakesley, following Larcher, believes that H. intends to describe the closing up of Persian squadrons from these distant points, but the nearest of them, Ceos, is forty miles off Salamis, while Cynosura is sixty miles away, so that the supposed movement is impossible. It seems probable that Cynosura (dog's tail) really was the name of the long tongue of land reaching out from Salamis towards Psyttaleia, and that Ceos and Munychia are mentioned because the prophecy must be fulfilled. Stein and Hauvette believe Ceos to be identical with Cynosura, the former, as the regular name, coming first and explaining the obsolete synonym; for this use of τε καὶ cf. ch. 43, 73. 3. Beloch's (Klio viii. 477) suggestion that Ceos is the old name of Lipso Kutali (Psyttaleia) and his attempt to find the true Psyttaleia in the isle of St. George are not acceptable (Appendix XXI. 5 n.). (See note, p. 416.)
- 2 Aeschylus implies that the Persians sent a squadron round the island to enclose the Greeks. It must have been these detached ships from which Aristides had to flee (79, 81), yet they are never clearly mentioned in H.
- Psyttaleia, said by Aeschylus to have been occupied by the flower of the Persian host, is described Pers. 447 f. νῆσός τις ἐστὶ πρόσθε Σαλαμῖνος τόπων | βαιά, δύσορμος ναυσίν, ἣν ὁ φιλόχορος | Πὰν ἐμβατεύει . . . ἐνταῦθα πέμπει τούσδ' ὅπως, ὅτ' ἐκ νεῶν | φθαρέντες ἐχθροὶ νῆσον ἐκωζοῖατο, | κτεῖνοιεν εὐχέρωτον Ἑλλήνων στρατόν, | φίλους δ' ὑπεκσφάζοιεν ἐναλίαν πόρων. Cf. also Plut. Arist. 9 τὴν Ψυττάλειαν ἢ πρὸ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος ἐν τῷ πόρῳ κείται. For the argument drawn from this as to the site of the battle cf. Appendix XXI. 4, 5.
- 3 οὐδὲν ἀποκοιμηθέντες, 'without having refreshed themselves with sleep'; cf. Aesch. Pers. 383.
- 77 This is perhaps the strongest profession of faith in oracles to be found in H., often as he delights to notice the fulfilment of prophecy (cf. ch. 20. 1 n., 96; ix. 43). His faith is in marked contrast with the scepticism of Thucydides (ii. 17, 54; v. 26). Probably the ordinary Athenian leaned to the side of faith. During the Peloponnesian war, oracles attributed to ancient seers, above all to Bacis (ch. 20. 1 n.), were widely current at Athens (Thuc. ii. 8, 21).

The keenness of the conflict between superstition and scepticism is shown by the frequent parodies of oracles in Aristophanes (Eq. 120 f., 997 f.; Pax 1060 f.; cf. *inf.*).

The beginning ἀλλ' ὅταν was common in oracles (i. 55. 2; iii. 57. 4; vi. 77. 2), and was therefore (with the variation ἀλλ' ὅπου) affected by the parodist, Arist. Eq. 197; Av. 967; Lysis. 770.

χρυσαόρου: an epithet of Apollo 'of the golden sword' (Il. v. 509; xv. 256) transferred to his sister.

ἱερὸν ἄκτῃν: in Hesiod, *Ἔργα* 597, 805 = the holy corn of Demeter, here 'the hallowed shore'.

γεφυρώσωσι. The great Persian fleet might seem to stretch like a bridge across the straits, either (1) at Salamis, which H. plainly understands the oracle to mean, there being temples of Artemis both at Salamis itself (Paus. i. 36. 1) and at Munychia on the Attic shore (Paus. i. 1. 4); or (2) if the oracle referred to the fighting off Euboea, (a) at Artemisium (vii. 176), or (b) between Euboea and Attica, or finally across the bay of Marathon from Cynosura to Halae Araphenides and Brauron, the sites of two temples to Artemis (Eur. Iph. Taur. 1450 f.; Strabo 399). But the oracle is best regarded as a *vaticinium post eventum* of Salamis.

Ἵβριος υἱόν: cf. vi. 86. γ 2; Pind. Ol. xiii. 10 ὕβριν κόρου ματέρα θρασύμυθον, Aesch. Ag. 766 f. Conversely, Solon, fr. 8; Theogn. 153 τίκει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν.

ἀνὰ πάντα πιθέσθαι seems meaningless, yet ἀνατίθεσθαι is strange, and ἀναπίεσθαι, 'swallow up,' rare and late. The concluding sentence rather clumsily resumes and repeats in another form the opening words of the chapter.

78 ὤθισμός: wordy strife; cf. ix. 26. 1; iii. 76. 3; and similarly ἀκροβολισάμενοι (64. 1), ἀμφισβασίη (81).

79 The narrative of H. suggests, though it does not assert, that this was the first return of Aristides to his country after his ostracism, which took place at the time of Themistocles' increase of the fleet (Ath. Pol. 22) in 483-482, or a little before (484-483, Jerome, Eusebius). But it appears that the general return of exiles must be placed in the archonship of Hypsichides, i. e. before June 480 (Ath. Pol. 22), though Plutarch (Arist. 8) makes it synchronize with Xerxes' march through Thessaly and Boeotia (July-August). Again, Xanthippus, who had also been ostracized, returned before the evacuation of Attica (Plut. Cato maj. 5; Philoch. fr. 84, F. H. G. i. 397). Finally, in the capture of Psytaleia, Aristides acts as general in command of a large force of Attic hoplites; i. e. appears to be one of the strategi (ch. 95 n.). If so, he must have been sent to Aegina on some mission, perhaps to take Athenian refugees thither (Grundy, p. 390), or to fetch the Aeacidae thence (Bury, Cl. Rev. x. 414 f.). The objection that while Aristides reached Salamis overnight, the trireme with the Aeacidae is not reported to have arrived till next morning (viii. 83), is parried by Burrows' remark (Cl. Rev. xi. 258) that Aristides did

not arrive till after midnight (viii. 76, 81), so that the sailors would have already turned in, and so would not welcome the Aeacidae till daybreak. Nor is it easy to see how any ship could have evaded the Persian blockade after Aristides. The objections remain that the trireme which fetched the Aeacidae must surely have been Aeginetan (viii. 64, 83, 84), and that, had Aristides been commissioned to escort the Aeacidae, H. would have known and mentioned so interesting a fact. With this character of Aristides cf. Plut. Arist. 3, where the people in the theatre apply to him the line of Aeschylus about Amphiaraus (Sept. c. Theb. 592) οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, and Timocreon, fr. 1 ap. Plut. Them. 21 ἀλλ' εἰ τύγε Πανσανίαν ἢ καὶ τύγε Ξάνθιππον αἰνέεις | ἢ τύγε Δευτυχίδα, ἐγὼ δ' Ἀριστείδα ἐπαινέω | ἀνδρ' ἱερὰν ἀπ' Ἀθανᾶν | ἐλθεῖν ἓνα λῶστον· ἐπεὶ Θεμιστοκλῆ ἤχθαιρε Λατῶ | ψεύσταν, ἄδικον, προδόταν, ὃς Τιμοκρέοντα ξείνον ἔοντ | ἀργυρίοισι σκυβαλικοῖσι πεισθεὶς οὐ κατὰγεν εἰς πατρίδ' Ἰάλυσον.

2 **στάς ἐπί** : not 'appearing before' (as in iii. 46. 1), but 'standing at the doors of', since he calls Themistocles out (cf. ἐξῆλθε, § 2). Probably only the commander-in-chief of Athens, Themistocles (vii. 173. 2 ; viii. 4, 19, 61), would have the right to attend the council.

4 **αὐτόπτης**. The new fact hitherto unknown to which Aristides can bear witness, is the complete envelopment of the Greeks by the Persian squadron sent round Salamis, blocking retreat to the west (cf. Appendix XXI. 5). The advance of the main body to block the eastern straits could hardly have escaped notice.

81 **ἐκπλῶσαι** implies that Aristides had a difficulty in putting out from Aegina, hence **διεκπλῶσαι** (cf. Plut. Arist. 8 **διεκπλεύσας**), 'slipping through the enemy,' is better.

82 **Τηνίων**. Diodorus (xi. 17) speaks of a Samian sent by the Ionians, and Plutarch, or his copyist (Them. 12), of a Tenedian ship, but Tenos duly appears on the snake supporting the tripod dedicated at Delphi (ix. 81 n.) as well as on the base of the statue of Zeus at Olympia (Paus. v. 23).

**κατελοῦσι** : cf. Thuc. i. 132 **ἐπέγραψαν ὀνομαστὶ τὰς πόλεις ὅσαι ἔγγκαθελοῦσαι τὸν βάρβαρον ἔστησαν τὸ ἀνάθημα**.

**Τῇ Δημνίῃ** : cf. ch. II. 3.

83-96 *The day of battle at Salamis. Exploits on both sides.*

83 1 **οἱ . . . ποιησάμενοι**. H. begins to say that the generals called an assembly and addressed it, and then only names Themistocles as making a speech, alluding to the other speakers merely by the words **ἐκ πάντων**, for which cf. i. 134. 2.

'The whole speech was a contrast of the better and the worse in all that belongs to man's nature and condition.' H. spares us the well-worn antitheses, victory and defeat, freedom and slavery, &c. Cf. Aesch. Pers. 402 **ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων ἴτε, | ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ', ἐλευθεροῦτε δέ, | παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν τε πατρώων ἔδη, | θήκας τε προγόνων· νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών**.

- 2 καταπλέξας, 'having wound up,' i.e. finished (iv. 205. 1).  
κατά: to fetch the Aeacidae; cf. ch. 84. 2; iii. 4. 2; and for the facts ch. 64.

84 1 ἀνεκρούοντο, 'the other Greeks were beginning to back water and to run their ships ashore'; this is not in Aeschylus (cf. App. XXI. 7). Παλληνεύς (cf. 93. 1): from the well-known deme Pallene (i. 62. 3). According to Plutarch (Them. 14) he was of Declea, and according to Diodorus (xi. 27; cf. Ael. V. H. v. 19, and vit. Aesch.), he was a brother of Aeschylus, but since the poet was thought to be of Eleusis (vit. Aesch.; schol. Ar. Ran. 886), this is perhaps a confusion. If Aeschylus is relating his brother's exploits, the simplicity of Pers. 408 f. has a double charm. He probably believed the Athenians began the battle, since the Phoenician ships were arrayed against them (85. 1; Pers. 410).

- 2 If the Aeginetans were on the other wing of the Greek fleet (Diod. xi. 18), each city might be honestly convinced that their champions had begun the battle. Very possibly the Aeginetans, who won the prize for valour, were right in their claim, yet the mention of the trireme bearing the Aeacidae looks like the invention of a happy omen.

85 1 ἑσπέρης. The true points of the compass are north-west and south-east; cf. vii. 36. 2, 176. 3. H. is probably under the misapprehension that the two fleets were ranged along the sides of the straits, but the true explanation would seem to be that each fleet pushed forward its right wing (Aesch. Pers. 399, 409, and App. XXI. 7; Grundy, p. 397), which could be supported by troops posted on the shore behind it. The Athenians, as at Plataea, had the left wing, the post second in honour (ix. 26 f.), the Lacedaemonians the post of honour on the extreme right. Diodorus (xi. 18) wrongly stations the Lacedaemonians with the Athenians, and puts the Megarians and Aeginetans on the right. He agrees in putting the Phoenicians on the right and the Ionians on the left of the Persian line (xi. 17), adding that the Cyprians, Cilicians, Pamphylians, and Lycians were between them arranged in that order (xi. 19). This geographical order may be taken from the list of ships in vii. 90-2.

τὰς . . . ἐντολάς: cf. ch. 22.

- 2 The exception is due to the author's peculiar interest in Samos. Theomestor must have received his reward at once and enjoyed it less than a year, since Samos was freed again in 479; cf. ix. 90 f.

3 Enrolment as a benefactor was an honour not uncommonly paid to foreigners by Greek states (cf. 136. 1 n.). It was also a regular Persian custom (cf. ch. 90. 4; iii. 140, 154, 160; vi. 30), as is proved by the book of Esther (vi. 1 f.; cf. ii. 23), the inscription of Gadatas (Hicks No. 20) διὰ ταῦτά σοι κείσεται μεγάλη χάρις ἐμ βασιλεως οἴκῳ, Thuc. i. 129 κείται σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραφτος, and Arrian, Anab. iii. 27. 4.

ὀροσάγγαι (Soph. fr. 193; Hesych. Phot.) = σωματοφύλακες τοῦ

βασιλέως, and in this sense might come from old Pers. *var*, 'to guard' and *khshâyata*, 'king,' but Nymphis (fr. 12; F. H. G. iii. 14) explains it as here, ξένοι βασιλαιοι. Rawlinson suggests *khur sangha* (Zend), 'worthy of praise or record.'

- 86 H., but for this short chapter on the general disorder and a sentence or two in ch. 89, gives us no description of the movements in the battle, such as we get at Mycale, as well as at Marathon and Plataea. In his account the fighting resolves itself into a series of individual exploits without connected plan. The general picture in Aesch. Pers. 412 f. is striking, τὰ πρῶτα μὲν νυν ῥεύμα Περσικοῦ στρατοῦ | ἀντείχεν· ὡς δὲ πλῆθος ἐν στενῷ νεῶν | ἤθροιστ', ἀρωγὴ δ' οὔτις ἀλλήλοις παρήν, | αὐτοὶ δ' ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐμβολοῖς χαλχοστόμοις | παίοντ', ἔθραυον πάντα κωπήρη στόλον, | 'Ελληνικαὶ τε νῆες οὐκ ἀφρασμόνως | κύκλῳ περίξ ἔθεινον, ἱπτιοῦτο δὲ | σκάφη νεῶν, θάλασσα δ' οὐκέτ' ἦν ἰδεῖν, | ναυαγίων πλήθουσα καὶ φόνου βροτῶν.

αὐτοὶ ἐωυτῶν (cf. ii. 25. 5) seems to mean 'they proved themselves better men than when off Euboea, and, indeed, surpassed themselves'.

- 87 2 συνήεικε, 'which turned out to her advantage'; cf. ix. 37. 4. The stress is on the double result of her action in saving herself from pursuit and in winning the praise of Xerxes (ch. 88).

φέρουσα, 'full speed,' elsewhere the middle or passive is used in this sense; cf. ch. 90. 2, 91, &c.

Καλυνδέων: from Calynda, on the borders of Caria and Lycia; cf. i. 172. 2; vii. 99. 2 n.

- 3 H. leans to the alternative that Artemisia fell foul of that particular ship by chance; cf. συνεκύρησε κατὰ τύχην παραπεσοῦσα. As one of her own squadron (vii. 99) it would be near her.

- 4 τριήραρχος: the brave Ameinias (ch. 93. 1).

αὐτοῖσι refers as usual not to the nearer object (τὴν νέαν) but to the more remote τριήραρχος (ch. i. 111. 1 *ad fin.*) by a *constructio ad sensum*.

- 88 2 τὸ ἐπίσημον: probably (cf. 92. 2 σημήιον) figure-head at the bow of a ship (iii. 37. 2 n., 59. 3), not flag. Polyænus (viii. 53. 1) says Artemisia varied her colours, showing now Greek, now Persian, but this is unlikely, though flags are represented as early as this at the sterns of Athenian ships (Torr, *Anc. Ships*, p. 100).

ἐπισταμένους, 'knowing,' but ἠπιστέατο (*inf.*), 'they believed.' Similarly ἐπιλέξασθαι is carelessly used in two senses (ch. 22. 1), ἐξελεῖν (ch. 121. 1), ἀναθεῖναι (ii. 135. 3).

- 89 1 Ἀριαβίγνης: commander of the Ionian and Carian contingent (vii. 97). Plutarch (Them. 14) speaks of the death of the king's brother and admiral Ariamenes. He elsewhere (Mor. 488 D; cf. Justin, ii. 10) speaks of the same Ariamenes as having contested the throne with Xerxes, where H. (vii. 2) writes of Artobazanes.

χειρῶν νόμφ = Attic ἐν χερσί, *comminus*, in hand-to-hand fighting; cf. ix. 48. 2.

- 2 For the Persian formation cf. Appendix XXI. 7.



- 90 3 Samothrace was naturally held to be a colony of Samos (Paus. vii. 4. 3), but probably in the eyes of the Persians all the maritime peoples of the Aegean were 'Ionian'; cf. iv. 138; vi. 8; vii. 95. For the execution of the Phoenicians cf. Diod. xi. 19.
- 4 κατήμενος: cf. Aesch. Pers. 465 Ξέρξης δ' ἀνῶμωξεν κακῶν ὁρῶν βάθος | ἔδραν γὰρ εἶχε παντὸς εὐαγῆ στρατοῦ | ὑψηλὸν ὄχθον ἄγχι πελαγίας ἁλός, and Plut. Them. 13 Ξέρξης μὲν ἄνω καθήστο τὸν στόλον ἐποπτεύων καὶ τὴν παράταξιν, ὥς μὲν Φανόδημος φησιν, ὑπὲρ τὸ Ἡράκλειον, ἧ βραχεῖ πόρῳ διέρχεται τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἢ νῆσος. Both the Heracleum (Diod. xi. 18; Ctes. Pers. 26) and the throne of Xerxes must be looked for opposite the town of Salamis, beneath the heights of Mount Aegaleus (*Skaramanga*). Sir G. Wilkinson's site (cf. Rawl. *ad loc.*) is possible but far from certain. In later days a throne of Xerxes (δῖφρος ἀργυρόπους) was stolen from the Acropolis (Dem. in Timoc. 129; Harpocration, s. v.).
- γραμματισταί: cf. vii. 100. 1 n.
- πατρώθεν: cf. vi. 14. 3 n.
- προσεβάλετο, 'contributed to the fate of'; cf. Eur. Med. 284 συμ-βάλλεται δὲ πολλὰ τοῦδε δείματος. Ariaramnes was probably an Achaemenid, since he bore the same name as the great-grandfather of Darius (vii. 11. 2), and such royal names were not taken by ordinary Persians.
- 91 ὑποστάντες, 'posting themselves as in an ambush' (v. 92. η 3) in the straits between Salamis and Attica. O. Müller and Stein hold that the reserve Aeginetan squadron (ch. 46. 1 n.) blocked the passage. But such co-operation would have been difficult, and must surely have been more distinctly mentioned. Probably the Aeginetans, belonging to the advanced right wing (cf. App. XXI. 8), worked round the left flank of the Persian fleet. Grundy (p. 400), however, believes that they were stationed next to the Athenians, and thus, since the Phoenicians got in advance of the rest of the Persian line, were able to take them in flank, while the Athenians attacked them in front.
- 92 1 τὴν . . . ἐπὶ Σκιάθῳ: cf. vii. 179 f., and for Pytheas vii. 181.
- 2 The point of Polycritus' taunt is that Athens ten years before had charged the Aeginetans in general, and his own father Crius (vi. 50 n.) in particular, with Medism (vi. 49, 73, 85).
- ὑπό: under the protection of the land army drawn up on shore; cf. ix. 96. 3.
- 93 1 ἄριστα Αἰγινήται: cf. ch. 122. Diodorus (x. 27. 2 = Ephorus) pretends the Spartans contrived that the prize should go to the Aeginetans to humble the Athenians, while Plutarch (Mor. 871 D; de Mal. Her. 40) carps at H. for stating the simple facts of the case: these comments of later authors are without foundation.
- Ἀναγυράσιος: from Ἀναγυροῦς, a deme of the tribe Erechtheis, on the coast near Cape Zoster (ch. 107), south-east of Mount Illymettus; cf. Paus. i. 31. 1, with Frazer.

- 2 γυναικα. For the general feeling about women cf. ch. 68. a n. The Athenians, whose repulse of the Amazons was among the greatest of their legendary glories (ix. 27. 4 n.), may have been specially sensitive.

ἦσαν . . . Φαλήρῳ. These words repeat, after the interruption, the conclusion of ch. 92.

- 94 That this Athenian story was a late and malicious invention is hinted by H. himself in the words (§ 4) μαρτυρεῖ δέ σφι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς. Indeed, the phrase φάτις ἔχει is itself a note of uncertainty; cf. vii. 3. 2; ix. 84. 2. There is no trace of any such charge elsewhere, and immediately after the battle the Athenians allowed the following epitaph to be placed on the tomb of the Corinthians buried at Salamis (Hicks, 18; cf. Plut. Mor. 870 E) [᾽Ω ξεῖνε, εὐσδρ]όν ποκ' ἐναίομες ἄστν Κορίνθου [Νῦν δ' ἀμὲρ Αἴα]ντος [νᾶσος ἔχει Σαλαμῖς]. The other couplet given by Plutarch (of which there is no trace on the stone) is a later addition, as shown by the scansion Πέρσας ἐνθάδε Φοινίσσας νῆας καὶ Πέρσας ἐλόντες | καὶ Μήδους ἱερὰν Ἑλλάδα ῥυσαμέθα, but there is no reason to suspect the epitaphs taken by Plutarch (*l. c.*), cf. Dio Chrys. xxxvii, p. 459, from the cenotaph erected to the Corinthians at the Isthmus and from the grave of Adimantus Ἀκμᾶς ἐστακυῖαν ἐπὶ ξυροῦ Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν | ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς κείμεθα ῥυσάμενοι and Οὗτος Ἀδεϊμάντου κείνου τάφος, οὗ διὰ βουλὰς | Ἑλλὰς ἐλευθερίας ἀμφέθετο στέφανον. The fact is that Adimantus, here as elsewhere (cf. viii. 5. 59), suffers for the sins of his son Aristeus, one of the most active enemies of Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war (cf. vii. 137. 3; Thuc. i. 60, 65, ii. 67). We should not, with Plutarch (*l. c.*), ascribe such tales to the malignity of H. but to the bitter feelings of his Athenian informants (cf. Introduction, p. 39). For the real mission of the Corinthians cf. App. XXI. 8.

τὰ ἱστία ἀειράμενον: hoisting sail was a proof of flight (cf. vi. 14. 2; viii. 56), since in battle the trireme took down mast and sail and used only oars.

- 5 Stein would place this temple of Athene Scirias on the south point of the island, apparently called Cape Sciradium (Plut. Solon 9), and would thus interpret Plutarch's (de Mal. 39; Mor. 870 B) τὰ λήγοντα τῆς Σαλαμινίας, 'the end of the land of Salamis,' but this phrase may better be applied to the territory of the town Salamis, and the temple placed two miles north of the town on Cape Arapis, near the modern arsenal and the isle of Leros (cf. Appendix XXI. 8).
- 95 Aeschylus distinctly put this exploit after the defeat of the Persian fleet, when the Greeks can surround the island with their ships and land from them (Pers. 455 f.). H. seems to date it at the time of the Persian rout (ἐν τῷ θορύβῳ τοῦτω, cf. ch. 91). Plutarch mistakenly makes Aristides land from boats with some picked volunteers at the beginning of the sea-fight, and adds other untrustworthy details from Phanias (Them. 13; Arist. 9). Bury argues forcibly that

Aristides, being given so important a duty, must have been a Strategus (ch. 79 n.).

96 1 **ἔτι ἔόντα** : many had been carried over to the Attic shore still held by the enemy (cf. § 2).

2 **Cape Colias** is wrongly placed by Strabo (398) near Anaphlystus. Since Pausanias (i. 1. 5) makes it twenty stades from Phalerum, it is probably Cape Cosmas (Kiepert, xiv. 6), a narrow tongue of land with shelving beach, (not Trispyrgi (Leake; Milchöfer), a rocky headland only 600 yards from the probable site of Phalerum.) Vessels would be thrown on this part of the coast by such a wind as appears from H. and Plutarch (Them. 14) to have blown on the day of Salamis. But no doubt the particular spot is named to bring out the fulfilment of the oracles, the completeness of which H. emphasizes in the words ἀποπλησθῆναι . . . πάντα.

ἀνδρὶ χρησμοδόγῳ : cf. vii. 6. 3 n.

ἐλελήθεε, 'whose meaning had escaped all the Greeks before the battle of Salamis.'

φρύξουσιν, 'the Coliad women shall roast (their barley) with oars.' Pollux, i. 246 Σόλων δὲ καὶ τὰς νύμφας ἰούσας ἐπὶ τὸν γάμον ἐκέλευσε φρύγετρον φέρειν σημεῖον ἀλφειτουργίας, shows that 'the roaster' was a distinctive token of the housewife.

97-9 *Xerxes meditates flight. Account of the Persian post and of the reception at Susa of the news of defeat.*

97 H. gives no details of the losses on either side, Ctesias (Pers. 26) gives the Persian loss in ships as 500, Diodorus (xi. 19, Ephorus) says 40 Greek ships were destroyed and over 200 Persian besides those captured.

Ctesias (Pers. 26) and Strabo (395) make Xerxes begin the mole before the battle. But it is unlikely that he would engage in a lengthy and laborious operation of such doubtful utility, while he had confidence in the superiority of his fleet. Again, after the loss of the battle and the retreat of his fleet, he could not hope to carry through the undertaking. Alexander, indeed, succeeded at Tyre (Arr. Anab. ii. 18), though only after defeating the Tyrian fleet, but there the channel was less than half a mile in width and three fathom deep, whereas at Salamis, even at the narrowest point by the Heracleum (Ctesias, l. c.), it is nearly a mile broad and four fathom at least in depth. H. is therefore justified in regarding it as a mere pretence to mask the retreat, unless indeed the whole story is a mistaken inference from some preparations for making a wharf or pier, or, again, an invention on the analogy of Xerxes' other violations of nature (Isocr. Paneg. 89; Juv. x. 174 f.), the Hellespont bridge and Athos canal (J. H. S. xxii. 332).

98 1 Xenophon (Cyp. viii. 6. 18), too, says the Persian post is the quickest travelling accomplished by man on land. We may compare 'The prairie post or pony express' in Mark Twain's 'Roughing

it' (Macan), and, better, the description of the Great Khan's post (Marco Polo, bk. ii, ch. 26; Yule, i. 433 f.): 'These men travel a good 200 or 250 miles in the day . . . the despatch speeds along from post to post always at full gallop with a regular change of horses.'

- 2 **λαμπαδηφορίη.** Torch races were held at the Panathenaea, and the festivals of Prometheus, Hephaestus, Pan (vi. 105. 3), Bendis (Plato, Rep. i. 328 A), Hermes, and Theseus. They appear to have been of two kinds. In the simpler, a number of runners each with a lighted torch started abreast, and the one who first carried his torch alight to the goal won (Paus. i. 30. 2). The other was a relay or team race. There were several lines of runners; the first man in each line had his torch lighted at the altar and ran with it at full speed to the second, to whom he passed it on, the second to the third, and so on till the last man carried it to the goal. The line of runners which first passed its torch alight to the goal was the winning team. Cf. Lucr. ii. 79; Aesch. Ag. 312 f.; and of the similar horse race to Bendis, Plato, *l.c.* λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις (cf. also Laws 776 B). The torch race arose from the custom of transmitting a new and sacred fire from the altar to hearths polluted by death or the enemy's presence (Plut. Arist. 20). In such cases the old fire was extinguished and new pure fire carried as quickly as possible by runners to the hearths awaiting it (cf. Frazer, Paus. ii. 392).

**ἄγγαρος,** 'post-rider,' is a Babylonian loan-word (Meyer, iii, § 39 n.), the pure Persian being *āstāndehs*. It is used by Aesch. Ag. 282 φρυκτὸς δὲ φρυκτὸν δεῦρ' ἀπ' ἀγγάρου πυρὸς | ἔπεμπεν, and Xen. Cyrop. viii. 6. 17. For this post cf. also Esther viii. 10, iii. 13.

- 99 1 For the offerings cf. vii. 54. 1 n., and for the first message viii. 54.  
2 Aeschylus (Pers. 535 f.) gives a vivid account of the mourning at Susa, but does not, like H., add the truly Oriental touch that the king's danger was the Persians' first thought.

100-2 *The advice given by Mardonius and Artemisia to the King.*

- 00 1 **ἔφερε:** here neuter: 'his opinion inclined to'; cf. iii. 77. 1.  
4 For the list of naval contingents cf. Artemisia's speech, ch. 68 γ. Both speakers omit the Ionians, as if free of blame; Mardonius substitutes Phoenicians for Pamphylians. A Persian would not be likely to blame the Phoenician and spare the Ionian.

01 1 **ὥς ἐκ κακῶν,** 'was pleased and glad so far as might be considering his past misfortunes'; cf. Thuc. vii. 42.

**ἐπικλήτοισι:** cf. vii. 8 n.

- 2 **ἀπόδεξις,** 'they would be glad to have an opportunity of proving their innocence.'

- 4 *ad fin.* Literally (Macan): 'Advise me by doing which of the two I shall succeed in having been well advised.' The phrase is an extension of the ordinary τί ποιῶν ἐπιτεύξομαι, ἐπτυγχάνει

being here (and in ch. 103) used with the participle like the simple verb (102. 1). Perhaps the preposition adds the idea of hitting the mark.

- 103 ἐς Ἐφεσον : the starting-point of the great road by Sardis to Susa ; cf. v. 52 f., especially 54, 55. Stein and Duncker (vii. 291) argue that the entrusting by Xerxes of his sons to Artemisia and Hermotimus shows that he had not determined to retreat, and consequently that the consultation of Artemisia is a fable. The suggestion is plausible but not convincing, since there are many reasons why Xerxes might prefer to send his sons by sea and go himself by land.

νόθοι : sons of concubines. H. regards the chief queen Amestris as the only true wife.

104-6 *Story of Hermotimus and his revenge.*

- 104 φερόμενον... οὐ τὰ δεύτερα. A metaphor from athletic contests ; cf. II. xxiii. 537 = οὐδενὸς δεύτερος (i. 23).

This notice of Pedasa (cf. v. 121 n.) is a repetition of one already given (i. 175), and was probably originally added in the margin by some reader who remembered the earlier chapter, and thence crept into the text. Here it does not suit the context. Again, though in style partially Herodotean, it betrays its origin by strange usages such as ἐν τὸς χρόνου, an unlucky imitation of ἐκὰς χρόνου (ch. 144. 5) and ἀμφί with the genitive, while φύει and χαλεπὸν seem like a grammarian's explanations of the Herodotean (i. 175) ἴσχει and ἀνεπιτήδεον. Finally, Strabo (611) quotes the passage as given in Bk. I, i. e. in its true form.

- 105 I ἤδη, here and ch. 106. 3, like δῆ, strengthens the superlative : 'the greatest known' ; cf. ii. 148. 1 ; Thuc. vi. 31 μέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους.

ἀλόντα : possibly at the time of the Ionic revolt (v. 121 ; vi. 32), possibly by pirates.

Ephesus and Sardis were the starting-points of the Royal Road to Susa (v. 52 f.). Also at Sardis there was a temple of Cybele (v. 102), 'the great mother,' served by eunuch priests called 'Galli' (Juv. viii. 176 ; Mayor), and at Ephesus the eunuch-priests of Artemis, called Megabyzi, were held in honour (Strabo 641).

- 2 τῆς πάσης, 'in every respect.' This view of the fidelity of eunuchs is ascribed by Xenophon (Cyp. vii. 560 f.) to Cyrus, while Ctesias (Pers. 5 and 9) makes Pesitacas and Bagapates have great influence with Cyrus, Ixabates and Aspadates with Cambyses, &c., but the preponderant influence of the eunuch and the harem in Persia seems really to begin with the reign of Xerxes (cf. ix. 108). For their extensive use and functions at court cf. iii. 77, 92, 130, and i. 117. The custom is said to have been derived from Babylon (cf. iii. 92 and Hellan. fr. 169, F. H. G. i. 68).

- 106 I ἐν Σάρδεσι : in the winter, 481-480 B.C. ; cf. vii. 37. 1.

Ἀταρνεύς : cf. i. 160. 4 ; vi. 28. 2 n. It is referred to (§ 2) as ἐκείνη.



3 τὸ μηδέν : cf. i. 32. 1 n. ; 'a cipher.'

4 περιήλθε : either as περιέλαβε (§ 3), 'entrapped,' or 'came at length upon'.

τίσις. The vengeance of heaven is personified as Ὁρκου πάϊς (vi. 86 γ), and in Homer as μοῖρα, ἄτη, ἐρινός ; it works of itself on behalf of justice, bringing about the chance meeting and the judicial blindness of the offender. The human agent only co-operates ; cf. also i. 13. 2 ; iii. 126. 1, 128. 5.

07-12 *Retreat of the Persian fleet and pursuit of the Greeks as far as Andros. Stories of Themistocles and the bridge (108-9), of his second message to Xerxes (110), and of the Andrians (111-12).*

07 1 ταύτην . . . τὴν ἡμέρην : apparently the day of the battle (ch. 108. 1), though H. does not expressly say so. This, however, is impossible, since one or more days are required for the mustering of the shattered fleet, the disembarkation of the Egyptian marines (ix. 32. 2), and the pretended preparations to continue the struggle (ch. 97) ; cf. Busolt, ii. 708.

πορευθῆναι : epexegetic infinitive loosely connected with διαφυλάξουσας ; cf. iv. 64. 3 ; vii. 25. 1.

2 Ζωστήρ. The massive triple-tongued promontory to the west of Vari (Anagyrus, ch. 93). Off the middle cape, a long, narrow, indented spit of land, is a large low island Phabra (Strabo 398). It is, however, hard to believe that even frightened Orientals mistook these headlands for ships. (Vouliaqman temple of Athena) 1927/8, 5

08 1 Φάληρον : whither they had retreated after the battle (ch. 92. 2). Ἄνδρου. Macan thinks the Greek fleet cannot have sailed to Andros, leaving Salamis unprotected, while Xerxes was still in Attica, nor have attacked the islands without an express resolution of the council passed at Salamis, but a reconnaissance to Andros by the main fleet, while a few ships guarded Salamis, is not improbable, and the decision of the council is taken there according to H.

2 Εὐρυβιάδης. Macan doubts whether Eurybiades should figure as the opponent of Themistocles in this debate, but the substitution of Aristides (Plut. Them. 16 ; Arist. 9) reads like a later fiction devised by some one anxious to add another occasion for their constant differences ; and the transfer of the conversation to Salamis seems almost accidental.

9 3 For the scourging of the sea cf. vii. 35 n. The burning of temples is proved by the instances adduced (v. 102. 1 n.) and by the ruins of temples never restored seen by Pausanias (x. 35. 2 f., with Frazer). It is strongly affirmed by Aesch. Pers. 809 οἱ γῆν μολόντες Ἑλλάδ' οὐ θεῶν βρέτη | ἡδοῦντο συλᾶν οὐδὲ πιμπράναι νεώς· | βωμοὶ δ' αἴιστοι, δαιμόνων θ' ἰδρύματα | πρόρριζα φύρδην ἐξανέστραπται βάθρων. But Cicero's idea (de Leg. ii. 10. 26) of an iconoclastic crusade is without foundation.

4 For ἀλλά . . . γάρ cf. ch. 8. 1, 108. 4 ; vii. 158. 3, &c.

Themistocles seems to assume that the Persians will at least retreat from Attica.

- 5 ἀποθήκην . . . ποιήσεσθαι. In Thuc. i. 137 Themistocles asserts his claim καὶ μοι εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται, γράψας τὴν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε δι' αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν. For the story of Themistocles' banishment and flight to Persia see Thuc. i. 135–8. He was probably ostracized 471–470, and fled to Persia five years later (Meyer, iii, § 286 n.).

II O H. is evidently here under the influence of traditions hostile to Themistocles. There is no special reason to suspect him of double dealing in this case; he may quite well have been honestly in favour of breaking down the bridge and stirring up revolt among the Greeks of Asia, and yet have resolved to sacrifice the project rather than make a breach in the alliance with the Peloponnesians. It is, however, hard to believe that he seriously contemplated sending the fleet to the Hellespont while the Persian army was still in Attica. Possibly he proposed the plan when Xerxes had begun his retreat; cf. further § 2 n. With this character of Themistocles cf. ch. 124; Thuc. i. 138.

- 2 Σίκιννος. Plutarch (Them. 16; Arist. 9) and Polyænus (i. 30. 4) substitutes a captive eunuch, Arnaces. Thucydides (i. 137; cf. 109. 5 n.) speaks of this second message as sent from Salamis. A. Bauer (Them. pp. 22, 49) and Wecklein (Ber. der bayer. Akad. (1876) p. 296; with whom Meyer, iii, § 226 n., seems disposed to agree) regard this second message as an invention of the enemies of Themistocles, designed to cloud the glory of the first. But Thucydides (*l.c.*), rightly construed, implies that some message warning Xerxes to retreat was sent. It may have been, however, as Duncker (vii. 295 f.), following Ephorus (Diod. xi. 19) and Ctesias (26 φεύγει Ξέρξης βούλη πάλιν καὶ τέχνη Ἀριστείδου καὶ Θεμιστοκλέους), argues, a mere ruse to hasten the departure of Xerxes, although in his letter (ap. Thuc. i. 137) Themistocles later claimed it was a benefit conferred on the king. It is certainly odd that Xerxes should again accept advice from Themistocles when Sicinnus' first message had had such disastrous results.

III 2 νησιωτέων: cf. vii. 95. 1.

χρήματα: clearly the fleet exacted war indemnities from islands that had supported the enemy (cf. 66. 2). These would be used for the pay and provisions of the crews. Such ἀργυρολογία was a common practice in the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. ii. 69; iii. 19; iv. 50, 75, &c.). H. unfairly (cf. ch. 4. 2 n.) represents the whole matter as if it had to do with the private gain of Themistocles (ch. 112). No doubt some money may have stuck to the fingers of the most influential leader (Timocreon, fr. 1), but these exactions were in the main public.

- 3 Cf. Alcaeus, fr. 92 ἀργύλεον πενία, κάκον ἄσχετον, ἃ μέγα δάμνης, ἡ λαὸν ἀμαχανία σὺν ἀδελφέα, Eur. fr. 250 οὐκ ἔστι πενίας ἱερὸν ἐχθίστης θεοῦ. For the concluding gnome cf. vii. 172. 3.

- 12 I ἐς τὰς ἄλλας: with the exception, of course, of the loyal states (cf. ch. 46).
- 3 ὑπερβολή: here and Polyb. xiv. 9. 8, 'delay' from ὑπερβάλλεσθαι. For the fact cf. ch. 121.  
 ἱλασάμενοι, 'appeasing,' a word appropriate to a man's attitude to a god (i. 50. 1, 67. 2, &c.); here ironical, Themistocles having boasted of the gods who were his good allies (111. 2).
- 13-20 *The retreat of Xerxes to Thessaly (113-14) and thence to Sardis (115-17). An alternative story rejected (118-20).*
- 13 I τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδόν: by the same way as he had come; possibly Xerxes and his suite returned from the Thriasian plain by Eleutheræ (ch. 65. 1 n.) to Thebes, though next year Mardonius is said to have gone by Decelea and Tanagra (ix. 15), but probably the army used all the practicable routes.  
 προπέμψαι. Considerations of transport and supply must have made it necessary for Mardonius to retire to Thessaly for winter quarters, and it was now October (ἄνωρῃ). Only Artabazus' corps really escorted the king on his homeward way (ch. 126). For the force retained by Mardonius cf. Appendix XIX. 5.
- 2 τοὺς ἀθανάτους: cf. vii. 41. 2, 83. 1.  
 θωρηκοφόρους: cf. vii. 61. 1 n.  
 τὴν ἵππον τὴν χιλῆν: in vii. 40, 41, and 55 it appears that there were two regiments of this strength. For the Medes cf. vii. 62, the Sacæ and Bactrians vii. 64, and the Indians vii. 65.
- 3 ἐν δὲ . . . αἰρέετο, 'among the nations selected the Persian was in strongest force.' Cf. Thuc. iii. 39 ἀποφαίνω Μυτιληναίους μάλιστα δὴ μίαν πόλιν ἡδικηκότας ὑμᾶς, iii. 113, viii. 40.  
 στρεπτοφόρους. For Persian ornaments cf. vii. 83. 2 n.; ix. 80. 2.
- 14 I τὸ διδόμενον, 'what was offered them'; iii. 148. 2; viii. 138. 1; ix. 111. 5.
- 2 Verrall has most ingeniously shown how this apocryphal story may have arisen from a painted or sculptured group symbolic of the fact that Plataea was Sparta's revenge for Thermopylae, depicting Xerxes answering a herald by pointing to Mardonius, with an inscription in hexameters here put into prose (cf. ix. 76 n.; Cl. Rev. xvii. 101, 102) ὦ βασιλεῦ Μήδων, Λακεδαίμονιοί τε φόνοιο | αἰτεῦσίν σε δίκας Σπάρτης ἀπὸ θ' Ἡρακλείδαι, | Ἑλλάδα ῥυόμενόν σφιν ὅτι κτεῖνας βασιλῆα. H. was convinced of the truth of the story by the inscription, and regarded the scene as an historic fact.
- 15 I δεξάμενος. In a double sense of 'accepting' the price offered and the omen; ch. 137. 5; i. 63. 1; ix. 91. 2.  
 πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. Though the advance (ch. 57. 1) took double the time, a retreat of about 550 miles in 45 days is not so rapid as to imply disorderly flight.  
 οὐδὲν μέρος: an obvious exaggeration, as may be seen from H.'s own statements elsewhere (ch. 130. 1). The Greeks were convinced

that Xerxes started homewards with the greater part of his force (Thuc. i. 73 *κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλείονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησεν*, cf. ch. 100. 5), only leaving Mardonius a picked force (ch. 113; Aesch. Pers. 803 *πληθος ἔκκριτον στρατοῦ*), and reached Asia with a mere handful of men; hence multitudes must have perished by the way. But in all probability Xerxes left Mardonius the bulk of the land force; otherwise what need was there for Artabazus with a corps from Mardonius' army to escort him (ch. 126?). And that corps, whose original strength was 60,000 (ch. 126), is estimated, even after its heavy losses in the winter campaign (ch. 127 f.), as 40,000 strong (ix. 66. 2). It would seem then that, even in Herodotus, the losses and sufferings of the retreat have been much exaggerated. Yet more incredible are the horrors in Aeschylus, the losses from hunger and thirst in Thessaly, where Mardonius wintered, and the disaster through the melting of the ice on the Strymon (Pers. 495 f.); cf. Grote iv. 489 f. From the first the contrast between the proud advance and the miserable retreat of Xerxes struck the Greek imagination, and the contrast got more and more exaggerated as time went on. Cf. Justin ii. 13 'ipse cum paucis Abydon contendit, ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus offendisset, piscatoria scapha trepidus traiecit . . . (carens) etiam omni servorum ministerio'. We may see from the scarcity of details, as well as from the suspicious character of some of those given, both in H. and Aeschylus, how slight was the knowledge the Greeks had of the retreat of Xerxes, as compared with the full account of his advance (vii. 61 n.).

- 3 **Siris**, on a tributary of the Strymon, in a fertile plain just north-east of Lake Cercinitis, capital of *Σιριοπαῖοι* (v. 15. 3 n.), now Seres. For the line of march cf. vii. 121. 2 n.

- 4 **νεμομένας**. The subject must be *τὰς ἵππους* understood from *ἄρμα* (*σὺρ.*); cf. iv. 8. 3. In describing the chariot (vii. 40. 3) H. spoke of horses, not mares.

According to Strabo (329, fr. 36 f.) the Agrianes dwelt round the source of the Strymon, but they were Paeonian (cf. v. 16. 1 n.; Thuc. ii. 96).

- 116 1 The **Bisaltae** lived above Argilus (vii. 115. 1), and the Crestonian land reached as far as the sources of the Echeidorus (vii. 124, 127. 2, and v. 3. 2 n.), but it may have touched Bisaltia at its other end and have been subject to the Bisaltian prince.

- 117 1 **ἐντεταμέναις**: cf. vii. 34 n. According to a tradition followed by Aeschylus (cf. Pers. 734-6 *μονάδα δὲ Ξέρξην ἔρημόν φασιν οὐ πολλῶν μέτα— | ἄσμενον μολεῖν γέφυραν γαῖν δυοῖν ζευκτηρίαν*), the bridge was still intact, and even after Mycale the Greeks did not know it had perished (ix. 106. 4).

- 2 Hippocrates (*περὶ ἀέρων* 7) ascribed the greatest importance to differences in the source and taste of water, *πλείστον γὰρ μέρος συμβάλλεται ἐς τὴν ὑγίειν*.

- 118 2 **Στρυνονίην**: North North-east. Arist. de Ventis 973 b 17 *Θρακίας*

κατὰ μὲν Θράκην Στρυμονίας, πνεί γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 192 πνοαὶ δ' ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος μολοῦσαι | κακόσχολοι, νήσιτιδες, δύσσορμοι, which are called (l. 1418) Θρηκίων ἀημάτων.

119 ἐν μυρίῃσι, 'among ten thousand opinions not one would be to the contrary.'

ἐς κοίλην νέα, 'into the hold' among the rowers, the Persian marines being on deck (vii. 184. 2).

ὅκως οὐκ ἂν . . . ἐξέβαλε. Instead of putting ἐκβαλεῖν answering to ἐκβιβάσαι, H. makes this clause depend on the main verb οὐχ ἔχω ἀντίξοον, and also substitutes ὅκως οὐκ ἂν ἐξέβαλε for μὴ οὐκ ἂν ἐκβαλεῖν.

Xerxes might well prefer to keep skilled Phoenician sailors and sacrifice a few Persian grandees.

120 The golden acinaces was among the regular royal gifts (iii. 84. n.; Xen. Anab. i. 2. 27, 8. 29), the royal tiara of golden tissue naturally was not. For similar gifts cf. iii. 20. 1; vii. 116.

τὴν ζώνην. Cf. the oath of Histiaeus, v. 106. 6.

Ἀβδηρα. For its site cf. vii. 109. 1 n. The sense is 'Abdera is nearer the Hellespont than is the Strymon'.

121-5 *The thank-offerings of the Greeks and the fame of Themistocles.*

121 I ἐς Ἴσθμόν: to Poseidon (ch. 123. 2), to whom there was an early Doric temple in the Isthmian sacred enclosure (Paus. ii. 1. 7, with Frazer).

ἐπὶ Σούνιον: to Poseidon. The marble temple, some of whose pillars still remain, stands on an old temple of stone (cf. Frazer on Paus. i. 1).

For the dedication of ships cf. Thuc. ii. 84, 92. It was more usual to cut the prows off and dedicate them (cf. iii. 59. 3; Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 8; vi. 2. 36, and the 'rostra' at Rome).

2 ἀκροθίνια. The first-fruits or tithe (δεκάτη); cf. v. 77. 4; vii. 132. 2 n.; viii. 27. 5.

ἀνδριάς: an Apollo (Paus. x. 14. 5), though H. suppresses the name; cf. ch. 27. 5; i. 183. 2.

Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ χρύσεος. The existence of this statue is confirmed by Ps. Philip (Ep. 21 = Dem. 12. 21) Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ προγόνου πρώτου κατασχόντος τὸν τόπον (i. e. Amphipolis) ὅθεν καὶ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων Μήδων ἀπαρχὴν ἀνδριάντα χρυσοῦν ἀνέστησεν εἰς Δελφούς.

122 Apparently Apollo claimed the ἀριστήρια for himself because he had vouchsafed to the Aeginetans a propitious sign such as that given to Lysander at Aegospotami (Plut. Lys. 12; Cic. de Div. i. 34. 75). After that battle the Spartans dedicated two stars to the Dioscuri, whose connexion with the stars is older than that with St. Elmo's fire. The third star here may have represented (Preller, Gr. Myth. i<sup>3</sup>. 207; ii<sup>3</sup>. 106) Apollo Delphinios, also a saviour from storms at sea much worshipped at Aegina. Probably one star was at the top of the mast and the others at either end of the yard-arm.



τοῦ Κροίσου κρητῆρος: i.e. the silver bowl which stood at the angle of the ante-temple; the golden bowl had been moved elsewhere (i. 51).

A more permanent memorial of Aegina's deliverance may be seen in the Aeginetan marbles at Munich, the pediment sculptures from the temple of Aphaia at Aegina; cf. iii. 59. 3 n.

- 123 διέφερον: voted in the division (iv. 138. 1). For the solemn procedure cf. Plut. Per. 32; Dem. de Cor. 134. Plutarch (Them. 17; de Her. Mal. 40. 871 D) makes *every* general vote the second prize to Themistocles. A similar story is told of contending sculptors who agreed in giving the second place to the Amazon of Polycleitus (Plin. N. H. xxxiv. 53).

- 124 1 ἀκρίτων, 'without deciding'; active, so ἄπιστος (ix. 98. 4), ἄπρακτος (Thuc. iv. 61, 99).

2 ὄχφ. Sparta was famous for its manufacture of chariots.

3 For the 300 Spartan knights cf. i. 67. 5 n.

Both the asyndeton (cf. i. 20. 1) and δὴ (cf. vi. 68. 3) intensify the force of μόνον. The Athenian envoy at Sparta (432 B.C.) is equally emphatic on the exceptional honours paid to Themistocles (Thuc. i. 74).

- 125 1 Ἀφιδναῖος: cf. ix. 73. 2 n.

τὴν ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, &c. The proposals of Alexander as envoy of Mardonius (ch. 136) and the Spartan reply would give occasion for dragging in Themistocles' relations with Sparta. Diodorus declares (xi. 27) that the Athenians were so angry with Themistocles for accepting gifts from the Spartans that they deprived him of his command and gave it to Xanthippus, but the statement is only an inference drawn by Ephorus from the facts in H.

- 2 Βελβινίτης. Belbina is a rocky islet about ten miles south of Sunium at the entrance of the Saronic gulf, now St. George. It remained a separate community (Scylax, 52), paying tribute as late as 425 B.C. (C. I. A. i. 37; Hicks, 64). It is here a mere example of an utterly unimportant place (Teles in Stobaeus, xl. 8 ονειδίζουσι μὲν ὅτι Κύθνιος ἢ ὅτι Μυκόνιος ἢ ὅτι Βελβινίτης), the assailant of Themistocles being an Athenian (§ 2) of Aphidna (§ 1), and the saying meaning, 'I should not have received this honour had I been of Belbina, nor will you though you are (like me) an Athenian.' Plato (Rep. 329 E, followed by Cic. de Sen. 3. 8, Plut. Them. 18) spoils the double point of the story by making the assailant himself a Seriphian.

- 126-9 *Winter. Artabazus in Chalcidice takes Olynthus and besieges Potidaea.*

- 126 Artabazus in the list of the army commanded only the Parthians and Chorasmians (vii. 66. 2). Here he is in command of a complete army corps of 60,000, belonging to Mardonius' force, which did not include any great number from those nations (ch. 113). H. is so

fully informed about his movements and views (ix. 41 f., 66, 89), and judges him so favourably, that some special connexion with him or his descendants may safely be assumed; H. seems to have found one of his sons, Tritanaechmes, satrap of Babylon (i. 192), while Artabazus himself was given (*circa* 477 B.C.) the satrapy of Dascyleum, to promote the treacherous intrigues of Pausanias (cf. v. 32 n.; Thuc. i. 129), and was succeeded in his satrapy by his descendants, the genealogy being probably as follows (Nöldeke, *Krumbholz, de Asiae Minoris Satrapis*):

Artabazus (satrap) 477–468 (Thuc. i. 129)

Pharnabazus I

Pharnaces II (satrap) 430–414 (Thuc. ii. 67; v. 1)

Pharnabazus II (satrap) 413–389

(Thuc. viii; Xen. *Hell.* i–v. 1 and *Anab.* vi, vii).

- 127 ταύτην. The city is here elicited from the people Ὀλυνθίους (*sup.*), the converse is common (121. 1).

Βοττιαῖοι: cf. vii. 123. 3 n.

τῷ Χαλκιδικῷ γένει (cf. vii. 185. 2). The inhabitants of the Chalcidic colonies, after whom the whole peninsula was called Chalcidice. In 432 B. C., under the influence of Perdiccas, Olynthus became the centre and capital of all these Hellenic settlements on the coast. The Bottiaei coalesce with the colonists and act in close conjunction with them (Thuc. i. 57 f.; ii. 79, 99, 101; iv. 7).

- 128 I The cities of Pallene were in alliance (§ 2 *ad fin.*); so Scione (vii. 123. 1 n.) furnished a contingent for the defence of Potidaea. ὅπως . . . γράψειε, 'as often as'; for the optative cf. ch. 52. 1; i. 17. 2 *ad fin.*

γλυφίδας: probably the points on each side of the notch, where the arrow is held by the fingers. The parchment was rolled round the butt end of the arrow and then feathers put on over it to hide it. Aeneas Tacticus 31, repeating this story, reads *περί*, but that would mean that the notch was wrapped round, which would make the arrow so clumsy as to be useless. For a similar method of communication cf. Caesar, *B. G.* v. 48.

- 29 I παρήσαν. The town reached across the Isthmus, so the Persians, being without ships and wishing to get to the side towards Pallene, tried to pass along the marshy shore at low tide, but when they got two-fifths of the way were caught by the tide. Aristeus was more successful (Thuc. i. 63).

- 3 Potidaea was under the special protection of the god from whom it was named, Posidon, whose image, taken perhaps from this very statue (Head, *H. N.* p. 212), was on its coins. Such extraordinary tidal waves were naturally ascribed to him, as were earthquakes

(vii. 129. 4). No doubt it is this remarkable sign of the wrath of the god which leads H. to dwell on an unimportant episode.

130-2 *Persian fleet mustered at Samos. The Greeks under Leotychides advance from Aegina to Delos (spring, 479 B.C.).*

130 1 ἐπιλάμψαντος. The metaphōr, like πρώιος, is from the dawn of day; cf. i. 190. 1 with iii. 135. 1.

αἱ δὲ . . . αὐτοῦ: according to Diodorus (xi. 27) these might be the Phoenician ships, which were not at Cyme; but probably he believed that they fled straight home from Salamis in fear of Xerxes' wrath (xi. 19).


Περσέων . . . ἐπεβάτεον. A strange phrase meaning apparently 'most of the marines were Persians and Medes'.

2 Μαρδόντης had commanded the men from the islands in the Persian gulf (vii. 80): at Mycale he commanded the marines; the other two are new admirals of the fleet (ix. 102. 4). Bagaeus may be the faithful servant of Darius (iii. 128) and Artachaees the overseer of the Athos canal (vii. 117; cf. vii. 22. 2, 63).

πριηκοσίας. Diodorus (xi. 27) says over four hundred ἦσαν δὲ αἱ πᾶσαι νῆες ἐν Σάμῳ πλείους τῶν τετρακοσίων. H. includes in his three hundred the Phoenician squadron sent home later (ix. 96. 1).

131 2 Cf. the list of Agiadae, vii. 204. The first king among the ancestors of Leotychides is Theopompus, the seven more immediate ancestors of Leotychides belonging to the younger branch, which gained the throne by the deposition of Demaratus (cf. vi. 65. 2).

### Theopompus



Εὐνόμου τοῦ Πολυδέκτου. It has been held that Eunomus is a mere pseudonym for Lycurgus, who created εὐνομία, and should be ejected from the lists; the order is reversed in Paus. iii. 7. 2; Plut.

Lyc. 1; the change in his place in the list is to accommodate his reign to the supposed date of Lycurgus.

Εὐρυφῶντος. Eurypon is the eponymous hero of the Eurypontid house. After him Pausanias, Plutarch (*ll. c.*), &c., insert Soos; but the insertion seems to be late and designed to make each royal house consist of an equal number of kings.

- 3 The emendation *ἐπτά*, i.e. ζ' for β', is necessary. The first king in the line of Leotychides' ancestors is Theopompus, not Hippocratides, and H. (i. 65. 1) agrees with Pausanias (iii. 1) in making Agesicles king. Of course the immediate descendants of Heracles were not kings of Sparta.

Xanthippus is the opponent of Miltiades (vi. 131. 2, 136. 1 n.), ostracized 485–484 B.C. (Ath. Pol. 22), but now returned from exile (ch. 79 n.). Curiously enough another Xanthippus was archon in 479 (Diod. xi. 27; Mar. Par. 52).

- 32 1 Ἴωνων. These men speak as if they were envoys sent by the Ionians, though apparently only Chian refugees acting on their own initiative.

- 2 Ἡρόδοτος: mentioned by the historian perhaps because of his name, perhaps from personal friendship or relationship; but cf. *Intro.* p. 2. An old Chian inscription (I. G. A. 382) gives Ἀθηναγόρης Ἡροδότου. Στράτι. Tyrant ever since the Scythian expedition; iv. 138. 2.

- 3 τὴν . . . Σάμον . . . ἀπέχειν. A dramatic exaggeration (cf. vi. 112). No doubt communication had been interrupted by war and piracy (Grundy, 433 f.), but Athenians had been to Sardis less than twenty years before, and even the Dorians had attacked Samos in the days of Polycrates (iii. 47 f.). In this *reductio ad absurdum* the author (or his Ionian source) is deriding the timidity of the Greeks and their admiral. It was not ignorance of the distance but fear of the enemy which kept the Greek fleet at Delos.

ἀναπλῶσαι seems a necessary emendation since here the author is speaking from an Ionian point of view, and ἀνωτέρω (cf. 130. 2) means 'further out to sea' (from Asia) than Samos. So καταπλῶσαι (§ 2) is 'to sail towards land' and κατωτέρω here 'nearer Asia' than Delos.

- 33-44 Mardonius through Mys consults oracles (133-5), and through Alexander of Macedon tries to win Athens. Origin of the Macedonian monarchy (137-9). Speeches of Alexander and the Spartans. Replies of Athens (140-4).

- 133 Εὐρωπεία: from Europus. There were towns of that name in Emathia (Thuc. ii. 100), Media (founded by the Macedonians, Strabo 524), and Syria (Steph. Byz.). Mys was, however, clearly a Carian (ch. 135. 3; Paus. ix. 23. 6). There was a town in Caria named Euromus (Strabo 635; Steph. Byz. *s.v.*), hence Stein suggested Εὐρωμεία here, needlessly, since Pausanias (*l. c.*) also reads Εὐρωπεία, and Steph. Byz. (*s.v.*) says Europus was another name for the Carian town Idrias.

But perhaps for some reason Hippokratides  
and his Tegen.

For a Carian as interpreter being *δίγλωσσος* cf. Thuc. viii. 85.  
 σφι. Mardonius and the Persians; cf. ch. 136. 2. Some would forbid access to a barbarian.

134 1 The old city of Lebadeia stood at the mouth of a wild gorge, probably on the eastern bank of the Hercyna, about ten minutes north of the modern town, while the grove of Trophonius was on the western bank (Strabo 414; Paus. ix. 37. 5, with Frazer, v. 196 f.).

The legend of Trophonius is the common folk-tale of the Clever Thief (cf. ii. 121 β; for his end cf. i. 31. 3 n.). Trophonius appears to have been originally the chief local god of Lebadeia (Paus. i. 34. 2); later, in accordance with a common tendency of Greek religion as it became systematized, he was degraded into a hero. On inscriptions he is sometimes distinguished from and sometimes identified with Zeus Basileus: Strabo (*l. c.*) speaks of an oracle of Zeus Trophonius, and Livy (xlv. 27) of a temple, yet Pausanias (ix. 39. 5) distinguishes Zeus Basileus and Trophonius. Cicero seems to identify Trophonius with Mercury (de Nat. Deor. iii. 22. 56). His statue by Praxiteles had the appearance and attributes of Aesculapius, particularly the snake, perhaps the earliest representation of the god (cf. Paus. ix. 39. 3). Pausanias (*l. c.*) describes the way of consulting the oracle from his own experience. The inquirer had first to live some days in the shrine of 'Agathos Daemon' and Tyche, to eat sacrificial meats and wash in the water of the Hercyna, and to sacrifice a ram. Then at night he was taken to the springs of Lethe and Mnemosyne, to drink forgetfulness of the past and memory for the revelations to come. Thence the priests took him to a vaulted cave on the hill; from the upper chamber he climbed down a small ladder into a pit some six feet across and twelve feet deep, bearing honey-cakes in his hands to appease the chthonian deity. There, lying on his back, he worked his way feet foremost through a small opening into the inner shrine and returned in the same way afterwards. While still bewildered and under the influence of the deity, the priests placed him on the chair of Mnemosyne, and asked him what he had seen and heard. His answer was interpreted and versified (Paus. iv. 32. 5) by the priests. For Trophonius cf. Farnell, Greek Hero Cults, pp. 21, 245-6, and for Amphiaraus *ib.* pp. 58-62.

\*Αβας: cf. ch. 33 n.

πρῶτα ὡς ἀπῖκετο: brachylogy for 'he visited Thebes first and when he was come there'; cf. i. 17. 2.

Ἰσμήνη: cf. i. 92. 1 n.; v. 59.

ἱροῖσι = ἐμπύροισι: 'burnt sacrifices'; in Thebes omens were taken from the flame or the ashes of the victim burnt (Soph. Oed. Tyr. 21 μαντεία σποδῶ). So the Iamidae (ix. 33. 1) took auspices at the altar of Zeus at Olympia; cf. Pind. Ol. viii. 2.

κατεκοίμησε ἐς Ἀμφιάρεω. Amphiaraus was consulted by sleeping in his shrine on the skin of a sacrificed ram (Paus. i. 34. 5). Mys probably visited not his most famous shrine near Oropus (Paus.



i. 34) but one near Thebes. Amphiarus, probably originally a chthonian deity, became in legend an Argive hero, one of the Seven against Thebes. The earth was said to have swallowed him up, by some at Harma (Paus. *l.c.*; ix. 19. 4), by others at a place between Potniae and Thebes, where there was a shrine (Paus. ix. 8. 3). This would seem to be the place meant here, since the offerings made by Croesus to Amphiarus were transferred to the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes (i. 52), and the refusal to permit Thebans to consult the oracles reads like a taboo against natives. Strabo expressly tells us (404) that the oracle of Amphiarus was brought to Oropus from Cnopia in the Theban territory, and this may have happened just after H. wrote (cf. Frazer, v. 31). In any case the usages would seem to have been similar. We may compare the oracle of Calchas at Drium in Apulia (Strabo 284) and of Faunus (Virg. Aen. vii. 81 f.; Ovid, Fast. iv. 649). Amphiarus was consulted chiefly by the sick; grateful patients cast gold or silver coins into the sacred spring (Paus. i. 34. 4); for parallels cf. Frazer, *ad loc.* Plutarch (Arist. 19; Mor. 412) says that Mardonius' envoy to Amphiarus was a Lydian, and that the vision vouchsafed to him foretold that Mardonius should be slain by a stone.

35 1 Πτόον. Mount Ptous was said to be named from a son of Athamas and Themisto (Apollodorus i. 9. 2). It is a range with three peaks (τρικάρηνον, Pind. fr. 70 ap. Strabo 412) between Lake Copais and the Euboic sea. On a conspicuous hill connected with it by a ridge is the ruined acropolis of Acraephia (Paus. ix. 23. 5 with Frazer), north of the Athamantian plain (cf. vii. 197. 1 n.). Fifteen stadia away from Acraephia, in a little valley beneath the true summit of Mount Ptous (Mount Palagia), was the temple of Apollo, excavated by the French School (1885-6, 1891). For an account of it cf. Frazer, v. 100-3.

The oracle declined after the destruction of Thebes (335 B.C., Paus. ix. 23. 6), and disappeared before the days of Plutarch (Mor. 412-14).

3 The miracle lay in the fact that the god answered the inquirer in his own tongue, which was doubtless unknown to the Promantis. He also apparently answered so clearly that there was no need of skilled priests to interpret the wild and whirring words. Pausanias (*l.c.*) spoils the story by making Mys inquire of the god in Carian.

6 1 For Alexander and Bubares cf. v. 21. 2.

ἔσχε, 'had her to wife'; cf. iii. 31. 6, 68. 3, 88. 3, &c.

'Αλάβανδα was always a Carian city, and was ruled by a Carian, Ariodolis (vii. 195). Hence Stein would correct to 'Αλάβαστρα, following Steph. Byz. 'Αλάβαστρα πόλις Φρυγίας, 'Ηροδότος.

The Proxenoι received the ambassadors of the states they represented, procured for them admission to the assembly, and in general looked after the interests of the state by which they were appointed (cf. ix. 85. 3). The title πρόξενος καὶ εὐεργέτης was often bestowed

as an honour in recognition of such services as Alexander implies (ch. 140. β 1) he had rendered Athens. It was eagerly sought by foreign princes and powers (Xen. de Vect. iii. 11); a number of such honoured benefactors are to be found in Demosth. Leptines; cf. § 60 ἐψηφίσασθε . . . προξενίαν, εὐεργεσίαν, ἀτέλειαν ἀπάντων. The earliest known decrees conferring such honours at Athens are of the middle of the fifth century. Cf. Hicks, 39; C. I. A. iv. (1) 27 Θαλκυιδὴν καὶ Μενέστρατον [καὶ] Ἀθηναίων τοὺς Θεσπιᾶς ἀναγρ[ά]φσαι προχσένους καὶ εὐεργέτας [Ἀ]θηναίων καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς [ἐκείνων] ἐμ πόλ[ε]ι ἐν στήλῃ λιθί[νῃ]. Cf. for later cases Hicks, 77, 89, 97, 111, 113; Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 4.

For the πρόξενοι at Sparta cf. vi. 57. 2 n.

- 3 ἀν . . . προλέγοι: a potential optative with vague reference to time past, as in Homer; cf. i. 70. 3 n., vii. 180 *ad fin.*, 214. 3; Goodwin, § 443.

137 1 ἔβδομος. Alexander himself is included (cf. ch. 139). It is usual in ordinals to count in both the beginning and the end, but the method seems strange when it causes a man to be counted among his own ancestors (cf. i. 91. 1) or descendants (i. 13. 2). Thucydides agrees as to the number of the Macedonian kings and in tracing their descent from Temenus of Argos (ii. 99 f.; v. 80); but in the fourth century another account was current, probably derived from Theopompus (fr. 30, F. H. G. i. 283; cf. Diod. vii. fr. 17; Euphorion fr. 24, *inf.*; Vell. Paterc. i. 6. 5; Justin vii. 1, &c.). By this Caranus ('head leader'), son or brother of the Argive king Pheidon (cf. vi. 127. 3 n.), is made the founder of the Macedonian dynasty, and is succeeded by Κοῖνος and Τυρίμμος (Satyr. fr. 21, F. H. G. iii. 164), who precede the first Perdiccas. The object of this lengthening of the line was to make the Macedonian dynasty at least as old as the Median (cf. vi. 127. 3 n.).

ἐξ Ἀργεος. Argos in the Peloponnese appears as the ancestral home of the family in all versions of the legend (Isocr. Phil. 32). But the Argos with which the Argeadae (cf. Appian, Syr. 63 Ἀργος τὸ ἐν Ὀρεστιά ὅθεν οἱ Ἀργεάδαι Μακεδόνες, Strabo 329, fr. 11 τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ Ἀργεάδαι καλούμενοι κύριοι) were really connected is Argos Oresticum (Strabo 326; Steph. Byz.), near the source of the Haliacmon. They first held the fruitful valleys there (valley of Kastoria), and the hill country as far as the source of the Erigon; this is the Upper Macedonia (cf. vii. 128. 1 n.) where the three brothers served (*inf.*), and to which Caranus went by order of an oracle (Euphorion, fr. 24 ἐκπρολιπὼν Ἀργος τε καὶ Ἑλλάδα καλλιγύναικα | χώρει πρὸς πηγὰς Ἀλιάκμονος). The Argeadae (cf. Paus. vii. 8. 9) later made Aegae their capital, and established an hegemony over the kindred tribes (cf. Thuc. ii. 99) in Upper Macedon, the Lyncestae, Orestae, Elimiotae, as well as over the coastlands as far as the Axios.

The likeness of name (Argos and Argeadae) led the Macedonian kings, at least from the time of Alexander I (cf. v. 22. 2 n.; ix. 45. 2),

to claim descent from the Heracleid kings of Peloponnesian Argos, just as the princes of the Lyncestae did from the Corinthian Bacchiads, those of the Molossi from Achilles (Strabo 327), and the Illyrian Enchelees (cf. v. 61. 2 n.) from Cadmus. Yet their names are not even Greek, and their origin is at least doubtful (cf. v. 22. 2 n.). In the legend the name Argos is misinterpreted, and Temenus is falsely inserted. Probably ἐς Ἰλλυριούς is put in because these Argives are believed to have come to Macedon by land from the West. Otherwise the story is a folk-tale, current among the Argeadae, about their earlier homes and the claim of their princes to their possession.

Γαυάνης: probably = βουκόλος, since in Sanskrit *gô* = βούς. If so, Ἀέροπος may refer to horses (cf. Φίλιππος) and Perdiccas to goats. The three brothers represent three tribes (Hesych. Ἀέροπος, ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ γένος τι), as in the Scythic legend (iv. 5 n.). Another point of resemblance is the superiority of the youngest brother.

ὑπερβαλόντες. The Scardus range, stretching south from the source of the Axios (Vardar), is crossed by two passes (Tozer, Highlands of Turkey, i. 350), one at Kalkandele, the other leading by Lake Lychnitis (Okhrida) eastwards to Aegae (Vodena), later the Via Egnatia (*op. cit.* i. 149). This route would take the brothers to the Lyncestis; Lebacia is otherwise unknown.

2 τὰ λεπτά τῶν προβάτων: sheep and goats (i. 133. 1).

For this primitive simplicity cf. Od. vi. 57 f. (Nausicaa washing clothes) and Il. vi. 424.

3 The double portion was an omen of future kingship; cf. vi. 57. 1; vii. 103. 1.

4 κατὰ indicates the direction and path of the rays that poured in. ἐσίων: cf. i. 193. 2; ii. 11. 1, 158. 2.

5 Perdiccas symbolically claims possession of the hearth (ἐστία) of the house and thus of the whole estate of its master, and then calls the sun to witness his claim to house and land. The primitive Germans seem to have looked on the sun as the original source of all rights to land; so Grimm says of a symbolic taking possession of a new fief: 'The new holder early in the morning rode out fully armed and with his naked sword (cf. μάχαιρα) made three strokes crossways in the air as soon as he saw the sun rise'; cf. also iii. 86.

38 1 In Euripides' play, Archelaus, an exile from Argos, destroys Cisseus, the treacherous king of Macedon, in his own snare, and fleeing thence founds a city, named, from the goat which led him, Aegae (Hygin. 219). He appeared on the stage as a goatherd (Dio Chrys. p. 70-1). In the other version Caranus, after helping Cisseus, the king of Orestis, to conquer the Eordi, guided by a goatherd surprised the stronghold which he renamed Aegae. Both stories emphasize the part played by a goat, and it is significant that the goat remained the standard of Macedon and the device on its coins.

- 2 ἄλλην γῆν . . . Μακεδονίης. *Μακεδονίς* proper, the district round Aegae, the home and burial-place of the Temenid kings.

Before the Macedonian conquest Phrygians were believed to have held Edessa or Aegae, now Vodena. (For a description cf. Tozer, *op. cit.* i. 155.) Cf. vii. 73 n.; Euphor. fr. 24; Strabo 330, fr. 25, 680.

Midas here is the mythical founder of the royal house (cf. i. 14. 3 n.), son of Gordias and Cybele. He invented the flute (Plin. N. H. vii. 204), founded the worship of his mother, and was judge of the contest between Apollo and Marsyas; cf. Hygin. fab. 191; Orphica (Abel), fr. 310.

- 3 **Silenus** ordinarily figures as the oldest and wisest of the rout of Satyrs (cf. vii. 26. 3 n.); perhaps he was originally a deity of fruitful streams (Lat. *silanus*) and fertile gardens. He unites the wisdom of the sage with drunken sensuality, and can inspire both music and prophecy (cf. Marsyas, vii. 26. 3 n.).

ἦλω: by Midas who put wine in the spring from which Silenus was wont to drink (Xen. Anab. i. 2. 13; Paus. i. 4. 5). The fact that Pausanias places the fountain at Ancyra and Xenophon at Thymbrium, while Bion (ap. Athen. 45 E) puts it in the Paeonian land near the borders of the Maedi, is one more argument for an early migration (vii. 20 n. and App. I, p. 371 f.). Silenus is said to have been asked what was the best thing for man, and in reply to have pointed out the futility of human hopes and endeavours, and to have praised death. (Aristotle ap. Plut. Mor. 115; Theop. fr. 76, F. H. G. i. 290; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 48, 114; cf. the Trausi, v. 4 n.)

ἄβατον ὑπὸ χειμῶνος, 'impassable from the cold.' The top is covered with perpetual snow.

τὴν ἄλλην Μακεδονίην: including much territory that before belonged to Paeonians and Thracians, who were subdued or expelled, as well as the kindred tribes of upper Macedonia, apparently dependants of Alexander I; cf. v. 17. 2 n.; vii. 112, 123. 3, 185. 2. For a rather different account of Macedonian expansion cf. Thuc. ii. 99.

- 140 α 2 αἴτιον, 'unless you should cause me to fail.'

- 4 θέειν κτλ.: cf. vii. 57. 1 n.

ὀρμημένου: cf. i. 158. 2, 'since the king inclines to.'

ἔσπε . . . ἀπάτης: the clause gives the terms of the proposed peace; cf. ix. 7 a. For *ὁμαιχμίν* cf. vii. 145. 2.

ἄνευ . . . ἀπάτης: a regular formula (i. 69. 2; ix. 7 a): 'nullo malo dolo.'

- β 1 ἐξ ἑμεῦ: cf. v. 11. 1; vi. 13. 1. Alexander was called *Φιλέλλην* (Dio Chrys. p. 25).

- 2 οὐκ οἷοισι. The use of the dative with *ἐνορᾶν* instead of the accusative (as in i. 170. 2) is without parallel; Stein justifies it by its use with the kindred word *συνειδέναί* (ix. 60. 3; v. 24. 3, &c.).

χέρ is joined with *δύναμις* as a symbol of power in iv. 155. 4; cf.

Isaiah lix. 1, 'Behold, the Lord's hand is not shortened, that it cannot save'; cf. l. 2, and for kings Ovid, Her. xvii. 166 'An nescis longas regibus esse manus?' The term 'long-armed' is therefore given to Eastern kings (so Nala, ii. 12 'Bhimas ma'hâ-bâhur' and Artaxerxes μακρόχειρ), though the term was in this case supposed by some to refer to a physical peculiarity (Plut. Artax. 1).

- 3 ἐν τρίβῳ, 'in the path' of danger, imitated by Dionysius vi. 34, xi. 54. ἐξαίρετον μεταίχμιον. Attica lay between the two powers as a natural battle-ground, since the Persians held Greece as far south as Cithaeron, and their enemies the Peloponnese to the Isthmus.

ἀλλὰ πείθεσθε: cf. ch. 62. 2.

- 141 τῶν λογίων: perhaps identified by H. with those taken from the Acropolis by Cleomenes, in which it was prophesied πολλά τε καὶ ἀνάρσια ἔσσεσθαι αὐτοῖσι ἐξ Ἀθηναίων (v. 90. 2), but surely of more recent invention, since only in 480-479 B. C. did a league of Persia and Athens seem a possible contingency.

- 2 συνέπιπτε: cf. ch. 15. 1; v. 36. 1 n.

1 Ἡμέας δέ: i. e. as opposed to Alexander. For δέ cf. ch. 68 a n.

- 2 The Athenians brought on the war by helping the Ionians (v. 97 f.) when the Spartans had refused. The Spartan conveniently forgets the message to Cyrus (i. 152) and the outrage on the herald (vii. 133).

περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς: MSS. Such a reference to the Athenian Empire is too naïve an anachronism, nor is it supported by the praise of Athens as a liberator (Blakesley, Rawlinson), for this refers to the Epigoni and the Heracleids in the mythical age, as is shown by τὸ πάλαι (§ 3), cf. ix. 27. Hence ἀρχήθεν (cf. ch. 22. 2 *ad fin.*) must be read.

- 3 ἄλλως according to Stein=χωρίς, 'apart from,' for which cf. iii. 82. 5; ix. 26. 6, but the use is unexampled and but weakly supported by ἄλλος τινος, *diversus ab aliquo* (iii. 8. 1). Matthiae and Abicht make αἰτίους do double duty: 'that Athenians, the cause of all this, should become the cause of.'

καρπῶν . . . διξῶν: two harvests, i. e. that of the past and of the coming summer, since it would seem that but few were able to sow that autumn as Themistocles advised (ch. 109. 4).

- 4 οἰκετέων ἐχόμενα: for the periphrasis cf. i. 120. 3, &c.

ἐπιθρέψειν: here and in 144. 3 *ad fin.* 'maintain', since the children are not sufficiently clearly indicated to justify the special sense 'bring up' (as in i. 123. 1).

- 5 τύραννος . . . τυράννῳ. Both Alexander and Mardonius (or rather his master Xerxes) were really legitimate national kings, not tyrants, and H. himself calls the kings of Macedon βασιλεῖς, though he styles the monarchy τυραννίς (ch. 137. 2). The opprobrious term is dramatically appropriate in the mouth of an enemy (cf. for the opposite case vii. 161 n.). Further, the tyrants of Ionia had been



the natural allies of the Mede (iv. 137, &c.), and, as the 'Holy Alliance' and *Dreikaiserbund* have shown, there is a certain natural affinity between monarchies.

- 143 2 This answer to Mardonius as well as that to the Spartans (*inf.*) is said by Plutarch (Arist. 10) to be due to Aristides, but this is no doubt a mere conjecture. For the formula cf. v. 92 a 1 n. and especially Soph. Phil. 1329 f. καὶ παῦλαν ἴσθι τῆσδε μήποτ' ἐντυχεῖν | νόσου βαρείας, ὡς ἂν αὐτὸς ἥλιος | ταύτῃ μὲν αἶρη, τῇδε δ' αὖ δύνῃ πάλιν.

For Persian disregard of gods and heroes cf. ix. 76, and for destruction of temples ch. 109. 3 n.

- 144 The speech falls into three parts: (1) repelling the suspicion of disloyalty (§§ 1-3), (2) refusing the maintenance offered (§§ 3, 4), (3) demanding an active campaign (§ 5).

- 2 τὸ Ἑλληνικόν. This noble assertion of Hellenic nationality may be unhistorical, but it is in harmony with the spirit of the struggle against the Mede. As Myres points out (Anthropology and the Classics, p. 134), 'H. here first gives us a reasoned scheme of ethnological criteria.' 'Common descent, common language, common religion, and common culture, these are the four things that make a nation one, and conversely the things which, if unconformable, hold nations apart.' He further thinks that H. gives the four criteria in what he regards as the order of their relative importance, and contrasts the somewhat similar order, laying stress first on physical characteristics, adopted by H. (iv. 23) in describing the Argippaei, with that of Aeschylus in the Suppliants (234 f.).

- 4 ὑμῖν . . . ἐκπεπλήρωται, 'the kindness on your part is complete.' ὑμῖν and ὑμεῶν *sup.* are put forward for emphasis. Stein thinks the tone of this one of polite irony, indicating that it was written at a time of tension between Sparta and Athens, but this is uncertain. H. does, however, by his vigorous insistence on the patriotism of Athens, hint at least that Sparta had shown scant gratitude for the great service done her.

## BOOK IX

*The campaigns of Plataea (ch. 1-89) and of Mycale (90-122).*  
1-5 *Advance of Mardonius on Athens. Renewed negotiations.*

- I ἴσκου . . . παρελάμβανε. For the construction cf. iii. 51. 3; viii. 52. 1, 115. 2.

For a list of the Greek allies, reckoned at 50,000 (ch. 32), cf. viii. 66.

Doubtless they had gone on furlough during the winter.

Θεσσαλῆς ἡγεομένοισι. For the Aleuadae as princes of Thessaly and their Medism cf. vii. 6. 2 n. Thorax, head of the house (ch. 58.

1), is mentioned in an early poem of Pindar (Pyth. x. 64, *circ.* 500 B.C.).

παρῆκε: H., always anxious to emphasize the guilt of the Aleuadæ (vii. 6. 2 n., 130. 3, 172. 1), speaks as if the Thessalian were free to act as he chose. But this is inconsistent with viii. 126. 2, 131. 1; nor can we doubt that the Persians kept Thermopylae in their own hands.

2 I κατελάμβανον, 'tried to hold back'; cf. iii. 36. 1.

ἐπιτηδεότερος. It was suitable for cavalry (cf. vi. 102), but the advantages here put forward are its convenience as a base of supply and as head-quarters for negotiations. From οὐκ . . . ἔων a word such as ἐκέλευον must be supplied; cf. v. 82. 2; vii. 104. 5, 143. 3.

2 κατὰ . . . τὸ ἰσχυρόν, 'by force of arms'; cf. i. 76. 3.

ταῦτὰ ἐγίνωσκον: a synonym for ὁμοφρονέοντας; cf. ταῦτὰ φρονέειν, v. 3. 1, 72. 2, &c. The relative clause shows that this union is no mere possibility, but certain to occur, as it had before.

περιγίνεσθαι, = 'conquer', governs the accusative on the analogy of νικᾶν.

3 I H. clearly holds that the idea of throwing Persian gold into the scale, and of gaining by bribery what they had failed to win by force, dates from the defeat of Salamis (cf. ch. 5, 41 and Diod. xi. 28). Nor is it improbable that the question was then mooted. But the first clear instances of such bribery, the missions of Megabazus (457 B.C.; cf. Thuc. i. 109) and of Arthmius of Zeleia, are later. Though Plutarch (Them. 6) seems to place the latter at the time of Xerxes' invasion, and attributes the man's punishment to Themistocles, the words of the decree inscribed on the pillar in the Acropolis, "Ἀρθμῖος Πυθωνάκτος Ζελεΐτης ἄτιμος [ἔστω] καὶ πολέμιος τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτὸς καὶ γένος . . . ὅτι τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ἐκ Μήδων εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἤγαγεν (Dem. Phil. iii. 41; de Fals. Leg. 271; Ael. Aristid. Dind. i. 310), make it probable that Athens was then at variance with the Peloponnesians. Again, though Plutarch ascribes the decree to Themistocles, Craterus (quoted by the scholiast on Aristides, *l. c.*) assigned it to Cimon. If so, Arthmius' mission must be placed after the outbreak of the war between Athens and the Peloponnese and the subsequent recall of Cimon, i.e. after 457 B.C. (cf. E. Meyer, iii. § 337; Busolt, ii. 653, n. 3).

ἀγνωμοσύνης: cf. v. 83. 1 n.

πυρροῖσι. The use of fire-signals has its origin in the beacon lighted to warn the neighbourhood of a foe's approach. It was frequent in the fifth century (cf. vii. 183. 1; Thuc. ii. 94, iii. 22. 80; and esp. Aesch. Agam. 280 f. the signals telling the fall of Troy). Apparently the numbers and direction of a hostile force could be signalled (Thuc. *l. c.*); yet for want of an adequate code, only more or less foreseen contingencies could be signalled even in the days of Polybius, though much attention had been paid to the art (Polyb. x. 43 f.).

διὰ νήσων without article=the mid-Aegean isles (cf. iii. 96. 1; vii. 95. 1), but those west of Delos were no longer in Persian hands (viii. 132). Hence Rawlinson is led to suggest that this line of beacons like that described by Aeschylus (*l. c.*) was by Athos and Lemnos.

2 δεκάμηνος. Probably the reckoning is inclusive (Busolt, ii. 722, n. 2), so that as Xerxes took Athens about Sept. 25, 480 B. C. (viii. 65 n.), Mardonius occupied it before the end of June.

4 2 προέχων: strangely used for προειδώς (ch. 41. 4); for ἔχων cf. ch. 2. 2, and for προ- cf. v. 82. 1 n.

5 1 τὴν βουλὴν. The Boule of 500 must therefore have held meetings in Salamis.

2 κατέλευσαν. Verrall has shown (Cl. R. xxiii. 36f.) that the Greek writers are in substantial agreement as to the fate of Cyrsilus or Lycides, and that the transference of this famous case of lynching to the previous year (480 B. C.), when the Athenians retired before Xerxes, is a confusion due to Cicero's (de Off. iii. 11, § 48) misinterpretation of Demosthenes (de Cor. §§ 202, 204). It is clear from H. and Lycurgus (in Leocratem, § 122) that the lynching took place in Salamis, and was a well-known case recorded in a decree. Demosthenes' date (§ 202) is vague, 'when the Athenians had the hardihood to abandon their land and city and take to their ships,' but may as probably refer to the continued or repeated exodus of 479 as to 480 B. C.; and by stating (§ 202), in language reminiscent of H. (viii. 140), that Athens had received offers from the king of Persia, by which she might have kept her own land and been given more, Demosthenes really fixes the event to 479, since in 480 Xerxes never offered Athens any such terms. Cicero has blundered, and H. is confirmed by the Greek orators. Probably, however, he has inadvertently substituted an ominous (cf. vii. 180) patronymic (Lycides = son of Lycus, 'wolfing') for the victim's true name Cyrsilus. The lynching of Cyrsilus is paralleled by the fury of the Hollanders in tearing De Witt to pieces.

6-II *An Athenian embassy to Sparta ends Sparta's hesitation and leads to the dispatch of a Spartan force.*

6 ἐπεμπον. Plutarch says (Arist. ch. 10) that this was done on the motion of Aristides, and that the envoys named in the decree were Cimon, Xanthippus, and Myronides; cf. Busolt, ii. 721, n. 5.

7 The Hyacinthia fell in the Spartan month Ἑκατομβεύς. They followed shortly after the Isthmian games (Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 1 f.), which took place in the early summer (Thuc. viii. 3, 9, 10). Apparently they usually fell in Thargelion (May), but this year, through intercalation in the Spartan Calendar, in Skirophorion (June); Busolt, ii. 722, n. 2. This prae-Dorian festival was celebrated annually at Amyclae in honour of Apollo and of Hyacinthus, the beautiful youth whom he had slain accidentally by a cast of his

quoit. Hyacinthus seems to personify the vegetation dried up by summer's heat. On the first day the offerings of the dead were made to Hyacinthus; his urn, which was behind a closed iron door beneath Apollo's altar, was opened, and his ashes drenched with wine and milk (Pats. iii. 19. 3). Abstinence and melancholy marked the day; no garlands were worn, no paeans sung, and only plain unleavened cakes were eaten. The second day was a joyful festival sacred to Apollo; boys celebrated the praises of Apollo in anapaestic measures to the accompaniment of cithara and flute; there was a horse race of boys and a solemn procession of maidens in chariots. Probably the robe woven by Spartan women (Paus. iii. 16. 2) was then presented to the god. Of the third day no details are known; the importance of the whole festival is shown by the anxiety of all Spartans and especially the Amyclaeans to return home to keep it even in time of war (Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 11; Paus. iii. 10. 1, iv. 19. 4).

1 ἦγον. For parallel cases cf. v. 63. 2 n.; vi. 106. 3; vii. 206. 1.

τὸ τεῖχος: cf. viii. 71; ix. 10 n.

τοὺς ἐφόρους: cf. ch. 8. 1, 9. 2, and for the significance of the fact App. XVII. 2.

a ἐπ' ἴση τε καὶ ὁμοίῃ: *aequo foedere*, i. e. between equal independent powers.

β 2 ὁ τι τάχος = ὡς τάχιστα; cf. Thuc. vii. 42. 3 and ὡς τάχος, v. 106. 5.

Θριάσιον πεδίων: cf. viii. 65. 1 n. It is a strange suggestion that the plains of Boeotia and Eleusis would be good battle-grounds for Greek hoplites opposed to cavalry, though it accords with the description of Greek warfare ascribed to Mardonius (vii. 9 β).

8 1 ἦν (sc. τὸ τεῖχος): from ἐτείχεον.

2 ἄλλο γε (sc. αἴτιον): cf. i. 49.


10 H.'s account of the long delay and sudden dispatch of the Spartans is obviously inadequate. The wall was probably defensible in the autumn of 480 B. C. (viii. 71). Again, there can have been no need for a Tegean to show the Spartan government that 'a great door to the Peloponnese was open' from the sea, if the Athenian navy changed sides (cf. Plut. de Mal. 41. 871 E). But the delay, as well as the secrecy and speed of the mobilization can be explained if we remember (1) that Argos had an understanding with Mardonius (ch. 12), (2) that the Eleans and Mantineans were at least wavering, since they arrived too late for the battle of Plataea (ch. 77), and afterwards banished their generals, presumably for Medism; indeed no Arcadians except the men of Tegea and Orchomenus (ch. 28) fought at Plataea. The Argives may have hoped to anticipate the strategy of Alcibiades in 418 B. C. (Thuc. v. 57 f.) by cutting off the Spartans from their northern allies. This explains why the Spartans marched by Orestheum (ch. 11. 2 n.) well away from the Argive frontier. It may, however, well be true that the Ephors were at last induced to

risk an attack from Argos and a rising in Arcadia, by the fear that the loyalty of Athens would stand no further strain.

H. puts the whole Spartiate force at 8,000 (vii. 234. 2 n.). The 5,000 here may be meant for two-thirds of the host, a common proportion (Thuc. ii. 10; iii. 15), or for a corps of 1,000 from each Spartan village (cf. ch. 53 n.). For the Helots cf. ch. 28. 2 n. and Appendix XIX. 2.

- 3 The eclipse, which was partial, was on October 2, 480 B. C. (Busolt, ii. 715). Cleombrotus must have contemplated attacking the Persians as they retreated from Attica, probably by marching through the Megarid to occupy the passes of Cithaeron in their rear (cf. ch. 13, 14). But to risk all that had been won at Salamis in another battle was utterly opposed to the cautious policy of Sparta. The eclipse only justified a timidity in keeping with the situation and with the orders no doubt given to Cleombrotus. The return home was due to the approach of winter, during which a Greek force was always disbanded. They then came back to complete the wall in the spring.

Εὐρύνακτα. The genealogy implied seems to be



but if Euryanax be the son of Dorieus who fell in Sicily (cf. v. 41-6) he should have been king before Leonidas. Perhaps Dorieus by going abroad (cf. vi. 70. 1 n.) forfeited the throne or renounced it for himself and his descendants, or possibly the Dorieus here mentioned belonged to a younger branch of the royal house.

- II I παλῆται: of the music, dances, and processions on the second day of the Hyacinthia cf. ch. 7. 1 n.

- 2 ἐπ' ὄρκου: a curious and unparalleled variant for σὺν ὄρκῳ (Xen. Cyr. ii. 3. 12, &c.). Stein compares Antiphon, Tetr. i. 3, 8, p. 119 ἐπὶ τῶν μαρτύρων, and Dionys. v. 29 πίστει δοῦναι ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν.

Ὀρέσθειον must not be confused with Orestia, called Oresteion by Euripides (Orest. 1647; cf. El. 1273 f.), the southern half of Megalopolis (Steph. Byz.) towards Messene (cf. Paus. viii. 34. 1-4), but must be identified with the Oresthasion of Pausanias (viii. 3. 1, 2, 44. 2), called Orestheion in Thuc. v. 64, Plut. Ar. 10. Oresthasion is placed by Loring (J. H. S. xv. 27 f.) above the little plain of Aëa between Marmaria and Papari. It lay not on the direct route from Sparta to Tegea and the north, which led too near the Argolid and through Mantinea, but on an alternative route up the Eurotas (towards Megalopolis), which turned near Oresthasium to Aëa Pal-

*(the lake)*

See  
RE  
XVIII  
S. V.  
Oresthasium, & W. Gey in *Anc. Soc. Jour.*, 301 n. 17.



lantium and the plain of Tegea and Mantinea (cf. Loring, *op. cit.* route c, pp. 47–52). It was used by the Spartans again in 418 B. C. (Thuc. v. 64) for the same reason, and served then as a mustering-place for their Arcadian allies.

ξείνους: Cic. de Off. i. 12. 37 (cf. ch. 53. 2, 55. 2) 'equidem etiam illud animadverto, quod qui proprio nomine perduellis esset is hostis vocaretur, lenitate verbi rei tristitiam mitigatam. hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur quem nunc peregrinum dicimus'.

12–15 *Mardonius, warned by the Argives, evacuates Attica. After raiding Megaris he retreats to a position in Boeotia.*

12 I ἡμεροδρόμων: cf. vi. 105. 1; Liv. xxxi. 24 'hemerodromos vocant Graeci ingens die uno cursu emetientes spatium'.

αὐτοί: *sponste*. On the Medism of the Argives cf. vii. 148. 2 n., 150. 1 n.; ix. 10. 1 n. The warning was necessary, since a picked Spartan force might reach the borders of Attica in three days (vi. 120), and, marching by the Megarid, might then block the passes of Cithaeron in Mardonius' rear.

13 2 τὰς Ἀθήνας. The lower town, the Acropolis having been burnt down in 480 B. C. (viii. 53. 2). There is some exaggeration in the complete destruction described; some few houses and parts of the wall (Thuc. i. 89), and possibly the old temples of the Dioscuri and Dionysus (Paus. i. 18. 1, 20. 2), remained.

3 κατὰ στενόν. Either (1) by the long and narrow defile through Mount Cithaeron, starting from Eleutherae and passing through Dryoscephalae (ch. 39. 1 n.), or (2) by the even more difficult path across Mount Parnes by Phyle and Panactum, or (3) by the circuitous route followed by Mardonius according to H. (ch. 15). The Peloponnesians might cross Cithaeron direct from Megara either along the coast by Pegae and Aegosthena, or by the Vilia pass near Plataea, and so cut Mardonius' connexion with Thebes.

14 It is most unlikely that Mardonius, who had determined to fight in Boeotia, led his whole army, or indeed any large portion of it, back towards Megara in the hope of cutting off the Greek vanguard. He merely threw out a cavalry screen to cover his own retreat and to prevent the Greeks advancing through the Megarid (ch. 13 n.). Pausanias (i. 44. 4) preserves a tradition that Persian archers reached the neighbourhood of Pegae.

ἐκαστάτω. For a similar remark cf. iv. 204. H. is, as often, weak on the points of the compass—the Persian force was further west in Thessaly or at Thermopylae, not to speak of Delphi—but he is right if he means that this detachment of cavalry penetrated furthest into Greece towards the south-west.

5 I Decelea, on a hill near Tatoi, commands the road leading from the Attic plain over Mount Parnes to Oropus and Tanagra. The road ascends to the summit of the pass through wooded ravines,

but is not difficult. Probably H. only gives us the route of the main column under Mardonius, and the Persians used other passes also (Delbrück, *Perserkriege*, p. 143 f.).

βοιωτάρχαι, eleven in number, formed the executive of the Boeotian league (Thuc. iv. 91; Oxyr. Papyr. v, p. 171).

Ἀσωπίων, called Parasopii (Strabo 408), = 'men of the Asopus valley' who would know the northern side of Parnes and the gorges leading down to the Asopus well, and also the pass into Attica.

Σφενδαλέας, or Sphendale, an Attic deme (Steph. Byz. C. I. A.) on the way to Tanagra (Milchöfer, *Karten von Attika*, Text. ix. 27 f.).

- 2 Σκῶλον: cf. Strabo 408 Σκῶλος δ' ἐστὶ κώμη τῆς Παρασωπίας ὑπὸ τῷ Κιθαिरῶνι, δυσοίκητος τόπος καὶ τραχύς. \* The little town must have been on the rough ground above the plain, but its site is uncertain. Pausanias (ix. 4. 4) puts it forty stades down the Asopus from the point where the road from Plataea to Thebes crossed the stream. Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 153-4) follows Leake in placing it near Dari-mari, and thinks the Persian fort guarded the Asopus where the road from Attica by Panactum crossed it. Grundy (p. 449 n., 463 n.) would place Scolus not far east of the road from Dryos-cephalae to Thebes, and the Persian camp, on the Asopus where that road crosses it; this seems the more probable view.

ἐν γῇ...Θηβαίων. Strabo (409) extends the territory of Thebes over the Asopus to Mount Cithaeron, and includes in it not only Scolus but Erythrae and Scaphae (Eteonus) also. Yet these townships would seem to have been traditionally united to Plataea (cf. vi. 108). They are so regarded by some authorities quoted by Strabo (l. c.) and by Pausanias (ix. 2. 1, 4. 4). At some date before 424 B. C. (perhaps only when Plataea fell in 427) these small places became subject to Thebes, and doubtless remained so till the peace of Antalcidas, 387 B. C. (cf. Oxyr. Papyr. v, p. 171, and notes, pp. 223-7).

ἔκειρε. He had to cut down trees, even fruit-trees (ch. 97), to build his square wooden fort (ch. 65. 1, 70. 1). The fort was not, however, merely a place of refuge; doubtless it commanded the passage of the Asopus, the bridge being further defended on the south side by a bridge-head. Both here and in ch. 65 it is distinguished from the camp, which was clearly larger, and which must have been entirely on the north side of the Asopus.

The sites of Erythrae and Hysiae are still matters of controversy. Munro (l. c.) again follows Leake in placing Hysiae close under Mount Cithaeron, just to the right of the main road from Athens and Eleutherae to Thebes, and Erythrae at Katsula about two miles east of his site for Hysiae. Grundy (pp. 458-60 and 464) would put Hysiae just above Kriekouki and Erythrae above the road from Eleutherae to Thebes. The two towns would thus be within a mile of each other.

H. probably only means that the Persians occupied the valley

over against Erythrae and Hysiae, as we find the Greeks in possession of Erythrae a little later (ch. 19. 3).

- 4 **Attaginus**, along with Timagenidas, led the Medizing oligarchy of Thebes (ch. 86. 1, 88).

16-18 *Stories of the banquet at Thebes, and of the testing of the Phocians.*

- 16 1 **Θερσάνδρου**. The story is notable because it is one of the four cases (cf. ii. 55; iii. 55, and iv. 76) in which H. gives the name of his informant (cf. Introduction, p. 29). The fifty 'Thebans' doubtless included men from other cities of Boeotia.

**κλίνειν**. The subject must be Attaginus, who as host would arrange this. In Greece it was usual that only two should recline on one couch at supper (Plat. Symp. 175 C), whereas the Roman *lectus* held three.

- 2 **ὁμοτράπεζος**, 'sharer in the feast'; **ὁμόσπονδος**, 'sharer in the libation' with which the drinking began; cf. Plat. Symp. 176 A.

- 3 These forebodings are interesting if true. Probably the Persians had lost confidence, as is shown by the evacuation of Attica and by the fortification of the camp; possibly, too, they were divided amongst themselves, Artabazus disapproving of the designs of Mar-donius (ch. 41, 66).

- 4 For inevitable fate cf. i. 91. 1; iii. 43. 1, 65. 3, and for *ἀναγκαίη ἐνδεδωμένοι* i. 11. 3; viii. 22. 2.

- 5 Verrall (Cl. Rev. xvii. 99) has ingeniously suggested that this maxim came from a tragedy, *ὀδύνη δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐχθίστη πέλει | αὕτη φρονούντα πολλὰ μηδενὸς κρατεῖν*. For the sentiment cf. Soph. Oed. Rex 316.

Thersander and H. are at pains to prove that this story cannot be discredited as a mere *vaticinium post eventum*.

- 17 1 **καὶ συνεσέβαλον**. This goes back to an earlier point of time, so that the author may bring out the contrast with the Phocians, who sent their force too late to take part in the invasion of Attica.

**Ἀθήνας** = Attica; cf. viii. 50. 2, similarly **Θήβας** (§ 2) for the Theban land.

**ἐμήδιζον . . . ἀναγκαίης**. If the manuscript reading is right it must mean that the Phocians now joined the Persians decidedly (*σφόδρα*) though unwillingly; but (1) *σφόδρα* should mean 'eagerly', and (2) some Phocians still fought for Greece (ch. 31. 5), and many more were, in H.'s opinion (vii. 203 f., 218 n.; viii. 29 f.), loyal at heart.

- 3 Arsaces actually shot down the exiled Delians after this fashion (Thuc. viii. 108).

- 4 For Thessalian enmity cf. viii. 29 f. *ἄνδρα*, which goes with *ἀγαθόν*, is put forward for emphasis.

**παρέχοντας**: to hand oneself over as to a doctor. The appeal is made in poetic language; for **μόρφω** cf. Aesch. Pers. 444 *δυσκλεεστάτω μόρφω*, and for *ἔρραψαν* Hom. Od. xvi. 379 *φόνον αἰπὺν ἐράπτωμεν*.

- 18 1 διετείνοντο τὰ βέλεα: probably 'stretched forth their javelins or throwing spears'; cf. κατακοντιεῖ (ch. 17. 3) and Thuc. viii. 108; less probably τὰ βέλεα may be taken with ὡς ἀπήσοντες, and the phrase construed 'bent (their bows) (cf. iii. 35. 3) as though to shoot their arrows'.
- 19-24 *Occupation by the Greeks of their first position in Boeotia on the slope of Cithaeron. Defeat of the Persian cavalry and death of Masistiis.*
- 19 2 καλλιρέειν is impersonal; cf. vii. 113. 2 n.  
The Greeks may have expected to find Mardonius still in Attica: indeed, the repeated sacrifice would seem to imply that the advance into Boeotia was beyond their original plan. Yet, in any case, they would naturally turn aside to Eleusis to pick up the Athenian troops, and would cross Cithaeron by the good road thence.
- 3 Ἐρυθράς: cf. ch. 15. 3 n.  
ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπώρεης. This position on the foothills of Cithaeron would give them protection against the attacks of the Persian cavalry, and would also cover the passes and roads to Attica and the Megarid, by which supplies and reinforcements reached them (ch. 28. 2, 38. 2, 39. 2).
- 20 Μασίστιος (cf. vii. 79). The form Μακίστιος might be thought by Greeks to signify the Persian leader's great height; cf. ch. 25. 1.  
Νησαῖον: cf. vii. 40. 2 n.  
κατὰ τέλεα. They charged successively by squadrons (vii. 81 n.), not all together (ch. 23).  
γυναικας: the bitterest taunt; ch. 107. 1, cf. viii. 88. 3
- 21 1 The station of the Megarians open to cavalry attack was doubtless the comparatively level ground where the road from Eleutherae to Thebes comes down from the pass. Grundy (p. 458 f.) rightly holds that the Greeks had come over the Dryoscephalae pass, and now were drawn up with their centre astride of the road, the Megarians being in the left centre of the Greek line (ch. 28. 6, 31. 5). Macan's suggestion that the Greeks were but just emerging from the pass in a column headed by the Megarians or by the Athenians is opposed to the clear statement of H. (ch. 19. 3).  
Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 157) puts forward the over-elaborate hypothesis that Pausanias marched with the bulk of his forces by Oenoe and Panactum, and finding himself checked by the Persian stockade, deployed his army to the left along the base of the mountain, continually extending his left flank westward as more troops came into line. Thus the Megarians might temporarily form the extreme left of the army. The Athenians would next come up (to take post to their left), and on them would naturally fall the duty of relieving the distressed Megarians.
- 3 οἱ τριηκόσιοι. There is no evidence that there was at Athens a permanent picked corps of 300, as the οἱ would naturally imply,

though we hear of the selection of 300 picked men for special service before Syracuse (Thuc. vi. 100).

The full details given of this cavalry skirmish were probably told to H. by some near relation of Olympiodorus. He was no doubt the father of the more famous Lampon, the seer and interpreter of signs and oracles, derided in comedy (e.g. Arist. Av. 521), especially by Cratinus for superstition, but the friend and adviser of Pericles. Lampon was one of the ten commissioners sent out to found Thurii; hence H. would naturally have met him there, even if he had not in Athens.

- 22 1 τοὺς τοξότας (cf. ch. 60; Aesch. Pers. 463). These archers were citizens of the Thetic class (C. I. A. i. 54. 79 τοξόται ἄστικοί), not the Scyths who were first enlisted by Pericles. E. Meyer (iii. 408) suggested that they numbered 800, and thus explained convincingly the redundancy in H.'s total of light-armed troops at Plataea (ch. 29). At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. ii. 13; Ath. Pol. 24) these archers numbered 1,600: hence Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 147) would assign the other 800 at this time to the Athenian fleet, since we learn from Plutarch (Them. 14) that four archers served on each ship at Salamis.

προέχων, 'being in front of the others'; cf. iv. 120. 3; Hom. II. xxiii. 453.

- 2 H. may have seen this corselet in the Erechtheum, where it was preserved with a sword believed to be that of Mardonius (Paus. i. 27. 1). For Persian armour cf. vii. 61. 1 n.
- 3 ἀναχωρήσιος. Each squadron would advance, hurl its missiles, and then retire rapidly without special orders. In their hasty retreat the fall of their leader passed unnoticed.
- 25 2 ἀποστήσαντες (sc. ἵππους): 'pulling up' their horses 'far away'. For the sense of ἵστημι cf. Hom. Od. vii. 4 στήσεν ἄρ' ἐν προθύροισι (τοὺς ἡμιόνους), and perhaps ἕστησαν, ch. 22. 3, and for ἀπό cf. ἀποστάς, v. 51. 2.
- 24 Such unbridled exhibitions of grief were characteristic of Persians (iii. 66. 1; viii. 99. 2 n.) as of other Orientals (vi. 58). Shaving the head as a sign of mourning was a common custom (ii. 36) among Greeks (vi. 21) as well as Persians (Q. Curtius x. 17) and other Orientals (Job v. 20). Cutting off the manes of horses was a Macedonian and Thessalian form of mourning (Plut. Pelop. 34; Eur. Alc. 428 f.), an honour paid, along with others of the same kind, by Alexander the Great to Hephaestion.

- 25-32 *Advance of the Greeks to a second position. Dispute between Athens and Tegea for precedence. Battle array of the Greeks and Persians, and composition of their forces.*

- 25 1 Apparently the wagon bearing Masistius' body was drawn along a road behind the Greek lines, i. e. from Erythrae towards Plataea, though Macan, believing that the Greeks were still in column



in the pass, thinks it went up the road through the pass to the rear.

- 2 ἐπικαταβῆναι. They moved towards Plataea, but also forwards down into the plain. H. does not understand at all the importance of this movement; by it the Greeks assumed the offensive and tried to provoke a battle. Yet if they really hoped to turn the Persian right by forcing the passage of the Asopus (Grundy, p. 473; Munro, J. H. S. xxiv. 158), this advance into the plain was absurdly rash in face of the superior Persian cavalry. Cf. App. XXII. 5.

- 3 Γαργαφίης . . . Ἀνδροκράτεος. We cannot be certain that the two points given are intended to mark the extreme limits of the Greek position, though the spring Gargaphia is clearly held by the Spartans (49. 3), the right wing of the army (28. 2), and the precinct of Androcrates, a Plataean hero (Plut. Arist. 11), very probably defines the position of the left wing. Neither spring nor precinct can be identified with certainty. Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 37–8) still maintains that Apotripi, the traditional site, is the true Gargaphia, but Grundy (p. 465 n.) and Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 159) seem right in preferring Leake's Gargaphia, a more abundant spring in a much more conspicuous position. The heroön of Androcrates is placed by Grundy (466 f.) within three-quarters of a mile of Plataea, to the right of the road to Thebes (cf. Thuc. iii. 24). Munro (*l. c.*) and Macan follow Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 38–40) in placing it at the church of St. John, a conspicuous site (cf. Plut. Arist. 11), and therefore preferable. They believe that Thucydides (*l. c.*) is distinguishing two roads to Thebes, which passed to the right and the left of the shrine.

- 26 1 τὸ ἕτερον κέρας. The right wing as the post of honour belonged to the Spartans as leaders (ch. 28. 2; cf. vi. 111. 1 n.); the left wing is here in question. Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 41) argues strongly that the story of this quarrel for precedence is an Athenian invention. The dispute, if historical, must have taken place earlier, i.e. directly the Greeks fell into position on Mount Cithaeron. Now the Athenians were probably then already on the left (ch. 21), as they succour the Megarians. Further, the Tegeans are found occupying the position next the Spartans not only here (ch. 28) but at Mantinea in 418 B. C. (Thuc. v. 71) and at Corinth in 394 B. C. (Xen. Hell. iv. 2. 19). The tactical reasons for posting the Athenians on the left as the largest single corps of hoplites (8,000) with the best archers are obvious, if we remember that the left wing was most exposed to cavalry (ch. 49).

- 2 Εὐρυσθέος: cf. ch. 27. 2 n.

- 3 Ἴωνων: cf. i. 146 n.

τὸν Ἰσθμόν. The fight took place on the boundary between the territories of Megara and Corinth (Paus. i. 44. 10).

ἐπὶ διακειμένοισι, 'on settled terms'; cf. Hesiod, Sc. 20, and συγκείμενα (iii. 158. 1).

4 ἐκατὸν ἐτέων, 'within a century' (for the genitive of time cf. ii. 115.6) = the fourth generation. Temenus, Aristodemus and Cresphontes, the Heracleid leaders of the successful Dorian invasion were the fourth generation from Hyllus, as is seen in the genealogies (vii. 204; viii. 131).

5 For **Echemus** cf. Pind. Ol. xi. 66 (of the foundation of the Olympic games by Heracles, ὁ δὲ πάλα κυδαίνων Ἐχέμος Τεγέαν). This combat (cf. Paus. viii. 5. 1) was represented on a memorial stele at Tegea (Paus. viii. 53. 10).

Φηγέος: probably a slip or accidental miswriting for Κηφέως, the name given by Pausanias (viii. 5. 1) and Apollodorus (i. 9. 16; ii. 7. 3; iii. 9. 1), whereas Phegeus belongs to Psophis, once called Phegia, in north-west Arcadia (Paus. viii. 24. 2 and 8 f.).

κοινῆς ἐξόδου: as though the Peloponnesian league had existed before the Dorian conquest.

7 ἀγῶνες: for these conflicts cf. i. 66 f.

27 As E. Meyer has shown (F. ii. 219), we have here an echo of the laud of Athens usual in funeral orations in the Ceramicus and in other panegyrics (cf. also vii. 161. 3 n.). These three mythical instances of valour and unselfishness were, along with Marathon (§ 5), the regular themes of patriotic Athenian orators. Cf. Isocrates, Paneg. § 54-70; Panath. 168 f., 193 f.; Plataic. 53; Plato, Menex. 239; Ps.-Lysias Epitaph. 3 f.; Ps. Dem. Epitaph. 8. Similarly in the Tegean speech there is a little history and a large admixture of myth.

1 προέθηκε, 'has laid on us the task of.' The idea seems to be that the Tegean has instituted a contest in self-laudatory panegyrics.

2 Cf. Diod. iv. 57, 58, and especially Apollodorus, ii. 8. The Athenians refused to surrender the Heracleids to Eurystheus, and slew his sons in battle, while Hyllus came up with Eurystheus as he fled by the Scironian rocks and slew him.

For another version cf. Euripides, Heraclidae.

3 Apparently in the oldest form of the legend it was Adrastus who persuaded the Thebans to allow the Argive heroes to be buried at Thebes (cf. Pind. Ol. vi. 15 with schol.); at any rate the grave of Tydeus was there (Paus. ix. 18. 2, quoting Il. xiv. 124, a spurious line); then the Attic tragedians, &c., made Adrastus flee to Theseus at Athens, who, whether by persuasion (Aesch. Ἐλευσίνιοι; Plut. Thes. 29; Isocr. Panath. 168-71) or by force of arms (Isoc. Paneg. 58; Euripides, Supp. 634 f.), recovered the bodies and buried them at Eleusis (Euripides, *op. cit.*), where their tombs were shown (Paus. i. 39. 2). Thus the story was turned into a panegyric on Athens.

4 Theseus is said to have carried off the queen of the Amazons, Antiope or Hippolyte (cf. iv. 110. 1 n.), from her land, going thither either as a companion of Heracles (Paus. i. 2. 1; Philoch. fr. 49, F. H. G. i. 392; cf. Plut. Thes. 26) or with his friend Pirithous (Pind.

fr. 161). The Amazons in revenge invaded Attica and fought long and fiercely with Theseus near the Pnyx and Museum. These daughters of Ares seized the hill of Ares (Aesch. Eum. 688 f.) to attack the Acropolis thence (cf. viii. 52). In that neighbourhood was the Amazoneion (Diodor. iv. 28; Aesch. Eumen. 655 f.) and the graves of the Amazons (Plut. Thes. 27). Graves of Amazons were also to be seen at Cynoscephalae and Scotussa in Thessaly, at Chaeronea in Boeotia, at Chalcis near Megara (Plut. Thes. 27), and at Troezen (Paus. ii. 31. 4, 32. 9).

Amazons are favourite subjects of sculptors and vase-painters. The fight with them was represented by Phidias on the shield of the Parthenos (Paus. i. 17. 2) and on the metopes of the Parthenon, and by Micon in the Stoa Poikile (Paus. i. 15. 2) and the Theseion (Paus. i. 17. 2). It is treated as the mythical counterpart of the Persian invasion.

ἀπὸ Θερμώδοντος: cf. iv. 110. 1.

οὐ τι πρόχει, 'it avails naught.' The Athenian speaker glides gracefully away from the Trojan war, in which his countrymen played no great part; cf. vii. 161. 3 n.

5 *μῶνοι* δὴ: very emphatic (cf. viii. 124. 3 n.). This insistence that the Athenians won Marathon by themselves ungratefully forgets the help of the Plataeans (cf. vii. 10. β 1). Attic orators follow the example of their advocate here; cf. Plato, *Menex.* 240 C; *Laws* 698 E; *Isocr. Panegyr.* § 86. 99; *Ps.-Lysias*, §§ 20-6; especially *μόνοι ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς πολλὰς μυριάδας τῶν βαρβάρων*.

The forty-six nations answer to the number of those who served on foot in the host of Xerxes (vii. 61-80). The assumption that they all fought at Marathon is purely gratuitous.

28 The studied variety of phrases used by H. to express the same idea, viz. the juxtaposition of the various Greek contingents, is remarkable, especially if it be compared with the monotonous repetition of ch. 31.

The great importance of this chapter for the question of Greek population is admitted even by Beloch (*Bevölkerung*, p. 9), though he holds, probably wrongly, that the numbers of hoplites given rest on a mere estimate made by the historian.

2 The repeated assertion that there were seven Helots to each Spartiate (ch. 10. 1, 29. 1, 61. 2) evidently rests on something more than mere conjecture. The words ἐφύλασσαν most naturally would mean that they were in personal attendance on their master, but elsewhere each Spartiate has but one squire (θεράπων, cf. vii. 186. 2 n., 229. 1 n.). Krüger would take it to mean that the light-armed Helots covered the right wing from the attacks of the Persian horse and archers; but though H. regards them as combatants (μάχιμοι, ch. 30; cf. 29. 8), there is nowhere any indication that they played an effective part in the fighting, though archers, and presumably other light troops, were urgently required (ch. 60). Hence

- at best they can only have been an army service corps (ch. 39, 50); [cf. Appendix XIX. 3. *in Xerxes' army*].
- 3 **εὔροντο**, 'gained the favour.' Potidaea (cf. vii. 123. 1; viii. 127 f.) was a colony of Corinth (Thuc. i. 56). E. Meyer (iii. 235 n.) holds that it is unlikely that any Potidaeans fought at Plataea, and that H. put them in erroneously because he found their name on the memorial at Delphi (ch. 81 n.), while Beloch (*l.c.*) would derive the whole list of names from the same source. Both views seem unlikely; cf. ch. 81 n. Obst (*Der Feldzug des Xerxes*, pp. 62-6) accepts the numbers given by Herodotus for the contingents of hoplites, and argues for the presence of the Paleans and Potidaeans at Plataea, which Munro (C. A. H. iv. 323) now doubts.
- 4 The only Arcadians who fought at Plataea were the men of Tegea and Orchomenus (cf. ch. 10 n.), though Mantineans and other Arcadians followed Leonidas (vii. 202) and Cleombrotus (viii. 72). The men of Tiryns and Lepreum were the only new recruits from Peloponnese. For Lepreum cf. iv. 148. 4. Tiryns and Mycenae were at the time of the Persian war independent communities; for their subsequent destruction cf. vi. 83 n.
- 5 **Χαλχιδέες**. Macan holds that these are probably the native inhabitants and not Athenian Cleruchs, since the latter would naturally have been brigaded with the Athenians. In viii. 1 and 46, however, Chalcidians serve on ships provided by Athens.
- Παλῆες**. Beloch (*l.c.*) suggests that Παλῆες is a misreading of the **Φαλῆιοι** (Eleans) extant on the Delphic serpent (ch. 81. 1 n.), but it seems far more probable that Pale really sent hoplites to Plataea, and, like Croton, Lemnos, and Seriphos, which each sent a single ship to Salamis, was not inscribed on the Delphic memorial because of the insignificance of its contingent.
- 6 **Μεγαρέων τρισχίλιοι**. Beloch (*op. cit.* and Klio vi. 52-7) holds that the 5,000 hoplites assigned to Corinth (§ 3) and the 3,000 to Sicyon (§ 4) and Megara are all exaggerated estimates. He points out (*Bevölk.*, p. 119) that the field army of Corinth in the Peloponnesian war and later is not much more than 3,000 strong (Thuc. i. 27, iv. 42-4, v. 57; Xen. *Hell.* iv. 2. 17), while Sicyon, whose force in 394 B.C. is but 1,500 (Xen. *l.c.*), and Megara he considers (pp. 118, 173) even less able to provide the contingents here given. But all these towns must have lost very much in strength during the period of the Athenian empire; all had been very important in the 6th century.
- Πλαταιέες ἑξακόσιοι**. In spite of Beloch's doubts (p. 165) this number agrees very well with the data in Thucydides, for the Plataeans much outnumber their 300 Theban assailants (ii. 3), and still number 400 after the removal of all but those necessary to garrison the town (ii. 78). As the campaign was in their territory, they would come in full force, **πανδημεί** (vi. 108) or **πανστρατιά** (Thuc. v. 57).
- ὀκτακισχίλιοι**. If allowance be made for the hoplites serving on

board the fleet (ch. 99 f.), this number agrees very well with the 9,000 or 10,000 said by late authors to have fought at Marathon (vi. 117 n.) and with the field army of 13,000 hoplites in 431 B. C., however we may explain the large number of men then used only for garrison duty (Thuc. ii. 13). For the whole number of citizens cf. v. 97 n.

29 2 This calculation rests on the ordinary Greek assumption that each hoplite was accompanied by a light-armed attendant (cf. vii. 186. 1 n.). Mere camp-followers are not included (cf. *μαχίμων*, ch. 30). The 800 extra light-armed troops, 34,500 as against 33,700 hoplites, are probably the Athenian archers (ch. 22. 1 n.).

30 αἱ ἑνδεκα μυριάδες. For the article with a round number cf. viii. 82. 2. It looks as if the Thespians were brought in to fill up the number.

οἱ περιέοντες. 700 Thespians had fallen at Thermopylae (vii. 202, 222, 226; viii. 25).

ὅπλα. The panoply of the heavy-armed soldier (cf. 63. 2); being without this, they fought as *ψιλοί*.

31 1 ἀπεκήδευσαν, 'had made an end of mourning for.' ἀπό, 'to the full'; cf. ii. 40. 4; viii. 76. 3.

ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν. Grundy (p. 470, n. 473) still clings to his view that H. uses the Asopus in two senses. Here and in ch. 40 he admits that it refers to the main stream, the 'Thespian' Asopus, but in line 1 and elsewhere (especially in ch. 51. 1) he insists that H. uses the name for the brook marked 'A. 1' on his plan, the 'Plataean' Asopus. This cutting of the knot has not found favour with other writers (Woodhouse, J. H. S. xviii. 56; Munro, J. H. S. xxiv. 161; E. Meyer, iii, p. 413). The name is throughout applied to the main stream. Mardonius' foot was stationed on the left bank (ch. 36, 40, 59), to protect the road to Thebes, which was threatened by the Greeks in their second position (25. 2 n.).

5 For the 1,000 Medizing Phocians cf. ch. 17, 18, and for the loyalists viii. 32.

τοὺς περὶ Θεσσαλίην: the seven dependent tribes described in vii. 132, &c.

32 1 For the Egyptian military classes cf. ii. 164 f. The force here described was composed of the marines from the 200 Egyptian ships; cf. vii. 89. 3 n.

2 πρότερον: i. e. viii. 113. 3, where it is clear that the horse are included. The number of the European allies confessedly rests on mere conjecture. No doubt the countries named might have furnished 50,000 men, but it is a suspicious circumstance that the European and the Asiatic forces of Mardonius are each just one-sixth of those absurdly ascribed to Xerxes (vii. 184, 185 n.). Again, the fact that their line faced only the Athenians, Plataeans, and Megarians (11,600 hoplites with over 12,000 *ψιλοί*) points to a force of some 25,000.



33-7 *The seers on either side, Tisamenus and Hegesistratus.*

33 I καὶ ἀμφοτέροι, 'both sides' (καὶ giving emphasis (i. 74. 3)); one would not have expected it of Persians. The Iamidae, who traced their descent from Iamus, son of Apollo (Pind. Ol. vi. 35-72; Paus. vi. 2. 5), were the most famous of the great families of soothsayers in Elis. They took auspices at the altar of Zeus at Olympia (Pind. Ol. vi. 5, 70; viii. 2, quoted viii. 133 n.) and furnished soothsayers to many Greek states (v. 44. 2; Paus. iv. 16. 1, vi. 2. 5, viii. 10. 5). They had a family tomb in Sparta (Paus. iii. 12. 8). Κλυτιάδην here is a late gloss, and does not occur in Paus. iii. 11. 6, a passage obviously derived from this. Further, Cicero plainly distinguishes the Iamidae and the Clytidae; De Div. i. 41. 91 'Elis in Peloponneso familias duas certas habet, Iamidarum unam, alteram Clytidarum, haruspicinae nobilitate praestantes'; Philostratus (Apollonius of Tyana, v. 25) agrees, adding the Telliadae (ch. 37. 1). Again Pausanias, who traces the Iamidae to Iamus and Apollo (vi. 25), makes Clytius, the ancestor of the Clytids, a descendant of Melampus (vi. 17. 1), as does Homer (Od. xv. 241) though with a different pedigree. Λεωσφέτερον : α ἄπαξ λεγόμενον, probably derived from λεώς, meaning full citizen (§ 4).

περὶ γόνου. Probably, being childless, he adopted his brother's son (§ 5), for Pausanias (iii. 11. 5) says that his grandson Hegias was with Lysander at Aegospotami as seer.

2 ἀναιρησόμενος γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας : cf. v. 102. 3.

ἀσκέων δὲ πεντάεθλον : cf. vi. 92. 2 n.

The order of events in the Pentathlon seems to be best given by Eustathius on Il. xxiii. 621 ἄλμα ποδῶν δίσκου τε βολὴ καὶ ἄκοντος ἔρωή | καὶ δρόμος ἦδε πάλη (cf. Soph. Elec. 691; schol. ad Pind. Isth. i. 35), Simonides (153) ἄλμα ποδωκείην δίσκου ἄκοντα πάλην displacing the running *metri gratia*. Certainly the wrestling came after all the other contests; cf. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 29; Bacchyl. ix. 30 f., especially ἡ τελευταία ἀμάρνγμα πάλας. Pausanias (iii. 11. 6) says that Tisamenus beat his opponent Hieronymus in running and jumping, but he was no doubt beaten by him in throwing the spear and the discus; hence the wrestling, the last event, was decisive. The wrestling then, as now, was decided by the best of three falls (Aesch. Eumen. 589 f.; Eur. Or. 434; Plato, Phaedr. 256 B, Euthyd. 277 D; Anthol. Pal. xi. 316). Each had won a fall in this, so all depended on 'a single fall' (ἐν πάλασμα), the last; this is better than to take ἐν πάλασμα in a more general sense of 'the odd event'. For a full discussion cf. E. N. Gardiner, J. H. S. xxiii. 54 f. He shows that any competitor, e.g. Aristomedes of Phlius (Bacchyl. l. c.), who won three events, must have won outright (cf. schol. ad Aristid. Panath. ἀρκεί (τοῖς πεντάθλοις) τρία τῶν πέντε πρὸς νίκην), and suggests that, if at the end, two or more competitors had scored an equal number of wins, account was taken of second and third

places as apparently in the mythical pentathlon of Peleus (Philost. Gymn. 3). (See note, p. 417.)

ἔδραμε (cf. vii. 57. 1 n.): more emphatic than the common *παρὰ μικρὸν ἦλθε*, *parum afuit quin*.

3 τὸ Τεισαμενοῦ μαντήιον: cf. v. 43 n.

ἡγεμόνα τῶν πολέμων. This cannot mean that the seer was to share the actual command in war, for in comparison with this the grant of citizenship would be nothing. It seems to refer to the position of the kings as priests, since they offered sacrifice before all important undertakings (Xen. Rep. Lac. 13). Tisamenus was to act with them in this.

5 χρησιμοσύνης: here concrete 'request'; so *κελενομοσύνη*, i. 157. 2. *τούτοισι μούνοισι*: added to give clearness and emphasis to *οὕτω*, 'on these conditions only.'

34 1 The parallel here is between the demands of two famous seers. For another parallel cf. v. 67. 1.

ὥς εἰκάσαι: cf. iv. 99. 5 and Thuc. iv. 36 ὥς μικρὸν μεγάλοις εἰκάσαι.

The legend is told with many variations of detail, but the general outline is as follows. The three daughters of Proetus, king of Tiryns, provoked the wrath of Dionysus by refusing to take part in his orgies (Hesiod, fr. 41, 42; ap. Apollodor. ii. 2. 2) or that of Argive Hera by contempt for her image and temple (Acusilaus ap. Apollodor. l. c.; Pherecydes, fr. 24; F. H. G. i. 74), and were punished with madness. They wandered in the wilderness and were joined by more and more Argive women, so that in despair the Argives summoned Melampus from the court of Neleus at Pylos (Apoll. i. 9. 11; Diodor. iv. 68). Melampus, well acquainted with the mysteries of Dionysus (cf. ii. 49), healed and purified the maidens, perhaps with Melampodium, black hellebore (Plin. N. H. xxv. 47), at the temple of Artemis at Lusi (Paus. viii. 18. 8 with Frazer), or at that of Apollo in Sicyon (Paus. ii. 9. 8). For representations of the scene cf. Roscher, ii. 2573. As a reward one princess with a third of the kingdom was given by her brother, king Anaxagoras, to Melampus, and another to Bias (§ 2) (Diod. iv. 68; Paus. ii. 18. 4). The legend seems to be Argive, and is ignored by Homer (Od. xv. 238 f.); Pindar (Paeon iv. 28 in Oxyrh. Pap. v, p. 37) makes Melampus refuse the kingdom of Argos.

2 προτεῖναι: here not 'offered' but 'demanded'. Both meanings come from the original sense, *propono* (cf. vii. 6. 2 n.), while *ἐπορέγεται* = 'raises his demands'.

35 1 μῦθοι . . . διή . . . πολιῆται. This statement is clearly inaccurate, since Helots were occasionally admitted to citizenship as Mothakes (Phylarch. fr. 44; F. H. G. i. 347), though not as Neodamodeis (Thuc. vii. 19, 58, &c.). Again, in mythical times H. himself records the admission of the Minyae to citizenship (iv. 145), and implies the same of the Aegidae (iv. 149). To these cases, and perhaps also

to the non-Dorian Talthybiadae (vii. 134) and the Epeunacti (Theopompus, fr. 190; F. H. G. i. 310), Aristotle may refer when he declares that in the days of the early kings the Spartans bestowed the citizenship freely (Pol. ii. 9. 17, 1270 a 35). H. must be taken to mean that Tisamenus and Hegias were the only foreigners admitted to Spartan citizenship in historical times, a striking example of an exclusiveness eventually fatal to the state; cf. Tac. Ann. xi. 24. H. clearly knew nothing of the alleged grants to Tyrtaeus (Plato, Leg. 629 A; Plutarch, Mor. 230 D) and to Alcman (Plut. Mor. 600 E).

- 2 This brief summary is our earliest and most authentic record of an anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese, which does much to explain the free hand allowed to Athens in the Aegean after 476 B. C., and the rapid growth of her power. The most certain point in the movement is the *συννοικισμός* at Elis before 470 (Diodor. xi. 54; Strabo 337) with the democratic changes that accompanied it, especially the formation of ten local tribes (Paus. v. 9. 5) and the establishment of a *βουλή* of 500, later increased to 600 (Thuc. v. 47); cf. Busolt, iii. 116 f. The democratic constitution of Argos, with its popular assembly (Thuc. v. 28, 31), *βουλή*, and law court, may date from this time; certainly it is not later than 460 B. C. (cf. Busolt, iii. 114 f.). On the other hand the *συννοικισμός* (Strabo 337) and the democratic movement at Mantinea (Ar. Pol. 1318 b 25-7), placed *circ.* 470 B. C. by Busolt (iii. 118), should be dated ten years later, since Mantinea took no part in the battle of Dipaea, and assisted Sparta in the Messenian war, i. e. at Ithome (Xen. Hell. v. 2, 3); cf. Meyer, iii. § 285.

On the battles of Tegea and Dipaea later writers (e. g. Paus. iii. 11. 7; viii. 8. 6 and 45. 2; Isocr. Arch. 99) add little or nothing of value to H. Both should be dated near together in the time of the movement against Sparta, i. e. *circ.* 473-470 B. C. (Busolt, iii. 121 n. 1; Meyer, iii. § 285). Themistocles would then be in Argos intriguing against Sparta, if the traditional date for the fall of Themistocles (470 B. C.) refers not to his ostracism (as Meyer, iii. § 286 n.) but to his final expulsion and flight (Busolt, iii. 112 n. 2). Tegea would seem to have been hostile to Sparta just before as well as after the Persian war. At any rate, Hegesistratus found refuge there before 480 B. C. (ix. 37), and Leotychides afterwards (vi. 72). Apparently the Tegeans, though defeated in the battle here mentioned, defended their city with success (Simonides, fr. 103). They were, however, induced then or later by Cleandridas to accept oligarchy and Spartan hegemony. Yet they seem to have been still in alliance with Argos at the time of the destruction of Mycenae, i. e. *circ.* 464 B. C.; cf. vi. 83. 2 n. and Strabo 377 'Αργεῖοι μετὰ Κλεωναίων καὶ Τεγεατῶν ἐπελθόντες ἄρδην τὰς Μυκῆνας ἀνείλον.

ἐν Διπαιεύσι: also called Dipaea (Paus. viii. 27. 3; Isocr. Arch. 6. 99), on the river Helison (Paus. viii. 30. 1), in the district Maenalía (Paus. iii. 11. 7), perhaps the modern Dabia. The

Argives are believed to have been kept away from this battle by the siege of Tiryns (cf. vi. 83. 2 n.), and the Mantineans stood aloof, doubtless from hostility to Tegea (Meyer, iii, § 285). The Spartans, though greatly outnumbered (Isocr. *l. c.*), gained a decisive victory, which restored their prestige in the Peloponnese.

Ἴσθμῳ, the reading of the MSS., is confirmed by Paus. iii. 11. 8 πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ Ἴσθμοῦ ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀποστάντας τῶν Εἰλώτων, since he is obviously combining this passage with Thucydides' (i. 101-3) account of the third Messenian war and the siege of Ithome. It is therefore uncritical (with Paulmier) to correct to πρὸς Ἰθώμην, especially as we know only of a siege and not of any battle at Ithome. The combat here mentioned is, like that of Stenyclarus in this war (ch. 64), elsewhere unnoticed. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (A. and A. ii. 296 n.) would read ὁ Μεσσηνίων πρὸς τῷ Ἴσθμῳ, making Μεσσηνίων depend on τῷ Ἴσθμῳ. In any case this Isthmus would seem to be an otherwise unknown place in Messenia. Stein is reminded of the legendary king of Messenia, Isthmius (Paus. iv. 3. 10). Tisamenus and the oracle at Delphi induced the Spartans to make terms with the revolted Helots and to let them go (Paus. iii. 11. 8; cf. Thuc. i. 103).

Τανάγρη: for Tanagra (457 B.C.) cf. Thuc. i. 107-8; Hill, Sources, p. 103 f. The Athenians received aid from Argos, Cleonae (Paus. i. 29. 5, 7), and other allies. Hicks, 28-30; Paus. v. 10. 4 with Frazer.

36 ἀμυνομένοισι. The seers on each side (cf. 38. 2) seem to have grasped the fact that the offensive was fraught with danger. Cf. Appendix XXII. 5.

37 1 Ἑλληνικοῖσι ἱροῖσι. Here, as elsewhere (vi. 97. 2; vii. 43. 2; viii. 133; vii. 113. 2 n.), the Persians follow Hellenic usage.

Τελλιαδέων: cf. c. 33. 1 n. Perhaps the seer Tellias (viii. 27. 3) belonged to this family.

2 ὥστε = ἄτε, as in § 3. πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου, 'ready to suffer much rather than die,' not 'being likely to suffer many grievous tortures before death', since the Greeks did not use torture except for slaves. For πρὸ = 'in preference to' cf. vii. 152. 3 *ad fin.*

4 ἐκ τῆς ἰθῆς, 'openly, straightforwardly'; cf. ii. 161. 4 *ad fin.*; iii. 127. 1. So ἰθὲρ τέχνη, ix. 57. 1.

συγκεκριμένον: *conflatum*; cf. iv. 152. 5 *ad fin.*; vii. 151, 145. 1 n.

Ζακύνθῳ. Demaratus, too, had sought refuge over sea in Zacynthus (vi. 70. 2).

38-40 *Reluctance of both sides to attack. The Persian horse seize the pass of Dryoscephalae.*

38 2 ἐπ' ἑωυτῶν: exclusively for themselves; cf. 17. 2.

39 1 The use of his overwhelming cavalry to cut communications was the obvious course for Mardonius (cf. App. XXII. 5). Even a temporary cutting of the lines, by such a raid as is here described, was serious, and might at any time be repeated. Dryoscephalae is usually rightly identified with the pass of Gyphto Kastro (cf. Grundy, 447,

493 n.; Frazer, Paus. v. 2), through which the main road from Athens and Eleusis by Eleutherae to Thebes passed in ancient as in modern times. This is the natural interpretation of Thucydides (iii. 24), and a modern traveller (Vischer, *Erinner aus Griech.* p. 533) states that the 'three heads' after which the Boeotians named the pass can be plainly distinguished from their side. On the other hand, the words αἱ ἐπὶ Πλαταιῶν φέρουσι hardly suit this pass. Hence Munro would include under the name the whole group of passes (J. H. S. xxiv. 155 n.), and others, e. g. Stein and Rawlinson, identify 'Dryoscephalae' with Grundy's second pass. Through this came probably the main road to Thebes from Megara and the Peloponnese over Mount Kardyes by the modern Vilia (J. H. S. xxiv. 155, 156). Cleombrotus used it in 378 B.C., and thus avoided touching Attic territory (Xen. Hell. v. 4. 14, 19). Grundy's third road (called by him the Plataea-Megara road; cf. p. 456 n.) seems to be a rough track of no great importance, used as a short cut by travellers on foot or on horseback.

περιβαλλόμενοι: either 'surrounding' (Stein; cf. Xen. Cyr. iii. 3. 23) or 'securing them' (Blakesley, Rawlinson); cf. iii. 71. 4; vi. 24. 2; vii. 190; viii. 8. 1.

- 40 The Thebans are praised ironically. They are the cause of others fighting (γάρ), making a brave show but leaving deeds of valour to the Persians.

μάλα = μάλ' αὖ *rursus*; cf. i. 134. 3.

ἔσκον: iterative.

- 41-6 *Eleventh day. Mardonius, in spite of Artabazus, resolves on immediate battle. Oracles. Warning of Alexander to the Athenians.*

- I I τῶν δέκα: i. e. the eight days mentioned in ch. 39. I and the two in ch. 40. I. It is, however, a suspicious circumstance that throughout the story of this campaign H. reckons in periods of ten days, i. e. in Greek weeks. The Athenian envoys are ten days in Sparta (ch. 8), the Greek army is in position inactive for ten days, it advances on Thebes ten days after the battle (ch. 86), while Thebes surrenders after a siege of twenty days (ch. 87. 1); cf. Busolt, ii. 726 n.; Meyer, iii. § 236 n. Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 58) further argues that the point of departure in H.'s chronology is uncertain; the words ἀντικατημένοις ἐν Πλαταιῇσι (cf. ch. 39. 1), usually and naturally taken to refer to the occupation of the second position by the Greeks (ch. 25), he would refer to the opening of the campaign when the Greeks seized their first position on the slopes of Cithaeron. He also suspects H. of duplicating the interval of two days between the closing of the passes and the final battle, regarding the two days of waiting as purposeless, and the Persian Council, the visit of Alexander, and the challenge of Mardonius as fictitious. He thus compresses the campaign from the occupation of the first position



to the final battle within a space of eleven days. Such bold reconstructions must of necessity be hypothetical. We may, however, agree that H.'s chronology is too vague to be satisfactory, and that there is more than one improbable incident in his narrative. Especially we may note with Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 160) and Macan (ii. 349, 369, 376) the improbability that the Greeks remained so long in their advanced position on the Asopus Ridge, and that Mardonius on his part delayed so long the cutting of their communications (cf. Appendix XXII. 5).

ἔδρη, 'chafed at inaction'; cf. Thuc. v. 7 ἀχθομένων τῇ ἔδρᾳ, Bacchylides (fr. 23 Bergk, 52 Kenyon) οὐχ ἔδρας ἔργον.

Ἀρτάβαζος: cf. viii. 126. 1 n. His prudent counsel is contrasted with the infatuation of Mardonius. He is to him what Solon is to Croesus, Croesus to Cyrus, or Artabanus and Demaratus to Xerxes.

- 2 The idea is not that the whole army should or could find refuge within the walls of Thebes, but that the city should be made the base of the army, and the wooden fort on the Asopus (ch. 15. 2 n.) be given up. In view of the Greek advance, a base on the Asopus may well have seemed too far forward.

The existence of plentiful supplies at Thebes is inconsistent with Alexander's report of a shortage on the Asopus (45. 2), since with superior cavalry it must have been easy to maintain communication between them. The statement here is probably accurate, as it comes from a better source (Busolt, ii. 730 n.) and is more in accord with the care of the Persians for their commissariat (cf. vii. 25). Grundy (pp. 476, 477), however, holds that the Phocians, who were threatening Mardonius's communications (ch. 31. 5), may have caused supplies to run short.

- 3 For the suggestion of bribery cf. ch. 25 with 3. 1 n. Plutarch (Arist. 13) declares that there was at this time an oligarchic plot among the Athenians to overthrow the constitution, and if necessary to betray Greece to the Persian. The statement is regarded as probable by Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 36) and Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 149), and as at least possible by E. Meyer (iii. § 233) and Busolt (ii. 730); but it may be a mere anecdote designed to illustrate the great services of Aristides in quelling the conspiracy, or transferred from some other occasion, e. g. Marathon (Macan, ii. 88).

- 4 οὐδαμῶς συγγινωσκομένη: probably repeats and strengthens the idea of foolish obstinacy expressed in ἀγνωμονεστέρα (cf. vii. 9. β 1), though it may mean 'in no way agreeing with Artabazus' (v. 94. 2; vi. 140. 2).

συμβάλλειν, like δοκέειν, depends on a verb, 'said, bade,' latent in ἐγίνετο γνώμη.

βιάζεσθαι, 'to constrain' the auspices to be favourable, by repeated consultation.

- 42 2 τῶν ἐπικλήτων: cf. vii. 8. 1 n.

- 3 This story may well be another attempt to explain why Delphi

was not plundered by the Persians. Mardonius' knowledge of this oracle seems inconsistent with the expedition to Delphi in the previous year (cf. viii. 35 f., and especially 39 n.), unless we assume that he only heard of it when inquiring of the oracles (viii. 133 f.) in the winter of 480–79 B. C.; cf. Busolt ii. 689. n. 3 and Hauvette, p. 389.

- 4 ὡς περιεσομένους: the circumstantial participle with ὡς, in the accusative absolute, implies that this is the thought of the Medizing Greeks. Goodwin, § 917; Madvig, Gr. Syntax, § 182.

- 43 I οἶδα. This phrase implies personal inquiry on the part of H., who seldom gives his opinion so strongly; cf. i. 20.

For the **Enchelees** cf. v. 61. 2 n. The oracle apparently promised the Enchelees victory over the Illyrians if they took Cadmus and Harmonia as leaders (Apollod. iii. 5. 4), and prophesied an incursion into Greece, warning them against the plunder of Delphi; cf. Eur. Bacch. 1330 f. (a speech of Dionysus to Cadmus):

Δράκων γενήσῃ μεταβαλὼν, δάμαρ τε σὴ | ἐκθηριωθείς ὄφεος ἀλλάξει  
τύπον, | ἦν Ἄρεος ἔσχεε Ἀρμονίαν θνητὸς γεγώς. | ὄχον δὲ μόσχων,  
χρησμός ὡς λέγει Δίος, | ἐλᾷς μετ' ἀλόχου, βαρβάρων ἡγούμενος. | πολλὰς  
δὲ πέρσεις ἀναρίθμῳ στρατεύματι | πόλεις ὅταν δὲ Λοξίου χρηστήριον |  
διαρπάσωσι, νόστον ἄθλιον πάλιν | σχίσουσιν . . .

τὰ μὲν = ἃ μὲν resumed by ταῦτα μὲν (§ 2). For Bacis cf. viii. 20. 1 n., and for Musaeus vii. 6. 3 n.

- 2 The extract is ungrammatical, no verb being given to govern σύνοδον καὶ ἰυγὴν. The style is Homeric; cf. Il. iv. 383 Ἄσωπὸν δ' ἴκοντο βαθύσχοινον λεχεποίην. Glisas, mentioned in Homer (Il. ii. 504), lay north-east of Thebes, just south of Mount Hypatus and above the Aonian plain (Strabo 412; Paus. ix. 19. 3 with Frazer); its ruins are perched on the rocky hill of Tourleza. The Thermodon seems to be the Calamites, rising west of Harma and flowing through the Aonian plain to the lake of Hylica (Frazer, Paus. v, p. 62). The fight between the Thebans and the Epigoni was said to have taken place in this region.

- 44 I προελήλατο: impersonal = *nocte multum provecta*; cf. ii. 121. δ 6 ὡς πρόσω ἦν τῆς νυκτός. There seems no reason to doubt that the Macedonians were opposite the Athenians on the Greek left (ch. 31. 5), or to disbelieve in the phil-Hellenism of Alexander (cf. v. 22. 1) or in his friendship for Athens (viii. 136. 140 β). Yet this story of his midnight visit is open to suspicion. Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 43) asks how he could have eluded the Persian sentinels, or, if he was believed to be the bearer of dispatches, where was the alleged risk. More serious objections are the improbability of his assertion that supplies were running short, and the falsification of his warning that Mardonius would fight the decisive battle next day. Macan (ii. 373) points out that Alexander has already given one friendly warning to the Greeks (vii. 173), and notes the tendency to justify the conduct of the Macedonian, yet he rightly holds that there was

probably some communication and collusion between Alexander and the Athenians (ii. 384).

τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι. The majority of the ten strategi (vi. 103. 1) would be with the army, though Xanthippus at least was with the fleet at Mycale (ch. 114). Plutarch (Aristid. 20) names Leocrates and Myronides besides Aristides, to whom he makes Alexander appeal (Aristid. 15).

2 ὀνομάζων: apparently Alexander inspires confidence by naming the Athenian general.

45 1 ἀπόρρητα ποιεύμενος takes the place of an unused verb = 'charging you to keep it secret'; cf. ch. 94. 1, Arist. Eq. 647 κἀγὼ φράσα | αὐτοῖς ἀπόρρητον ποιησάμενος. It is followed naturally by μή (like ἀπαγορεύειν, vii. 149. 1), here made emphatic in the phrase πρὸς μηδένα λέγειν.

46-51 *Twelfth day (46-51). Athenian and Spartan change of positions (46, 47). Challenge of Mardonius (48). The Greeks, harassed by cavalry, resolve to retreat to the Island (49-51).*

46 Few critics or historians will now accept this story of marching and countermarching as the literal truth. These manœuvres could not be carried out by large bodies of troops in face of the enemy in a single day (Hauvette, p. 469). Such conduct on the part of Spartans is unexampled (Grote), and would surely have demoralized the whole Greek army. The foundation of the story is probably some manœuvre whose purpose was misunderstood by H. (Grundy, p. 470), or wilfully misrepresented by his Athenian informants (Woodhouse, J. H. S. xviii. 47, &c.). The simplest hypothesis is that of E. Meyer (iii, p. 40), that the Spartans moved to the left wing because when the Greeks advanced that was the post of danger. Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 159, 160) suggests that the troops marched to the second position by brigades, and that the Spartans, moving first, marched by the Athenians, and then the Athenians in turn pushed on behind this screen of troops and again formed the left wing near the Asopus.

2 It is no doubt literally true that no living Spartan had fought in a pitched battle against the Persians, since Aristodemus, the sole survivor from Thermopylae (ix. 71), took no part in the fighting there (vii. 229); but we can hardly believe that the Spartans, after Thermopylae, feared the Persian—they certainly had more reason to fear Thessalians (v. 63); nor is it true, so far as we know, that they had fought with the Boeotians, whereas the Athenians had defeated them utterly (v. 77).

3 Plutarch treats Pausanias' unwillingness to face the Persians as ridiculous (de Mal. Herod. 42, Mor. 872 B), and (Aristides, ch. 16) makes the Athenians grumble at his orders till reconciled to them by Aristides. The latter variant is evidently designed to glorify Aristides.

- 47 ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου (*sc. ἐποίησε*). Mardonius did likewise on the left wing.
- 48 The taunt and challenge of Mardonius seem to be reminiscences from Homer (Il. iii. 67 f.; viii. 161 f.). We may, however, compare the combat for Thyrea (i. 82 n.).
- For Spartan reputation for valour cf. vii. 209; Thuc. iv. 40.
- 4 τί δὴ οὐ . . . ἐμαχεσάμεθα; These questions with τί οὐ, expressing surprise that something is not already done, and implying an exhortation to do it (Goodwin, § 62), are common in Attic; this is the only instance in H. For ἦν and εἰ parallel cf. iii. 35. 2; viii. 21. 1.
- βαρβάρων. H. has no more scruple than Aeschylus (Pers. 187, 337) in making a Persian herald speak of his nation as 'barbarian'. νικᾶν depends on λέγομεν understood from ἄρξομεν τοῦ λόγου (3 *ad fin.*).
- 49 1 τὰ καταλαβόντα : what befell him; cf. ch. 104; iii. 42. 4; viii. 6. 2 n.
- 2 ἵπποτοξόται : that the Persians were mounted archers follows from comparing vii. 84 with vii. 61; cf. also Xen. Anab. iii. 3. 7; Aesch. Pers. 26. The Parthians inherited his mode of fighting; Hor. Odes i. 19. 11, ii. 13. 17; Virg. Georg. iii. 31, &c.
- 3 Notice that the Spartans are made solely responsible for the loss of the fountain Gargaphia, on which cf. ch. 25 n.
- 50 Since the successful raid of the Persian cavalry, the Greek transport dare not leave the shelter of the hills. The enemy's horse might at any time sweep down upon them if they attempted to cross the open ground between the pass and the Greek position.
- 51 At the present day there is no such 'island' as H. describes near Plataea. But the Greeks felt no objection to calling a peninsula an island; cf. Peloponnesus, Chersonesus, &c. Leake and Vischer identified as 'the island' a level stretch of meadow land intersected by several streams, which later unite to form the Oeroe. Grundy (p. 481 f.) objects that in September, when the battle was fought, these streams would be dry before they reached this part of the plain, and that their beds offer no obstacle to cavalry. Further, in order to reach this supposed refuge from the cavalry, the Greek army, already shaken, would have had to cross a mile of open country exposed to its attacks. Finally, this tongue of land is surrounded by good cavalry ground, so that in case of defeat, the Greek army would have been in a hopeless position. Grundy, therefore, rightly prefers (p. 484 f.) the ridge or ridges at the foot of Cithaeron between the upper courses of the same streams, because this position is almost unassailable by cavalry, and lies (πρὸ τῆς Πλαταιέων πόλεως) east of Plataea, the side towards which the city looks, and from which it is naturally approached. The only difficulty is the statement that it is ten stades from the Asopus. If we reject Grundy's use of the name for the tributary stream from Apotripi (ch. 31. 1 n.), we must either with Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 57)

insert  $\kappa' = 20$  after 'Ασωποῦ before καί, or with Munro hold that the sentence means, 'the island is distant from the Asopus, or rather from Gargaphia, at which they were then encamped, ten stades'; cf. J. H. S. xxiv. 161.

- 2 σχιζόμενος [ὁ] ποταμός. Since the river referred to must be the Oeroe, the article is better away. There is now no trace of such a division of the stream. The Oeroe is a small and sluggish stream, formed of brooks from Mount Cithaeron and flowing west to Creusis.

ὅσον περ, 'as much as' (cf. ii. 170. 2; iv. 50. 2). ὅσον τε, 'about,' is more Herodotean.

- 3 ὥσπερ κατιθῶ ἔδντων, 'as they did when they were directly exposed to them.' The remark would apply specially to the Athenians who had advanced furthest on to the plain.

- 4 H. speaks as if the whole force was first to take position on the island behind the Oeroe, and then the right wing was to move sideways along the hills to the pass or passes over Cithaeron. It is, however, far more likely that only a part of the army was intended to occupy the island, probably only the Athenians, while the Spartans themselves undertook the difficult operation of relieving the provision trains blocked in the passes, and thus reopening the communications of the Greek army (Grundy, p. 492; Woodhouse, p. 53). They would also permanently secure the passes for the future.

52-7 *Night of the twelfth day. Flight of the Greek centre (52). Retreat of Pausanias and of the Athenians delayed by the obstinacy of Amompharetus (53-7).*

- 52 H. evidently believed that the Greek centre, including all the troops from the Corinthians to the Megarians (cf. ch. 28 and 69), fled in a panic. But, if so, it is not easy to see why they halted and piled arms before Plataea, instead of making directly for the Plataea-Megara pass (Grundy, p. 490). Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii, p. 50 f.), followed by Munro and Macan (ii. 382), suggests that the centre really occupied its intended position. Hence it was readily reached by a messenger from Pausanias (ch. 69), and then, in accordance with its orders, split up into two brigades.

πόλιν. Plataea had been burnt by the Persians (viii. 50), but no doubt parts of its walls still were standing, and would cover the left flank of the Greek position.

Ἡραῖον. Probably on the site of the large temple found by the American excavators. It lies east of the fortified north-west corner of the town, identified by Grundy as fifth-century Plataea, and yet within the larger later city, as is implied by Pausanias (ix. 2. 7, with Frazer *ad loc.*). It is eighteen stades from Grundy's Gargaphia and fifteen from Apotripi. It is natural to suppose that the largest temple at Plataea was dedicated to its chief goddess, Hera Teleia



(cf. Paus ix. 2. 7 f.). According to Plutarch (Aristides, ch. II and 18), Hera was called also Hera Kithaironeia.

53-7 The story of Amompharetus reads like a camp tale. It is no doubt a fact that he remained behind with a detachment; it is very possible that in a council of war he opposed the plan of retreat. But the whole scene here described is opposed to the high repute of Spartan discipline, and the maxim that it is a disgrace to retreat before the enemy is as mythical as 'the Guard dies but never surrenders'. Probably he was left behind with a rear-guard to cover the delayed retreat (cf. 57 n.).

53 I κατά, 'after them'; cf. i. 84. 5; ii. 70. 2; iii. 4. 2; ix. 59. I. The expression is loose, but H. clearly believed all the Greek brigades were to converge on 'the island'.

2 The existence of a Pitanae λόχος is totally denied by Thucydides, i. 20 (cf. vi. 57. 5 n.), who is echoed by Hesychius (*s. v.* Πιτανάτης) ὁ Πιτανάτης λόχος αὐτοσχεδιάζεται, οὐκ ὦν ταῖς ἀληθείαις. Nevertheless Caracalla, in forming a number of young Spartans into a λόχος Πιτανάτης, believed himself to be imitating ancient usage (Herodian, iv. 8). There is a good deal of evidence for the view that the earliest λόχοι at Sparta were local corps, probably five in number (cf. Gilbert, G. C. A. p. 68 f.). Schol. Arist. Lysist. 454 λόχοι γὰρ οὐκ εἰσι τέτταρες ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ ἀλλὰ πέντε, 'Εδῶλος Σίνις Ἀρίμας Πλοῦς Μεσσοάγης; cf. schol. Thuc. iv. 8 and Hesychius, who cites Aristotle as the authority for five λόχοι. H.'s 5,000 Spartiates (cf. io. 4) perhaps represents a corps of 1,000 from each Spartan village. We may explain the direct contradiction in Thucydides by supposing that H. has made a mistake as to the name of the λόχος, since Pitana, though an important suburb (cf. iii. 55. 2), was not, according to the scholiasts, one of the 'quarters' after which the λόχοι were called, or less probably by the fact that the organization of the Spartan army, which was kept a secret (Thuc. v. 68), had been changed before Thucydides wrote, probably at the time of the Helot revolt (*circ.* 464 B.C.), so that a denial true for his own day might be false for the time of the Persian war.

ξείνους: cf. ch. II. 2 n.

οὐ παραγενόμενος. This looks like a hypothesis invented to explain absence of opposition earlier, but Amompharetus may have been on outpost duty with his regiment.

Εὐρύναξ: cf. ch. io. 3 n., 55. I.

54 I The Spartans and Tegeans formed together the right wing.

The excuse put forward by the Athenians to explain their own failure to reach their appointed post on the 'island' does not hold water (Woodhouse, J. H. S. xviii. 52; Macan, ii. 383). Why should Pausanias after ordering a general retreat expose his own division unsupported to Persian attack? Probably in the end he reached, or all but reached, his appointed station (App. XXII. 6; Macan ii. 382). If he delayed to start, it was probably because he

intended himself to cover the retreat of the other divisions, and the Athenians, by their own admission, were not yet moving. It is probable enough that already in 479 B. C. there was mistrust of Sparta at Athens, caused by the delay in sending help, and justified perhaps by the jealousy shown in Sparta's attempts to prevent the rebuilding of the walls of Athens (478 B. C.; Thuc. i. 89 f.; cf. App. XXII *ad fin.*). Yet the phraseology of H. recalls the charges of treachery current at Athens in the Peloponnesian war, satirized by Aristophanes (Acharn. 308; Pax 1067), and most fully expressed by Eurip. Androm. 446 f. Σπάρτης ἔνοικοι, δόλια βουλευτήρια, | ψευδῶν ἄνακτες, μηχανόρραφοι κακῶν . . . | οὐκ αἰσχροκερεῖς; οὐ λέγοντες ἄλλα μὲν | γλῶσση, φρονοῦντες δ' ἄλλ' ἐφευρίσκεσθ' αἰεῖ; H. unconsciously reflects Athenian prejudice (cf. viii. 144. 4 n.) of the kind which made *Punica fides* proverbial at Rome, and *perfidie Albion* in France.

- 55 2 τὰ ἐντεταλμένα: the questions he had been ordered to ask; cf. 54. 2.

The Athenians were to close up to the Spartans and conform their movements to those of Pausanias. In H.'s opinion the purpose would be to close the gap left by the retreat of the centre, but most probably it was throughout intended that in the new position the Athenians should be next the Spartans and Tegeans (cf. Appendix XXII. 6).

- 56 2 ταχθέντες, 'under orders' (from Pausanias); cf. vii. 169. 1; viii. 7. 2, 13. 1. Grundy (p. 504) rightly holds that the Athenians were posted on the Asopus Ridge, and descended its western slope into the plain, thus starting their march in the *opposite* direction to the Spartans (τὰ ἔμπαλιν, cf. vii. 58. 1).

- 57 1 Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 54) holds that Amompharetus was left behind with a rear-guard to cover the retreat of the right wing, and perhaps also of the Athenians who were evidently still trailing across the plain at sunrise (Munro, J. H. S. xxiv. 164). He retreated slowly (βάδην) only just in front of the Persian cavalry (§ 3).

περιείχετο, 'kept on insisting' that they should stay where they were (Macan).

ἰθὺν τέχνη: outright; cf. ch. 37. 4.

- 2 If Hude is right in adopting the conjecture δ' = 4 for δέκα = 10, there can be little doubt that Grundy's identification of the temple of Eleusinian Demeter (p. 496) with the modern church of St. Demetrius should be accepted, as it is some four and a half stades from his Gargaphia. The church is, however, nearer his stream A 5, with which he at first (1894; cf. Topography of Plataea, p. 33) identified the Moloeis, than the more important stream A 6, which he now (G. P. W. p. 495) prefers. The Ἀργιόπιος χῶρος is unknown.

If the MS. reading δέκα be retained (cf. App. XXII. 6), it would seem probable that there is a confusion between two temples. There were at least two temples of Demeter within the field of operations, (1) near Plataea, cf. Paus. ix. 4. 3; (2) near Hysiae, Plut. Aristid. II.

It would seem then that the Demeter temple here, if *ten* stades from Gargaphia, should be looked for under the rocky foot of Cithaeron, either on some high ground about fifteen stades from Plataea, where now are the foundations of a large Byzantine church (Hauvette, p. 476, cf. Amer. Jour. Arch. vi. 467), or just east of Kriekouki and west of the Eleutherae-Thebes road, where two inscriptions have been found relating to the worship of Demeter (Frazer, Paus. v, p. 5; Munro, J. H. S. xxiv. 163), while that mentioned in ch. 65 would be the modern Demetrium. Grundy, although he retains the ten stades from Gargaphia, is convinced that only one temple is meant throughout, that which is now the church of St. Demetrius.

58-75 *Battle of Plataea. Mardonius attacks the Spartans and Tegeans and is defeated* (58-65).

58 2 ἐλέγετε. H. does not ascribe such a saying directly to the Aleuadae, though they may be included in the phrase (48. 1) ὑπὸ τῶν τῆδε ἀνθρώπων. From a Persian point of view they might be regarded as neighbours of Sparta. For this boast of the Spartans cf. vii. 104. 4, 5, 209, 234; ix. 53.

ἐναπεδεικνύατο. Stein would supply an object (e.g. ἔργα, ἀρετάς), but the middle may have the force of 'approved themselves', *se ostentabant*.

3 For the genitive ἐπαινεόντων after the dative ὑμῶν cf. i. 3. 2; viii. 69. i.

συνηδέατε, 'of whom you knew somewhat'; cf. ch. 60. 3; v. 24. 3; vii. 164. 2.

Ἄρταβάζου goes with τὸ [καὶ] καταρρωδῆσαι, θῶμα . . . ἐποιεύμην being equivalent to ἐθώμαζον; cf. viii. 74. 2. For the facts cf. ch. 41.

ἀναξεύξαντας: cf. viii. 60. a n.

59 1 The Athenians having descended into the plain to the west of the Asopus ridge (ch. 56. 2 n.) would be hidden from the enemy by the northern extension of that ridge (Grundy, p. 504 n.).

2 κόσμῳ: the discipline and order of the separate corps or regiments.

τάξι: their position and use in the army as a whole (cf. viii. 86 n.).

60 1 Doubts have been thrown on this message of Pausanias. Its wording has clearly been altered to suit Athenian prejudices, exalting Athens and condemning the other allies. But it is quite natural that Pausanias, who probably thought he was attacked by the whole force of the enemy, should ask for reinforcements from his nearest allies, and especially for archers (§ 3) to help him against the Persian cavalry (cf. ch. 22. 1 n.).

2 δέδοκται. There is no need for a new resolution, because their course has already been determined; cf. iv. 68. 4; v. 96. 2; vi. 109. 3; ix. 74. 1.

61 2 Only one light-armed soldier is reckoned for each Perioecus and Tegeate ; cf. ch. 29. 2 n., but there were seven for each Spartiate (ch. 20. 2 n.).

3 γέρρα : light wicker shields (vii. 61. 1 ; Xen. Anab. i. 8. 9 ; ii. 1. 6). Rüstow supposes that the Persians fixed them in the ground with the help of their short spears, but, as Stein points out, some more elaborate and effective arrangement seems required. They are described as a considerable obstacle to the Greek hoplites (ch. 62. 2, 102. 2, 3) and a real protection for the Persians (ch. 99. 3). It is only when the Greeks have broken through this shield-wall that the Persians are defenceless.

The Heraeum (cf. ch. 52 n.) would be above and behind him, to the left.

62 1 It is clear that Pausanias showed great tactical skill, and the Spartans their usual courage and discipline in remaining passive under the hail of arrows, till the Persian infantry was thoroughly engaged, so that a battle at close quarters was inevitable. He thus rendered the Persian cavalry practically useless, except in covering the retreat (ch. 68), and might confidently count on the superiority of the Greek hoplite in arms and discipline (62. 3, 63. 2).

2 τὸ Δημήτριον : cf. ch. 57. 2 n.

3 ἀνοπλοι need only mean 'without shields', though the strong expressions below (63. 2) seem to imply that they were also without cuirass or corselet. This was true of the Bactrians, Indians, and Sacae, but some at least of the Persians and Medes wore cuirasses (viii. 113 ; vii. 61. 1 n.) quilted with scales of metal.

The skill (σοφίη) of the Lacedaemonians may have been shown as at Thermopylae (vii. 211. 3) by a feigned retreat, as is definitely stated in Plato, Laches 191 C. For similar tactics against a shield-wall cf. the Normans at Hastings.

63 1 χιλίους. The regiment of horse picked in viii. 113. 2.

64 1 For the oracle cf. viii. 114 n.

The genealogical remarks serve to show and enhance the importance of the Greek leader (cf. vii. 186. 2 n.). For Leonidas' genealogy cf. vii. 204.

2 Ἀριμνήστου. Plutarch (Aristid. 19) says Arimnestus slew Mardonius by striking him with a stone, but a distinguished Spartiate would be unlikely to use a stone as a weapon. Stenyclarus is the name given to the northern or upper plain of Messenia, divided from the southern by low hills, as well as to the deserted town once the capital of the district.

Arimnestus fell in the Helot revolt known as the third Messenian war, probably in its opening engagement (464 B. C.).

Macan, reading Ἀειμνήστου, thinks he may have been a Plataean 'well known in Sparta', since Thucydides tells us of a Lacon, son of Aeimnestus at Plataea (iii. 52) and also of a Plataean contingent sent to help Sparta in the Helot revolt (iii. 54). But how came

a Plataean to be fighting among the Spartans, and not on the other wing? Cf. however ch. 72. 2 n.

65 1 *τείχος*: cf. ch. 15. 2 n.

2 Grundy (p. 503) holds that this incidental statement strongly supports his view that the temple stood on the site of the church of St. Demetrius (cf. ch. 57. 2 n.), as the barbarians would naturally flee on both sides of the hill on which the sanctuary stood.

For this caution in dealing with things divine cf. ii. 3. 2 n.

*ἀνάκτορον*. This is the first mention of the destruction of the temple at Eleusis. *τὸ ἱρόν* is a gloss on *ἀνάκτορον*, the proper term for the cella or shrine containing the statue of the god (Pollux i. 9); cf. Eur. Ion 55, Iph. Taur. 41, 66, &c., and specially used for the sanctuary of Demeter, at Celae (Paus. ii. 14. 4) and at Eleusis, Athenaeus 167 f. *Ἐλευσίνι τε μυστηρίων ὄντων ἐθήκεν αὐτῇ θρόνον παρὰ τὸ ἀνάκτορον*, cf. 213 D. Possibly the great hall of initiation is meant (Frazer, Paus. ii, p. 510; iii, p. 82).

66-70 *Flight of Artabazus* (66). *Victory of the Athenians and defeat of the Greek centre* (67-9). *Storming of the Persian camp* (70). *Losses on both sides*.

66 1 For Artabazus cf. viii. 126, ix. 41. Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 165) suggests that when the battle took place he may have been still several marches in rear, and that his absence was later ascribed to prudence. The suggestion though ingenious seems over bold.

2 In viii. 126. 1 Artabazus commands a complete army corps of 60,000: the missing 20,000 must have fallen at Potidaea, or been detached on garrison duty, cf. Appendix XIX. 5.

67 *οἱ . . . μηδίζοντες τῶν Θηβαίων*. These words seem incidentally to admit that there was a non-Medizing party at Thebes; cf. vii. 222 n.

*τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων*. This probably refers only to the barbarian allies or subjects, who would naturally follow the Persians like a flock of sheep (ch. 68, 70, 1). We hear only of barbarians fighting and falling in the fort (ch. 70. 4, 71). The thirty myriads (ch. 70. 5) are the barbarian forces, exclusive of the Greek contingents (ch. 32. 2). But as only the Boeotians fought zealously, the other Greeks may have been forgotten by H.; probably they scattered to their homes as quickly as they could.

68 *τοσαῦτα* explained by the succeeding participles; cf. v. 16. 3.

69 1 *ἀγγέλλεται*. Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 50, 51) argues that this message was in fact an order from Pausanias, sent to his central division posted in the position they had been instructed to occupy (cf. ch. 52 n.). The right section, headed by the Corinthians, was ordered to join the right wing, the left, including the contingents from Phlius, Megara, and all those posted between them, was to support the left wing. He also ingeniously suggests that the Phliasians and Megarians are named to give us the two extremes of



the section (cf. ch. 28 n.). This would imply, however, that the Plataeans were throughout brigaded with the Athenians, which is nowhere stated by H. (cf. however Diod. xi. 32 (i.e. Ephorus). Possibly Corinth, Megara, and Phlius are named simply because they supplied the most considerable contingents to the right and the left centre.

τὴν φέρουσαν ἄνω : i.e. across the ridges coming down from Cithaeron towards the Asopus.

τὴν λειοτάτην : across the plain, perhaps along the road from Plataea to Thebes.

- 2 Ἀσσωπόδωρος : perhaps the same mentioned by Pindar (Isthm. i. 34) as father of a Herodotus, who won a chariot-race at the Isthmia.

The Megarians who fell in the Persian war, at Artemisium, Mycale, Salamis, and Plataea, were buried within the city (Paus. i. 43. 3, Frazer, *ad loc.*) and honoured with sacrifice as heroes. This we learn from the heading to the inscription added by the high-priest Helladios, who (*circa* A.D. 300) restored the epigram over them, attributed by him to Simonides, Hicks 17 Ἑλλαδι καὶ Μεγαρεῦσιν ἐλεύθερον ἄμαρ ἀέξειν | ἰέμενον θανάτου μοῖραν ἐδεξάμεθα . . . τοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν πεδίῳ Βοιωτίῳ οἵτινες ἔτλαν | χεῖρας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἵππομάχους ἰέναι. The distich praising their courage in facing cavalry at Plataea may well be a later addition : in any case conventional praise of the dead cannot outweigh H.'s distinct statement of their rout (but see Appendix XXII. 1, 6, 7).

- 70 1 ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ, 'perished unheeded'; cf. iv. 135. 1; vii. 223. 2 H. accordingly refuses to count them among those who fell in the battle.

- 2 τειχομαχέειν. Spartan inefficiency in siege operations is borne out by the facts that they were obliged to blockade Ithome (Thuc. i. 104) and Plataea (Thuc. ii. 75–8), and that they fail to take even the hasty and incomplete fortifications at Pylus (Thuc. iv. 4, 5, and 11, 12). Whether Athenian skill in siege work, such as it was, was developed so early as this has been doubted; cf. however Thuc. i. 102.

- 3 Hauvette (p. 481) sees in the Athenians the sappers, in the Tegeans the scaling party, of the Greeks. Delbrück (Perserkriege, p. 112) and Busolt (ii. 737 n.) suggest H. has put together without reconciling two local traditions.

σκηνὴν. This tent of Mardonius is probably that left by Xerxes (cf. ix. 82). The Odeum of Pericles is said to have been built in imitation of it (Plut. Pericles 13; Paus. i. 20. 4, Frazer).

Ἀλέης Ἀθηναίης : cf. i. 66. 4 n.

- 4 ἀλκῆς ἐμέμνητο : Homeric cf. Il. vi. 112 μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς. ἀλύκταξον : α ἄπαξ λεγόμενον; 'to be distraught'; cf. ἀλύω; ἀλύσσω, ἀλυσθαίνω, ἀλυκτέω.

- 5 Perhaps the Greeks spared only 3,000 of those who took refuge in the fort; but doubtless many barbarians, besides the corps of Artabazus, fled elsewhere. Diodorus (xi. 32) estimates the Persian

loss at Plataea at more than 100,000, Ctesias (Persica, ch. 26, p. 70) the whole loss after Salamis at 120,000, but these numbers deserve no credit. The massacre was, however, great and indiscriminate; cf. Aesch. Pers. 816 f. τόσος γὰρ ἔσται πέλανος αἵματος φαγῆς | πρὸς γῇ Πλαταιῶν Δωρίδος λόγχης ὑπο· | θίνες νεκρῶν δέ.

The numbers of the Greeks slain are incredibly small, even if it be granted that H. gives only those who fell in the actual battle, disregarding previous operations. He certainly omits the Megarians and Phliasians, and probably the Perioeci and all light-armed troops. Even so the numbers are inconsistent with the many Spartans who fell (61. 3, 63. 1), and the long struggle between the Spartans and Persians (62. 2) and between the Athenians and Boeotians (67. 1). Probably H. misunderstood the inscriptions on the monuments erected over the fallen (ch. 85). If the fifty-two Athenians all belonged to the tribe Aeantis (Clidemus ap. Plut. Arist. 19; F. H. G. i. 362), H.'s error in their case may have consisted in mistaking the stele of a single tribe (cf. Hicks 26) for the full muster-roll of the Athenian dead. Plutarch (l. c.) reckons the Greek dead at 1,360, a small but possible total.

# 71-5 *Individual feats of valour.*

71 1 This vague expression of opinion as to the superiority of the Spartans in valour becomes in Diodorus (xi. 33, i. e. Ephorus) a definite award of the prize to the Spartans and Pausanias from favouritism. Plutarch (Arist. 20; de Malig. Herod. 42, Mor. 873 A) speaks of a bitter rivalry between Spartans and Athenians as to the Aristeia and setting up the Trophy, happily settled by the mediation of Aristides and by the ingenious suggestion of the Corinthian Cleocritus, to award the prize to the Plataeans. But this story seems due to the late and untrustworthy Idomeneus. It was clearly unknown to H., and Thucydides would surely have made some allusion to it in the speech of the Plataeans to their Spartan judges (iii. 53-9), had he ever heard of it.

2 For Aristodemus and his dishonour cf. vii. 229-31.

The order in which the names are given is clearly that of merit, hence below only Posidonius is compared with Aristodemus.

Σπαρτιῆται. The MSS. Σπαρτιῆτης is impossible, as it would imply that the other two were Perioeci.

4 τίμιοι: probably besides a public funeral and monument, 'heroic honours,' i. e. offerings to the dead; cf. τιμᾶν, i. 30. 5; v. 67. 4. For these cf. v. 47. 2 n.; ix. 69. 2 n.

72 1 Imitated from Il. ii. 673 Νιρῆς δὲ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθεν | τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν, cf. v. 47. 2 n.

κατήμενος might only mean 'stationary', but it seems to have been quite usual to sit down in the ranks; cf. Eurip. Suppl. 357, 664, 674; Plut. Arist. 17.

2 According to Plutarch (Aristides, ch. 11) Arimnestus commanded

the Plataean contingent, and Pausanias (ix. 4. 2) says that he did so at Marathon also, and that his statue was set up in the temple of Athenea Areia built with Persian spoils. But it is not easy to see how the Plataean commander (or indeed any Plataean) could have been in the Spartan ranks, since their station was on the left wing with the Athenians (ch. 28; Plut. Arist. 20). Thucydides mentions (iii. 52) Aeimnestus as father of Lacon, Spartan Proxenus at Plataea, and so the name is given in some MSS. here; cf. c. 64. 2 n.

73 1 Δεκελέων repeats and emphasizes Δεκελεῖθεν; cf. ix. 92 ἀνδρὸς Ἀπολλωνίῳ, Ἀπολλωνίης δέ, vii. 80. For Decelea cf. c. 15. 1 n.

2 The old Attic myth is but loosely connected with the anecdotes of Sophanes; cf. vi. 121. It is probably a temple legend serving to explain the worship of the Dioscuri in Athens (as Anakes in the Anakeion, near the precinct of Aglauros; cf. viii. 53. 1 n.). It is given in fuller if later forms by Plutarch (Theseus, 31 f.), Diodorus (iv. 63), Pausanias (i. 17. 5), and was treated by the poets Alcman (Paus. i. 41. 4), Stesichorus (Paus. ii. 22. 6), Pindar (Paus. i. 41. 5), and on the chest of Cypselus (Paus. v. 19. 3; Dio Chrys., p. 163). Theseus, with his comrade Peirithous, seized the girl Helen as she was dancing at the feast of Artemis Orthia, and placed her under the care of his mother Aethra in the hill-fort of Aphidna. Whilst he was away, having gone with Peirithous to carry off Persephone, the Dioscuri came to Attica to rescue their sister.

Δεκελός, eponymous hero of Decelea, may have had treachery imputed to him on account of his name (δεικνύναι); the insolence (ὑβρις) of Theseus consisted in his deposition of the local princes and unification of Attica under one ruler (Plut. *loc. cit.*). The later versions (cf. Plut. *l. c.*), which made the Dioscuri besiege Athens itself (following Alcman), substitute Academus for Decelus, and the Academy as the spot spared by the Spartans.

Ἀφίδνας (Ἀφίδνα), one of the twelve Cecropian townships (Strabo 396), a deme of the tribe Acantis, is probably the ruined fortress on the isolated hill Kotroni, six miles east of Decelea (Frazer, Paus. ii. 163).

Τιτακός: eponymous hero of the deme Τιτακίδαι, not far from Aphidna; like all the deme heroes he is regarded as autochthonous.

3 προεδρία: seats of honour at public games, and ἀτελείη, exemption from the tax on foreigners, were often granted as marks of honour to benefactors; cf. i. 54. 2; Hicks 89, 126, 134, 165. Here they are regarded as such distinctive marks of friendship that H. rather ungrammatically attaches to them the crowning proof of Sparta's favour, abstention from wasting the land of Decelea in the Peloponnesian war.

ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. H. elsewhere (vii. 137. 1) refers in similar terms to the Peloponnesian war, implying it was going on while he was writing. The sparing of Decelea no doubt refers to the five early invasions (431-425 B.C.); in 431 at least Archidamus wasted the

Ephorus (ap. D. Sic. xii. 451) & Isocrates (334 F 30) said that the Sp. spared the Tetrapolis (i.e. they feared the curse of Euryganeus, who, killed by Heracles, was buried in that area, at Palisae); many authors said that the Spartans spared the temples too on the Attic & the 12 trees at Akademeia

country surrounding it; cf. Thuc. ii. 23. H. did not live to see Decelea occupied by Agis (413 B. C.); cf. Intro. § 8 f.

74 1 διξούς: possibly 'the two stories told' had their origin in Scolia (drinking songs) in honour of the famous warrior.

ἐδέδοκτο: *instituerat*; 'it was his wont to'; cf. ch. 60. 2 n.

2 Before ἀγκυραν most editors with some MSS. read ἐπίσημον 'as a device on his shield', and some such word is required. For such devices cf. i. 171. 4; Aesch. Sept. c. Thebas 375-652; Eur. Phoen. 1107-38.

75 For Eurybates, his exploits and death, cf. vi. 92 n., and for the Pentathlon ix. 33. 2 n.

Leagrus belonged to a good family. His son Glaucus commanded the reinforcements sent to Corcyra 433 B. C. (Thuc. i. 51; Hicks 53), and had been general in 440 B. C. (Busolt, iii. 199 n.), and his granddaughter was wife of Callias δαδοῦχος (Andoc. Myst. 117).

Δάτφ. Δάτος or Δάτον was apparently a name given originally to the whole district east of Mount Pangaeum and west of the Nestus, from the mountains north of Philippi to the sea. It was fertile, well timbered, and rich in gold mines (Strabo 331, fr. 34, 36). The name is so used here and in Isocrates, de Pace 86. The people are called Δατήνιοι (Harpocration). The town Δάτον was not founded by the Thasians till about 360 B. C. (Diodorus xvi. 3. 7; Ps.-Scylax 68), probably on the site of the older mining settlement Crenides, called afterwards Philippi (Appian, B. C. iv. 105; Ephorus and Philochorus ap. Harpocr., cf. Busolt, iii. 197, n. 5 and Pauly-Wissowa), though Kiepert and others place it on the coast near Neapolis; cf. Strabo *l. c.*; Plin. iv. 42. Thucydides twice tells us (i. 100; iv. 102) that the Athenian colonists were destroyed at Drabescus (cf. Diod. xi. 70, xii. 60; Paus. i. 29. 4), probably the modern Drama, ten miles north-west of Philippi at the end of the plain (Busolt, iii. 203 n.). The disaster is dated by Thucydides thirty-two years after the death of Aristagoras (498-497 B. C.) and twenty-nine before the foundation of Amphipolis (cf. Diodorus xii. 32), i.e. 465 B. C. The attempted settlement is connected with Cimon's expedition against Thasos, which had revolted owing to disputes with Athens about its mines and possessions on the opposite coast (Thuc. i. 100, 101); cf. Busolt, iii. 198 f.

76-9 *Stories of Pausanias, the lady of Cos, and Lampon of Aegina. Mantineans and Eleans too late for the battle.*

6 1 Φαρανδάτεος: cf. vii. 79. He was a nephew of Darius. κοσμησαμένη. Pausanias (iii. 4. 9) also insists on her rich attire and retinue.

ἀρραμάξης: cf. vii. 41. 3 n.

2 Verrall (Cl. R. xvii. 99-101) has ingeniously argued that this speech is a transcript from an inscription, explaining a picture or bas-relief dedicated by the lady and representing her as a suppliant

before the 'king', with Persian corpses (one named Φαρανδάτης Τεάσπιος) on the ground, and two maids on the one side balancing two ephors on the other. The inscription would run Ὁ βασιλεὺς Σπάρτης, λῦσαι μ' ἱκέτιν δοριλήπτου | (αἰχμαλώτου) δουλοσύνης. σὺ γὰρ εἰς τόδ' ὄνησας τοὺςδ' ἀπολέσσας, | τοὺς οὐθ' ἠρώων (δαιμόνων), οὐ θεῶν ὅπιν οὐτὶν ἔχοντας. | Κῶ δ' εἰμὶ γένος, θυγάτηρ Ἡγητορίδαο | Ἀνταγόραο· βίη δὲ λαβὼν Κῶ μ' εἶχεν ὁ Πέρσης. H. has but substituted the generic δαιμόνων for ἠρώων (cf. viii. 109. 3 n.) and disguised the verse by writing αἰχμαλώτου for δοριλήπτου, though even so the expression remains poetical; cf. viii. 114. 2 n. H.'s interest in this lady of Cos may be explained by the close connexion between Cos and Halicarnassus (vii. 163 n.); both were under Artemisia (vii. 99).

βασιλεῦ. Pausanias, though only regent (ch. 10), might well be addressed as king (cf. vii. 161 n.). For Pausanias cf. v. 32 n.

- 3 In Xenophon's time at least the king was regularly accompanied by two ephors on all European expeditions (Xen. Rep. Lac. xiii. 5; Hell. ii. 4. 36), and it may be that this custom is as old as the time of the Persian war. Yet Pleistoanax (445 B. C.) is accompanied to Attica not by Ephors but by a number of councillors, the chief of whom is appointed by the Ephors (Plut. Per. 22), and Agis after his failure by ten councillors (Thuc. v. 63, 418 B. C.). The apparent freedom from any control enjoyed by Pausanias and Leotychides, as well as by Archidamus at the beginning and Agis at the end of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. viii. 5) is also remarkable. We must either suppose that the Ephors, though present, did not interfere with the king, but only reported on his conduct, or that the custom is later and the presence of Ephors on this occasion accidental.

- 77 I αὐτίκα μετὰ ταῦτα. H. uses a standing formula (viii. 108. 1; ix. 93. 3 n.) intended to emphasize the fact that the Mantineans and Eleans arrived from the Peloponnese just too late when all was over (ἐπ' ἐξεργασμένοισι, cf. iv. 164. 3; viii. 94. 4). Probably the two states were infected with Medism, and waited for the issue of the battle of Plataea before joining the victors. The banishment of the generals perhaps indicates a democratic revolution against a ruling oligarchy (cf. ch. 10 n. and Munro, J. H. S. xxiv. 148).

ἄξιοι . . . ζημιῶσαι, 'deserved that men should punish them'; cf. iv. 42. 1.

- 2 τοὺς Μήδους: generic; Persians, not the special people, the Medes.

ἐδίωκον, 'were minded to pursue'; but ἐδίωξαν (2, 3; cf. i. 68. 5), 'banished.'

- 3 The Eleans, however, though not the Mantineans, who had been at Thermopylae (vii. 202), contrived to have their name inserted in the inscriptions on the national memorials (ch. 81 n.), not only at Olympia but at Delphi. Possibly they owed this to Spartan favour, since it appears that the Spartans were responsible for the list of



names on the Delphic memorial (Thuc. i. 132), and both the dialect and lettering of that inscription are Laconian.

Phocian

- 8 1 Λάμπων δ Πυθέω. Pytheas, father of Lampon, is not likely to be the heroic son of Ischenous, captured at Sciathus and released at Salamis (vii. 181; viii. 92). It is, however, tempting to identify Lampon with the father of the Pytheas, whose victory as a youth at Nemea (before 480 B. C.) was celebrated both by Pindar (Nem. v.) and by Bacchylides (Ode xiii), while those of his brother Phylacidas at the Isthmus (480, 478 B. C.) were sung by Pindar (Isthm. iv and v). The objection is that Pindar (Isthm. v. 16) speaks of Lampon as son of Cleonicus, but Cleonicus may be a remoter ancestor (cf. Isthm. iv. 55) or a title given to Pytheas from the numerous athletic victories of the family (Isthm. iv. 17 f.; v. 60 f.). Lampon belonged to the great house of the Psalychidae (Isthm. v. 63) and was famous for hospitality (Isthm. v. 70; Bacch. xiii. 191). If the Lampon here mentioned be not Pindar's friend, he must have been a contemporary and relative. For τὰ πρῶτα cf. vi. 100. 3 n.

The tale here told of Lampon illustrates two tendencies in H. or his sources: (1) a prejudice against the Aeginetans (v. 81 n.), to whom Athenian opinion was most hostile when H. wrote (cf. ch. 80. 3, 85. 3; vi. 87, 91 nn.); (2) a wish to contrast Greek and barbarian (cf. ch. 82; vii. 134 f.).

- 3 For the fate of Leonidas' corpse cf. vii. 238 n. Mardonius seems to have been brought in by the apocryphal story in viii. 114.

80-5 *The booty. The dedicatory offerings. The tombs at Plataea.*

- 1 For the gold cups and vessels cf. vii. 119. 2, 190.  
2 The Persians, especially the guard of 'Immortals', were splendidly attired (vii. 83; viii. 113).

τοὺς ἀκινάκας. The article is inserted (cf. iii. 118. 2; ix. 107. 2) because the acinaces (vii. 54. 2 n.) was well known to be a Persian weapon.

- 3 The Swiss, after the defeat of Charles the Bold at Granson (A. D. 1476), are said to have been equally ignorant. (P. de Commines, Mémoires, v. 2) 'Il y en eut qui vendirent grande quantité de plats et d'escuelles d'argent pour deux grands blancs la pièce, cuidans que ce fut d'estaing'.

The point of the story, 'and that is the way the Aeginetans first grew rich,' reveals its character as a malicious Attic witticism, invented in days when Aegina's commercial greatness had been so completely eclipsed by the new power of Athens that the distant and profitable voyages of the earlier Aeginetan traders (ii. 178. 3; iv. 152. 3; vii. 147. 2) had been forgotten.

- 81 The famous golden tripod at Delphi and the statues at Olympia (and at the Isthmus) were dedicated from the spoil won at Plataea, and hence were regarded by Pausanias (v. 23. 1; x. 13. 9) as trophies of that victory alone. But the words which head the list

of states inscribed on the bronze triple serpent supporting the tripod, [T]ο[ῖ]δε τὸν πόλεμον [ἐ]πολ[έ]μεον, as well as those of Thucydides (i. 132), ὅσαι συγκαθελοῦσαι τὸν βάρβαρον ἔστησαν τὸ ἀνάθημα, show that it was regarded as a memorial of the whole war (cf. the inclusion of states which fought at Salamis only, viii. 82. 1 n.). Either on the stone pedestal of the column or, less probably, on the thirteenth coil of the serpent, which has been flattened to receive the words given above, Pausanias had originally inscribed Ἑλλάνων ἀρχαγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὤλεσα Μήδων | Πausanías Φοῖβφ μνᾶμ' ἀνέθηκα τόδε (Anthol. i. 133; xliii; less characteristically given in κοινή and in the third person by Thuc. i. 132, &c.). Probably the place of this erased inscription was taken by the couplet quoted by Diodorus (xi. 33. 2), Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόρου σωτῆρες τόνδ' ἀνέθηκαν | δουλοσύνης στυγερᾶς ῥυσάμενοι πόλεις. Probably the three feet of the tripod rested on the three serpents' heads, though there is no mark of a join on the top of the one still extant. It is less likely that the feet of the tripod rested on the stone base, and that the serpent column was merely the central prop of the golden cauldron supported by the tripod. In the sacred war (355 B.C.) the Phocians stole the golden part of the monument but left the bronze (Paus. x. 13. 9). Constantine carried off the serpent column and placed it in the Hippodrome (Atmeidan) at Constantinople, where it still remains. It was apparently converted into a three-mouthed fountain by a later emperor. It was seen and described by travellers from 1422 on, but in 1700 was thrown down and the serpents' heads were broken off. The base of the column was excavated by Sir C. T. Newton (1855) and the inscription published in 1856 by O. Frick and Dethier; a revised version is due to Fabricius (1886). Of the twenty-nine serpent coils fifteen had been underground, the inscription beginning on the thirteenth coil and ending on the third; the twelfth and thirteenth coils have been scarred and dented with sabre cuts, so the inscription is hardly legible.

The list of states on the serpent column should be compared with that on the trophy at Olympia and with those given by H. of the Greeks who fought at Plataea and Salamis, as is done on the opposite page.

It will be noticed that five names found in H. are not given on the Delphic inscription, and that four more are omitted by Pausanias. Prof. A. Bauer (Wiener Studien, 1887, p. 223 f.) would explain the omissions by the suggestion that the right to have names inscribed on a monument was earned not by fighting but by contributing to the cost of the monument. But this view is contradicted by the heading of the Delphic inscription (*sup.*) and by the words of Thucydides (i. 132 *sup.*), as well as by H.'s statement. It is far more likely that states whose contingents were very small were left out, unless, like the Tenians, they rendered signal service (cf. viii. 82). Indeed, it would appear from the fact that the names

Hicks 19  
Serpent Column.

Paus. v. 23 : Statue of  
Zeus at Olympia.

H. viii. 43-8, 82 ; ix. 28-30, 77

1 Lacedaemonians	12th coil	1 Lacedaemonians	1 Lacedaemonians	10,000	16 T
2 Athenians		2 Athenians	2 Tegeans	1,500	
3 Corinthians		3 Corinthians	3 Corinthians	5,000	40 T
4 Tegeans	11th coil	4 Sicyonians	4 Potidaeans	300	
5 Sicyonians		5 Aeginetans	5 Orchomenians	600	
6 Aeginetans		6 Megarians	6 Sicyonians	3,000	15 T
7 Megarians	10th coil	7 Epidaurians	7 Epidaurians	800	10 T
8 Epidaurians		*8 Tegeans	8 Troezenians	1,000	5 T
9 Orchomenians		9 Orchomenians	9 Lepreans	200	
10 Phliasians	9th coil	10 Phliasians	10 Mycenaean	400	
11 Troezenians		11 Troezenians	11 Tirynthians		
12 Hermionians		12 Hermionians	12 Phliasians	1,000	
13 Tirynthians	8th coil	13 Tirynthians	13 Hermionians	300	3 T
14 Plataeans		14 Plataeans	14 Eretrians	600	7 T
15 Thespians		15 Mycenaean	15 Styreans		2 T
16 Mycenaean	7th coil	16 Ceans	16 Chalcidians	400	20 T
17 Ceans		17 Melians	17 Ambraciots	500	7 T
18 Melians		*18 Ambraciots	18 Leucadians	800	3 T
19 Tenians	6th coil	19 Tenians	19 Anactorians		
20 Naxians		*20 Lepreans	20 <i>Palean</i>	200	
21 Eretrians		21 Naxians	21 Aeginetans	500	30 (or 40) T
22 Chalcidians	5th coil	*22 Cythnians	22 Megarians	3,000	20 T
23 Styrians		23 Styrians	23 Plataeans	600	
24 Eleans		24 Eleans	24 Athenians	8,000	180 T
25 Potidaeans	4th coil	25 Potidaeans	25 Thespians	1,800 (light-armed)	
26 Leucadians		26 Anactorians	26 <i>Mantineans</i>	(too late)	
27 Anactorians		*27 Chalcidians	27 Eleans	(too late)	
28 Cythnians	3rd coil		28 Ceans		2 T 2 P
29 Siphnians			29 Naxians		4 T
30 Ambraciots			30 Cythnians		1 T 1 P
31 Lepreans			31 <i>Crotoniats</i>		1 T
			32 Melians		2 P
			33 Siphnians		1 P
			34 <i>Seriphians</i>		1 P
			35 <i>Lemnian</i>	} deserters	1 T
			36 Tenian		1 T

N.B.—Those italicized in list 3 do not appear on either inscription ; those in list 1 are not found in list 2.

\* indicates a marked difference in order from list 1.

of the Tenians and Siphnians are written irregularly, and in each case make a fourth name on the coil, three being the usual number, that these states were inserted later. The thirty-one names on the Delphic tripod is the precise number given by Plutarch (Them. 20) as fighting against Persia. Whether the four omissions in Pausanias are due to faulty copying of the inscription at Olympia, or whether here, too, the comparative insignificance of the contingents caused the omissions, must remain doubtful. Domaszewski's explanation (Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher, i. 181-7) of the arrangement as three groups, (1) Tegea to Tiryns, Peloponnesian allies (Spartan); (2) Plataea to Elis, Athenian allies; (3) Potidaea to Ambracia, Corinthian colonies, is untenable, as neither Mycenaean, Chalcidians, nor Eleans are specially Athenian allies, and the order is different at Olympia. In both lists the compilers seem to have been guided at once by the importance and services of the states, and by geographical considerations, but they applied the principles rather differently. Tegea, for instance, is put specially high on the Delphic list because of the bravery of her hoplites at Plataea (cf. ix. 61, 62, and 70; cf. also ix. 26); cf. in general Frazer on Paus. ix. 13. 9; Röhl, I. G. A. 70 (with a picture); Hicks, 19.

- I τοῦ βωμοῦ. Cf. ii. 135. 4 n. On the level space near it, north-east of the temple just above the Sacred Way, stands a huge base with two pedestals, one recording the dedication of a tripod and a Victory by Gelo, in commemoration of the battle of the Himera (Diod. xi. 26), the other probably dedicated by Hiero (Jebb, Bacchyl. p. 452 f.). Just above this stands the base on which the Plataean trophy is believed to have rested.

τῷ ἐν Ἴσθμῳ. Poseidon (cf. viii. 121. 1 n.). Probably there was a list of names on this offering too.

- 2 καὶ τοῦτοισι: as well as to Pausanias.

πάντα δέκα: tenfold, almost proverbial; cf. iv. 88. 1.

- 82 This contrast (cf. ch. 78 n.) between Persian luxury and Spartan hardness is rather strangely assigned to Pausanias, who himself within a year or two fell into the luxurious and despotic habits of an Eastern Sultan (Thuc. i. 130). For a similar story cf. i. 71.

- 83 I ἐφάνη κτλ.: ch. 83. 2 and 84 as well as this sentence are rejected by Krüger and Gomperz as containing a collection of disconnected notices here out of place, and also because of some strange or corrupt words and phrases, e. g. καὶ τὸ ἄνω τῆς γνάθου, ἐπεῖτε δέ, τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ. Stein takes refuge in his usual theory of notes incorporated in a second edition, a suggestion more applicable to ch. 81, 82, since the words ὑστέρῳ μέντοι χρόνῳ and καὶ τῶν Πλαταιέων συχνοί have no point unless the sentence follows immediately on the end of ch. 80, the contrast being with the Helots and Aeginetans. The notice may be modelled on iii. 12.

- 2 Albrecht Achilles, Margrave of Brandenburg 1486 A. D., had a skull without a suture (Bähr), Pyrrhus, and a son of Prusias of Bithynia,

an upper jaw with the teeth all of a piece (Plut. Pyr. 3; Plin. vii. 69).

- 84 1 The connexion is defective and the words *ἐπεῖτε δέ* meaningless. Stein suggests *ἐπεὶ γε δὴ* on the assumption that the gigantic skeleton was that of Mardonius. This can hardly be true, for there is nowhere a suggestion that Mardonius was a giant, though no doubt other Persian leaders are big men (vii. 117. 1, 187. 2; ix. 25. 1, 96. 2).

Pausanias, who repeats this story (ix. 2. 2), saw a grave of Mardonius to the right of the road from Eleutheræ to Plataea near the battle-field.

ἤδη . . . ἤκουσα : cf. iv. 77. 1.

πολλοὺς . . . τινάς : very many ; *τις*, intensive, cf. § 2; v. 33. 2.

παντοδαπούς, 'of all nations.' Pausanias (*l. c.*) makes all the successful claimants 'Ionian'.

- 2 τοιούτω : i. e. secretly, if the reading is sound.

- 85 1 The opening sentence is clearly connected with the end of chapter 81.

ἔθαπτον . . . χωρὶς ἕκαστοι. Pausanias believed there were only three tombs in all (ix. 2. 5) τοῖς μὲν οὖν λοιποῖς ἐστὶν Ἑλλήσι μῆμα κοινόν. Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίων τοῖς πεσοῦσιν ἰδία τέ εἰσιν οἱ τάφοι, καὶ ἐλεγεῖα ἐστὶ Σιμωνίδου γεγραμμένα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. Presumably the other tombs had disappeared from neglect.

ἱρέας. Iren is the term for a young Spartan between twenty and thirty years of age. These youths had no part in the meetings of the assembly and no right to a household of their own, but they were free from the discipline of the boys, and were indeed expected to inspire them by precept and example. They were also largely employed on military service. But it is impossible that all the Spartiates who won the highest distinction at Plataea were irens, and in particular that Amompharetus, colonel of his regiment, with a voice in the council of war (ch. 53, 55), should be so young a man. (This has led Blakesley to suspect the clause *ἐνθα μὲν . . . Καλλικράτης.*) Again, the Lacedaemonians or Perioeci (ch. 11. 3) are left out in H.'s scheme. It seems more likely that the first tomb contained all the Spartiates (the majority of whom may have been irens; cf. ch. 12. 2), the second the Perioeci, and the third the Helots.

- 2 Ἀθηναῖοι : so too Pausanias (*l. c.*). Thucydides (ii. 34) says that those who fell in war, except at Marathon, were buried at Athens, but it is a mistake to regard this as a deliberate contradiction. Marathon was the only purely Athenian battle-field on which the victors were buried, but Plataea was a Pan-Hellenic triumph.

- 3 The particular fact that the Aeginetan tomb was erected ten years after the battle by Cleades, their proxenus (viii. 136. 1 n.) at Plataea, is no doubt true enough, but the inference drawn by H. is unfair. It is probable enough that there were many cenotaphs erected later. Only where the dead fell thick and fast in a single spot, as in the case of the states previously named (§ 2), could their



bones be gathered for burial. Those who fell in the earlier fighting, or even in the skirmishing of the day just before (ch. 49, 52) the battle, would be scattered over a wide area. In such cases it was customary to set up a cenotaph in memory of the dead; there would be no attempt at deception.

86-9 *The siege, surrender, and fate of the Thebans. The retreat of Artabazus.*

86 I For Timagenidas cf. ch. 38, Attaginus, ch. 15. The constitution of Thebes is described by a Theban orator (Thuc. iii. 62) as having been at this time a dynastic oligarchy ἡμῖν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν... δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα. Cf. also vii. 222 n.; Plut. Arist. ch. 18 (cf. *inf.*); Paus. ix. 6. 2.

87 2 πλέω μὴ ἀναπλήσῃ, 'let not the land of Boeotia suffer any more for us'. For the expression implying evil cf. v. 4. 2, vi. 12. 3; for such negative exhortations cf. Goodwin, § 259; vii. 10 η μὴ νυν οὕτω γένηται.

ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ, 'from the public treasury' (vii. 144. 1), but σὺν τῷ κοινῷ, 'with the assent of the whole state' (v. 109. 3; viii. 135. 2 n.). H. insists that the whole Theban state Medized eagerly (cf. introduction, p. 40), but apparently there were two parties there (cf. Thuc. iii. 62 cited above), Plut. Arist. 18 προθυμότατα τῶν πρώτων καὶ δυνατωτάτων τότε παρ' αὐτοῖς μηδίζοντων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος οὐ κατὰ γνώμην ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχούμενον ἀγόντων. Pausanias (ix. 6. 2), too, acquits the commons of Medism. καί: the penalty must be paid by the state since the offence, Medism, was also general.

88 τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους is assimilated to the case of the relative (τοὺς... ἐξέδοσαν); cf. iii. 147. 1.

δῶσσεσθαι. αἰτίην must be supplied (Bähr).

ἀντιλογίης: *causae dictio*, both of the prosecution (87. 2) and of the defence.

This expectation of a trial is interesting; it may be compared with the case of the Plataeans in the Peloponnesian war (iii. 52-68). Pausanias, when in his turn accused of Medism, hoped to escape by bribery (Thuc. i. 131); indeed the corruptibility of the Spartans was notorious (cf. vi. 72 n.); nor were the other Greeks much better (Thuc. viii. 45).

Blakesley makes the unlikely suggestion that Pausanias was already Medizing, and so was glad to put Timagenidas out of the way lest he should disclose his treachery, while he spared the children of Attaginus to conciliate their father, who was still at large.

But H. takes a simpler and more generous view of his action, nor does even Thucydides (i. 128 f.) hint that his treachery began before the fall of Byzantium, 478 B. C. Pausanias let the innocent go free, but foresaw and defeated the devices of Timagenidas and his friends.

Κόρινθον: strictly to the Isthmus where the council of allies met; cf. vii. 172. 1, 173. 4, 175. 1, 195. Macan suggests that this taking to Corinth means that the prisoners were duly tried (presumably by the Council), and that Pausanias merely executed the sentence of the Court. The representation of his action as arbitrary and autocratic may come from a hostile tradition current after his fall.

89 I Ἀρτάβαζος . . . φεύγων: through Phocis (cf. § 2, c. 66. 3) to Thessaly. It is difficult to believe that Artabazus arrived in Thessaly before the Thessalian cavalry reached home, and before any rumour of the defeat at Plataea had spread there. Again, in his speech to the Thessalians, he is absurdly vague and fails to lie with circumstance.

4 τὴν μεσόγαίαν: taking the straight way across the land (vii. 124 n.), e. g. from Thermo to Acanthus.

Θρηίκων. Demosthenes (in Aristocr. § 200 περὶ συντάξεως, § 24) substitutes *Perdiccas* of Macedon, who did not come to the throne till 454 B. C. Possibly *Alexander* of Macedon may have turned against the beaten Persians.

ἐκ Βυζαντίου. Why Artabazus did not cross the Hellespont at Sestos is not made clear. If the Greek fleet was already besieging Sestos (ch. 114), it is curious that he should have made no effort to save it, though such timidity is in harmony with the caution ascribed to him by H. The sequel of Plataea and that of Mycale are to H. two quite independent stories. (See note, p. 417.)

90-5 *Samian envoys reach the Greek fleet at Delos. Story of Euenius.*

90 I τὸ τῶμα: as in vi. 132. 1. H. does not explicitly say the disaster was Persian.

κατέατο, 'lay inactive'. The story is resumed from viii. 132. The Persian fleet had been 'stationed' (κατήμενοι, viii. 130. 2) at Samos, and an embassy from Chios had already asked for help from the Greeks (viii. 132). For Theomestor cf. viii. 85. 2 n.

2 ἄγρην, 'they would never make such a catch again.' The Persian fleet, if surprised by an attacking force from the sea, supported by a revolt in the island, might be captured or destroyed at a blow.

3 This disparagement of the barbarian fleet comes from interested Ionians. It is in contrast with the view of Themistocles (viii. 60 a n.); but that was before Salamis, this after.

91 I κληδόνος: cf. ch. 101. 3 n.

κατὰ . . . ποιούντος, 'by chance (iii. 74. 1), through God's doing'; equivalent to *θείῃ τύχῃ* (iii. 139. 3).

2 For the play on the name cf. vi. 50. 3 n.; Aesch. Ag. 689. For names as omens cf. vii. 180 n.

92 2 Stein would bracket the clause *μετὰ σφέων . . . ποιούμενος*, as a marginal annotation on *Δέκομαι τὸν οἰωνόν* (91. 2), inconsistent with *αὐτός*

τε . . . ἀποπλεύσει (91. 2). It may, however, be an intentional correction of that statement, Leotychides having after all decided to keep Hegesistratus with his own fleet (μετὰ σφέων) and send on his companions (οἱ μὲν).

Ἀπολλωνίης δέ—since Ἀπολλωνιῆτεω = ἐὼν ἐξ Ἀπολλωνίης; cf. ch. 73. 1 n. The addition is necessary to distinguish this Apollonia from that on the Euxine (iv. 90, 93) and from some twenty other less distinguished towns (Steph. Byz.). It was a colony of the Corinthians (Thuc. i. 26) founded in the days of Periander (Plutarch, 552 F). The Corcyraeans forced their way in here as in other Corinthian colonies, and claimed credit as joint or sole founders (Strabo 316; Scymn. Chius 440; Paus. v. 22. 4). It lay ten stades from the river Aous and sixty from the sea (Strabo *l. c.*). As one of the termini of the Egnatian Way it became very important in Roman days, and also had a reputation as a place of education (Suet. Vit. Aug. 8).

- 93 I ἱρὰ ἡλίου πρόβατα : doubtless sheep (§ 2), 350 or 360 in number, to correspond with the days of the year; so Homer speaking of the isle Thrinacia, Od. xii. 128 βόσκοντ' Ἡελίοιο βόες καὶ ἵφια μῆλα, | ἐπὶ τὰ βοῶν ἀγέλαι, τόσα δ' οἶων πῶεα καλά, | πεντήκοντα δ' ἕκαστα, &c.; cf. Hymn. Apoll. 412.

ποταμόν : apparently the Aous, which rises in Mount Lacmon, the central part of Pindus (Strabo 271), and flows by Apollonia though nowhere near Oricum. Possibly H. has confused this 'river' with the little stream which enters the sea at Oricum.

γένεϊ δοκιμῶτατοι : cf. Ar. Pol. iv. 4. 1290 b 11 ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ . . . ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἦσαν οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας, ὅλιγοι ὄντες πολλῶν. Apparently descent from the original settlers was a necessary qualification for citizenship; cf. iv. 161. 3 n. We may compare the feeling of the Boers towards the Uitlanders in the Transvaal.

- 3 For such visitations cf. vi. 139. 1 n.

- 4 πρόφαντα : cf. v. 63. 2 n. = χρηστήρια (94. 1) and θεοπρόπια (94. 3).

τοὺς προφήτας ignores the custom at Delphi (viii. 36. 2 *ad fin.*), where there was but one *προφήτης*, and at Dodona (ii. 55. 1), where there were priestesses. It is a scholiast's attempt to explain αὐτοί (*inf.*), which plainly refers to the gods consulted, Zeus and Apollo, who speak in person; cf. i. 47. 3; vii. 141. 3.

- 94 3 The cause of Euenius' anger is explained by the words ὡς ἐξ ἀπατηθεῖς; had he known the whole state of the case, he would have asked for more.

ἔμφυτον . . . μαντικήν. This is the promised gift of the gods (93. 4 *ad fin.*). Euenius was the inspired seer like Calchas (Il. i. 72) or Iamus (Pind. Ol. vi. 65), not the learned interpreter. For the contrast cf. Cicero, Div. i. 18, quoted vii. 6. 3 n.

- 95 ἀγόντων Κορινθίων : cf. ch. 36, and for the connexion with Corinth ch. 92. 2 n.

ἦδη . . . ἤκουσα gives a variant discredited by the author ; cf. iv.

77. I ; vii. 35. I, 53. 3.

ἐπιβατεύων, 'relying on' ; cf. iii. 63. 3, 67. 2 ; vi. 65. 4.

ἐξελάμβανε is correlative to ἐκδίδοναι, and the whole expression recalls ἐργολάβος, and implies one who works for hire as a day-labourer ; cf. Hom. Od. xvii. 383. Such soothsaying for hire was viewed with contempt. For ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, round about all Hellas, cf. Od. xvii. 386, xxiv. 201, and especially xvi. 63 πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστεα δινηθῆναι.

6-107 *Battle of Mycale. 97-9 Advance and landing of the Greeks. 100-5 The battle. 106, 7 The Greeks return to Samos to hold council. The Persian leaders quarrel at Sardis.*

96 I Καλάμοις: Alexis of Samos (ap. Athen. 572 f. ; F. H. G. iv. 299) mentions a temple of Aphrodite ἐν καλάμοις, which might well be the marshy ground near the mouth of the Imbrasus, between the Heraeum and the city of Samos. Perhaps the phrase τὸ Ἡραῖον τὸ ταύτῃ is meant to indicate this position outside Samos ; in any case the great Heraeum is meant, as is shown by H.'s usage elsewhere (i. 70. 3 ; iii. 123. I ; iv. 88. I, 152. 4), and by the fact that no other Heraeum near Samos is known. The Greek fleet would naturally take post on the east side of the island near the town of Samos and opposite Mycale, as the Persian had done before.

ἀνήγον: put out to sea across the narrow strait dividing Samos from Mycale (cf. i. 148. I).

πρὸς τὴν ἡπειρον gives the result of their action, viz. to reach the mainland.

ἀπῆκαν ἀποπλέειν. Probably H. is right in holding that after Salamis the Persians dare not face the Greeks at sea, particularly as the Ionians were untrustworthy (Meyer, iii, § 238), and so sent the Phoenician ships home to secure their safety. Delbrück (Perserkriege, p. 104) strangely ascribes their departure to over-confidence caused by the long inaction of the Greek fleet, while Domaszewski (Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher, i. 188) suggests that they may have been sent to guard the coast of Thrace. Whether H. is right in postponing the departure of the Phoenicians till the Greeks reached Samos, or at least were sailing from Delos, is more doubtful (Stein). Diodorus (xi. 19 ; cf. viii. 130 n.) seems to mean that they sailed straight home from Salamis ; at latest they must have gone at the first news of the Greek advance.

2 καταλελειμμένος τοῦ ἄλλου στρατοῦ: left behind by the rest of the army, either when it marched on Greece, or when it was disbanded after its return. Krüger regards στρατοῦ as a partitive genitive (cf. vii. 170. 3 n.), since the construction is used elsewhere with the simple verb (vii. 168. 4 ; viii. 113. 2 ; ix. 19. I).

3 ἔρυμα: cf. ch. 15. 2 n.

97 Πότνια in the singular is applied to any goddess just as ἄναξ is to

any god ; but the plural *πότναι* is used only of the Eumenides (Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. 887 ; Eum. 951 ; Soph. Oed. Col. 84), or as here of Demeter and Kore (Oed. Col. 1050 ; Arist. Thesm. 1149 ; Paus. ix. 8. 1). Besides the temple of Demeter on Mycale (ch. 101. 1) there was one at Priene, recently excavated by Wiegand (Priene, p. 147 f.), at which the goddesses were called *θεσμόφοροι ἀγναὶ πότναι* (Boeckh, C. I. G. ii. 2907).

For Thesmophoria near Ephesus cf. vi. 16.

*Γαῖσων* or *Γαῖσος* is probably the brook running by Domatia south of Mount Mycale, which flows into a marsh bordering on the sea. Ephorus, fr. 91, ap. Athen. 311 E ; F. H. G. i. 260 ; Mela, i. 17 ; Plin. N. H. v. 31, § 113. Probably the word *ποταμόν* has fallen out of the text.

*Σκολοπίεις*. Placed by Wiegand (Priene, p. 17), arguing from an inscription at Domatia, on the east bank of the Gaeson, while the Persian stockade, to which perhaps it owes its name, must have been lower down on the west bank (Kiepert, Formae, No. vii n.).

For Neleus cf. i. 147. 1.

*ἔρκος*. Diodorus (xi. 34) adds a deep ditch.

*ἡμερα*. The destruction of fruit trees, although there was a large forest close by on the hill, showed reckless disregard of the Milesians' property, but cf. ch. 15. 2 n.

If the words bracketed by Krüger be retained in any form, they must mean that the Persians were prepared to stand a siege in defence of their fleet and to strike a blow for victory with their army (cf. 101. 3 *ad fin.*).

98 2 *ἀποβάθρας*, 'gangways', here 'boarding-bridges'. Clearly the Greeks intended to fight in the old-fashioned way by boarding (Thuc. i. 49), not trusting to the new manœuvres. For these cf. vi. 12 n.

3 *συνθήματος*, 'watchword' in battle or on the march, usually the name of a deity ; cf. Xen. Anab. i. 8. 16 ; vi. 5. 25 ; vii. 3. 39.

*Ἡρης* is an almost certain conjecture, as the famous Heraeum (ch. 96. 1 n.) had been the starting-point of the Greek fleet, and stood behind their line of battle.

4 The passage appears to be an interpolation modelled on viii. 22. At least *ἔπειτε ἀνεειχθέντα* and *ἀπίστους τοῖσι Ἕλλησι*, 'mistrustful of the Greeks,' are suspicious phrases.

99 3 *τοῖσι Μιλησίοισι*. This re-appearance of the Milesians, who had all been killed or led away captive (vi. 19, 20 n.), is paralleled by that of the Eretrians who fought at Salamis (viii. 46. 2) and Plataea (ix. 28. 5), in spite of the similar fate that befell them in 490 B. C. ; cf. vi. 101 n., 119. Doubtless H. exaggerated in both cases the completeness of the destruction wrought by the Persians.

The dative after *κατεδόκεον*, 'whom they suspected,' seems to be on the analogy of *κατακρίνειν* (cf. vii. 146. 2).

*γέρρα* : cf. ch. 61. 3 n.



- 00 I *φήμη*. As has been shown by Grote (v. 47 f.), the multitude in all ages is subject to 'sudden unaccountable impressions', whether of panic or encouragement, which in an age of faith are naturally attributed to divine intervention. The *φήμη* here is paralleled by that in Aeschines (in Timarch. § 128 f. and de Fals. Leg. § 144 f.; cf. also Paus. i. 17. 1) and by the *ῥοσσα* of Homer (Il. ii. 93; Od. xxiv. 413). If, however, we are to find any real foundation for the report, we must either suppose with Grundy (p. 526) that it referred to one of the earlier successes of the Greeks in Boeotia, e.g. the death of Masistius, or we must give up the precise synchronism between Plataea and Mycale (§ 2, ch. 101. 2). Either is better than accepting the rationalizing suggestion of Ephorus (Diod. xi. 35; Polyæn. i. 33) that Leotychides invented the report to encourage his men, while the Persian generals told their troops that Xerxes was coming to their aid with a large force. The traditional precise synchronism between Plataea and Mycale (cf. Diod. xi. 34; Justin ii. 14) is a little discredited by the similar record as to the Himera and Salamis (vii. 166 n.), or the Himera and Thermopylae (Diod. xi. 24). Further, though no exact chronology is possible, if Mardonius was at Athens in June (ch. 3 n.), the battle of Plataea probably took place at the beginning of August (ch. 41. 1 n. and Busolt, ii. 725, n. 4). The dates in Plutarch, third Boedromion (Camill. 19, Moral. 349 F) and twenty-sixth Panemos=Metageitnion (Aristid. 19), seem to be those on which the victory was celebrated at Athens and at Plataea (cf. vi. 106. 3 n.). Mycale, on the other hand, is more naturally placed in the middle of August (Busolt, ii. 742, n. 2), since by the time that the Athenians have settled down to besiege Sestos it is autumn, i.e. mid-September, ch. 117 n. A fortnight's interval would give time for the rumour to cross the Aegæan.
- 2 *τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης*. H. rather awkwardly confuses two ways of stating the same fact. (1) 'The days of Plataea and that of Mycale were identical,' and (2) the self-same day saw the battles of Plataea and Mycale.
- 01 I For the Demettrion near Plataea cf. ch. 57. 2 n.
- 3 *περὶ Μαρδονίῳ πταίσῃ*, 'that Mardonius might be the rock on which Hellas would make shipwreck.'  
*κληδών* = *φήμη*; cf. v. 72. 3 and 4; Soph. Philoctet. 255.  
*ἔσπευδον* means eagerness of spirit, not actual motion, since the Persians awaited attack (ch. 99).
- 02 I *προσεχέσι*: used predicatively with *τεταγμένοισι*, as is shown by *τοῖσι ἐπέξῃς τεταγμένοισι* (§§ 1 and 3). The Greek leaders apparently landed to the east of the Persian camp, and, finding the beach too narrow for the deployment of their troops, marched the left wing along it straight against the enemy, while the right wing made a turning movement (*περιήσαν*) on the hills above. Then followed the breaking through the shield-wall and the rout of the Persians, and finally the capture of the camp.

χαράδραν. Perhaps the Gaeson, which served the Persians as a natural moat to their camp (ch. 97 n.).

- 4 For Tigranes cf. ch. 96 and vii. 62. 1 n., for the other Persian leaders viii. 130. 2.

103 2 ἑτεραλκῆς νίκη (or Ἄρης) means in Homer and Aeschylus (Pers. 930) 'decisive victory', but here and in viii. 11. 3 (ἑτεραλκέως) 'inclining now this way and now that, *anceps*, undecided'.

Ephorus, being from Cyme, was led by local patriotism to emphasize, and probably to exaggerate, the share of the Asiatic Greeks in the victory. He makes the appearance of the Samians and Milesians the turning-point in the battle, and declares that the Aeolians and others took part in the pursuit and slaughter of the Persians (Diod. xi. 36. 4, 5).

- 105 Ἑρμόλυκος. Pausanias saw on the Acropolis a statue of Hermolycus, the Pancratiast, who is probably to be identified with the one here mentioned (cf. Frazer on Paus. i. 23. 10).

παγκράτιον ἐπασκήσας: cf. vi. 92. 2 n. The Pancratium was a mixture of boxing and wrestling. For a detailed account cf. E. N. Gardiner, J. H. S. xxvi, pp. 21-2, and Greek athletic sports and festivals.

For Carystus cf. vi. 99. 2 n.; viii. 66. 2, 112. 2, 121. 1. It was subdued by Athens in the war here mentioned, placed by Thucydides (i. 98) after the capture of Scyros and before the revolt of Naxos, i. e. *circa* 472 B. C. (Busolt, iii. 140, n. 6). For Geraestus cf. viii. 7. 1 n.

- 106 2 ἀναστάσις here = 'peaceful removal' cf. § 3 and iv. 115. 3 ἐξανα-στέωμεν ἐκ τῆς γῆς.

Ἑλλας here in the wide sense of any land inhabited by Hellenes, and only limited by the relative clause to lands in the power of the confederates.

- 3 τοῖσι ἐν τέλει: a vague phrase for the competent authorities, i. e. the king and his advisers; cf. οἱ ἄρχοντες (iii. 46. 1; vi. 106. 2 n.) and the use of τὰ τέλη in Xenophon, on which cf. Underhill, Hellenica, p. 341, n. 8, and Gilbert, G. C. A. p. 54, n. 3.

τῶν μηδισάντων. The reference is primarily to the list of traitors given in vii. 132. 1, i. e. Thessalians, Malians, Locrians, and Boeotians (except Thespieae and Plataea), but we may suppose many islands to be included, e. g. Andros, Tenos, Paros, and Carystus in Euboea (vii. 95 n.; viii. 66, 111 f.), and perhaps those Peloponnesian states whose neutrality savoured of treachery (viii. 73. 3 *ad fin.*), especially Argos (vii. 148 f.) and Achaia (vii. 94. n.; viii. 73. 1 n.).

The idea of evacuating Ionia had been suggested by Bias (i. 170), and even partially carried out both in 546 B. C. (i. 164-8) and in 494 B. C. (vi. 17, 20). Hence there is nothing improbable in its suggestion here. Possibly, too, it might be regarded as a military measure within the competence of Leotychides and his council,

though a question of such far-reaching importance as the expulsion of the Medizers should surely have been referred to the Probouloi at the Isthmus. Diodorus (xi. 37), in saying that both Ionians and Athenians at first agreed, and that the latter repented only when the Ionians and Aeolians had made all their preparations to emigrate, is guilty of foolish exaggeration, since the assent of the Ionians is not in accord with their strong attachment to their native land (cf. i. 165; vi. 3).

- 4 H. distinctly limits admission into the league to the islanders present with the Greek fleet. We have already heard of the Chians and Samians (viii. 132; ix. 90 f.), but the Lesbians are here first mentioned. Presumably they had previously joined but H. omitted their adhesion, just as he omits to mention the presence of allies as well as Athenians at the siege of Sestos (ch. 124. 2 n.). The other loyal islanders (enumerated in viii. 46 and n.) must have been long before formally admitted to the league (cf. vii. 145). There is a difficulty as to the position of the Greeks on the mainland. H. here appears to exclude them, and in ch. 101 *ad fin.* makes 'the islands' and the Hellespont the prize of victory, yet Ionia (in which Miletus is included) has already 'revolted from Persia' (ch. 104 *ad fin.*), and, according to Thucydides (i. 89), allies from Ionia and the Hellespont helped the Athenians to take Sestos, while Ionians and others lately freed from the king are foremost in promoting the transference of the hegemony to Athens (i. 95). Diodorus (xi. 37) cuts the knot by admitting to the league all Aeolians and Ionians without distinction, which has led Steup to insert *καὶ τοὺς ἡπειρώτας* here. But Diodorus in this chapter is full of errors, and it seems better to suppose that such Greeks of the mainland as revolted from Persia were at first informally under the protection of Athens, and that they were only granted a formal alliance later, probably when the hegemony was transferred to Athens (cf. Busolt, iii. 39, 40). Of course many Greek states in Asia remained subject to Persia for years after this (cf. vi. 42 n.).

*τὰς γεφύρας.* The bridge had perished ten months before (viii. 117), but the Greeks may well have been ignorant of the fact so long as the Hellespont was in the hands of the enemy.

- 7 1 For Masistes, son of Darius and of Atossa, cf. vii. 82, and for his taunt ch. 20 n.

- 3 *Κιλικίης πάσης ἡρξε.* This would be most interesting if true, but Xenagoras cannot well have been satrap of Cilicia, because that country, though called a satrapy (iii. 90), remained till at least 400 B. C. under the rule of its native princes (Xen. Cyrop. vii. 4. 2), who bore the title *Συνέννεσις*. Cf. i. 74. 3 n. (585 B. C.); v. 118. 2 (500 B. C.); vii. 98, and Aesch. Pers. 326 (480 B. C.); Xen. Anab. i. 2 *ad fin.*; Ctes. Pers. § 58, p. 78; Diod. xiv. 20 (401 B. C.). Hence the conjecture *Λυκίης*.

108-13 *Tragedy at the Persian Court. The amours of Xerxes and the vengeance of Amestris.*

108 1 προμηθεόμενος, 'from respect for' = αἰδεόμενος, hence followed by the acc. ; cf. ii. 172. 5.  
τῷ αὐτό. The same thought, viz. that the king would not use violence.

Darius, the eldest of Xerxes' three sons, was murdered by his brother Artaxerxes (465 B. C.) at the suggestion of Artabanus, the Vizir who slew Xerxes (Diod. xi. 69; Ctes. § 29, p. 71).

θυγατέρα: somewhat strangely in apposition to γάμον, cf. iii. 88. 2.

2 ἡγάγετο. The middle is commonly used of the bridegroom, but here (cf. ch. III. 3; i. 34. 3) of his father bringing about the marriage.

109 2 τῇ δέ: attracted into the case appropriate in the next clause; cf. i. 24. 5 *ad init.*

ἔδεε: of the decrees of fate; cf. ii. 161. 3; similarly χρῆν, i. 8. 2; ii. 55. 2.

3 For the grant of cities cf. ii. 98 n.; Thuc. i. 138; Xen. Hell. iii. 1. 6.

στρατός. E. Meyer (iii. § 20) inclines to interpret this of a body-guard. So the στρατῆν of Masistes (ch. 113 *ad fin.*) can hardly have been more than a guard.

110 2 For birthday feasts cf. i. 133. Plato (Alcib. i, p. 121 C) says that the birthday of the king's eldest son was celebrated with feasting throughout the Empire.

τυκτά = Persian *tacht*.

σμάται: cf. iv. 73. 2. It would seem that the king, who at all other times appeared in full royal dress crowned with the tiara (cf. vii. 61. 1), on the day of this feast showed his head bare, and, like his companions at table, smeared it with ointments.

Πέρσας δωρέεται. For the gifts cf. Thuc. ii. 97; Plut. Alex. 69; Xen. Cyr. viii. 5. 21 and 7. 1; Meyer, iii, § 17; and Esther ii. 18. For the whole scene Matt. xiv. 6-9; Mark vi. 21-6.

111 2 ἐμὸς ἀδελφεός: i. e. full brother; cf. vii. 7 n., 82 n., 97.

5 τὰ διδόμενα: cf. viii. 114. 1 n.

τοσόνδε, 'only so much'; cf. i. 128. 2, 199. 3.

Masistes' answer 'You have not yet destroyed me', means primarily 'You have taken from me not life, but all that makes life worth living', and perhaps contains a covert threat 'You have still left me life and the chance of revenge'.

112 For similar barbarities cf. Homer, Od. xviii. 86; xxii. 475; Il. xxi. 455; xxiii. 21. For Amestris' cruelty vii. 114.

113 For Bactra and the Bactrian νομός cf. iii. 92. 2; vi. 9. 4

114-22 *The Athenians besiege and take Sestos. Story of Artayctes. The wisdom of Cyrus.*

114 1 ἀπολαμφθέντες: *intercepti*, arrested by contrary winds; cf. ii. 115. 4; Liv. xxxvii. 37.

2 Thucydides (i. 89) speaks as if the Peloponnesians had sailed straight home from Mycale, but adds the significant fact that Ionians and Hellespontines helped to besiege Sestos, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ξύμμαχοι ἤδη ἀφειστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως ὑπομείναντες Σῆστον ἐπολιόρκουν. In each case the fuller account should be followed. Thucydides omits the fruitless voyage of the Peloponnesians, but supplies an omission in H. (cf. ch. 106). Sestos was of great importance to Athens as commanding the corn-route to the Euxine (vii. 147. 2 n.), and as the strongest (ch. 115) place in the Chersonese (Thuc. viii. 62; Xen. Hell. iv. 8. 5), on which Athens had claims founded on the dominion of Miltiades (cf. vi. 34 f.); App. XVI, § 8.

115 ἐόντος: for the case cf. viii. 69. 1 n.

For Cardia cf. vi. 33. 3 n.

ἐνθαῦτα and ταύτην refer to Sestos.

116 1 ἐτυράννευε: more properly ἐπετρόπευε (vii. 78 *ad fin.*).

τούτου τοῦ νομοῦ: apparently the European (i. e. Thracian) conquests of Darius, the Skurdra of the Nakshi-Rustum Inscription, which may well have formed a satrapy, of which Sestos was the capital and Artayctes the governor (vii. 33. 1 *ad fin.*), though it is not mentioned in H.'s list (iii. 90 f.), as it had not been conquered at the beginning of Darius' reign, and was lost again by Xerxes.

ὑπαρχος is, however, also used of the commandant of a fortress; cf. vii. 194. 1 n.; while νόμος is used of districts smaller than satrapies; ii. 165, 166, &c.; iv. 62. 1, 66.

Artayctes is also leader of the Macrones and Mossynoeci (vii. 78); cf. Masistes, vii. 82, ix. 113; Meyer, iii, § 42 n.

Protesilaus of Phylace in Phthiotis was slain as he landed on the Trojan shore (Il. ii. 701 τὸν δ' ἔκτανε Δάρδανος ἀνὴρ | νηὶς ἀποθρώσκοντα πολὺ πρῶτιστον Ἀχαιῶν). He was honoured as a hero at Phylace (Pindar, Isthm. i. 58) and generally (cf. Wordsworth, Laodamia) so regarded (Paus. iii. 4. 6), yet at Elaeus he was worshipped as a god (ch. 120. 3; Paus. i. 34. 2). Probably he was a native deity identified with the Greek hero from similarity of name. His oracle, like those of Amphiaraus and Trophonius (with whom Pausanias, i. 34. 2, compares him), was frequented by the sick (Philos. Her. 670, 678 f.). For Elaeus cf. vi. 140. 1 n.

3 Cf. vii. 5. 2 n. The request for a man's house was so natural that the king had no suspicion of the sacrilege intended.

The Persian kings claimed all Asia (i. 4. 4; vii. 11. 4 n.), as did the Sassanids (Dio (epit.) lxxx. 4; Herodian vi. 2. 2).



**117** πολιορκεόμενοισι : passive, 'the besieged,' as in i. 84. 1; similarly the active of besiegers, iii. 56. 1; viii. 129. 1.

φθινόπωρον. The rising of Arcturus (Sept. 18) marked the beginning of autumn (cf. ch. 100. 1 n., 101). The murmuring of the besiegers and the distress of the besieged (ch. 118) clearly began in the autumn, but the siege no doubt lasted into, and perhaps through, the winter (Thuc. i. 89 ἐπιχειμάσαντες εἶλον). The statement of Diodorus (xi. 37) εὐθὺς ἐκ κατάπλου προσβολὰς τῇ πόλει ποιησάμενος εἶλε Σῆστον is an obvious blunder. H.'s words (ch. 121) κατὰ τὸ ἔτος τοῦτο, no doubt limit the siege to a single year, but his year, like that of Thucydides, is a campaigning year from spring to spring; cf. viii. 130, 131; vii. 37; vi. 31.

**118** τόνους. The leather girths of a bedstead supporting the mattress, and perhaps the leather plaited work forming the seat of a chair; cf. v. 25. 1, 2; vii. 36. 1.

ὀπισθε : at the back of the fortress, the front being plainly towards the sea.

**119** 1 Ἀψίνθιοι : cf. vi. 34. 1 n. For the practice of sacrificing strangers to Artemis in the Tauric Chersonese cf. iv. 103, and for the custom of the Getae iv. 94.

2 Αἶγος Ποταμῶν : an open roadstead opposite Lampsacus, named, perhaps, from two small streams which reach the sea near it, famous for the final defeat of the Athenians by Lysander (Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 18 f.).

**120** 1 ἐπάλλοντο : cf. i. 141. 2, and for a similar portent Homer, Od. xii. 394 f.

4 For Madytus and the place of the bridge cf. vii. 33 n.

They crucified him with hands and feet stretched out and nailed to cross-pieces; cf. vii. 33. This barbarity, unusual on the part of Greeks, may be explained by the enormity of the outrage or by Athenian deference to local feeling.

**122** 2 The ruggedness of Persia proper is frequently insisted on in antiquity, rightly in the main; cf. i. 71. 2 f.; Plat. Laws 695 A; Arrian, Anab. v. 4. 5.

πλέοσι : in more points (Stein); cf. ἀπασι (i. 1. 2, 91. 6).

3 H. ascribes to Cyrus the teaching of Hippocrates περὶ Ἀέρων 24 (cf. i. 142) εὐρίσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς χώρας τῇ φύσει ἀκολουθοῦντι καὶ τὰ εἶδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους. ὅκου μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ πίειρα καὶ μαλθακή . . . καὶ τῶν ὥρέων καλῶς κεῖται, εἰταῖθα καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι σαρκαώδεές εἰσι καὶ ἀναρῆροι καὶ ὑγροὶ καὶ ἀταλαίπωροι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοὶ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. . . ὅκου δ' ἐστὶ ἡ χώρα ψιλὴ τε καὶ ἄνυδρος καὶ τρηχεῖα καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ χειμῶνος πιεζομένη καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου κεκαυμένη, ἐνθαῦτα δὲ . . . τὰ τε ἦθεα καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς αὐθάδεας καὶ ἰδιογνώμονας τοῦ τε ἀγρίου μᾶλλον μετέχοντας ἢ τοῦ ἡμέρου ἐς τε τὰς τέχνας δξυτέρους τε καὶ συννετωτέρους καὶ τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους εὐρίσεις. H. throughout assumes the influence of climate on character and on institutions. Differences between one folk and another he would trace in part to differences in physical

and geographical environment, since he is convinced of the relativity of human institutions (cf. Macan, *ad loc.*, and iii. 38). It should never have been doubted that this anecdote was deliberately chosen by the historian to close his work. It recalls the fact that the Persians, though now defeated, were a famous race of warriors; it perhaps is intended to warn the conquerors that they too may suffer decline and fall if they relax their discipline (cf. vii. 102). No doubt the moral is a little obvious, the literary artifice somewhat naïve, but is not all this characteristic of Herodotus?

# APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX XVI

### HERODOTUS ON TYRANNY

§ 1. **The tyrants in Greek literature.** The picture of tyranny and tyrants given by H. is one of almost unrelieved blackness. Tyranny is the negation of law and order, the arbitrary rule of an individual, puffed up with pride yet racked with suspicions, who sacrifices the lives of men and the honour of women to gratify the caprice of the moment (iii. 80). This judgement is borne out by the long catalogue of crimes attributed to Polycrates (iii. 39-47, 54-60, 120-6) and to the Corinthian tyrants (iii. 48-53; v. 92). The Ionian tyrants are willing slaves of their Persian master (iv. 136-42), traitors to the cause of Hellas and of freedom. The lords of Syracuse, damned with faint praise by Thucydides (i. 17), were at least champions of Hellas against the barbarian (vii. 153-67), and meet with kindlier treatment, as do Cleisthenes of Sicyon (v. 67, 68; vi. 126-30), perhaps on account of his connexion with the Alcmaeonids and the rulers of Athens itself, Pisistratus and his sons (i. 59-64; v. 55, 56, 62-5, 94-6).

In this censure of despotism H. is followed by other Greek writers. Possibly his Periander served as a model for their pictures; certainly Xenophon in the *Hiero* and Plato in the *Republic* dwell on the misery of the tyrant's life, friendless in the midst of foes. Finally, the plain and prosaic account in the *Politics* of Aristotle is as effective an indictment as the dramatic sketches of Plato and H.

We can easily account for these dark pictures of tyranny. The private vices of a tyrant in a small Greek state came home as personal matters to his subjects: his brutality and debauchery, unlike that of a Nero or a Napoleon, could not be unknown. The smallness of the Greek state also made the danger of tyranny ever present, and the oligarchic leanings which mark all branches of Greek literature except oratory rendered it inevitable that the tyrant, whose hand was especially heavy on the aristocratic class, should be evil spoken of. It can hardly be accidental that the tyrants of Syracuse, who paid scant regard to the people (vii. 156),

but enlisted in their service famous literary men, were on the whole more favourably judged than most of their class.

Allowing for all these causes of prejudice, we can form for ourselves a truer picture of tyranny than that current in Greece. We see that it was a necessary stage in the progress of the state: politically it was the transition from an oligarchy of birth to a more popular form of government, socially it broke down the barrier between the propertied and the unpropertied. And tyranny was not wholly selfish. The despots of Sicily saved the Western Mediterranean for Graeco-Roman civilization: the despots of older Greece, by their dynastic alliances and diplomatic intercourse, and by the reverence they showed for the national temples, Delphi and Olympia, and their encouragement of the great festivals, did much for the unification of Hellas. Above all, the tyrants' patronage of art and literature developed that culture which was the chief glory of Hellas.

§ 2. **Tyranny at Sicyon and Megara.** The first home of tyranny would seem to have been the coastlands of Asia Minor,<sup>1</sup> where Lydian influence was strong, but it spread rapidly among the wealthier and more progressive states (cf. Thuc. i. 13), particularly in the cities near that great avenue of trade, the Isthmus of Corinth. In these states the tyranny embodied a reaction against oligarchy, a rising of the original inhabitants against their Dorian conquerors. This aspect is most clearly seen at Sicyon. The Orthagoridae are said to have sprung from the people (Andreas  $\Rightarrow$  Orthagoras was a cook, Diod. viii. 24), and to have preserved their power for a century by their moderation and justice in their dealings with their subjects (Ar. Pol. 1315 b 12). This must refer to the conquered race, the peasants and husbandmen, who formed the bulk of the population. For on the Dorian nobility the hand of Cleisthenes fell heavily. Even though we need not take the nicknames given the three Dorian tribes as official titles (cf. v. 68 n.), nevertheless the

<sup>1</sup> The name tyranny as well as the thing seems to originate in Asia Minor. Its earliest use, in which it implies nothing more than absolute monarchy, is in Archilochus, fr. 25 (Bergk) *Οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεια τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει . . . μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος*, and in Simonides of Amorgos, fr. 7, l. 69 *ἢν μή τις ἡ τύραννος ἡ σκηπτοῦχος ἦ* (cf. the use of it for gods, *ἡ τύραννος*, Herondas, v. 77, and *Μῆν τύραννος* on inscriptions). The later sense of a rule illegal in origin and character appears first in Alcaeus, fr. 37 a, Theognis 1181, and in the Attic song in praise of Harmodius. In H. both uses appear, the same person being often termed both *βασιλεὺς* and *τύραννος* (cf. v. 44 n.), yet the distinction between lawful king, e.g. at Cyrene and Sparta, and lawless despot is everywhere implicit and occasionally explicit. Later, under the influence of Plato, the notion arises that the tyrant's rule is not only illegal, but also necessarily evil in its objects and in its methods. Tyranny to the philosophers is the perversion of monarchy, utterly selfish, and a curse to its subjects (Ar. Pol. iii. 7. 5. 1279 b 5, &c.).

supremacy of the non-Dorian element seems implied in their new name 'Archelaoi'. The attempt to stamp out Dorianism reappears in the attack on Argive influence. The recitation of the epics, in which Argos is glorified, is forbidden; Argive Adrastus is to be driven out by the welcome given to his Theban foe Melanippus, and the choruses which had been held in his honour are transferred to the popular wine-god Dionysus (v. 67 n.).

That Cleisthenes was a magnificent monarch with wide connexions may be seen from the tale of his daughter's betrothal (vi. 126 f.), from his victories in the chariot-race at Olympia (vi. 126) and at Delphi (Paus. x. 7. 6), and above all from the part he played in the Sacred War against Crisa and in the reorganization of the Pythian festival (v. 67 n.).

The tyranny of Theagenes in Megara (Ar. Pol. 1305 a 24), unmentioned by H., derives its chief interest from the light thrown by the poems of Theognis on the social and economic condition of the people after its fall. The struggles between the oppressed peasantry and their lords are there vividly depicted; but of the Megarian tyranny we know little or nothing.

§ 3. **Tyranny at Corinth.** The case is far otherwise with the greatest of this group of tyrannies, the Corinthian. Here we have two divergent views preserved in tradition. H. (v. 92), though he gives us the charming tale of the preservation of the infant Cypselus, is clearly inspired with oligarchic hate of the Cypselids. Cypselus is a harsh despot, and Periander, though at first milder, is speedily converted by the advice of his Milesian ally Thrasybulus, and becomes a tyrant, whose sad and lonely old age (iii. 50 f.) is but the due punishment for his monstrous brutality (iii. 43-9, v. 92).

In later writers, who probably followed Ephorus (Aristotle, Nic. Damasc. fr. 58-60), Cypselus is the milder type of tyrant, rising to power by demagogic arts, and ruling Corinth without a body-guard by tact and ability (Ar. Pol. 1315 b 27), while Periander is an adept in the black arts of tyranny (Ar. Pol. 1313 a 37), giving advice to Thrasybulus to lop off the tallest ears of corn (Ar. Pol. 1311 a 20, 1284 a 26; cf. H. v. 92), thoroughly understanding how to break a people's spirit. Neither tradition is thoroughly trustworthy, but the probabilities are that Cypselus, like Pisistratus, tempered despotism by seeking to retain popularity, and that Periander relied more on naked force and military ability. Both would seem to have been great rulers.

Like other tyrants they acquired wealth by confiscating the property of the banished nobles; but probably the only taxes were harbour and market dues (Ps. Heraclides 5, F. H. G. ii. 213), and there was no direct taxation, the tradition that Cypselus took tithe of all property being late and untrustworthy (Pseud. Ar. Oecon. ii. 2), and they spent their wealth royally in the service of art and religion. Temples were built, indeed the gable (*αιερός*) of



a temple was held to be a Corinthian invention (Pind. Ol. xiii. 21); a treasury was built at Delphi to which rich gifts were sent (i. 14. 50); the offerings at Olympia were yet more famous, a colossal golden statue of Zeus in the Heraeum (Plat. Phaedr. 236 B; Paus. v. 2. 3), and the celebrated chest (cf. v. 92. 2 n.). It was probably in the days of Periander that the Isthmian games reached the rank of a national festival, for Solon (Plut. ch. 23; Diog. Laert. i. 55) instituted prizes for victors in the Isthmian as well as in the Olympic games. The popular worship of Bacchus was encouraged by Corinthian as by other despots, and the dithyramb and cyclic chorus appropriate to the festive god first perfected by Periander's court-poet Arion (i. 23, 24). Nor were the tyrants indifferent to the economic welfare of their subjects. To prevent too great a flow of population to the city and the neglect of agriculture, immigration was checked, while citizens were compelled to work and the number of slaves was restricted (Diog. Laert. i. 98; Nic. Damasc. 58; F. H. G. iii. 391). These measures were further intended to prevent the gathering together of idlers in the market-place, characteristic of free democracy, but dangerous to tyranny (cf. Ar. Pol. 1292 b 25, 1318 b 9, 1319 a 30); indeed it is the political rather than the economic purpose of these measures that impressed Aristotle.

§ 4. **The colonial and foreign policy of the Corinthian tyrants.** It is, however, the colonial policy of the Cypselidae which most excites our admiration. Numerous colonies are founded to provide for surplus population and promote trade, so that the north-western region is brought politically as well as commercially under the sway of Corinth. Three colonies dominating the Ambraciot gulf are ascribed to the three illegitimate sons of Cypselus (Nic. Damasc. *l.c.*). First Leucas is said to have been colonized by Pylades, the peninsula (Hom. Od. xxiv. 378) being converted into an island by cutting through the sandy isthmus which joined it to the mainland (Strabo 452), and its harbour protected with moles. Then Anactorium at the mouth of the Ambraciot gulf was settled by Echiades, and Ambracia itself, with its rich lands and ready access to the trade of Epirus, by Gorgos (Strabo, *l.c.*). Corinth recovers her suzerainty over Corcyra, whither Lycophron is sent as viceroy (iii. 32), and in concert with the Corcyraeans founded Apollonia and Epidamnus (Dyrrachium) at one end of the great road across Illyria known later as the Via Egnatia. Near the place where that road reaches the Aegean, Evagoras, son of Periander, founded Potidaea (Nic. Damasc. fr. 60; F. H. G. iii. 393), which secured for Corinth a hold on Chalcidice and on the trade along the great Illyrian road.

The foreign policy of the Corinthian tyrants cannot be reconstructed for lack of sufficient material, but evidently Periander had relations with the phil-Hellenic kings of Egypt (cf. the name of his nephew, Psammetichus) and of Lydia (iii. 48). He is allied with

## APPENDIX XVI

Thrasybulus of Miletus (i. 20 ; v. 92), and at enmity with Samos (iii. 48), reversing the earlier policy of Corinth, which had stood with Samos and Chalcis against Eretria and Miletus in the great Lelantine war. Periander decides in favour of Athens her dispute with Mitylene concerning Sigeum (v. 94 n.), and is evidently the most powerful ruler of his age in Hellas. He kept up a navy on both the Corinthian and the Saronic gulf, and, inspired perhaps by the success of the canal at Leucas, planned to unite the two seas by a canal through the Isthmus (Diog. Laert. i. 99). The task proved too hard for the engineers of antiquity, and has only been accomplished in our own day (1893), but the scheme shows the despot's daring and enterprise. In the days of the Tyranny Corinth was a great imperial state, not the nation of shopkeepers seeking and fighting for commerce, and commerce only, which she became under the rule of the oligarchy.

§ 5. Pisistratus' social and economic policy. While to H. the Corinthian is the worst type of tyranny, the Athenian is the best. Like other authorities, he emphasizes the fact that Pisistratus did no violence to the Solonian laws and constitution (i. 59. 6 ; Thuc. vi. 54 ; Ath. Pol. 16). No doubt some of the law-giver's measures fell into disuse (Ath. Pol. 22), and care was taken that some member of the despot's family should hold office (Thuc. *l. c.*), but Pisistratus, though he strengthened himself with a mercenary bodyguard and by taking hostages from suspected foes (i. 64), observed the laws and even appeared to defend himself before the Areopagus (Ar. Pol. 1315 b 21 ; Ath. Pol. 16). In fine he anticipated Augustus in founding a principate, a monarchy under the guise of a republic. This aspect of the rule of Pisistratus H. understands and values. But of his far-reaching foreign policy he gives us but scattered and unconnected glimpses, while he says nothing of the part tyranny played in promoting the social and economic welfare of Attica, and little of its great services to art, literature, and religion. Among the social and economic measures we may mention the lending of money to the needy peasants (chief among whom were his own supporters, the *Diacrii*) for the purposes of agriculture (Ath. Pol. 16), and probably the provision of lands for them from the confiscated estates of the banished nobles, their former masters (cf. Busolt, ii. 327-8). After Pisistratus, the landholder in Attica is, as a rule, a peasant proprietor. Again peace and order are secured and the administration of justice in the country districts improved by the institution of local courts (*κατὰ δήμους δικασταί*, Ath. Pol. 16). Lastly, the interest shown by the Pisistratids in the road system of Attica is exemplified by the action of Hipparchus in setting up of the *Hermæ* as sign-posts (cf. Ps. Plat. Hipp. 228 D), and of Hippias' son Pisistratus in dedicating the altar of the Twelve Gods (cf. vi. 108. 4 ; Thuc. vi. 54) the central milestone of Attica (ii. 7).

Clearly it was the aim of Pisistratus, as of the Corinthian tyrants (*sup.*), that his subjects should employ themselves in their own callings (Ath. Pol. 16) and leave politics to their ruler (*op. cit.* 15, *ad fin.*). Hence Theophrastus was led to ascribe the νόμος ἀρχίας to Pisistratus, not to Solon (Plut. Sol. 31; cf. ii. 177 n.), and though this may be a mistake, its enforcement was probably a maxim of his policy. In any case, under the fostering care of the despot Attica prospered greatly; to the commons the rule of the tyrants was a golden age, like that of Cronos (Ath. Pol. 16; Ps. Hipp. 229 B).

§ 6. **Pisistratus' encouragement of commerce and the arts.** We must not, however, think that the city was neglected for the land nor commerce for agriculture. Pisistratus and his sons did much for the water supply of Athens, constructing the Ἐννεάκρουνος (vi. 137. 3 n.), whether that be the conduit and watercourse discovered near the Agora by Dörpfeld or not. In the age of the tyrants begins the great and profitable trade in Attic pottery, which was exported wholesale to all parts of the Greek world. To this period belongs the first great style of Attic vase painting, the black figure on red ground, and the beginnings of the red figure on black ground, the style which was to culminate in Euphronios. And if we turn from a minor to the greater arts, among the buildings of Pisistratus we may name the first plan and beginnings of the largest among Athenian temples, the Olympieum by the Ilissus, which remained a torso till the days of Antiochus Epiphanes, and was only completed by the antiquarian emperor Hadrian. To Pisistratus, too, may be ascribed at least the peristyle of that old temple of Athena on the Acropolis so ingeniously reconstructed by Dörpfeld (Harrison, Athens, p. 503 f.; D'Ooge, Acropolis, 43-63, 369-97; Frazer, Paus. ii, Appendix), the early Hecatompedon.

To the pediment of this temple belongs in all probability a vigorous sculpture of Athena slaying a giant (E. Gardner, G. S. 163-4), a part no doubt of a Gigantomachy. Again, we must assign to the age of the despots most of the charming series of female draped figures, often called 'priestesses of Athena', discovered in the excavation of the Acropolis (Gardner, *op. cit.* 164-74). On the base of one of the latest in style among them is an inscription assigning it to Antenor, the sculptor of the first group representing the tyrannicides. In fine we must ascribe to the age of the despots a great advance in the most characteristic Greek arts, architecture, vase-painting, and sculpture.

§ 7. **Pisistratid patronage of literature and religious festivals.** Nor were the Pisistratidae backward in the encouragement of literature. Even if the Pisistratid recension of Homer be doubted or denied (vii. 6. 3 n.), Hipparchus was a great patron of poets, such as Lasus of Hermione (vii. 6), Anacreon, and Simonides of Ceos (Ps. Plat. Hipparch. 228 f.). More important is the connexion of Pisistratus with the city Dionysia and the first beginnings

of tragedy. The foundation of the tragic contests and the victory of Thespis is assigned (Marm. Parium, 43) to the year 534 B.C., and we can hardly be wrong in ascribing this new literary development and the reorganization, if not the institution, of the city Dionysia to Pisistratus. In Athens, as at Sicyon and elsewhere, the tyrants favoured these popular festivals and discouraged exclusive aristocratic family worships. It is probable that the festival at Eleusis owed much to the despots. The second temple there, more than twice as large as the oldest, belongs to this period. Again, the great prominence of Dionysus-Iacchus in the Eleusinian mysteries may well be ascribed to Orphic influence favoured by the Pisistratidae. The Homeric hymn knows only of the two goddesses, mother and maid, at Eleusis; Dionysus, like Orphism, would seem to come from Thrace to Athens and thence to Eleusis. At least the spiritualization of the wine-god and earth-goddesses and their festivals is the work of Orphic mystics (Harrison, *Prolegomena*, ch. ix f.). And the connexion of the Pisistratidae with Orphism is clear. Apart from their knowledge of oracles and soothsaying,<sup>1</sup> Onomacritus (vii. 6. 3 n.), the apostle of Orphism, who is said to have put the Orphic maxims into verse (Aristotle, fragm. 7, Rose<sup>3</sup>) and settled the forms of purification (τελεταί), was the trusted adviser of the Pisistratidae till convicted of forgery (vii. 6). The elevation of the Eleusinian mysteries to the rank of a national festival, and their spiritualization under Orphic influence, were achieved in the age of the despots. Finally the Panathenaea, though its foundation is assigned to the year 566/5 (Pherecydes, fr. 20; F.H.G.i. 73), must owe its greatness to the fostering care of the tyrants, who themselves marshalled the splendid procession of the festival (Thuc. i. 20; vi. 57). The despots must needs pay all honour to the national goddess by adding splendour to her festival as well as by decorating her temple.

§ 8. **Pisistratus' foreign policy.** Lastly, the foreign policy of Pisistratus is spirited and successful. On the great trade route to the Pontus he seized two important positions. He recovered Sigeum from the Mityleneans and established his son Hegesistratus there (v. 95 n.). He encouraged the colonization of the Thracian Chersonese under the Philaid Miltiades (I) (vi. 36 f.), and supported his house in their principality, clearly as vassals of their Athenian over-lord (vi. 103). By these means he secured a hold on the great corn route.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Pisistratid collection of oracles seized by Cleomenes (v. 90), the accurate knowledge of oracles attributed to Hippias (v. 93), and also the frequent occurrence in the history of the Pisistratids of oracles (i. 62, 64) and ominous dreams (v. 56; vi. 107).

<sup>2</sup> Further, Hippias at least was in alliance with Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus (Thuc. vi. 59).

No less valuable were the goldmines of Mount Pangaeum near the Strymon (i. 64; *Ath. Pol.* 15) and the port of Rhaecelus on the Thermaic gulf, which he occupied. Hence his alliance with the kings of Macedon (v. 94 n.). In the islands of the Aegean (Cyclades) Pisistratus sought to plant his power. Naxos he held through Lygdamis (i. 61. 4 n.); further he sought to win the favour of the Delian Apollo by a purification of the land round his temple (i. 64; *Thuc.* iii. 104). Delos was already important as the centre of an Ionic amphictyony of islanders. But this Aegean policy of Pisistratus needed the support of a strong fleet, which at that time Athens did not possess (probably she had at most fifty ships; cf. vi. 89 n.). Indeed, before the fall of the Attic dynasty, Polycrates (iii. 125) and Lygdamis had been overthrown (*Plut. de Mal. Herod.* 21, *Mor.* 859 D), while Sigeum and the Chersonese had been compelled to submit to Persia.

On the mainland Pisistratus made alliance with the chief powers of Northern and Southern Greece. His alliance with Thessaly (v. 63, 94) was proclaimed by the name given to his third son (Thessalus); the friendship of his house with Sparta (v. 63, 90) held good in spite of his close relations with Argos, whence came his wife Timonassa and a timely reinforcement of 1,000 men (i. 61; *Ath. Pol.* 17), which aided in his restoration. At the same time he received the support of the Eretrian and Theban oligarchies (i. 61; *Ath. Pol.* 15). In fine, a far-reaching foreign policy is characteristic of the Athenian as of other tyrants, since on their success abroad depended in large measure their security from plots at home, fomented by the banished nobles.

§ 9. **Polycrates of Samos.** The tyranny of Polycrates at Samos forms a fitting pendant to that of Pisistratus by likeness and by contrast. Like Pisistratus he aimed at an Ionic suzerainty of the Aegean (iii. 122), and curried favour with Apollo of Delos by presenting him with the neighbouring island of Rheneae (*Thuc.* i. 13; iii. 104). Unlike Pisistratus, he increased his fleet to 100 vessels, and after defeating Miletus and her ally Lesbos in a great battle, became a dangerous pirate power like the Algerine corsairs (iii. 39). At first he would seem to have aspired to independence, and perhaps even hoped successfully to withstand the Persian power, as Thrasybulus of Miletus had the Lydian (i. 17 f.). At least he made alliance and exchanged gifts with Amasis of Egypt (iii. 40; ii. 182). In the day of need, however, he deserted the Egyptian and sent a squadron to join Cambyses (iii. 44), thus acknowledging the suzerainty of Persia. Indeed, it is obvious that Samos could preserve her independence only so long as the Persian kings were occupied in suppressing revolts or extending their empire in the East.

The public works of Polycrates (*Ar. Pol.* 1313 b 24) were on a magnificent scale. Besides building himself a palace, which Caligula intended to restore (*Suet. Cal.* 21), he may well have had



## APPENDIX XVI

a share in all the three wonders described by H. (iii. 60). He also valued the work of the artist Theodorus (iii. 41) and patronized the doctor Democedes (iii. 131), and at least the lighter muses, the poets of love and wine, Ibycus and Anacreon (iii. 121).

§ 10. **The fall of tyranny.** The fall of tyranny was no doubt due in the main to natural causes. Quarrels in the ruling house, or the succession of a weak ruler, gave opportunity to the undying hatred of the exiled nobles. It is, however, distinctly stated by Thucydides (i. 18) and Aristotle (Pol. 1312 b 7) that the Spartans put down most of the tyrannies.<sup>1</sup> Yet this statement is hard to justify in detail. In H. we only hear of the expulsion of the Pisistratidae (v. 63 f.) and of the abortive attack on Polycrates (iii. 44, 54-6). In each of these cases the Spartans had special reasons for their action, more satisfactory than the injuries (i. 70; iii. 47) or the piety (v. 63) put forward by H. The offence of the Athenian tyrants may well have been their Argive alliance (Ath. Pol. 19). Against Polycrates Sparta was pushed forward by her commercial allies, especially Corinth; Aegina had an ancient but still remembered grudge against Samos (iii. 59); Corinth, apart from the motive given by H. (iii. 48 f.), a more recent and more bitter hatred. Above all Corinth saw her trade in the Aegean threatened by the piratical power of Polycrates. We need not, then, follow Plutarch (de Mal. Her. 21. 859 C) in ascribing to Sparta a consistent hatred of tyranny on principle. Still less can we accept without criticism his list of tyrants expelled by the Spartans (22. 859 D). Of the tyrants there enumerated the Cypselids at Corinth and Ambracia can hardly have been forcibly expelled by Sparta, since as to Corinth neither H. (v. 92) nor Ephorus (Nic. Damasc. fr. 60; F. H. G. iii. 393) says any such thing, and as to Ambracia the account given by Aristotle (Pol. 1304 a 31, 1311 a 39), and especially the establishment of democracy, seem inconsistent with Spartan interference. Lygdamis of Naxos might well have been put down at the time of the Spartan expedition against Samos, though H. does not mention the fact.<sup>2</sup> Again, the expulsion of Aeschines from Sicyon<sup>3</sup> might well have accompanied or followed close upon that of the Pisistratidae from Athens (v. 68 n.). The others, Symmachus of Thasos, Aulis in Phocis, Aristogenes of Miletus, and two kings Aristomedes and Angelus in Thessaly, are mere names to us. Further, if the list be, as is probable, chrono-

<sup>1</sup> In Rylands papyrus 18 this is distinctly ascribed to Chilon the ephor and to king Anaxandridas.

<sup>2</sup> Before 500 B.C. the restored oligarchs have been expelled by the democrats (v. 30 n.).

<sup>3</sup> Rylands papyrus 18 (second century B.C.) also couples Aeschines of Sicyon and Hippias. The existence of this earlier authority gives some support to Plutarch, but it is chronologically impossible to connect Hippias with Chilon and Anaxandridas as the papyrus appears to do.

logical, they are of later date. On the whole it seems best to interpret the statements of Thucydides and Aristotle as applying rather to the indirect influence than the direct interference of Sparta. The Peloponnesian league under her leadership was the natural counterpoise to tyranny. It favoured the very forces the tyrants had laboured to destroy, Dorianism and constitutional oligarchy. It substituted a rather narrow Peloponnesian policy for the wider outlook of the greater tyrants. But Sparta restored a constitutional, if aristocratic, form of government, and therefore has won the praise of philosophers and the approval of history as the friend of liberty.

In this appendix I owe most to E. Meyer, Busolt, and Abbott. For attempts to prove the commercial origin of the Tyrannis cf. Ure, *J. H. S.* xxvi. 131 f., and to identify the position of Aesymnete with that of tyrant cf. R. Nordin, *Klio* v. 392 f. Ure has expanded his article into a book on the origin of tyranny, but Busolt, in his admirable account of Greek tyrants (*Griech. Staats.* pp. 372 f., 381-411, 859-68), rightly rejects his theory (p. 386) as well as that of Nordin (pp. 373, 383-4); cf. also Swoboda in *Klio* xii. 341-54.

## APPENDIX XVII

### SPARTA UNDER KING CLEOMENES (520-490 B.C.)

§ 1. **Cleomenes in H.** For the history of Sparta (from 520 to 490 B.C.) H. furnishes abundant materials, but they are diverse in kind and value, and disconnected in the historian's narrative. The internal history of Sparta is treated in the main as the biography of her kings.<sup>1</sup> The foreign relations of the Spartan state are either similarly treated<sup>2</sup> or are but incidentally mentioned in connexion with Athenian, not Spartan, history.<sup>3</sup> It is at once obvious that H. makes no attempt to bring the various questions of foreign policy, the Athenian, the Argive, and the Persian, into connexion with each other, or to estimate their influence on home policy, or on the relations of Sparta and her allies. In this confusion we have to find a clue, to discover from the facts recorded a reasonable policy which we may attribute to Sparta's great king Cleomenes. For through the mists of oblivion and calumny Cleomenes looms large as

<sup>1</sup> e.g. (1) the story of Cleomenes and Dorieus (v. 39-48); (2) the birth, deposition, and exile of Demaratus (vi. 61-70), with excursus on the Spartan kingship (vi. 52-60); and (3) the end of king Cleomenes, with a parenthetical account of his war with Argos (vi. 74-84).

<sup>2</sup> As e.g. the supposed Scythic embassy (vi. 84), the visit of Aristagoras to Sparta (v. 49-54), and the question of the Aeginetan hostages (vi. 49, 50, 73, 85, 86).

<sup>3</sup> e.g. the hostile relations of Sparta and Athens (v. 63-5, 70-6, 90-3), the important part played by Cleomenes in promoting the alliance of Plataea with Athens (vi. 108), and the summons to Marathon conveyed by Philipides, with the late arrival of the Spartans there (vi. 106, 120).

the one great figure of his day at Sparta. He puts down one king and sets up another, he thrice invades Attica and sets her at variance with Boeotia; he deals out war or peace, and grants or refuses alliance to Samos, to Ionia, and to Athens. To this heroic monarch H. does scant justice because Spartan tradition had declared against the man who meant not only to reign but to govern. He says expressly that Cleomenes reigned no long time (v. 48), yet he had clearly been on the throne some years before 510 B. C., when he took part in the expulsion of Hippias (v. 64-5), and his brother Dorieus in the destruction of Sybaris (v. 44, 5); indeed he is already on the throne when Maeandrius of Samos seeks aid from Sparta, *circ.* 515 B. C. (iii. 148), and he is still king in the year of the battle of Marathon, 490 B. C. (vi. 73). Possibly H. forgot the lapse of years and remembered only that Dorieus, had he stayed in Sparta, might have succeeded to the throne instead of his younger brother Leonidas, but the statement is curiously inaccurate. Again Cleomenes is contrasted most unfavourably with his brother Dorieus. He secures the throne simply by virtue of seniority, though he is somewhat of a madman (v. 42), while Dorieus is a prince among men, sure of the crown if merit be allowed weight. Yet Dorieus, too proud to stay in Sparta, made shipwreck of his life in vain attempts to promote the advance of Hellenism in the west, while the despised Cleomenes is beyond dispute the greatest king of the century.

Even the Medizing Demaratus is to H. a more acceptable personage than the great king who procured his deposition. Yet Cleomenes had great excuse for his unscrupulous action. At least on two most important and critical occasions Demaratus had thwarted his policy; his defection broke up the great army gathered at Eleusis to humble Athens and put down her democracy (v. 75), probably in 506 B. C., and his opposition prevented for the time the exaction of hostages from Aegina in 491 B. C. (vi. 50). In the last case, too, Demaratus might be held guilty of the Medism he afterwards openly showed. But if we refuse to be blinded by the prejudice of H. or his informants, and look at the facts for ourselves, we shall see in Cleomenes an active and energetic monarch, at once a successful warrior in his campaign against Argos (vi. 78), and an astute politician, as is shown by his politic recommendation of Plataea to the protection of Athens (vi. 108), and by his rejection of the overtures of Aristagoras (v. 50). It is true that ambition at times made him unscrupulous, as in the deposition of Demaratus, and even led him to entertain guilty schemes of personal aggrandisement, as in his unpatriotic intrigues in Arcadia (vi. 74). It may even be true that in his old age remorse or unsatisfied ambition drove Cleomenes to frenzy and suicide, but genius, not madness, stamps the policy of his earlier years. Possibly suspicion of his unbridled ambition had blackened the fair fame of Cleomenes certainly the

glories of the Persian war had thrown his exploits into the shade when H. wrote his history.

§ 2. **Powers of the Kings, Ephors, and Apella.** Before turning to the external relations of Sparta in the days of Cleomenes it is necessary to discuss the position held by the kings in the Spartan state, and the extent to which they directed foreign policy. It need not be questioned that throughout historical times the formal declaration of peace or war lay with the Apella (cf. Thuc. i. 67, 72, vi. 88; Xen. Hell. vi. 4. 3, &c.). The proceedings at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. i. 79, 87) seem (but for the fact that there was an actual vote taken) typical. In H. it is clearly stated that the first two expeditions against Athens are set on foot and dispatched not by the king but by the Lacedæmonians (v. 63, 64). The congress of allies summoned to consider the project of restoring Hippias is called and addressed by the Spartiatae (v. 91). It lies with the Assembly to fix the terms of peace and alliance (i. 152; vii. 149, cf. Thuc. v. 77; Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 20). But while it may be true that the formal decision belonged of right to the Assembly at Sparta as at Rome, the real direction of affairs lay with the men to whom the Assembly looked for guidance.

In the earlier days of Sparta this guidance was given by the kings. The prerogative ascribed to them by H. of levying war, *πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν*, on whom they would (vi. 56), may be an archaic survival, and since it was a power depending on the unanimity of the kings, and in any case seldom asserted. Nevertheless the story of the Aeginetan hostages confirms the notion that the kings, if united, could control the foreign policy of Sparta. The Aeginetans reject with contumely the demand of Cleomenes for hostages, so long as he is unsupported by the other king (Demaratus, cf. vi. 49, 50), but yield at once when both kings, Cleomenes and Leotychides, appear (vi. 73). Similarly the Athenians refuse to surrender at the prayer of one king, Leotychides (vi. 86), the hostages entrusted to them by both. We thus reach the important conclusion that the concurrence of both kings was necessary.

This view is confirmed by the story of the attempted invasion of Attica under Cleomenes. His earlier seizure of the Acropolis (v. 72) may have been unauthorized, though it was not disavowed; but the great invasion can hardly have been a private adventure of a single king. H. tells us that the destination of this great host, assembled from all Peloponnesians, was kept a secret, although the Bœotians and Chalcidians were moving on Attica in concert with the Peloponnesians. Surely the only thing that can have been concealed was the purpose to make Isagoras tyrant, not the intention of invading Attica. Nevertheless, the implication is clear that the two kings, but for the defection of Demaratus, might have directed the further course of the campaign according to their own will and pleasure, although no doubt they would on their return home have been held

## APPENDIX XVII

responsible for their conduct of the war, and might have been impeached before the ephors (vi. 82), sitting with the Gerousia, as a high court of justice (vi. 85 ; Paus. iii. 5. 2). The dissensions which on that occasion led the Spartans to pass a law that only one king should go out with the army were so constant (vi. 52) that it was seldom the two kings could agree on a policy. In the course of the century (550-450 B. C.) the constant feuds and frequent corruption of the kings finally discredited their authority (Plut. Agis 12), and the direction of foreign affairs passed to the ephors.

But in his best days Cleomenes had succeeded in asserting the royal ascendancy. It is true that Samian envoys (iii. 46), and the Athenian messenger who summoned the Spartans to Marathon, are called before the ἀρχοντες (vi. 106), but it is with Cleomenes that Maeandrius treats (iii. 148), and the Scythian envoys (vi. 84). To Cleomenes the Plataeans appeal for protection against Thebes (vi. 108), to him Aristagoras applies, and when repulsed, he does not betake himself to the ephors or the Gerousia, but throws himself as a suppliant on the mercy of the king (v. 49-51). Cleomenes and his complacent colleague (Leotychides) deal summarily with Aegina (vi. 73). The only action of the ephors recorded is their expulsion of Maeandrius at the request of Cleomenes. But a little later all this is changed. When the Athenians call on Sparta for aid before the battle of Plataea, their envoys are brought before the ephors (ix. 7, 11), who thenceforward guide the policy of the Spartan state. No doubt there are still occasional instances of independent action on the part of the kings (Thuc. viii. 5), but in general the management of foreign affairs lay with the ephors as the executive government of Sparta. They receive or refuse to receive ambassadors (Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 13, 19 ; v. 2. 11), carry on negotiations (Xen. Hell. iii. 1. 1 ; v. 2. 9, 11), give the orders for mobilization (Xen. de Rep. Lac. 11. 2), (the phrase for which is *φρουρὰν φαίνειν*, cf. Xen. Hell. vi. 4. 17, &c.), dispatch and recall generals (Thuc. viii. 12 ; i. 131), and in general act as the executive and directing force in foreign affairs.

It may be that this transference of power from the kings to the ephors found expression in the change by which the ephors superseded the kings as presidents of the Gerousia and Apella (Thuc. i. 87), since clearly the presidency of a council whose members were effete through age, and an assembly with large formal rights, but small power of asserting them, would be a most valuable instrument of government. In any case this change in the balance of power was a real though peaceful revolution. It may have left the formal rights of kings and people untouched, but it signified the reduction of the kings to the position of hereditary generals (Ar. Pol. 1285 a 7), and their subjection to the Ephorate.

§ 3. **Foreign policy of Sparta, 520-490 B. C.** In the foreign policy of Cleomenes the crucial point is his refusal to support the



## SPARTA UNDER KING CLEOMENES

Ionians in their struggle for freedom. The story in H. is from a Spartan source (v. 49), and is throughout an apology for the short-sighted and selfish policy of leaving the Ionians to their fate. Accordingly Aristagoras is represented as an untrustworthy adventurer, who proposed to Cleomenes a mad scheme, a march on Susa, an idea which could not have entered any Greek's mind till after the years of victory (480-460 B.C.). Doubtless in fact Aristagoras only asked the Spartans to do what Athens attempted, to free Ionia by an attack on Sardis. And the Spartan refusal to aid their brethren over-seas was of a piece with their later abandonment of the extra-Peloponnesian Greeks to the armies of Xerxes and Mardonius. For in view of the Persian conquest of Thrace (bk. iv ; v. 1-15) and the recent attack on Naxos (v. 30-35) European Greece could not expect long to escape a Persian invasion.

Yet Sparta had real and cogent grounds for her refusal. Not only was her temper and polity ill suited for distant enterprises, but her previous intervention in Asiatic affairs had been utterly futile. Her grand alliance with Lydia and Egypt had proved delusive (i. 69, &c.), her diplomatic intervention (*circ.* 545 B.C.) on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks had been slighted by Cyrus (i. 152-3), her expedition (*circ.* 525) against Polycrates had proved abortive (iii. 56). Further, Sparta had pressing difficulties nearer home which claimed her immediate attention. In the earlier days of Cleomenes she had aimed at extending her hegemony north of the Isthmus in Central Greece, but her attempts to bring Athens to submission had ended in discomfiture and dishonour. Spartan infantry had been cut up by Thessalian horse in the Phaleric plain (v. 63); the attempt to embroil Athens and Thebes about Plataea only led to an Athenian victory (vi. 108); the democracy established at Athens proved more stiff-necked than the expelled tyrant, shutting up the Spartan king in the Acropolis, and punishing the philo-Laconian aristocrats of Athens (v. 72). Last and worst of all, the allies of Sparta rebel against her high-handed proceedings. Corinth, the second state in the confederacy, took the lead in the desertion of Cleomenes at Eleusis (v. 75-6), and induced the congress of allies assembled at Sparta to reject the proposal to restore Hippias (v. 93). Clearly the Peloponnesians were afraid that the burdens of the league would be increased and their own autonomy endangered, if Sparta succeeded in extending her hegemony beyond the Isthmus, while Corinth, already hemmed in on the south by a ring of smaller cities devoted to Sparta's interests, feared that, if Attica should become the servile vassal of Sparta, her own trade might be strangled and her very independence menaced.

Sparta, therefore, was fully occupied in setting her own house in order, since she had to restore her Peloponnesian hegemony, discredited by her frequent failures and undermined by the discontent of her allies. To secure this end, Argos, her old rival, must be

## APPENDIX XVII

overthrown. Argos had now recovered from her defeat in the struggle for the Thyreatis half a century before (*circ.* 550 B. C.), and would have taken the opportunity, had Sparta been involved in war in Ionia, to renew the fight for the headship of the Peloponnese. For her own security as well as from ambition, Sparta must crush Argos.

This task Cleomenes undertook, probably during the Ionic revolt (vi. 76 f.). The synchronism between the Argive war and the approaching fall of Miletus is implied in the double oracle (vi. 19, 77), whether genuine or not, and supported by the fact that the Argives as late as 481 B. C. can plead as their excuse (vii. 148) for neutrality in the Persian war their recent losses in the war with Cleomenes. Of course the plea may have been unreal, since in 479 B. C. the Argives promise Mardonius to prevent the Spartans going forth against him (ix. 12), though they utterly fail to do so, but surely its absurdity would have been too glaring if the defeat in question had taken place, as Pausanias states (iii. 4. 1) at the very beginning of Cleomenes' reign, forty years before (*circ.* 520 B. C.). No doubt there are one or two difficulties in placing the Argive war *circ.* 500-495 B. C. In the third Aeginetan war with Athens (i. e. probably in 488-487 (cf. vi. 93 n.) but possibly in 490 B. C.) a thousand volunteers came from Argos to help Aegina (vi. 92); but since we are expressly told they came without the sanction of the state, we may perhaps conclude that they were attracted by the hope of pay or plunder, and that the existence of such soldiers of fortune is a sign rather of disorder than of restored prosperity in Argos. Again, the capture of Tiryns and the attempt to overthrow the Spartan hegemony at Tegea (H. ix. 35 n.) *circ.* 472 B. C. would no doubt be more probable fifty years after the defeat by Cleomenes than twenty-five, but there is nothing impossible in such a recovery in the course of a single generation. On the whole the double oracle, which has been ingeniously conjectured by Bury (cf. vi. 19 n.) to be Delphi's response to an inquiry from Argos whether she should accede to a request of Aristagoras and aid Miletus, and the excuse proffered by Argos in 481 B. C. seem decisive in favour of a later date. If so, no better reason can be found for Spartan inaction in 500 B. C. Sparta must leave Ionia to her fate that she may secure undisputed supremacy in the Peloponnese.

The success of Cleomenes in his Argive campaign was complete, except that he failed to take the town (vi. 80-2; cf. vi. 77, 80 nn.). He so utterly broke the power of Argos that her subjects rose up against her and revolutionized the government (vi. 83.) Even when order had been restored in Argos, Tiryns and Mycenae asserted their independence by joining the Greeks who resisted the Persian invasion, though Argos remained neutral.

Sparta, having now disabled Argos for at least a generation, could afford again to indulge in wider ambitions and to re-assert

her claim to be champion and leader of the Greek race. Further, the reconquest of Ionia, the recovery of the coasts of Thrace and Macedon by Mardonius, and the appearance in Greece of Persian heralds demanding earth and water, at last convinced her that the advance of the barbarian was a serious menace to European Hellas. Athens, compromised by her share in the Ionic revolt and more immediately threatened, took the prudent and patriotic course of recognizing the leadership of Sparta over all loyal Hellenes (cf. vi. 61. 1 ; vii. 145. 1) by appealing to Sparta against the treachery of Aegina to Greece in giving earth and water to Darius (vi. 49). No doubt Aegina, as a member of the Peloponnesian league, owed allegiance to Sparta (vi. 50, 73, 92), but the recognition by Athens of Spartan hegemony and of the essential unity of Hellas are noteworthy signs of advance. The Persian invasion tends already to unite Greece by bringing together its two leading states. Whether Sparta and Athens sealed the compact by a common crime, the murder of the Persian heralds (vii. 133. 9), has been doubted (cf. vii. 137. 3 n.) ; in any case the alliance finds prompt expression in the summons of Philippides (vi. 106) and the dispatch of 2,000 Spartiates to Marathon (vi. 120), and paves the way for yet more zealous and active co-operation ten years later.

NOTE.—The Argive campaign, as well as the dealings with Plataea, are placed by Wells (J. H. S. xxv. 193-6) at the beginning of the reign of Cleomenes. He is regarded as a meteor-like prince whose reign begins with success and ends with gloom. The arguments for reverting to the older view and dating the Argive war with Pausanias *circa* 520 B. C. have been briefly considered above, nor has any other recent writer adopted this date. E. Meyer and others prefer the date given by our texts of Thucydides (519 B. C.) for the Athenian alliance with Plataea, arguing that such action on the part of Athens is far more probable in the days of Hippias than after his expulsion. While an error in a number is likely enough in Thucydides' texts, the reasons urged by Grote (and given in the notes on vi. 108) against the date 519 B. C. are not conclusive. In this Appendix I owe much to Macan, especially to his Appendix VII, and, on the relation of kings and ephors, to Gilbert, G. C. A., p. 20f., and Dum, Entstehung des Ephorats. Wells has revised and republished his article in Studies in Herodotus (pp. 74-94) ; cf. also E. M. Walker in C. A. H. iv. 137-9, 163 7, 259-63.

## APPENDIX XVIII

### MARATHON

§ 1. **Marathon.** **Fifth-century accounts.** H.'s account of Marathon is beyond dispute our principal authority. Except the picture in the Stoa Poikile, none of the other accounts can be shown to be drawn from contemporary tradition. And from the

description of the picture by Pausanias (i. 15. 3), careful as it is, little historical material can be taken. There were clearly three scenes depicted; on the left the struggle between Greek and Persian is still equal, in the centre the barbarians in full flight are thrusting one another into the marsh, and on the right the Greeks are slaughtering the barbarians as they strive to get on board Phoenician ships. The picture then, while agreeing in the main with H., adds the losses of the Persians in the marsh and other details omitted by him (cf. vi. 114 n. and *inf.*), but, on the other hand, H. cannot have derived from the picture his description of the tactics by which the battle was won (cf. vi. 111, 113 and *inf.*).

Yet if H. be our best authority, his account is in many points defective and in some positively misleading. Compared with his descriptions of Thermopylae and Artemisium, of Salamis and of Plataea, it is meagre and lacking in detail, though the tactics employed are more clearly indicated. The slightness of the narrative shows itself in the omission of the numbers engaged on either side, an omission emphasized by the record of the numbers of the Athenians and Persians slain (ch. 117 n.). It shows itself also in the omission of all reference to the monuments on the field of battle, described by Pausanias (i. 32), the tombs of the Athenians (cf. Thuc. ii. 34. 5) and of the Plataeans and slaves, the trophy of white marble (cf. Arist. Eq. 1333, Vesp. 711), and the memorial of Miltiades. It is seen in the vagueness of the historian's topography, which makes it unlikely that he ever visited the field of Marathon. H. knows, indeed, that 'Marathon looks on the sea', but he says nothing of the 'mountains that look on Marathon', nothing of the water-course (*χαράδρα*) dividing the little plain, or of the marshes at either end (cf. Paus. i. 32). It is probable that H., like Thucydides and Theopompus, deliberately rejected a good deal of patriotic fiction with which Athenian, and above all Philaid, tradition had already overlaid the plain facts, and so found himself unable to construct from his materials a detailed history.

The element of the supernatural is less prominent than might be expected in the tale of a great deliverance. Apart from the unimportant dreams of Hippias (vi. 107) and Datis (vi. 118), there are but the waking visions which cheered Philippides on his way to Sparta (vi. 105), and which blinded Epizelus at Marathon<sup>1</sup> (vi. 117). And H. omits the supernatural aid given to the Athenians, according to the picture in the Stoa Poikile (Paus. i. 15), by Athena, Heracles, and Theseus, and by the local heroes, Marathon and Echetlus.

There are, however, in H.'s account of Marathon at least four crucial problems (as pointed out by Macan) which must be solved or at least faced by any critical student of history. These are

<sup>1</sup> Curiously enough in this case a phantom hoplite fights for Persia against Athens.

(1) the double exaggeration that the Athenians were 'the first to charge the enemy at speed' (*δρόμῳ*) and 'the first to endure the sight of men clad in Median dress' (vi. 112 n.); (2) the anachronism or confusion as to the command at Marathon (vi. 109, 110 and *inf.*); (3) the absence of any reference to the Persian cavalry in the battle, an omission made the more striking by the fact that their presence on board the transports and their disembarkation at Eretria have been carefully noted (vi. 95, 101), by the statement that Marathon was selected as a landing-place because it was suitable for cavalry (vi. 102 n.), and by the reported surprise of the Persians at the absence of cavalry from the Athenian ranks (vi. 112 n.); (4) the problem of the purpose and time of the shield-signal (vi. 121, 124 and *inf.*).

§ 2. **Marathon. Fourth-century accounts.** These difficulties in the narrative of H. force us to inquire whether we can supplement or correct his account from other sources. Unfortunately little help is forthcoming. Attic poets sing the spears and shields (Aesch. Pers. 240) or the hearts of oak (Arist. Ach. 180 f., 692) that won Marathon; Plato and the Attic orators, beginning with those reported by H. (ix. 27) and by Thucydides (i. 73) grossly exaggerate the services of their fathers to Hellas, ignoring the help of the Plataeans. By their rhodomontade they drove Thucydides (i. 73, 74) and Theopompus (fr. 167; F.H.G. i. 306) to depreciate the traditional glories of Marathon. Aristotle, however, throws some light on the subject, giving us a rational account of the relation between the Polemarch and generals (Ath. Pol. 22), dating the battle in the archonship of Phaenippus (cf. also Marmor Parium, 48. l. 62, and Plutarch, Arist. ch. 5), and above all recording (Rhetoric iii. 10. 1411 a; cf. Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 303) that the decree which sent the Athenians forth to meet the Persians in the field was proposed by Miltiades. The supposed deaths of Datis (Ctesias, Pers. 18. 21, p. 69) and of Hippias (Justin ii. 9; Cicero, ad Att. ix. 10. 3) are negatived in the first case by the express testimony of H. (vi. 136), in the other by the silence of H. and Thucydides (cf. vi. 59). Nor can the account drawn by Cornelius Nepos (Milt. 4-6) from Ephorus be regarded as of independent value, though historic rationalism has made it comparatively plausible and coherent. It ignores the polemarch, and ascribes the decision to take the field not to a resolution of the people (cf. *sup.*) but to a decision of the generals, encouraged by the arrival at Athens of the Plataeans. In both cases Ephorus would seem to have answered the constitutional questions wrongly. We might be more inclined to believe in the story of a defensive battle, accepted by the Athenians in a position covered by the hills and strengthened with a barricade of tree trunks, and forced on by Datis for fear of the arrival of the Spartans, were it not for the complete absence of any real description of movements in the battle and the direct



contradiction involved of some of the clearest points in H., e.g. the long delay at Marathon, and the final assumption of the offensive by Miltiades. Further, Polybius, no mean judge, while generally favourable to Ephorus (xii. 23), expressly says that his accounts of battles on land are rendered worthless by his lack of military experience (Polyb. xii. 25 g).<sup>1</sup>

§ 3. **Marathon. Later writers.** The many allusions and criticisms in Plutarch are unfortunately for the most part written with the purpose of magnifying his hero Aristides (in his life ch. 5) or Callimachus and the tribe Aeantis, Quaest. Conviv. i. 10. 3, Mor. 628 E) or of discrediting H. (de Malig. Herod. ch. 26 f.). From the life we get the tradition that the tribes Leontis and Antiochis, commanded by Aristides and Themistocles, were in the centre; from the convivial questions the fact guaranteed by an elegy of Aeschylus that the tribe Aeantis, to which Callimachus belonged, led the right wing in the battle (ch. 111. 1 n.). Thrice does Plutarch (de Malig. 26, Mor. 861 E; Camillus 19; de Glor. Ath. 7, Mor. 349 F) fix a definite day for the battle, Boedromion 6th, but the date seems to rest on a confusion between the day of the battle and that of the commemorative feast to Artemis (ch. 106 n.). If this date be rejected, one criticism of H. breaks down. Plutarch's (de Malig. 26) censures of the account of the shield signal as improbable, and of the defence of the Alcmaeonids as hollow, are shrewder, and indicate not malignity but some incompleteness and inconsequence in the historian; but his objection that H., by minimizing the number of the slain and the glory of the victory, played into the hands of those who belittled the battle as a mere skirmish, shows only how little the critic could judge of historic truth and probability.

Pausanias, in his notes on Marathon, shows all his usual merits. His record of memorials set up at Athens (i. 15; cf. *sup.*) or at Delphi (x. 11. 5; cf. Hicks,<sup>1</sup> 13) is interesting; still more valuable is his account of the monuments on the spot and of the topographical features of the field of battle (i. 32; cf. *sup.*). He also tells us of the local cult of the dead as heroes (cf. C. I. A. ii. 471), the local tradition of the part played by the rustic hero, Echetlus, in the battle, and of the neighing of horses and clashing of arms that might still be heard at night on the field of battle. Finally, the late Byzantine grammarian, Suidas, traces the origin of the proverb *χωρίς ἰππέως* to a tradition that, as Datis was retreating, the Ionians in his force signalled from trees to the Athenians that 'the horse were away', whereupon Miltiades attacked and triumphed. Though its source is suspect (cf. vi. 134 n.), the story, if true, at once records the absence of the Persian cavalry and supplies a motive for Miltiades' sudden attack.

<sup>1</sup> For justification of this criticism cf. Busolt, ii. 685; iii. 147, 315, 720 f.; and Holm, G. iii. 18.

§ 4. **The command at Marathon.** When a modern writer attempts to weave together a consistent account out of materials so diverse, so inconsistent, and so incomplete, he is confronted by numerous difficulties. Before entering into the problems of strategy and tactics, it may be well first to discuss the question of the command at Marathon. It can hardly be doubted that the alleged election of the polemarch by lot (vi. 109 ὁ τῷ κυάμφ λαχὼν Ἀθηναίων πολεμαρχεῖν) is an anachronism. The use of the lot is most unlikely while the polemarch has still the important functions of leading the right wing (vi. 111) and of sitting, perhaps, as president in the council of war (ch. 109). Further, its introduction is definitely placed three years later (487 B.C.) in the Athenaion Politeia (ch. 22). Finally, the point emphasized by H. is that the polemarch still sat in council with the generals, while the statement that he held his office by lot is a casual *obiter dictum*, introduced perhaps for effect; the fate of Athens hung on the decision of an official appointed by the chance of the lot (109 n.). The account given of the command in the field is confused and misleading. We need not doubt H.'s view that the supreme control rested with a board composed of the ten strategi and the polemarch, but we cannot accept either his express, or his implied, views on the actual command. Explicitly (vi. 110) the command (πρυτανίη) is said to circulate among the ten generals, each holding it for a day.<sup>1</sup> Miltiades holds the command for several days by grace of his colleagues, who cede their days to him, and yet, though convinced that the interests of Athens demand instant battle for fear of internal sedition (vi. 109), he will not engage till his own day comes round (ch. 110). But there is a latent tendency to look on Miltiades (as is done by Nepos, Justin, &c.) as commander-in-chief throughout, for the phrase τῶν δὲ δέκατος ἦν Μιλτιάδης would suggest to the historian's contemporaries that Miltiades was not last and least, but first and foremost, of the generals (cf. vi. 103. 1 n.); and the actual direction of the Athenian movements is throughout ascribed to him. On the other hand the Athenaion Politeia (ch. 22) distinctly declares that the στρατηγοί at Marathon were only colonels of the tribal regiments, while the polemarch was still commander of the whole host. This statement (even if it be only a conjecture founded on a careful and critical consideration of the conflicting materials supplied by H.<sup>2</sup> (Macan, ii. p. 198 f.)) is strongly supported by incidental points in the historian's narrative. The Polemarch leads the right wing (vi. 111; Plutarch, Quaest. Conviv. i. 10. 3), the post of honour and of danger

<sup>1</sup> As at Arginusae and Aegospotami if we may believe Diodorus xiii. 97, 106.

<sup>2</sup> Before the discovery of Aristotle's treatise this inference had been already made by K. Lugebil, Zur Geschichte der Staatsverfassung von Athen, 1871 (v<sup>ter</sup> Supplementband des Jahrbuchs für klassische Philologie) and by Macan (cf. his Herod. i. 365).

naturally taken by the general (vi. 111. 1 n.; Xen. Hell. ii. iv. 30; Lugebil, *op. cit.*, pp. 604-24); he has at least an equal vote in the council of strategi (ch. 109 *δμόψηφον τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι*), and, both from his possession of the casting vote (vi. 110) and from the language of Miltiades' appeal to him (vi. 109), would seem to have been president of the council.<sup>1</sup> We can also see why in the popular tradition Miltiades ousted the polemarch from his rightful position. A grateful people with a true instinct recognized in Miltiades, who carried the decree for battle in the field (cf. *sup.*), the true author both of the strategy and of the tactics which won Marathon; in its anxiety to emphasize this truth it insisted that Miltiades must have been commander-in-chief.<sup>2</sup>

§ 5. **Object of the Persian generals.** In attempting a reconstruction of the campaign it is necessary to consider first the aims and objects of the Persian expedition. Whatever wider views of conquest may be implied in the mission of the heralds to demand earth and water (vi. 49), its immediate object seems to have been the punishment of the Eretrians and Athenians for their part in the Ionic revolt (vi. 94). The reduction of the Ionian cities beyond the Aegean was the natural sequel and completion of the pacification of Ionia; and Athens at least might well be regarded as a subject which had broken the oath of fealty taken by her envoys (v. 73). Eretria was first attacked as the easier prey, that by its fate waverers at Athens might be frightened into submission, but Athens was throughout the true objective of the Persian leaders. But if Athens was their goal, why did they land in a distant corner of Attica twenty-four miles' march from the city? The reasons alleged by H. (vi. 102) that it was near Eretria and good ground for cavalry are inadequate. Nearness to Eretria would not compensate the Persians for remoteness from Athens, and the plain of Athens (not to speak of the Thriasian plain) is more suitable for the operations of cavalry; nor is it likely that the Persian leaders doubted their power to force a landing on the open coast near Phalerum. Modern writers have suggested that in leading the Persians to Athens by way of Marathon, Hippias was following the example of his father's return from Eretria (i. 62). But the circumstances were entirely different. It was good policy for the exiled adventurer to land far from Athens and near his adherents in the rugged country of Diacria; he might and did gain time to mature his plans and gather his partisans before moving on Athens. But Hippias could never have expected the Athenians to view with supine indifference the landing of a barbarian host on their shores. Indeed, the idea that the Persians intended to march from Marathon on Athens is decisively negated by the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the language used by Themistocles to Eurybiades, viii. 60.

<sup>2</sup> In this section on the command at Marathon, as in the criticism of H. and the other literary authorities, I owe most to Macan, Appendix X.

fact that they made no attempt to seize the passes leading from the plain of Marathon towards Athens, though they must have had at least a day in which to do so before the Athenians could come up.

The purpose of the Persian generals therefore clearly was to lure the Athenian forces to Marathon. But their object in so doing was not simply to finish the campaign by a single battle in the field. They can hardly have expected the Athenians to risk a pitched battle against superior numbers on ground favourable to cavalry; and to force on a battle would have been far easier in the plain near Athens, an ideal site for Persian tactics. Finally, had that been their object, they would not have waited quietly day after day, watching the Athenians in their strong position, but would either have attacked at once or, more probably, would have sailed away to find another and a better opening. There is, however, one suggestion that explains the choice of a remote corner of Attica and the long delay before the battle; the object of the Persians was to draw and keep the Athenian army as far as possible from Athens, in order that in its absence traitors might betray the city into their hands.

§ 6. **Existence of traitors at Athens.** There is quite enough evidence to show that Athens was at this time honeycombed with intrigue, and that a faction within her walls was in communication with Hippias. The shield signal is by itself a proof (vi. 121). Not only the old adherents of the Pisistratid house, but also the Alcmaeonidae were suspected, probably with justice, of treachery. H.'s defence, by its manifest weakness, condemns them. The Alcmaeonid plea in their own defence, their constant hatred of tyranny (cf. Alcibiades ap. Thuc. vi. 89), is but weakly supported by the expulsion of Hippias as of his father before him (vi. 123; i. 61), for it ignores the restoration of Pisistratus by Alcmaeonid aid (i. 60) and the friendly relations of the great Attic family with the tyrant of Sicyon (vi. 126 f.) and with the barbarian monarchs of Lydia (vi. 125). The submission made (*circ.* 508 B. C.) by the envoys to Artaphrenes at Sardis (v. 73), the unexplained recall of the Attic squadron (498-497 B. C.) from Ionia (v. 103 n.), and the punishment of Phrynichus (vi. 21 n.) must surely have been the work of a Medizing party at Athens. In spite of the refusal of Athens to receive back Hippias at the bidding of Artaphrenes (v. 96), the Pisistratidae were not without friends in Athens, as is shown by the election of the leader of their faction, Hipparchus (Ath. Pol. 22), to the archonship in 496 (Dion. Hal. v. 77, vi. 1). May we not fairly suppose that just as the aristocratic party of the Plain relied on Sparta, so the Alcmaeonids looked to Persia for aid in the strife of factions? The charge of treason would seem to be confirmed by the dark allusion in Pindar (Pyth. vii. 18 τὸ δ' ἄχνημαι φθόρον ἀμειβόμενον καλὰ ἔργα, the victory celebrated was either in 490 B. C. (Boeckh) or in 486, Wilamowitz, A. and A. ii. 32 f.) to the sinister reputation of the Alcmaeonidae, and by the express statement in Aristotle (Ath.

Pol. 22) that Megacles, son of Hippocrates the Alcmaeonid (ostracized 487-6; cf. Hicks, 14), was regarded like Hipparchus as implicated in schemes of tyranny. Neither Medism nor tyranny had become as yet utterly abominable; many Greek cities remained prosperous and happy under the easy yoke of the Great King, and the Athenian commons remembered the principate of Pisistratus as an age of gold (Ath. Pol. 16). Miltiades, the aristocratic leader, had triumphantly refuted the charge of tyranny made against him on his return from the Chersonese to Athens 493 B. C. (vi. 104), and was now clearly in power resting on the support of Sparta. Was it not better from an Alcmaeonid point of view to make terms with Hippias and with Persia, than to risk an aristocratic reaction backed by Sparta, which might well endanger the institutions of Cleisthenes? The political situation, the existence of traitors within the walls expressly attested by H. (vi. 109), and the identification of those traitors as the Alcmaeonids, confirmed by the historian's reluctant admissions (vi. 124), illuminate the strategy of both the Persian and the Athenian generals.

§ 7. **Probable division of the Persian forces.** The scheme of the Persian leaders was to keep the Athenian field force at Marathon, while traitors within the city, supported by a Persian detachment, delivered Athens into the hands of Hippias. As long as the whole Persian army remained at Marathon, the Athenians were secure in their strong position near Vrana; if the whole army attempted to move on Athens either by sea or land it incurred serious risks. If it went by the only open road, that along the coast towards Pallene, it exposed its flank and rear to Athenian attack, if by sea, it exposed its rearguard to destruction during the long process of embarkation; and in either case it was open to the Athenians to return to Athens by the shorter if rougher mountain-road past Kephisia, and to defer the decisive encounter.

But if the Persians made use of their numerical superiority, perhaps 40,000 against 20,000 (cf. vi. 117 n.), to leave a containing force at Marathon and send a detachment to capture Athens, the whole position was altered. Miltiades could not afford to divide his inferior forces. If he retreated over the hills towards Athens, he would be harassed and delayed by the pursuit of the Persians from Marathon, if he decided to attack the containing force, he must venture out into the plain and expose his hoplites to a flank attack. In either case the city might be betrayed before he could return thither. The reasons which determined Miltiades to run these great risks by going to meet the Persians at Marathon were, however, weighty. With the fate of Eretria before his eyes, he dare not stand a siege, lest Athens too should be betrayed to the Mede (vi. 109; cf. 100). And it would seem probable that Athens could only call on her allies for help if her own forces were prepared to take the field. It is at Marathon that the Plataeans join them (vi. 108) and to Marathon



that the Spartans march (vi. 120), while the Athenian cleruchs from Chalcis leave the Eretrians to their fate when they find they will not fight outside their walls (vi. 100, 101). Miltiades had therefore the strongest motives for facing the Persians at Marathon, but so long as the whole Persian army remained there, he need not force on battle. The Persian generals at Marathon might long look in vain for the expected signal from traitors at Athens, unwilling finally to commit themselves by open sedition. Meanwhile Miltiades did well to wait for the promised Spartan succour as well as for the anticipated separation of the Persian forces.

The change in the strategy of Miltiades from the defensive to the offensive, implied obscurely in H.'s account of the debate in the council of war at Marathon (vi. 109, 110), must have been occasioned by some more serious motive than the supposed 'Prytany' of Miltiades (cf. *sup.*), which explains neither the previous delay nor the assumption of the offensive. It has been substituted for the true motive, the division of the Persian forces. Of that division faint vestiges remain in the tradition, preserved by Suidas and confirmed by H.'s silence, of the absence of the Persian horse from the battle, and perhaps in Nepos' statement that only 100,000 out of 200,000 Persian footmen fought at Marathon. But the division of the Persian forces is exactly the kind of point that national vanity would omit or obscure. It is at least the only hypothesis which supplies an adequate motive for an Athenian attack.

§ 8. **The shield signal and the absence of the horse.** As to the shield signal its main purpose is clear. When the conspiracy in Athens was ripe, some traitor was to signal the news from Mount Pentelicus to the expectant Persians at Marathon. The only difficulty is that, according to H.'s express statement, the Persians were already on board when the signal was made. It is possible that H. has misunderstood his informant. The historian, not realizing the division of the Persian forces, may have confused the embarkation of the Persian detachment for Phalerum before the battle, with the embarkation of the survivors after the battle. But it is more probable that the plot in the city hung fire, and that the Persian generals anticipated the signal from fear that the imminent arrival of the Spartans might frustrate their well-laid plans. In any case the landing at Marathon, the delay there, the division of the Persian forces, and the shield signal are all explained by an understanding between the Persians and traitors at Athens, while the division of the Persian forces explains Miltiades' assumption of the offensive.

Lastly, it is clear that the move on Athens was to have been made by sea. If the Persians had been attacked while filing past the Athenian position, how could they have escaped and re-embarked with so slight a loss of men? Above all, how is it that the cavalry take no part in the battle? It is absurd to suppose that the cavalry

was re-embarked 'because on the march to Athens it would have been a useless encumbrance' (Bury). The road to Athens through Pallene had been traversed by Pisistratus and his Eretrian horsemen and presents no difficulties for cavalry. If any part of the Persian force was to go by land it would be the cavalry; the fact that they were re-embarked (Suidas) is the strongest evidence that the move on Athens was to be made by sea. But if it be supposed that the cavalry, with the rest of the brigade for Athens, was already on board, all is clear. Their absence would give an opportunity for an Athenian attack, while at the same time it would make embarkation easier, and explain the slight loss on either side. The horsemen useless at Marathon while the Athenians clung to their position on the hills, might be most valuable for a dash on Athens or a battle on the Phaleric plain (cf. v. 63).

§ 9. **The victory and its effects.** When the dreaded horsemen and a part of the infantry were safe aboard, Miltiades at once resolved to attack. Taking post near the entrance of the valley of Vrana, he lengthened his line so as to make it equal to that of the Persians, by weakening his centre. He found the Persians ranged in battle array parallel to the sea-shore. Their position is indicated by the situation of the 'Soros', which would naturally be placed where the Athenians had fallen thickest, and by the facts that the Athenian centre was driven inland (vi. 113) and that the defeated barbarians reach their ships without difficulty. Miltiades first routed the Persian wings, and then, while they escaped to their ships, wheeled inwards to crush the Persian centre. Few of the Persians and Sacae who had victoriously advanced inland can have escaped death. The seven ships captured were doubtless some of those waiting to rescue the fugitives from this second fight, while most of the squadron had already put out to sea. The victory was not won without a struggle, nor were the Persian losses overwhelming. Hence there is no real difficulty in H.'s statement (vi. 115, 116) that the fleet sailed round Sunium,<sup>1</sup> hoping to reach Athens before the Athenian army. The detachment originally destined for that purpose was still unbeaten and may well have been willing, even if treachery failed to do their work, to put their fortunes to the hazard of battle; the rest of the fleet and army, after picking up the captive Eretrians, would naturally follow, in the hope that they might even yet retrieve their defeat. But when the Persian generals found that the demonstration did not lead to internal sedition at Athens, they recognized that another struggle with the victors of Marathon, who had now hurried back to defend their homes, could only lead to further disaster.

But if the material results of Marathon were small, the moral effect was tremendous. The Greek hoplite had proved his superio-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch (Aristides, ch. 5) alleges they were driven thither by wind and sea, but admits the Athenians hurried back for fear of them.

city to the best warriors of the East. But the victory was a political as well as a military triumph. Marathon made tyranny and Medism henceforth impossible at Athens. The blood of the heroes buried there was the seed of Greek liberty.

*Note.*—In the latter part of this Appendix I have but repeated or summarized the arguments put forward by J. A. R. Munro in favour of his convincing reconstruction (J. H. S. xix. 185-97), with which G. B. Grundy (Great Persian War) is in substantial agreement. Busolt, who, like Schilling (Philologus, 1895, pp. 253-73), had anticipated some points (Die Lakedaimonier, pp. 355-69), has since (ii. 585 f.) been converted by H. Delbrück (Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege, 52-85; cf. Geschichte der Kriegskunst, 41-59), and follows Nepos (Ephorus) in making the Persians attack the Athenian position on the hills, while the Athenian charge of eight stades becomes a pursuit for that distance, a view unsupported by good evidence. (See note, p. 417.)

## APPENDIX XIX

### NUMBERS OF THE ARMIES AND FLEETS 480-479 B.C.

§ 1. **The Greek forces.** Any attempt at a rational reconstruction of the campaigns which culminated at Salamis and Plataea must be preceded by a criticism of the estimates or records of the numbers on both sides. Clearly those of the Greek forces are the more trustworthy; and of these the number of triremes would be more easily ascertainable than that of hoplites. There are three early reckonings of the Greek fleet:

(a) The muster-roll of ships at Artemisium, 271 triremes and 9 penteconters (H. viii. 1-2), or, if the reinforcement of 53 Athenian ships be added (H. viii. 14), 324 triremes and 9 penteconters.

(b) The figure given by Aeschylus for Salamis, 310, including a special squadron of 10. Pers. 339 Ἑλλήσιν μὲν ἦν | ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ἐς τριακάδας δέκα | ναῶν, δεκάς δ' ἦν τῶνδε χωρὶς ἔκκριτος.

(c) The muster-roll of Salamis in H. (viii. 43-8), where the items amount to 366 triremes (besides 7 penteconters), but the total is given as 378<sup>1</sup> (viii. 48, 82).

The lists in H. (summarized in ix. 81 n.) look like official muster-rolls, and so have a *prima facie* claim to acceptance. The high total at Salamis, however, not only contradicts Aeschylus, but further makes no allowance at all for losses in the hard fighting at Artemisium. I would therefore suggest that the list of the fleet at Artemisium may well be a genuine muster-roll; that the figure given by Aeschylus for Salamis may be taken, after allowing for losses and reinforcements, as approximately correct, and that H.'s

<sup>1</sup> This discrepancy may be explained by the mention of an additional Aeginetan squadron guarding their own shores (H. viii. 46 n.).

## APPENDIX XIX

total of 380 for Salamis includes all who fought for Greece at any time during the campaign, making no allowance for losses in the previous battles<sup>1</sup> (Tarn, *J. H. S.* xxviii. 219-21).

Turning to the numbers of the Greek army at Plataea, there is nothing incredible in the total of hoplites, 38,700, or even in the details given of the contingents<sup>2</sup> (ix. 28). In spite of sceptical critics, the list may probably be accepted as a real muster-roll of troops in the field, but of course the actual number of effectives would fall somewhat short of the official estimates, and the 'morning strength' of the army, even at the beginning of the campaign, must have been under 35,000 hoplites. H.'s repeated assertion (ix. 10. 1, 28. 2, 29. 1) shows that he had some reason to believe that a specially large proportion of Helots served in this campaign. Yet since there is no record of effective service on their part as light troops (cf. ix. 60), either their number (40,000 in all) has been exaggerated or many of them were little more than camp followers, at best an army service corps (cf. Macan on ix. 28). In all there may have been forty or fifty thousand light-armed on the Greek side, but many of them would be ill-trained and inefficient.

§ 2. **The fleet of Xerxes.** There can be little doubt that both the army and fleet of Xerxes largely outnumbered the Greek forces.<sup>3</sup> Yet the enormous disproportion alleged by H. can be traced in part to a misunderstanding of the data contained in the official Persian records, and in part to an extravagant over-estimate deliberately adopted by the historian (vii. 184 n.). Here, again, the number given for the fleet is far more credible than that for the army. Indeed, the traditional number of the king's navy (1,000 or 1,207) has been accepted by the majority of modern critics as probable or at least possible (cf. *J. H. S.* xxviii. 202). It would seem, however, that it rests on a single passage in Aeschylus referring to Salamis (Pers. 342-5) *Ξέρξης δέ, καὶ γὰρ οἶδα, χιλιάς μὲν ἦν | ὧν ἦγε πλῆθος, αἱ δ' ὑπέροποι τάχει | ἑκατὸν δὲ ἦσαν ἐπτά θ'.* Some writers,<sup>4</sup> believing the main body to be exclusive of the

<sup>1</sup> It has been urged that the number of the Athenian contingent is suspiciously high (Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, p. 508 f.), and that the fifty-three ships mentioned in viii. 14 are not a fresh reinforcement but a detachment already counted in the main fleet. But tradition seems strongly in favour of the view that the total of the Athenian fleet really amounted, as H. repeatedly affirms (vii. 144; viii. 44, 61), to 200 vessels (cf. Thuc. i. 74; *Dem. de Sym.* § 29, *de Cor.* § 238).

<sup>2</sup> They have been vigorously assailed by Beloch (*Bevölkerung*, 8, and especially *Klio*, vi. 52 f.) and Delbrück (*Kriegskunst*, i. 11 f.), but are accepted as at least probable by many recent writers, e.g. Busolt, ii. 728; Macan, ii. 352, Grundy (*J. H. S.* xxviii. 80; Thuc. p. 215 n.), and with more hesitation by Munro (*J. H. S.* xxiv. 152). For a list cf. ix. 81 n.

<sup>3</sup> *pace* Delbrück, *Perserkriege*, 160 f., *Kriegskunst*, i. 39 f., 69 f., 82, 87.

<sup>4</sup> H. vii. 89, 184; Diodor. xi. 3; Isocrates, *Paneg.* §§ 93, 97, 118.

special squadron, make the total 1,200 or 1,207,<sup>1</sup> while others hold<sup>2</sup> that the 207 fast sailers are included in the total of 1,000. No doubt the numbers given by H. for the various contingents support his total, but there is no proof that these come from any official list, and in the catalogue of the land forces numbers are conspicuous by their absence. It may further be admitted that a grand total of 1,200 is possible for the complete muster-roll of the king's navy, since half that amount (600) seems to be a conventional estimate for an important expedition.<sup>3</sup>

But there are some grounds for questioning the figure taken from Aeschylus. According to H. (vii. 97) there were four Persian admirals. Of these two have definite local squadrons<sup>4</sup> assigned to them, Achaemenes the Egyptian, and Ariabignes the Iono-Carian (doubtless including the thirty Dorian ships), amounting in each case (vii. 89 and 93-4) to 200 ships. Again, the only detached squadrons mentioned, that sent round Euboea (H. viii. 7) and that sent round Salamis (Diod. xi. 17; cf. xi. 3), consist of 200 ships. Surely this points to four divisions, each 200 vessels strong, giving a total of 800 (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 299). Again, if we accept H.'s figures, the Persian armada had lost half its numbers before it reached Salamis; of his original total of 1,200, 400 perished on the Sepiad strand (vii. 190) and 200 more on the rocks of Euboea (viii. 13); taking then the losses in battle as balanced by reinforcements, we should make the Persian fleet at Salamis approximately 600 strong. This may well be near the truth, since the advice of Achaemenes (vii. 236) implies that the Persian fleet after Artemisium would lose its numerical superiority if 300 ships were detached to assail the Peloponnese; and H. himself (viii. 13) states that it had been by divine intervention brought down nearly to the level of the Greek. A total of 600 at Salamis would be sufficient to explain Persian enveloping tactics and the prevalent impression among the Greeks that they were enormously outnumbered, and it is borne out by the statement that only 300 were left to muster next

<sup>1</sup> The 120 added for European allies is admittedly conjectural (vii. 185), and beyond question an over-estimate.

<sup>2</sup> Schol. ad Pers. 342; Dem. de Sym. § 29; and apparently Ctesias, Pers. 23, 26; Plato, Laws 699 B.

<sup>3</sup> e.g. the fleet, believed to be mainly Greek, that accompanied Darius to Scythia (iv. 87-9), that drawn from Cyprus, Cilicia, Egypt, and especially Phoenicia which triumphed at Lade (vi. 6. 9), or that which took Datis to Marathon (vi. 95).

<sup>4</sup> Macan (ii. 153) and Tarn (J. H. S. xxviii. 202 f.) both rightly insist on the territorial division of the fleet. With less probability Macan would reduce the squadrons to three of 400, making the fourth admiral a successor to Ariabignes (vii. 97 n.), or a joint commander of the third squadron, while Tarn, by a conjectural addition of a fifth squadron, and reduction of the strength of each to 120, reaches a total of 600.



## APPENDIX XIX

spring at Samos (viii. 130). But a total of 600 at Salamis is inconsistent with Aeschylus, and even with the original estimate in H., since his assumption that half the fleet was lost in storms is most improbable (cf. vii. 188 n.; App. XX, § 6 (4)). It would, however, accord admirably with an original paper strength of 800.

§ 3. **Army of Xerxes. Alleged number.** Lastly, the amazing figures given for the Persian army<sup>1</sup> confront us (vii. 184 f.). The doubling of the numbers for attendants is a pure conjecture (vii. 186) founded on the analogy of a Greek force, and may be regarded as worthless. Similarly, the thirty myriads of European contingents (vii. 185) are due to the historian's own imagination. But the list of forty-six nations (cf. vii. 61 n.; ix. 27. 5) distributed among twenty-nine commanders is clearly official. It is, however, a catalogue not of any particular army but of all 'peoples, nations, and languages' ruled by the great king. H. (vii. 21, 56) made, as did Aeschylus (Pers. 12. 71), the characteristically Greek assumption that Xerxes brought every man he could muster against Greece. Again, it is clear that the incredible total given (1,800,000) does not come from the official army list, which gave no numbers for the various contingents (vii. 60).<sup>2</sup> It is further noticeable that this total is just six times as great as the number said to have been left with Mardonius (viii. 113). Now, without maintaining the correctness even of this figure (300,000), we may perhaps see in it another and a more sober estimate of the host Xerxes led against Greece. It is hardly credible that Xerxes, if he were taking with him the bulk of his army (Thuc. i. 73) and leaving Mardonius only picked troops (viii. 113; Aesch. Pers. 804), should need to be escorted homewards by Artabazus and 60,000 of those

<sup>1</sup> They may be tabulated thus—

<i>Army.</i>	<i>Fleet.</i>
Infantry from Asia . . . 1,700,000	Crews of triremes from Asia 241,400
Cavalry (with camelry and charioteers) . . . 100,000	Marines . . . . . 36,210
Europeans . . . . . 300,000	Crews of smaller vessels . 240,000
	Crews of European triremes 24,000
<u>2,100,000</u>	<u>541,610</u>

Total fighting men, 2,641,610; add non-combatants, 2,641,610. Diodorus (xi. 3; cf. Ctes. Pers. 23) reduces the Asiatic infantry to 800,000, and the total number of Europeans (xi. 5) to less than 200,000.

<sup>2</sup> The story of the numbering of the host (vii. 60) by a cumbrous and childish method is an obvious folk-tale, which cannot be taken seriously. H. may have been led to increase his enormous totals (vii. 186) by the early estimate of Xerxes' land forces at three millions in the epigram of Simonides (H. vii. 228). Figures of this kind, due to popular or poetic imagination, are of course worthless. (Cf. the numbers given for the host of the great Khan in Marco Polo, bk. i, ch. iii; Yule, i. 335.)

troops (viii. 115 n.). Thus we may find in the forces ascribed to the Persians at Plataea (300,000) and at Mycale (60,000) a means of estimating the whole force at the disposal of Xerxes.

§ 4. **Real meaning and value of the army list.** Nevertheless a closer examination of the list as given by H. confirms the impression that it contains an official account<sup>1</sup> of the Persian army's organization, and that H.'s impossible figures are based on a misunderstanding of or a miscalculation from the data supplied by the list. The decimal system of organization<sup>2</sup> prevails; there are decarchs, hecatontarchs, chiliarchs, myriarchs (cf. Aesch. Pers. 302, 314, 981, 994), and above them, twenty-nine Persian *ἄρχοντες*, and six generals in chief. But the *ἄρχοντες* in H. command not 100,000 but 60,000 men. That this was the normal strength of a Persian army corps seems proved by the fact that the separate corps actually mentioned, that of Artabazus (viii. 126) and that of Tigranes (ix. 96) are of this strength. It corresponds also with the conventional number for a Persian fleet, 600 ships (iv. 87; vi. 9. 95). But is H. right in supposing that his twenty-nine *ἄρχοντες* commanded such army corps? So awkward a number as twenty-nine could hardly be chosen as the basis of any scheme of organization, and a thirtieth commander is ready to our hand in Hydarnes, captain of the Immortals, but these numbered only 10,000. Here is the origin of H.'s error. The twenty-nine *ἄρχοντες* really, like Hydarnes, were myriarchs, while the corps of 60,000 were commanded by the six generals. Thus we should get a grand total of 360,000 men, of whom 300,000 would be infantry commanded by the thirty *ἄρχοντες*, while each of the six corps would also include 10,000 horse. This number agrees with those assigned to the Persian leaders in 479, Mardonius having 300,000 at Plataea (viii. 113), and Tigranes 60,000 at Mycale (ix. 96). It finds further support in the story that Cyrus (i. 189) divided his army into 360 divisions to dig as many channels for the river Gyndes.

We may then assume that 360,000 represents the total strength of the Persian field army, and that it was organized on a territorial basis. The Anatolian races, according to H., supplied the infantry for two corps but no cavalry<sup>3</sup>, the Persians and the nations of the further east perhaps three corps of infantry and five divisions of cavalry, while one corps of infantry would seem to have been drawn from very diverse regions, and accompanied, if we might believe Herodotus, by chariots and camelry. So much for the army list. But Xerxes cannot possibly have taken his whole field army to Greece. There

<sup>1</sup> Here I follow with confidence Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 296 f.) and Macan, ii. 158 f.

<sup>2</sup> A decimal system prevailed also among the Tartars from the days of Gengis Khan (Marco Polo, bk. i, ch. liv; ii, ch. vii; Yule, i. 261, 350) and passed to the Turks.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Macan, ii. 164 f.

are some indications that he took only three complete army corps. The army marches in three divisions, and though six generals are named they are coupled together as though two were in joint command of each column (vii. 121). Only three separate commands emerge clearly, those of Mardonius, of Artabazus, and of Tigranes. There are only three hipparchs (vii. 88), Masistius being obviously the successor of Pharnuches. Thus 180,000 may be taken as the irreducible minimum of the Persian force, apart from European contingents. It would, however, seem probable that picked troops from the other army corps accompanied the king, and produced the impression that he was followed by every tribe in his empire. Nevertheless, the total must have fallen short of the 300,000 assigned to Mardonius at Plataea (viii. 113; ix. 32).

§ 5. **The army of Mardonius.** It is not easy to determine what portion of this force remained to fight under Mardonius. Clearly he would retain his own corps, 60,000 strong. This would seem to have been composed (cf. viii. 113; ix. 31) of Immortals, other Persians, Medes, Indians and Bactrians with Sacae, each contingent consisting of a myriad of infantry, the sixth myriad consisting of cavalry. The picked men from other nations (viii. 113; ix. 32) may have only filled gaps in the ranks, though the corps of Egyptian marines (ix. 32) seems to be a separate unit. The European allies reckoned by Herodotus (ix. 32) at 50,000 may safely be reduced in 479 as in 480 B.C. to half that amount. In support there was Artabazus with 40,000 men (ix. 66, 70), that is, with so much of his army corps of 60,000 (viii. 126) as remained available for active service; but we cannot say when, if ever, he reached the field of active operations in Boeotia. Thus Mardonius may well have had 150,000 men nominally under his command, but not more than 100,000 concentrated at Plataea. Tradition, which repeatedly insists on the disproportion between the forces of Xerxes and of his opponents, gives a less certain sound as to Mardonius. The discouragement in the Persian camp (ix. 16, 42), the alternative plan of campaign (ix. 2, 41), above all the whole story of the complicated manœuvres which preceded the battle of Plataea, seem to show that the disproportion between the two forces was not very great. Marathon had proved that the Greek hoplite was more than a match for the most warlike nations in Asia, but a large part of Pausanias' force was composed of light troops inferior to Mardonius' warriors. Hence it seems likely that the total number of men engaged on each side was more nearly equal than has been commonly supposed.

*Note.*—In dealing with the Persian numbers I have followed Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 294 f.; xxiv. 144 f.). Macan (ii. 150 f., 351) has arrived at similar conclusions as to Persian armies. Munro now (C. A. H. iv. 273–6, 302 n.) follows Tarn as to the number of Greek ships and the normal divisions and strength of the Persian

## NUMBERS OF THE ARMIES AND FLEETS

navy, but holds that the total of 600 was on this occasion strengthened by an additional squadron of 60 Phoenician ships, and an uncertain number (70?) of fast cruisers.

### APPENDIX XX

#### THE CAMPAIGN OF 480 B.C.

§ 1. **Persian plan of campaign.** There is at least clearness and consistency in the Persian plans for the campaign which ended with the battle of Salamis. The elaborate care taken in bridge building, in making roads and canals, in storing provisions, above all the steady advance of huge forces without any sign of failure in supplies, shows careful organization and competent leading. But the Persians suffered from too rigid adherence to the leading idea of their plan of campaign, the close and direct co-operation of their land and sea forces.<sup>1</sup> Possibly considerations of supply induced the Persian leaders to keep the fleet in close touch with the army; yet since Xerxes advanced from Therma to Thermopylae unsupported by his fleet, he plainly could dispense with its aid for a time. Perhaps the Persians dared not trust the fidelity of their naval allies, or at least of the Greeks among them, out of sight of the land forces. Whatever was the cause, the Persian fleet remained tied to the Persian army. It was, indeed, allowed to make a turning movement round Euboea (viii. 7, 14) and may have been used in the same way at Salamis (App. XXI. 4 f.), but no really independent action (e.g. a diversion against the Peloponnese, vii. 235-7) was sanctioned by the Persian generals.

§ 2. **Possible lines of defence.** The Greek plans for defence were conditioned by the character of the Persian strategy. It was necessary to find a position where inferior forces might hope to check a double attack by land and sea. Four such lines of defence were open, three were at one time or another actually held by the Greek forces. The last line of defence, guarding the Acropolis of Hellas, the Peloponnese, was the Isthmus of Corinth, a position admirably defensible by land. Further arguments in its favour were the great dangers involved in the dispatch of any large land force far from the Peloponnese. The Helots were a constant danger, Argos was obviously disloyal (cf. vii. 148-52; viii. 73; ix. 12), Elis and Mantinea not wholly trustworthy (ix. 10 n.). Again it was necessary to garrison the Peloponnese strongly so long as the Persians held command of the sea, for fear that a detached squadron might land troops south of the Isthmus. Yet no responsible leader can have contemplated abandoning all Northern Greece to the enemy without a struggle. To do so would have been to sacrifice Athens, and to risk the loss of her fleet, without which all resistance by sea must collapse. Even if Athens proved loyal to the last, the Greeks might be forced

<sup>1</sup> This co-operation is seen also in the campaign of Darius in Thrace (iv. 89 f.) and of Mardonius in Thrace and Macedon (vi. 43-5).

to face the superior Persian navy in the open waters of the Saronic gulf. The second possible line, that of Cithaeron, can hardly have been seriously contemplated in 480, except by despairing and short-sighted Athenians (viii. 40). It could not be held except by a large force, and even then might be turned by an enemy moving by Oropus and Declea. Above all, it separated army and fleet, whether the latter took its post in the Euripus or at Salamis, and thus failed in the first and most essential point requisite for a successful defence.

§ 3. **Greek plan of campaign.** But if for these and other reasons the defence must be pushed further north, it followed that the land force must be content to play a subordinate part, merely checking the advance of Xerxes, while the Greeks struck hard with their stronger arm the navy. Further, the battle must if possible be fought in a narrow sound, where the enemy could not use their superior numbers and greater manœuvring power. In the straits of Euboea the Greek admirals might hope to defeat the enemy, as the Romans the Carthaginians, by ramming prow to prow with their stouter vessels (viii. 60n.), and by boarding with better-armed troops. The difficulty was to induce the enemy to attack them there instead of ignoring them and sailing past. Now a Greek fleet posted at Artemisium guarded the whole stretch of coast from Tempe to Marathon (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 304). To land a large force on the rocky coast of Magnesia was impracticable, while to disembark in Euboea was useless, if the narrows by Chalcis were guarded so that the invaders could not cross to Boeotia. If, therefore, Xerxes' army could be checked either at Tempe or Thermopylae, his admirals must fight the Greek fleet at Artemisium before they could turn the position of the force defending the pass. They could not take their whole fleet outside Euboea to the Saronic gulf, since it was essential to their plans that army and fleet should reach the Peloponnese together.

The question whether Tempe or Thermopylae should be held turned on the loyalty of Thessaly. Both Xerxes and the Greek leaders seem erroneously to have reckoned on the whole-hearted support of the Thessalians. Xerxes believed that the promises of the Aleuadae held good for the whole nation (vii. 6, 130, 172), the Greeks seem to have made the same mistake about the summons received apparently in the early spring of 480 B. C. (vii. 172). In any case such a call to defend the frontiers of Greece could not be left unanswered. A force of 10,000 hoplites was taken by ship to Halus, and marched thence to Tempe; the fleet remained in the Pagasaeon gulf, but doubtless, had all gone well, it would have taken post at Artemisium. We may accept as probable H.'s suggestion that the reason for the evacuation of Thessaly was the discovery that there were other passes from Macedon by which Tempe could be turned (vii. 173. 4). If, on the contrary (J. H. S.



xxii. 305), the Greek leaders had any previous knowledge of the passes of Petra and Volustana (vii. 128 n., 173 n.) they must have expected that Thessalian levies would defend them. In either case, when only cavalry appeared to support them (vii. 173. 2) they realized the disaffection of the lower orders in Thessaly and the hopelessness of holding the passes without their co-operation.

The fiasco at Tempe seems for the time to have discouraged the Greeks utterly. The forces sent retired not to Thermopylae but to the Isthmus (vii. 173). To this time we must assign the menacing oracles given to the Athenians,<sup>1</sup> which held out no hope of a successful resistance northward of Salamis, that is close to the last possible line of defence (vii. 140, 141 n.).

§ 4. **The interdependence of Artemisium and Thermopylae.** The resolution to return to Artemisium and to hold Thermopylae was taken only after some debate and difference of opinion (vii. 175). Yet surely this line of defence must have been contemplated earlier at least as a possible alternative (cf. vii. 177). No doubt Thermopylae like Tempe could be turned, but nowhere else could a small body of troops withstand the great barbarian host with equal hope of success, nowhere was there a better field for the naval tactics of Themistocles, nowhere could fleet and army co-operate more closely and effectively. That the rôle of the land force is defensive and subordinate is indicated by the small number of men who fought under Leonidas (cf. vii. 202 n.), compared with the full muster of ships at Artemisium (viii. 1); its sole object was to hold the pass long enough to enable the fleet to cripple Xerxes' navy. But the two positions are absolutely interdependent. If Thermopylae alone were held, its defenders might have been assailed with showers of missiles from the hostile fleet (cf. Paus. x. 21), or absolutely cut off by the landing of a hostile force in their rear. And, on the other hand, it was useless to hold Artemisium unless the land route were blocked at Thermopylae, since the king's fleet might in that case evade the Greeks by sailing outside Euboea, and then quietly rejoin the army when it had reached the coast of the Saronic gulf.

Herodotus does not bring out the interdependence of the two positions, and indeed ignores it in some parts of his narrative; in his work the story of Thermopylae is finished off before that of Artemisium begins; the Greek navy too beats a hasty retreat (vii. 183) and twice contemplates flight (viii. 4. 9) without a thought that thereby they imperil the heroic defenders of Thermopylae. Nevertheless in the narrative this interdependence is implicitly indicated by many signs. H. is conscious of the

<sup>1</sup> Delphi evidently did not wish to bring itself into disfavour with the Persian by encouraging a defence of Artemisium and Thermopylae (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 306).

parallel advance of the Persian army and fleet and of the resolution of the Greeks to occupy a line of defence where army and fleet can co-operate (vii. 175 f.). Further, the arrangements made for communication between Thermopylae and Artemisium (viii. 21) and the synchronism of the three days' fighting on land and sea (viii. 15) suggest the conclusion enforced by the immediate retreat of the fleet after the fall of Thermopylae, that the two positions were absolutely interdependent.

§ 5. **Correction of the parallel diaries of the Persian fleet and army.** This interdependence, and the synchronism of the three attacks on Thermopylae with the three sea-fights at Artemisium (viii. 15), make it certain that H.'s parallel diaries of the Persian fleet and army must be corrected. The discrepancy of two days may be removed by inserting two days in the log of the fleet, which would give the time requisite for the main fleet to refit, and for the detached squadron to sail round Euboea (Busolt, ii. 681-2; Grundy, pp. 342-3). A more attractive suggestion is to subtract two days from the journal for the army (Bury, B. S. A. ii. 95 f.; Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 308-11; Macan, ii. 272 f.). As, however, it involves a serious departure from the narrative of H. the nature and the reasons of this second rearrangement must be given in detail. The omission of these two days reduces the two storms in H. (vii. 188 f. and viii. 12) to one, and the general retreat of the Greek fleet to the Euripus (viii. 183) to the dispatch of a detachment to guard the strait of Chalcis. Further, it implies that the Persian squadron sent round Euboea started not from Aphetae (viii. 6) but from the Sepiad shore.

It may be most conveniently exhibited in the annexed table.

PARALLEL DIARY OF EVENTS AT THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM.

*A. As given by H.*

Day

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Persian army leaves Therma.                 |  |
| 12.  | Persian fleet sails from Therma to Sepiad shore (vii. 179 f.).   |
| 13.  | First storm. Wreck of Persian fleet (vii. 188-91),   |
| 14. Persian army reaches Malis (vii. 196-8).   | Storm continues.   |
| 15. Army remains inactive (vii. 208-10).       | Storm continues.   |
|  | Fleet moves to Aphetae when the storm was over (vii. 193); 200 ships sent round Euboea (viii. 6).        |
| 16. Ditto.                                     | First sea-fight (viii. 9 f.); second storm and wreck (viii. 12 f.).                                      |
| 17. Ditto.                                     | Arrival of 53 Athenian ships; second sea-fight (viii. 14).   |
| 18. First attack on Thermopylae (vii. 210-11). | Third sea-fight (viii. 15-17); news of disaster at Thermopylae and retreat of Greek fleet (viii. 21 f.). |

19. Second attack on Thermopylae  
(vii. 212).
20. Catastrophe at Thermopylae  
(vii. 213-33).

*B. As reconstructed by Bury.*

- |                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Persian army leaves Therma.    |  |
| 12.                               | 200 Persian ships sent round Euboea and 53 Athenian to guard the Euripus.    |
| 13.                               | Storm wrecks both Persian fleets.  |
| 14. Arrival of Xerxes in Malis.   | Storm continues.   |
| 15. Xerxes before Thermopylae.    | Storm continues.   |
| 16. First attack on Thermopylae.  | Persian fleet moves to Aphetae; first sea-fight.                             |
| 17. Second attack on Thermopylae. | Return of 53 Athenian ships; second sea-fight.                               |
| 18. Catastrophe at Thermopylae.   | Third sea-fight; news of disaster at Thermopylae and retreat of Greek fleet. |

Macan (ii. 275) while agreeing in general would make Xerxes enter Malis on the 12th day and reach Thermopylae on 13th.

By the less radical reconstruction of Busolt (ii. 681-2) and Grundy (pp. 342-3), the events crowded into the 16th day of the naval diary are spread over three days, viz.: 16. Move to Aphetae. 17. Dispatch of squadron round Euboea. 18. First sea-fight and second storm. Thus again the three fights at Artemisium and Thermopylae correspond (viii. 15). Munro attempts a more elaborate reconstruction of the movements of the Persian fleet (C.A.H. iv. 284-91) with a full diary (opposite p. 316).

§ 6. **Grounds for Bury's rearrangement.** For this rearrangement of H.'s story there are the following grounds:

(1) Chronologically the diary of the fleet does not seem open to any objection. As we might expect, Herodotus seems well informed as to its movements. On the other hand, the notice of Xerxes' march through Thessaly is vague and scanty (vii. 196), and Xerxes' four days' delay at Thermopylae is unintelligible unless the four days be that of his arrival and the three days of the storm.

(2) The repeated report that the Greeks meditated (viii. 4, 9) and in one case even effected a retreat (vii. 182), ignores the plain fact that such a retreat would have sacrificed the land force at Thermopylae. Whatever murmurings there may have been among Peloponnesian sailors or captains, Eurybiades and Themistocles cannot have thought of deserting Leonidas. Nor is it likely that a fleet, panic-stricken at the mere approach of the enemy, should afterwards have made so stout a resistance against superior numbers. These rumours illustrate a tendency in the tradition to exalt the noble failure of Thermopylae above the mean success of Artemisium.

No doubt, on the other hand, there is a basis of fact behind the statement (vii. 182) that the Greeks shifted their station from Artemisium to Chalcis to guard the Euripus.<sup>1</sup> Here, however, the crucial point is the alleged motive 'to guard the Euripus' near Chalcis. The danger to be met is clearly the dispatch of a Persian squadron round Euboea, but the method of meeting it can hardly have been a general retreat. Yet the story of a retreat might well have arisen (Bury, p. 88 f.) from the fact of the dispatch of a squadron 'to guard the narrows of the Euripus'; and such a squadron may be found in the fifty-three Athenian vessels (viii. 14) which later drop, as it were, from the skies with the joyful tidings that the Persian ships sent round Euboea had been wrecked.

(3) H.'s account of the dispatch of the 200 Persian ships intended to circumnavigate Euboea involves two grave difficulties. If they started from Aphetae in the afternoon, they could not that same night have reached the 'Hollows' of Euboea (viii. 7, 14)<sup>2</sup>; and the stratagem of sending them outside Sciathos to avoid observation becomes ludicrous, since they were in full view of the Greek fleet when they started. Both these objections are avoided if we suppose (Bury, p. 92; Munro, p. 309) that they parted company with the main fleet four days earlier, while it lay off the Sepiad shore. And further, the news that such a squadron had been sent to turn their position would account for the dispatch of an Athenian detachment to guard the Euripus (cf. *sup.*), and also for the panic in the Greek fleet on the first approach of the enemy. Tidings of the capture of three look-out ships seems an insufficient cause for a general flight; but a signal that a squadron had been sent to threaten their retreat would naturally alarm the sailors, and lead the admirals to take the necessary precautions. Finally, the plan of sending a squadron round Euboea must surely have been premeditated, and not a happy thought extemporized at Aphetae. But if so, this squadron would never have put in at Aphetae, but have passed outside Sciathos (as indeed Herodotus says) to avoid the observation of the Greek fleet.

(4) Bury's correction of the diary identifies the two storms in H., since on his hypothesis the same storm wrecks the main fleet on the Sepiad strand, and the squadron sent round Euboea. Now in one passage (viii. 66. 2) H. himself seems to recognize but a single storm.<sup>3</sup> It is suggested that its duplication may well have arisen from the variety of H.'s sources, and an undetected dis-

<sup>1</sup> Grundy (p. 324) holds that the entire fleet ran before the storm round Cape Kenaeum, but even if the ships were not beached at Artemisium, there was safety and shelter close by at Oreus. Hence a general retreat seems improbable.

<sup>2</sup> This objection is met equally well by the insertion of two days in the log of the fleet advocated by Grundy and Busolt; cf. *sup.*

<sup>3</sup> Unless τοῦ χειμῶνος means simply 'the foul weather'.

crepancy in their chronology. In favour of this it may be urged that while the first storm undoubtedly did real and extensive damage to the main Persian fleet, the supposed second storm had no appreciable effect upon it (viii. 12). The account of it reads like a duplicate, with the exaggerations and graphic touches, taken perhaps from an epic poem (cf. vii. 188 n.), toned down or omitted. On the other hand, the reality of one storm is proved by the destruction of the squadron which attempted to circumnavigate Euboea. Whether it was totally destroyed by a North-easter in the open sea (viii. 13), or as seems more likely, a remnant reached the Hollows (viii. 14 n.) on the South-west Coast and there met its fate, either through stress of weather or through the attacks of the Athenian detachment (Munro, pp. 310, 311), cannot be determined; in any case the whole squadron perished utterly.

§ 7. *The sea-fights at Artemisium.* Of the actual fighting at Artemisium little can be said.<sup>1</sup> The capture of Sandoces and fifteen ships would seem to be, as H. says, an accidental success in cutting off stragglers (vii. 194-5), but the first two combats at Artemisium need rather more explanation (viii. 9-11, 14). In each case the Greeks, despite their inferior numbers, attack the barbarians late in the day, and after a partial victory retire at nightfall. On the second occasion we are definitely told that the ships attacked were Cilician. No doubt sound strategy demanded that the Greeks should attack, while the Persians naturally waited to see if the turning movement round Euboea, or the victory of their land forces, would compel the Greek to retreat without a battle. But the key to these initial successes of the Greeks is to be found in the statement of Ephorus (Diod. xi. 12) that the Persians when attacked were dispersed, as they had come from different anchorages (Grundy, p. 334; Tarn, J. H. S. xxviii. 217), there being in fact no single harbour in the neighbourhood large enough to hold the whole fleet. Clearly the Greeks attempted to crush one squadron before the others could come up. On the first occasion the Greeks, according to H., took thirty ships and retired in good order, when the Persians had concentrated their whole fleet; on the second they almost destroyed the Cilician squadron. On both, by attacking late in the afternoon, they gave the Persians no time to operate with their combined fleet.

The third battle was of a different character (viii. 16-18). The Persian leaders, resolved that their squadrons shall no longer be defeated in detail, themselves attack at midday. The Greek claimed a drawn battle, but admittedly they were roughly handled, and contemplated retreat even before they heard of the loss of Thermopylae. Presumably they were out-manœuvred and driven back, but escaped disaster because the lighter Persian vessels dare not

<sup>1</sup> It does not seem possible to fit Sosylus' story of Heraclides (cf. v. 121 n.) into H.'s account.



ram prow to prow, or their light-armed marines board. This is confirmed by the statement that the Egyptians, whose marines were heavy armed (vii. 89), did best on this day and captured five Greek ships (viii. 17). But the strongest proof is that Themistocles was convinced that it was absolutely necessary for the Greeks to fight the decisive battle in waters where the enemy must come to close quarters (Tarn, J. H. S. xxviii. 218).

§ 8. **Thermopylae.** The story of Thermopylae raises a number of difficult questions. But it is clear that the main object of Leonidas in holding the pass was to give the Greek fleet an opportunity of striking an effective blow (cf. *sup.*). For this purpose a small force would suffice, since all that was necessary was to check Xerxes' march. Leonidas may have expected more support from central Greece, or even reinforcements from Peloponnese, to enable him to hold the passes by which Thermopylae could be turned; but the pretence that his force was but a vanguard, to be followed when the Carnean and Olympian festivals were over (cf. vii. 203, 206, &c.) by the full muster of the Peloponnese, was but dust thrown in the eyes of the extra-Peloponnesian allies. Thermopylae itself was strong enough to defy a frontal assault. The Persian leaders, whose attacks on the first two days may perhaps have been feints intended to distract attention from their real designs, evidently aimed at turning the position, first by sending their fleet round Euboea, and then by the path Anopaea. But if such were their plans, why did they not at once send a force up the Asopus into Doris, by the good hill road afterwards used in their advance into Phocis (viii. 31 n.) and perhaps by Artabazus in his final retreat (ix. 66, 89)? The only satisfactory answer is because Trachis was held by the Locrians and blocked the gorge of the Asopus (cf. vii. 203 n.). Whether Trachis surrendered and thus opened the road and the Anopaea path to the Persians, or Hydarnes, like Brennus (Paus. x. 22), went behind Trachis round the western end of the Trachinian hills through the land of Aenianes, and thus reached the Asopus above the gorge and the Anopaea path, cannot be determined (cf. vii. 216 n.). In any case the Phocians holding the path seem not to have expected an attack (vii. 218). When surprised by the enemy, they saved themselves by a hasty retreat, which left Hydarnes free to attack the Spartans from behind.

§ 9. **Leonidas' last stand and its purpose.** The most difficult problem remains, what was the purpose of Leonidas in clinging to his position at Thermopylae when it had apparently become untenable. The official explanation that Leonidas, like Decius Mus, sacrificed himself to save his country from destruction is obviously the product of later reflection embodied in a *vaticinium post eventum* (vii. 220, 221 n.). Further, it is quite inconsistent with the previous account of the expedition (vii. 202-7); nor does it supply any reason for Boeotians remaining with him to the bitter end. Leonidas

was in no sense bound to immolate himself and his men at the imagined call of honour, since it was clearly no disgrace for a Spartan leader to order a retreat when sound strategy dictated such a course, as may be seen from the action of Eurybiades and Pausanias. He was no doubt at the head of a forlorn hope, but that there was some hope is shown by the conduct of the Boeotians in standing by him. The Thespians (and probably the Thebans, cf. vii. 222 n.) represent a small patriotic minority in a country at enmity with Athens and ready at the first opportunity to join in the expected triumph of the Mede. They rightly felt that if Thermopylae were lost, there was no refuge for them in their own land. If the worst came to the worst it might be better to fall into the hands of the barbarian rather than trust to the tender mercies of their own countrymen. At any rate they were in the mood to risk all on the slender chance of holding the pass longer, and there was still one chance left. The Peloponnesians who retreated, 2,800 in number, according to one account retired under orders (vii. 220 f.). Most probably they were dispatched to meet Hydarnes on the Anopaea before he could debouch from the tangled forest of firs just above the modern Upper Drakospilia, and thus to prevent him from taking Leonidas in rear (Grundy, p. 306 f., vii. 222 n.). It is true that Greek tradition is silent on the point, merely recording their escape. But if they, like the Phocians, failed in performing the duty imposed on them and secured their own retreat at the cost of Leonidas' destruction, there might well be a conspiracy of silence to conceal their shame (cf. vii. 221 n.). Leonidas was not, on this hypothesis, sacrificing the lives of his followers to the phantom of honour, but taking a great risk for an adequate end. Even if he could no longer hope to hold the pass and save central Greece from invasion, he could still give the Greek fleet another chance of crippling the enemy, and thus might yet ensure the final triumph of his race. (See note, p. 417.)

His immediate purpose was frustrated by the faults of others, but his faithfulness unto death inspired his countrymen on many a stricken field. No victory in the Persian war, neither the first-fruits at Marathon, nor the life and death struggle at Salamis, nor the crowning mercy at Plataea, stands on a level with Thermopylae in the pages of H. Nowhere else do we find so devoted a loyalty, so high a level of heroism.

In this appendix I owe most to Munro (J. H. S. xxii, pp. 302-18), but I have also learned much from E. Meyer, Bury, Grundy, Macan, and Tarn (J. H. S. xxviii, 210-19).

## APPENDIX XXI

### SALAMIS

§ 1. **The councils of war.** The account of the battle of Salamis given by H. is beset with difficulties at every turn.

There are many suspicious features in the story of debates that preceded the battle. Of Xerxes' council of war it is unlikely that H. could know more than vague gossip handed down by Halicarnassian tradition. The six Persian admirals are conspicuous by their absence, while Mardonius is unduly prominent. Above all, the advice of Artemisia (ch. 68) is a patent *vaticinium post eventum* embodying a quotation from Aeschylus (Pers. 728), and pitched throughout in a key inconceivable before Salamis. The most we can say is that there was a council at which various views may have been expressed, before the final decision to fight was reached: we cannot rely on any of the details.

Nor are we on much firmer ground in considering the debates of the Greek admirals, though here no doubt tradition would be copious.

(1) The chronology of the councils is incoherent and erroneous, more than one council being confused together. (a) A council is sitting at Salamis debating whether to retire to the Isthmus before Xerxes reaches Athens (ch. 49); it is apparently still engaged in the same debate when news of the fall of the Acropolis, which held out some time (ch. 52), drives it to decide for immediate flight (ch. 56). (b) Next day an irregular mass meeting (ch. 74) is transformed into a council of generals still debating the same point. It is sitting when Themistocles slips away to send his message to Xerxes (ch. 75), and is still wrangling when Aristides brings the news that the Greek fleet is completely surrounded (ch. 79 f.).

(2) There would seem to be prejudice against Themistocles in deferring to the second council, and ascribing to Mnesiphilus (ch. 57) cogent and obvious arguments which must surely have been used in the earlier debate.

(3) The idea that the Greeks were bent on running away (cf. *inf.*), combined with Attic hatred of Corinth, accounts for the prominence of Adimantus (ch. 59, 61, and esp. 94 n.). Tradition preserved the fact that the question of retreat was debated, and duly emphasized the paramount importance of the message of Themistocles; possibly, too, it enshrined more than one famous retort, but in general the debates do but express in dramatic form the feelings believed by H. to have inspired the action of the generals.

§ 2. **Herodotus and Aeschylus.** We have seen that the story of the debates in the councils of war is coloured by the prejudices of the historian or rather of his authorities; it is equally clear that his conceptions of the strategy are vague or erroneous, while

all real account of the tactics is conspicuously absent. The final encounter between the fleets dissolves away into a collection of isolated incidents and disconnected traditions inspired by local patriotism and local antipathies; the preliminary discussions are even more completely permeated with the thoughts and feelings of a later generation. Clearly H., here as elsewhere, relied on the gossip of the seamen as reported by tradition, and was ill-informed as to the plans and intentions of the leaders. No doubt there are precious fragments of truth scattered throughout his narrative, but his general view is vitiated by the illusion that Themistocles was telling the truth when in his message to Xerxes he represented the Greeks as bent on flight, and by a misconception of the position of the two fleets both before and during the battle.

Fortunately, we have in Aeschylus a picture from which many of the defects in H. may be corrected. The *Persae* (produced 472 B.C.) was the work of a man who in all probability himself fought in the battle (Paus. i. 14. 5; Ion in schol. to Pers. 431), and was acted before an audience who had themselves seen the realities of which the play was the counterfeit presentment. We may therefore accept Blakesley's (ii. 402) maxim 'that when Aeschylus relates any particulars of the action of such a kind as must have come under the notice of eyewitnesses, his narrative possesses paramount authority'; but we must even in Aeschylus make allowance for a patriotic bias which may have led him to exalt the heroism of his comrades in battle, and for a dramatic purpose, which may have entailed the omission or foreshortening of events. Nevertheless, our critical canon must be that H. may be used to supplement Aeschylus but not to contradict him (Munro). With regard to the later writers, and in particular to Diodorus, there is so much doubt whether they possessed any independent evidence of first-rate value that it is more prudent to use them merely to confirm and elucidate the narrative of our primary authorities.

§ 3. **The stratagem of Themistocles.** The first question which calls for an answer is, 'What brought the Persian fleet inside the straits of Salamis, into the narrow seas favourable to the enemy?' Why did the Persian admirals play their opponents' game, instead of sailing across the Saronic gulf to take the defences of Peloponnese in rear? The Greek fleet must needs have followed and fought in open water, if, indeed, it held together at all. This cardinal error in Persian strategy may be confidently ascribed to the message of Themistocles (ch. 75 f.; Thuc. i. 74; Aesch. Pers. 355 f.<sup>1</sup> Yet all the details of this famous stratagem are more or less

<sup>1</sup> Ἀνὴρ γὰρ Ἑλλήν ἐξ Ἀθηναίων στρατοῦ | ἐλθὼν ἔλεξε παιδὶ σὺ Ξέρξῃ τάδε, | ὥς εἰ μελαίνης νυκτὸς ἵξεται κνέφας, | Ἑλλήνες οὐ μενοῖεν, ἀλλὰ σέλμασιν | ναῶν ἐπενθορόντες ἄλλος ἄλλοσε | δρασμῷ κρυφαίῳ βίοντον ἐκωσσοῖατο.

disputed, the time, the purpose, and the exact contents of the message being differently reported by Aeschylus and H.

(1) In Aeschylus the message delivered to Xerxes towards evening (Pers. 357 f.) seems as though it were the sole cause of the Persian movement after nightfall (377 f.): in H. the messenger comes to the admirals (ch. 75) after nightfall (ch. 70, 76), when the decision to fight had been already taken and the movement begun.

(2) In Aeschylus (Pers. 361) the purpose of the stratagem is simply to delude the enemy and lead him to give battle in an unfavourable position; in H. (ch. 75, 80) Themistocles deceives his colleagues also, so as to compel the Peloponnesians to remain and fight.

(3) While both poet and historian agree that the message declared that the Greeks were bent on flight (Pers. 355 f. *sup.*), H. alone (ch. 75) adds the assurance of Themistocles that he and many others were ready to betray their comrades and co-operate with the Medes.

It is not possible wholly to reconcile the divergent accounts of the poet and the historian, but perhaps a reasonable compromise between them may approach the truth. The dramatic purpose of Aeschylus may well explain his omission of all previous movements of the Persian fleet, so as to concentrate our attention on the fatal advance at midnight; hence the silence of Aeschylus does not on this point rule out of court the evidence of H. On the other hand, it seems most improbable that Themistocles can have hoped or intended to deceive his brother admirals as well as the great king. Here H. has with the greatest simplicity taken Themistocles at his word; that past master in deception told the enemy that the Greeks meditated flight, and the noble lie has been treated as undoubted truth (Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. 204; Munro, *J. H. S.* xxii. 323, 324).

No doubt the Peloponnesians were nervous about the security of the Isthmus; doubtless, as at Artemisium, their seamen murmured that they were being sacrificed to the Athenians (ch. 74); perhaps even the leaders lost heart on hearing that a squadron had been sent to cut off their retreat, but they can hardly have ignored the obvious advantages of their position in the straits of Salamis, if only the Persian could be induced to attack them there. Later Athenian prejudice was only too willing to accept as fact the fiction that the Peloponnesians, and especially the Corinthians, longed to flee, but the whole bearing of the seamen next day, as pictured by H., not to speak of Aeschylus, is not that of would-be runaways. Lastly, the supplementary clause in the message as given by H. may be accepted with confidence. If Themistocles had only told Xerxes that the Greeks were bent on flight, the king might have been well content to let them go, in the hope that they would disperse to their homes, or he might have pursued and attacked them on the high seas. Even if he decided to blockade them in Salamis, he need never have ventured inside the straits so long as he closed



their entrances. But the full message must have sounded to the King as follows; the Peloponnesians are so completely cowed that they wish to flee, and we Athenians are so disgusted at being deserted that we are willing to Medize; attack this dispirited and divided fleet and you will end the war in a blaze of glory (Munro, p. 331; Tarn, J. H. S. xxviii. 223). Enticed by the tempting bait, Xerxes rushed headlong into the trap laid for him. Like the Czar Alexander at Austerlitz, he threw away the advantages gained by sound and cautious strategy in the vain hope of a brilliant victory.

§ 4. **The position of the two fleets according to the ordinary interpretation of H.** The next great difficulty is tactical. What was the position of the two fleets on the morning of the battle, and how had they reached those positions? The older view put forward by Leake, *Topography of Athens*, and the *Demi*, ii, Appendix (1841), dominant from Grote (1849) to Rawlinson (3rd ed., 1875), and maintained still by Hauvette, Busolt (1894-5), Bauer, and Beloch (Klio, viii, p. 477), rests on the natural interpretation of H., though Goodwin<sup>1</sup> ingeniously attempts to bring H. into harmony with Aeschylus and Diodorus. Nevertheless H., so far as he has any general notion of the positions, would seem to have imagined the Greek fleet as ranged along the Salaminian coast, and the Persian along the Attic coast opposite it. The Persians move out from Phalerum the evening before the battle (ch. 70), and range themselves in order of battle ready for next day. Then, after the receipt of Themistocles' message, at midnight (ch. 76), they moved out the western wing, swinging round towards Salamis while those posted by Cynosura moved out and held the whole strait as far as Munychia. The natural sense of this is surely that the Persian line stretched along the Attic coast from the end of Mount Aegaleus to Munychia, and that it enveloped the Greeks by swinging round the extremity of either wing, so as to hold the narrows by the islands of Psyttaleia to the east and of St. George to the west.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In an article (*Journal of Archaeological Institute of America*, 1882-3, pp. 239 f.) revised and defended in *Harvard Studies of Classical Philology* (1906, pp. 75 f.) he would remove some of the principal obstacles (1) by interpreting *κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμίνα* (ch. 76. 1) of the dispatch of the Egyptian squadron, then forming the left wing, to circumnavigate Salamis; cf. p. 383; (2) by showing that the west wing of ch. 85. 1 need not (and on his interpretation of ch. 76, cf. *sup.*, cannot) be identical with that of ch. 76. Indeed he is now inclined to interpret ch. 85 of the two wings of the Greek fleet in the harbour of Salamis before they put out to sea. He hardly seems to realize the many other differences between Aeschylus and H.

<sup>2</sup> This is confirmed by the natural interpretation of ch. 85. 1. 'Opposite the Athenians were arrayed the Phoenicians (for these held the wing towards Eleusis and the west) and opposite the Lacedaemonians the Ionians. These held the wing towards the east and Piraeus.'

But if this be II.'s conception of the battle it is absolutely inadmissible, since it is inconsistent with other features in his own story and irreconcilable with topographical facts and with the description given by Aeschylus. The main objections put forward by Goodwin and sustained by Grundy, Munro, and others, are: (1) The Persian fleet could not have slipped along the coast past the Greek fleet unperceived by the Greek admirals (ch. 78, 81; cf. Plut. Them. 12; Arist. 8), since the passage between Aegaleus and Salamis is but 1,500 yards wide.<sup>1</sup> (2) It is incredible that the Persians, if drawn up ready for battle less than a mile away, should have remained supine while the Greeks embarked at their leisure. Surely they would have anticipated the manœuvre by which Lysander destroyed the Athenians at Aegospotami (Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 27, 28). (3) All authorities (Aesch. Pers. 441-64; Hdt. ch. 76 n., 95; Plut. Arist. 9) agree that Xerxes landed troops on Psyttaleia because he thought it likely to be a central point in the coming sea-fight, yet on Leake's hypothesis it is remote from the scene of battle.<sup>2</sup> (4) Aeschylus (Pers. 395. 8), an eyewitness, declares that only after the Greeks had rowed forward for some time were they visible to the Persians. The statement would be ludicrous if the two fleets were drawn up on opposite sides of the straits not quite a mile apart. (5) It is also difficult to see how, if this were the case, the Greeks avoided being outflanked by the superior forces of the enemy, and how the Persians, when defeated, escaped outside the straits instead of being driven ashore (Macan, ii. 298). For all these reasons the theory of the battle founded by Leake on H. must be given up in favour of that of Goodwin,<sup>3</sup> which does justice to Aeschylus and to the topographical conditions of the problem.

§ 5. **True position of the two fleets.** What, then, can we gather from Aeschylus, and how far can his account be confirmed, explained, and supplemented from those of the later authorities? In the first place there can be no doubt, from Xerxes' orders to his admirals,<sup>4</sup> that the Greeks are to be completely hemmed in and

<sup>1</sup> Busolt (ii. 702), adhering to the old view, sees that he must get rid of the traditional full moon. But could the Persian fleet, if the night were dark, have moved without noise?

<sup>2</sup> Beloch (Klio, viii. 477) would solve this and some other difficulties by identifying Psyttaleia not with Lypsokutali but with the island of St. George (cf. Strabo 395). His reasoning is attractive rather than cogent, and he ignores or evades other points, e.g. Themistocles' message he regards as a baseless anecdote.

<sup>3</sup> Goodwin had been anticipated in some points by Blakesley (H. exc. on viii. 76) and Loeschke (Ephorus-Studien, Jahrb. Klass. Phil. 1877). He is followed in the main by Grundy, Munro, E. Meyer, and most modern critics, and by Milchöfer even in his interpretation of H.

<sup>4</sup> Pers. 361 f. ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ὡς ἤκουσεν, οὐ ξυνεῖς δόλον | Ἕλληνας ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ τὸν θεῶν φθόνον, | πᾶσιν προφανεῖ τόνδε ναυάρχους λόγον, | εὖτ' ἂν φλέγων

every outlet closed against them. It is not necessary to discuss the exact meaning of ll. 366-8, since whether the three 'ranks' be three divisions guarding the channels (1) between Attica and Psyttaleia, (2) between Psyttaleia and Salamis, (3) between Salamis and the Megarid, while the other ships are a cordon of cruisers (Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 327), or ll. 366-7 be interpreted of the main fleet on either side of Psyttaleia, and 368 of the squadron sent to circumnavigate Salamis (Goodwin), in any case the orders and threats of the King make it clear that every way of retreat is to be barred, the passage by Megara no less than those by Psyttaleia. Now if it be admitted that the Persian fleet cannot have filed past the Greeks unperceived, the only way in which they can thus have surrounded the enemy is by sending a squadron round Salamis to close the Megara channel.

This is exactly what Diodorus (xi. 17. 2 ? Ephorus) says was done (cf. Plut. Them. 12 ; Arist. 8). The king sends the 200 Egyptian ships (cf. xi. 3. 7 ; H. vii. 89) round the island to block the exit by Megara ; in other words he repeats the manœuvre already attempted off Euboea. And there are certain phrases in H. confirmatory of this view. Though in their present context they have (*pace* Goodwin) been adapted to H.'s erroneous conception, in the source from which they came, they may well have borne a sense in harmony with Aeschylus and Ephorus. In ch. 76 the words *κυκλοῦμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμίνα* read like a misunderstood reference to the circumnavigating squadron, while *κατεῖχον μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν πορθμὸν* may well have meant blocked the whole strait on either side Psyttaleia from Cynosura to Piræus, especially as the next sentences describe the occupation of Psyttaleia. Anyhow, even in H., the facts he records, 'as distinct from his erroneous theory,' i. e. the occupation of Psyttaleia, the message of Themistocles, and the fact that the Greeks are completely surrounded by the enemy before they detect any movement on their part, demand the manœuvre sketched by Aeschylus, and elucidated by Ephorus, viz. the closing of the straits of Salamis at both ends.

§ 6. **The time and purpose of the Persian movements.** The precise time and purpose of the Persian movements remain a difficult problem. If Aeschylus' description be regarded as exact in every particular, and not as a dramatic summary, we should be obliged to believe that no Persian ship left harbour till nightfall, whereas H. clearly implies movements in the evening. Probably Aeschylus' words are true of the main Persian fleet, but there are two movements which must surely have been planned and even begun before

ἀκτῖσιν ἥλιος χθόνα | λήξῃ, κνέφας δὲ τέμενος αἰθέρος λάβῃ, | τάξαι νεῶν μὲν  
στῆφος ἐν στοίχοις τρισὶν | ἔκπλους φυλάσσειν καὶ πόρους ἀλιρρόθους, | ἄλλας  
δὲ κύκλῳ νῆσον Αἴαντος πέριξ· | ὥς εἰ μόρον φευξοῖσθ' Ἕλληνες κακόν, |  
ναυσὶν κρυφαίως δρασμὸν εὐρόντες τινά, | πᾶσιν στέρεσθαι κρατὸς ἦν προκείμενον.

night. These are the dispatch of the Egyptian squadron round Salamis, and the occupation of Psyttaleia.

Each of these might well form part of a general plan for blockading the Greeks (Macan, ii. 306), undertaken by the Persian admirals on their own initiative, before receiving the message of Themistocles; neither can well be put after nightfall. To land troops on a rocky island in the dark would be a difficult and dangerous operation, while if the Egyptian fleet was to threaten the Greek rear at Leros, or even to block their retreat at the bay of Trupika, a start before nightfall was surely necessary. If this movement of the Egyptians was reported to the Greeks it would account for the fears of the Peloponnesians (ch. 74); in any case it was probably from these ships that Aristides escaped with difficulty on his way back from Aegina (ch. 79-81; Plut. Them. 12, Ar. 8). If, then, the blockade of the Greeks was complete during the night, the dispatch of the circumnavigating squadron must be dated to the previous afternoon. H. would seem to be right in ascribing some movement to the Persians at that time, though he utterly misunderstood the nature of the movement.

§ 7. **The battle.** All night long the Persian seamen toiled at the oar, and in the morning their ships blocked the straits just outside Cynosura and Psyttaleia. But the Greeks had made no attempt to slip through the blockading squadrons.<sup>1</sup> After daybreak the Persians heard the paean and signal-trumpet of their still invisible enemy ring out.<sup>2</sup> Clearly the Greeks, as they put out from the bay of Salamis, were hidden by the promontory of Cynosura. Suddenly they emerge from behind it, the right wing leading, in orderly array. They must surely have stretched across the strait, either from the town of Salamis to the ferry opposite, or from Cynosura to Keratopyrgos; perhaps (Grundy, 392-397) they advanced from the former position towards the latter. The only definite statement (Diod. xi. 18) that the Greeks held the strait from Salamis to the Heracleum, when combined with those of Ctesias (Pers. 26) and Phanodemus (fr. 16, F. H. G. i. 368; cf. 90 n.; Plut. Them. 13) that the Heracleum lay near the narrowest parts of the strait, points to a position near the ferry, just in front of the island of St. George.<sup>3</sup> But it is clear

<sup>1</sup> Pers. 382 f. καὶ πάννυχτοι δὴ διάπλοον καθίστασαν | ναῶν ἀνακτες πάντα ναυτικὸν λεών. | καὶ νῦν ἐχῶρει, κού μάλ' Ἑλλήνων στρατὸς | κρυφαῖον ἔκπλουν οὐδαμῇ καθίστατο.

<sup>2</sup> Pers. 386 f. ἐπεὶ γε μέντοι λευκόπῳλος ἡμέρα | πᾶσαν κάτεσχε γαῖαν εὐφειγγῆς ἰδεῖν, | πρῶτον μὲν ἡχῇ κέλαδος Ἑλλήνων πάρα | μολπηδὸν ἠυφήμησεν . . . | σάλπιγξ δ' αὐτῇ πάντ' ἐκεῖν' ἐπέφλεγεν. | εὐθὺς δὲ κόπης ῥοθιάδος ξυμβολῇ | ἔπαισαν ἄλμην βρύχιον ἐκ κελεύματος, | θοῶς δὲ πάντες ἦσαν ἐκφανεῖς ἰδεῖν.

<sup>3</sup> Leake's identification of this Heracleum with the Ἡράκλειον τετράκωμον (Steph. Byz.), and Rhediades' attempt to localize it near the bay of Keratsini (cf. Goodwin, *op. cit.*) must apparently be given up. Cf. Milchöfer in Paul. Wiss. v, p. 1911, and Beloch, *Klio*, viii. 483.

from Aeschylus<sup>1</sup> that the Greeks advanced from that position with their right wing leading. When they appeared round Cynosura close upon the enemy, the Persians on their side pushed forward with a cheer (Pers. 406 f.). Perhaps at this point we may place the momentary retreat of the Greeks (ch. 84), devised, perhaps, to draw the enemy further into the straits. Clearly the Persians had to narrow their front (Pers. 412) as they streamed through the channels on either side of Psyttaleia up the straits. Thus we may account for the disorder into which they fell as soon as the battle began (Pers. 413 f.; Diod. xi. 18). Before they could recover from their confusion the Greeks were upon them, and in spite of a stout resistance turned their initial disorder into a final rout.

Of ordered movements in the battle we hear little or nothing, Aeschylus giving (Pers. 412 f.) only a vivid picture of the *mêlée*, and H. (86 n.) isolated exploits in the general scene of confusion. The Greek right wing, headed, no doubt, by the Spartans under Eurybiades, the admiral in command (so H. viii. 85 n., as against Diod. xi. 18), led the way (Pers. 399), encouraged by the support afforded by the troops holding the shores of Salamis. But it would seem that the Persian right wing (the Phoenician squadron) was thrown forward even more sharply, since Aeschylus declares that a Phoenician vessel was the first rammed by a Greek<sup>2</sup> (cf. Grundy, 396-7). So, too, H. (ch. 84) inclines to believe that Ameinias began the fray, where the Athenians on the Greek left faced the Phoenicians (ch. 85). Probably the Persian right, close under the eyes of the king and of the troops on shore, pushed boldly forward, while the left was delayed in wheeling round the island of Psyttaleia. Soon after the Persian columns had advanced into the straits, the Greeks attacked their leading ships. Thus at the point of contact they may well have been equal in number to the enemy (Plut. Them. 15), and may have seemed to surround their vanguard (Aesch. Pers. 418). Further, Themistocles had secured his object, a fight in the narrow seas, where the Persian numbers proved a hindrance rather than a help to them,<sup>3</sup> and where the stouter vessels of the Greeks gave them an advantage in ramming and their superior arms in boarding.

§ 8. **Behaviour of particular contingents.** Apparently both Phoenicians and Ionians (ch. 85) fought bravely in spite of their mutual recriminations (ch. 90), but the centre of the Persian fleet has left no mark on the traditions of the battle (Tarn, J. H. S. xxviii. 226). Perhaps in the advance into the straits it was crowded out, perhaps it was deliberately held back as of inferior quality, in any case it

<sup>1</sup> Pers. 399 τὸ δεξιὸν μὲν πρῶτον εὐτάκτως κέρας | ἡγήετο κύσμφ.

<sup>2</sup> Pers. 409 ἦρξε δ' ἐμβολῆς Ἑλληνικῇ | ναῦς, κάποθραύει πάντα Φοινίσσης νεῶς | κόρυμβα.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch (Them. 14) adds that the early-morning sea wind common in Greek waters (Thuc. ii. 84; Grundy, p. 398 n.) helped to throw the Persians into confusion, as Themistocles had reckoned.



would seem to have formed those rear ranks which, by pressing on as the vanguard retreated, added to the general confusion (ch. 89). On the Greek side the Aeginetans were most prominent in the battle and gained the prize of valour (ch. 93). Probably they were posted near the Spartans on the Greek right (Diod. xi. 18), and after breaking the Ionians took the Phoenicians in flank and rear as they, too, retired to the open sea (ch. 91, 92). But the full lustre of their exploits is naturally obscured in the Attic tradition preserved by Aeschylus and H. Second to them, yet only second in the deliberate judgement of the combatants, came the Athenians.

A word must be said of the Corinthians. That they fought well is abundantly proved, since all Greece but Athens bore out their own tradition to that effect (ch. 94 n.); yet the spiteful Athenian story that they fled to the temple of Athene Scirias, and returned when all was over, may contain an element of truth. Probably the Corinthians were dispatched westward to block the path of the Egyptian squadron sent round Salamis to take the Greeks in rear (Grundy, p. 405; Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 329). Where they met them we cannot tell, as the site of Athena's temple is unknown (ch. 94 n.); but since the legend makes them rejoin the main fleet immediately after the battle, it is more likely that they met and repulsed the enemy in the straits near the new arsenal and the isle of Leros, than in the far-off narrows near Megara (Tarn, J. H. S. xxviii. 222). No doubt the Egyptians, directly they had news of the failure of the main attack, would retreat at once to secure their own safety.

Lastly, the Persian troops on Psyttaleia were annihilated. This exploit of Aristides and the Attic hoplites, who held the shore of Salamis, has been celebrated and doubtless exaggerated by Aeschylus even more than by H. Probably Persian troops had been landed there, like the Spartans on Sphacteria, with a view of making the blockade of Salamis complete. Possibly, had all gone well, they were to cross over to Salamis and complete the destruction of the Greeks by a land attack (Macan, ii. 317-18); obviously, when the Persian ships were driven back, they were at the mercy of the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Their destruction may be put late in the day when the fleet has been routed (95 n.; Aesch. Pers. 454 f.).

§ 9. **The significance of the victory.** Clearly at first the full significance of the victory was not realized. The Greeks prepared for a renewal of the sea fight (ch. 96), and Xerxes at least pretended to make preparations for continuing the campaign (ch. 97).<sup>2</sup> Probably the Persian loss in ships was not overwhelming, though we have no trustworthy figures (ch. 97 n.). But the moral effect was decisive. The best sailors of the East, the Phoenicians, had been beaten, the

<sup>1</sup> This makes Tarn's suggestion (J. H. S. xxviii. 225), that they were marines landed after the fighting began, unlikely. Cf. also Caspari, J. H. S. xxxi. 108.

<sup>2</sup> Minor difficulties, e.g. the mole (viii. 97 n.) and the date (viii. 65 n.), are here disregarded.

Ionians were suspected of disloyalty, the rest of the fleet was of less reputation. It seemed hopeless to expect the beaten sailors to renew the combat at sea. But if the fleet was to go home, the army, too, must retire to its base and magazines in Thessaly, since with the fleet would go the grain-ships and transports. Naturally, too, there would be fears of revolt in the newly conquered cities on the coasts of Thrace and Macedon, not to speak of Ionia. It was also natural that the king himself should now resign the command. It might still be possible to represent the campaign as successful in its main object, the capture of Athens, and marred only by an unfortunate incident at sea. In any case the chance of a spectacular success was now over, and the long and troublesome task of reducing the Peloponnese to subjection was more suitable for a lieutenant. Xerxes himself would be safer at Susa, and more useful at Sardis, keeping a firm hold on disaffected Ionia. How far personal cowardice or apprehension for the safety of the Hellespont bridge affected his decision, we cannot tell.

The horrors of his retreat have been much exaggerated in Greek tradition (ch. 115 n.), which, beginning with Aeschylus, treated the invasion of Xerxes as a drama in which the haughtiness of man was brought low by divine Nemesis. Was not the moral too clear to be ignored? Never again did a Persian king stand as a conqueror on the soil of Greece. The days of Persian aggression were swiftly passing away, and giving place to the new era in which the Greeks fought no longer for their own homes and liberties but to rescue from slavery their brethren in Asia.

In this account of Salamis I owe most to Goodwin (*op. cit.*), Grundy, and Munro (J. H. S. xxii. 323-32). Munro (C. A. H. iv. 304-12) gives a clear picture of the battle of Salamis with plans. Guratsch (Klio xix. 128-39) sufficiently refutes Beloch's repeated attempts (Klio viii. 477 f., xi. 431 f., xiii. 128 f.; cf. Griech. Gesch. ii. 2. 107 f.) to disprove the identity of Psyttaleia with Lipsokutali, and Judeich's placing the battle within the straits (Klio xii. 129 f.). He inclines to accept Macan's theory of a flank attack by the Greeks on the Persians, but this, too, is open to criticism; cf. C. R. xxvii. 225.

## APPENDIX XXII. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 479 B.C.

§ 1. **The character of the sources.** The general character of the history shows that it rests in the main on oral tradition drawn principally from Greek sources. We should recognize, however, in the peculiar favour shown to Artabazus (viii. 126; ix. 41, 66, 89), the influence of a family record, which came to Herodotus directly or indirectly from the satraps of Dascylium (viii. 126 n.), and in the parallel case of Alexander (viii. 136 f.; ix. 44) that of a phil-Hellenic Macedonian source. Nevertheless, the main thread in H.'s narrative of events at Thebes and in the Persian camp would seem

to be the story told him by some Boeotian partisan of Persia; we have the account of the banquet at Thebes directly attributed to Thersander of Orchomenus (ix. 16); we may add with confidence the advice of the Thebans (ch. 2), that of Timagenidas and its success (ch. 38 f.), and the siege of Thebes (ch. 86 f.).

On the Greek side it is clear that the minor states except Tegea (ch. 26-8, 59-62, 70) have failed to make their voices heard. Their levies are openly taunted with cowardice (ch. 52, 60); they perish and are of no account (ch. 69), unworthy even of a tomb (ch. 85). It used, however, to be held (K. W. Nitzsch, *Rhein. Mus.* xxvii (1872), p. 226 f.) that the final victory at Plataea, and the whole campaign of Mycale, was told by H. after an official Spartan account. Now, although particular incidents and stories lend some support to this opinion, it seems unlikely that such an account would ascribe to the Athenians almost the whole credit at Mycale (ch. 102 f.) and the capture of the camp at Plataea (ch. 70). Doubtless we should recognize Spartan stories in the narrative of their great struggle with the Persians (ch. 61-5) and in some of the anecdotes appended to the account of the battle (ch. 71, 72, 82), but throughout the Attic element is predominant in H. This is obvious in the emphasis laid on their loyalty in rejecting the tempting offers of Mardonius (viii. 143 f.; ix. 1-6), in spite of Sparta's failure to redeem her promise, and on their bravery in volunteering to relieve the hard-pressed Megarians and in the ensuing combat (ix. 21 f.). It appears also in two incidents probably misreported or misunderstood by H., their successful assertion of their claim to the post of honour on the left (26 n., 27 f.) and their supposed interchange of positions at the request of the Spartans (ch. 46 n., 47). To Athenian sources also we may probably ascribe the depreciatory account of the retreat of the Greek centre (ch. 52, 60) and of its part in the victory (ch. 69), as well as the malevolent anecdotes about the Aeginetans (ch. 78-80, 85). More obviously Attic are the eulogistic legend of Sophanes (ch. 74-5) and the account both of the battle of Mycale (ch. 102-6) and the ensuing siege of Sestos (ch. 114 f.).

In fine, in considering H.'s story of the war in 479 B.C., we must make large allowance for the bias of the Attic informants, on whom he too confidently relied.

**§ 2. Political and military problems of the campaigns.** Besides the difficulty of discovering and valuing the sources used by H., the campaigns of 479 B.C. are full of problems, partly military and partly political. Yet the purpose of Mardonius to complete the conquest of Greece is clear. So long, however, as the Greeks held the Isthmus and retained the command of the sea, the Peloponnesus was safe. Accordingly his first plan was to regain naval superiority by detaching Athens from the Greek confederacy (viii. 136 f.). Even when Alexander's mission had

failed (winter 480-479 B. C.) he did not despair, but endeavoured to coerce where he could not persuade (ix. 1 f.). Possibly he also had a promise from the Argives (ix. 12) that they in concert with other Peloponnesian malcontents (ix. 10 n.) would hinder the Spartans from marching to the Isthmus, and hoped to carry the wall before they arrived. When these schemes miscarried, he showed sound military judgement in retreating to Boeotia, and attempting to entice the Greeks to give battle on ground favourable to his cavalry.

The political and strategic problems on the Greek side were far more complicated. There can be little doubt that the Greek leaders recognized the necessity of an offensive campaign to drive Mardonius from Northern Greece. But there might well be a question whether he should be attacked directly, or whether the land operations should be confined to the occupation of some strong line of defence (e. g. the Isthmus or Mount Cithaeron) and the fleet alone be used for offensive purposes. If the Greek fleet, now supreme in the Aegean, were sent to stir up revolt in Ionia and to cut the Persian communications at the Hellespont and Bosphorus, Mardonius might be compelled to retire without a blow. Even if it were resolved that, as in 480 B. C., both fleet and army should take part in the work, there was still a doubt whether the primary object should be the direct defeat of Mardonius, or a vigorous offensive on the coast of Asia Minor. Curiously enough it was the land power, Sparta, which was eager for maritime warfare, and the sea power, Athens, which insisted on an offensive campaign in Boeotia. Sparta, fearful of Helot revolt, of Argive hostility, and of Arcadian disaffection (ix. 10 n.), might well shrink from an encounter with Mardonius, if it could be evaded by a diversion in the Aegean. But the Athenians were not disposed again to sacrifice their land and city, still less would they risk the safety of the refugees on Salamis, by sending their whole fleet across the sea. They saw that no naval victory, however decisive, would relieve them of the constant hostility of the Boeotians and other Medizing Greeks, even if it entailed the withdrawal of Mardonius. Further, it would diminish the value of the Athenian fleet in the eyes of Sparta, since there could be no more question of a Persian attack on Peloponnesians. It might, indeed, have enabled Sparta to pursue her own ends there, while she left Athens to make head against the disloyal powers of Northern Greece. Hence Athens demanded the removal of the more immediate danger before she undertook distant adventures. The result of this division of interests was that the Greeks were dilatory and backward in both spheres of action. Leotychides put out to sea, but he had only 110 ships and dared not venture beyond Delos (viii. 131 f.), while on land the Peloponnesians were content with fortifying the Isthmus, and refused to meet Mardonius in the open field (ix. 7 f.).

It is tempting to connect the extravagant honours paid to

## APPENDIX XXII

Themistocles at Sparta (viii. 124) and his disappearance from the command of the Athenian fleet and army with his advocacy of a vigorous offensive in the Aegean (viii. 100). His fleeting popularity at Sparta, and loss of position at Athens might be due to his support of a plan of campaign favoured by the Lacedaemonians but distasteful to his own countrymen. Yet since within two years Themistocles acts in concert with Aristides in hoodwinking the Spartans (479-8 B. C.), while the latter promotes Themistocles' policy of maritime expansion by the formation of the Delian league (478-7 B. C.), it is more probable that there was an understanding between the leaders. Perhaps Themistocles thought Aristides and Xanthippus better able to put pressure on Sparta, perhaps he had secured a free hand in 480 B. C. by promising them the command in 479 B. C. (Macan, ii. 331 f. ; Munro, J. H. S. xxii. 301).

§ 3. **Connexion between Plataea and Mycale.** In the end a compromise was made between the rival plans of campaign. Athenian urgency drew the Peloponnesians first to Attica and then over Mount Cithaeron, while the fleet at last advanced from Delos to Samos and thence to Mycale (ix. 90). These movements, whether simultaneous or successive, mark in each case the definite adoption of the strategic offensive. Though the campaigns of Plataea and Mycale run their separate course, since the close and constant co-operation of modern warfare was impossible owing to the slowness of communication, there is a real connexion between them. Mardonius, aware that the advance of the Greek fleet might extort his recall from the fears of Xerxes, was naturally eager to take any chance that offered of decisive victory, while Pausanias could afford to await events on the other side of the Aegean and need only accept battle on ground favourable to hoplites. On the other hand, so long as Mardonius held Athens and threatened Salamis, the Greek fleet hesitated to advance. Very possibly the Athenian contingent remained behind to protect the refugees, and only joined Leotychides just before the advance from Delos to Samos.<sup>1</sup>

§ 4. **First stage of the campaign at Plataea.** The opening stage of the Plataean campaign presents no great difficulty, though there is some incompleteness and some unconscious bias in the

<sup>1</sup> Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 147, cf. Macan ii. 336) suggests that the 110 ships of Leotychides at Aegina (viii. 131) are a purely Peloponnesian squadron, the number being reached by subtracting the 200 Attic triremes from *Aeschylus'* total for Salamis, 310. The 250 assigned by Diodorus (xi. 34) to Leotychides at Delos he holds are these 110 Peloponnesians, together with an Athenian contingent of 140, the strength Diodorus (xi. 12) attributes to them at Artemisium. His manipulation of the figures is ingenious rather than convincing; but the arrival of an Athenian reinforcement at Delos would explain the assumption of the offensive. For this the invitation of the Samians (ix. 90) is by itself an insufficient motive, since the similar request of the Chians had been refused (viii. 132).



narrative of Herodotus. It is, however, unfair to convert the general statements that Mardonius pressed forward to Athens (ch. 1) and later retreated by Decelea (ch. 15) into precise declarations that he took his whole force to Athens, and retired to Boeotia by only one route. The true meaning is that Mardonius made Athens his objective and head-quarters, and that he and his staff with the main column fell back by Decelea, Oropus, and Tanagra to a position on the Asopus. There Mardonius encamped, securing the passage of the river by building a fort, which doubtless commanded one of the roads from Athens to Thebes, most probably that by Dryoscephalae (ch. 15 n.). The Greeks thereupon took up a strong position on Mount Cithaeron covering the road from Thebes to Athens by Eleutherae. The simplest explanation is the best, viz. that they marched through the Dryoscephalae pass (ix. 39 n.) and deployed into line of battle on the foothills of Mount Cithaeron (ix. 15, 21 n., 22; Grundy, p. 458). If so, the Megarians in the left centre must have been at the one point assailable by cavalry, on the low ground astride of the road to Thebes, as is shown by their complaint that they alone have borne the whole brunt of the charge (ch. 21). The Attic origin of H.'s account is clearly indicated by the mention of Olympiodorus, and its bias shown by the exaltation of Athenian heroism in volunteering to take the post of danger (ix. 21, 22), since it was the plain duty of the Athenians to succour the hard-pressed Megarians, if, as is probable, they were already arrayed next them in the line of battle (cf. ix. 28). The Persian cavalry was sharply taught the lesson that horsemen cannot on rough ground break steady infantry, while the Greeks may have been led to exaggerate the superiority of hoplites to the light armed troops opposed to them. They had secured the command of the passes and driven the Persians back to the plain of the Asopus.

In this situation both sides were admirably posted for defence but weak for attack. Secure on Mount Cithaeron, the Greeks, who were receiving and expecting (ix. 41, 77) reinforcements from Peloponnese, covered Attica and threatened Boeotia. Mardonius, now on good cavalry ground, with his front protected by the Asopus and an admirable base for supplies behind him in Thebes, naturally refused to repeat the error of a frontal attack on well posted infantry. Thus for some days<sup>1</sup> both sides were content to remain on the defensive: perhaps each general hoped that the other would be foolish enough to attack recklessly.

§ 5. **Second stage in the Plataean campaign.** The second stage in the campaign begins with an unsolved riddle, the advance

<sup>1</sup> We have no means of determining the number of days spent by the Greeks in position on the slopes of Cithaeron, unless, with Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 58) and Macan (ii. 369, 376, 392), we boldly transfer the 8-12 days said to have been spent in the advanced second position on the Asopus to the first stage of the operations.

## APPENDIX XXII

of the Greeks to their second position on the Asopus Ridge. H. has no conception of the importance of this offensive movement, ascribing it to wholly inadequate motives, a good supply of water and convenience of camping (ch. 25). Modern critics (Grundy, p. 473; Munro, J. H. S. xxiv. 158; Woodhouse, J. H. S. xviii. 41, 45) tend to rush into the other extreme, and attribute to Pausanias an elaborate manœuvre designed to turn the enemy's right and drive him off his line of communications. Such a scheme, which would involve crossing the Asopus and fighting in the open plain, would surely have been too rash in face of the unchallenged superiority of the Persian cavalry. However much Pausanias had been encouraged by the repulse of Masistius, he can hardly have ignored the difference between the defence of a well-chosen position and an attack on the open plain. The object of the advance was doubtless to bring on a battle, but most probably the Greek general hoped by threatening the Persian right to draw the enemy across the Asopus. He had found Mardonius too wary to attack him again on the bastions of Mount Cithaeron, but might he not be tempted to assault the comparatively low and exposed ridge close to the Asopus? (cf. Macan ii. 379). On this hypothesis the Greek general has indeed assumed the offensive strategically, but his object is still to fight a defensive battle on ground suitable to hoplites.

Mardonius refused to be drawn or driven into battle on the ridge. According to H. (ch. 41 n.) he left the Greeks unmolested for eight or ten days. No doubt there is evidence in the advice of the soothsayers (ch. 36, 37) of the unwillingness of both generals to cross the Asopus, and it is clear that Mardonius would secure an enormous tactical advantage by fighting on the plain. Hence he may have delayed in the hope of drawing Pausanias across the river, or to give time for the arrival of Artabazus and his corps.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that a Persian general needed to be taught by a Boeotian the use of cavalry in cutting the enemy's communications (ch. 39), and that he refrained for eight days from sending his horsemen to seize the low ground between the Greeks and Mount Cithaeron. Only so long as he was thus unaccountably supine could Pausanias maintain himself on the exposed Asopus ridge. Further, many of the stories with which H. fills this eight days' interval, the dispute between Athens and Tegea (ch. 26 n., 27), the marching and countermarching of the Spartans and Athenians (ch. 46 n., 47), the Persian council (ch. 41 f.), and the challenge of Mardonius (ch. 47), are justly open to suspicion. In fact if the Greeks really held their second position for ten to twelve days, we

Artabazus, though he is said to have joined Mardonius in Thessaly (viii. 129), does not appear again in the story till his final conference with Mardonius (ix. 41 f.).

know little or nothing of their doings or motives,<sup>1</sup> while Mardonius' long inaction remains unexplained. It is easier to believe that through some error in H.'s diary two or three days have been converted into ten or twelve (ch. 41 n.).

Whether, however, the Greeks held the Asopus ridge for few or many days, it is clear that in the end the Persian archers and cavalry made the position untenable. By cutting the communications they prevented the arrival of supplies and reinforcements (ch. 39, 50), they swept through the trough in the hills round the Greek rear, and they drove them from Gargaphia and the other sources of their water-supply (ch. 49). Retreat was inevitable, and as the Greeks had to cross a mile or more of level ground before they reached the shelter of Mount Cithaeron, the movement must be made by night to escape the attacks of the Persian horse.

§ 6. **The Greek retreat.** This retreat, which led immediately to the final battle, forms the third and last stage of the operations. Confused and uncertain as are many of the details in the traditional account, there can be little doubt of its purpose and objective. The Greek army was clearly intended to ensconce itself on the foothills of Mount Cithaeron between Plataea and Hysiae, but some blunder in the execution of a complicated manoeuvre resulted in the isolation of the three divisions at dawn next day. In H. the failure is ascribed to the precipitate flight of the centre (ch. 52), and to the delay in the retreat of Pausanias caused by the obstinate insubordination of Anompharetus (ch. 53 n., 55, 57); but it would seem that the historian's eyes have been blinded by the prejudices of his Attic informants and his own ignorance of war. He believes that the whole Greek army was to withdraw to the 'Island'. But so large a force could not be cooped up in a position only 'three stades wide' (ch. 51), or even in the somewhat larger area rightly identified by Grundy (p. 480 f.) with the 'Island' of H. (51 n.). Further, it would seem that the centre, now become the left wing, was always intended to take its station, where it actually did, in front of Plataea (52 n.). A mob of fugitives would surely have fled to the one pass left open (Grundy, p. 490), but this division not only halted and piled arms regularly in its new position, but was ready next morning on receiving tidings of the fighting (or perhaps orders from Pausanias, ch. 69 n.) to march in two brigades to the aid of the Spartans and Athenians. Indeed Plutarch (de Malig. 42, p. 872 F) declares that H. stood alone in regarding their absence from the field of battle as a proof that they were traitors. Again Pausanias himself seems to have nearly reached his appointed station. Unfortunately we cannot locate with certainty the Moloeis or the temple of Demeter (ch. 57 n.), while the 'Argiopian land' is wholly unknown.

<sup>1</sup> Grundy's hypothesis (p. 479 n.) of a threefold development of this second position rests on very slight foundations.

## APPENDIX XXII

But it is significant that H. gives the distance from Gargaphia to the Island as ten stades (ch. 51), and the distance the Spartans retreated as also ten stades (ch. 57).<sup>1</sup> Pausanias neither reached nor probably ever intended to reach the Island, but presumably was well on his way to a position in line with it to the right, in front of Grundy's second pass (ch. 59 n.), since one great object of the retreat was to secure the passes (ch. 51). In the morning the Spartans and Tegeans awaited attack in perfect order, though they had become separated from the other divisions of the Greek army.

The greatest difficulty is the position and conduct of the Athenians. Clearly by failing to reach their appointed station, 'the Island', they were largely responsible for the gap in the Greek line. But there may well have been a better reason for their failure than distrust of the Spartans (ch. 54 n.). The manœuvre ordered was complicated if, as seems probable, the contingents in the Greek centre were first to retire south-west on Plataea to form the new left wing, and afterwards the Athenians were to move south-east across their track to the Island in the centre of the new line.<sup>2</sup> How easily in a night march might an unexpected obstacle delay the first movement, and thus render the second impossible. We cannot definitely apportion the blame to the different Greek army corps, but on their own admission the Athenians were late in starting, and at dawn next day were still on the open plain, not in position on the Island.

§ 7. **The battle of Plataea.** When day dawned the Greek army had split up into three separate corps, which were apparently in full retreat. Mardonius naturally thought he had the opportunity of striking a decisive blow, and that he (cf. *sup.*) need no longer run the risks involved in waiting for his cavalry to compel the Greeks to withdraw. But though the symmetry of the Greek order was gone, the position was by no means desperate. The Spartans and Tegeans steadily bore the brunt of the main attack; the Athenians, though caught on the plain, fought bravely with the Greek allies of the Persian, while the other contingents hastened to the support of the corps actually engaged. And on the Persian side the left wing alone under Mardonius pressed the attack with its whole heart. Of the Medizing Greeks on the right only the Boeotians made any serious effort to turn the fortunes of the day. Artabazus, presumably in the centre, failed miserably to support Mardonius, and apparently beat a retreat with his corps intact. In fact the fate of the battle hung on the encounter between the protagonists on either side, the

<sup>1</sup> All MSS. and all editors before Hude read δέκα, τέσσαρα is an emendation by Pingel.

<sup>2</sup> This may be inferred from the actual position of the centre (ch. 52) and from the declared intention to retreat to the Island (ch. 51), but the absence of any direct statement that the Athenians were to be moved from the left wing is remarkable. Possibly it is due to the bias of H.'s Attic source.

Spartans and the Persians. In this combat Pausanias showed high qualities as a commander. He kept his men well in hand while the Persians stormed rashly up the slope against him, showering darts and arrows upon the Spartan ranks (ch. 64 n.). Only when the enemy's infantry was irretrievably committed to a battle at close quarters, did the Spartan hoplites charge, crash through the shield-wall, and engage the Persians in stubborn if unequal combat. Mardonius, after vainly striving to rally his broken ranks, fell fighting; with him disappeared the Persians' last faint hope of victory. Though still covered by their cavalry, the barbarians fled in hopeless disorder to their fortified camp, to make a last stand within its walls. Meanwhile the Athenians had driven off the Boeotians, a task which may well have been rendered easier by the diversion of the Theban cavalry. Probably the rout of the men of Megara and Phlius took place while they were hurrying to the help of the Athenians in their struggle with the Boeotians, and thus contributed to the eventual victory of the Athenians. The last act of all was the junction of the Greek forces in the attack on the Persian fort, the storming of its wall, and the indiscriminate massacre of the barbarians who had taken refuge there.

It is clear that Plataea is in the main a soldier's battle. The plans of the Greek leaders seem to have been well laid, but, like many another elaborate scheme of operations, they had been marred by faults in their execution. Nevertheless, the retreat by its very faults secured its main object, since it drew Mardonius across the Asopus to fight at close quarters on ground favourable to infantry. Under these conditions the courage and steadiness of the hoplite plucked victory out of strategic failure. The highest meed of praise (and, if we might believe Diodorus (xi. 33), the actual *aristeia*) was given of right to Pausanias and his Spartans, but whatever may have been the errors of the Greek left and centre during the night march, on the actual day of battle all did their best. The smaller contingents, slight as was their share in the victory, at least hurried to join their more successful comrades, while the Athenians by sheer hard fighting drove back the Medizing Greeks opposed to them. The crowning victory of the Persian war was no heaven-sent miracle, but the natural result of better arms, better discipline, and better tactics.

§ 8. **Mycale.** The story of Mycale given in H. evades detailed criticism by its slightness. As has been already suggested, the squadron of 110 ships gathered at Aegina may have been doubled when Leotychides sailed to Samos and Mycale. Such a reinforcement would explain his assumption of the offensive and the abandonment by the Persians of all resistance at sea. Further, the marines from 110 ships would have numbered at most some 3,300 men, a force surely inadequate for the storming of the Persian camp. It is true that H. may well be mistaken in assigning



## APPENDIX XXII

a whole Persian army corps (60,000 men) to its defence, and may also have undervalued the aid given to the Greeks by their Ionian kinsmen (Diod. xi. 36; ch. 103 n.); still it would seem more probable that the Greek marines at Mycale were some 6,000 strong, and that the total of their ships should be raised proportionally. The assurance of victory given by the supernatural 'Rumour' and the herald's staff would seem to be a genuine tradition, however we explain it (ch. 100 n.). Nor do the other details of the action on which suspicion has been thrown really discredit the story of the fighting. The separation of the two wings, the shield-wall and its breach, the last struggle in the fortified camp, and its close on the arrival of the other wing of the Greek force, have been regarded as vain repetitions of incidents properly belonging to Plataea. But these events being for the most part natural consequences of the Persian methods of fighting and of fortification must of necessity recur. And there are important differences. At Mycale the Greeks were throughout the attacking party, hence the station on the level, which at Plataea was a hindrance, was at Mycale a distinct advantage to the Athenians; at Mycale also the left wing in general, and in particular the Athenians, were adjudged worthy of the prize of valour. Tradition here is supported by the subsequent course of events, since the high repute of Athens among the Greeks of Asia after the war, though no doubt due in part to the sentiment of kinship (ch. 106) and to the perseverance shown by her generals in the siege of Sestos (ch. 117) is best explained, if the Athenians displayed at Mycale a courage and skill comparable with that which had already won the greater triumph of Salamis.

In this Appendix my thanks are specially due to Grundy (Great Persian War) for the survey and topography of Plataea, and to Woodhouse (J. H. S. xviii. 33-59), Munro (J. H. S. xxiv. 144-65), and Macan (especially vol. ii. 326-97) for their criticism of H. Munro (C.A.H. iv. 317-46) restates his views on the campaigns of 479 B.C., while Wells (Stud. Herod. 158-63) defends the narrative of Herodotus; cf. also Kromayer (*op. cit.* p. 209).

### ADDITIONAL NOTE ON PLATAEA.

The account of Plataea here given depends on the analysis of H.'s sources and on the recognition of an Athenian bias in the historian's narrative derived from them. It is, however, right to say that this view is not accepted by some modern critics, e.g. by Grundy. In favour of H.'s account it may be urged:

1. It is in the main supported by the secondary authorities, Diodorus and Plutarch in the life of Aristides. It is of course attacked in the *de Malignitate Herodoti* (ch. 41-3), but even there the only fresh evidence consists in some rather vague inscriptions.

2. It is at any rate not inconsistent with the topography of the battlefield.

3. The atmosphere of mutual suspicion between the Spartans and Athenians (ch. 54 n.) is that which Thucydides describes as prevailing shortly after the victory (i. 98), and is curiously like that in the allied armies at Waterloo. Cf. for Gneisenau's suspicion of Wellington, Müffling, *Passages from my Life*, p. 212, and Pflugk-Hartung, *Aus den Tagen des 17.-18. Juni 1815*, pp. 188-90.

4. Though there are improbabilities, little or nothing that is actually impossible is related as fact by the historian.

The story of the night march is a test case. Here the direct evidence, except that of the *de Malignitate*, is for the misconduct of the minor contingents and of Amonpharetus; the failure of the Athenians is a matter of inference.

In fine, while every one would admit that H.'s ignorance of strategy and tactics has prevented him from understanding the plans and motives of the generals, and has made his account incomplete even as a record of fact, many would still deny that it is misleading.

## APPENDIX XXIII

### ARMS, TACTICS, AND STRATEGY IN THE PERSIAN WAR

AT all times arms, tactics, and strategy must be in one sense or another interdependent. But in modern warfare I imagine it would be generally agreed that strategy was less mutable and more important than tactics or armament. Even here there are obvious and notable exceptions to the general rule. In the Austro-Prussian War it was the superiority of the Prussian breech-loading needle-gun to the Austrian muzzle-loader which won the battle of Königgratz and so justified the bold strategy of Moltke. In the late war the heavy German and Austrian howitzers broke down with unexpected rapidity the resistance of the elaborate Belgian fortresses, and thus compelled the retreat from Mons; again, the use of tanks, both heavy and light, on a large scale was a decisive factor in more than one of the great struggles that led up to the final defeat of the Germans. Nevertheless in modern warfare such differences are in the main temporary and accidental; if, for instance, the Germans began the war with superior heavy artillery, before its close they were surpassed by the Allies; if they secured an initial advantage by the use of poison gas, here too the Allies in the end showed themselves superior to the inventors of this deadly instrument of war. The advantage gained by inventors is mainly that of surprise, and is therefore evanescent, not permanent. In

the main the fleets and armies on either side are equipped in the same way, and (if we leave out of account the morale, numbers, and resources of the nations engaged) victories are gained and wars decided most of all by strategy, the massing of troops at the right time and place, and secondarily by tactics, the best use of them in actual battle.

But in many ancient and medieval campaigns, and in particular, as I shall hope to show, in the Persian War, the case is quite different. The wars I mean are those fought between two widely separated races accustomed to a different physical environment. Then it may naturally happen that each race or nation has developed an armament and a style of fighting suitable to the nature of the country in which it dwells, and is practically unable to alter its national arms and tactics. In such cases it will be the rule rather than the exception that the nature and character of the arms used by the two nations will determine the tactics, and the tactics in turn the strategy of the campaign. The reason for this is that the issue of a battle may often depend entirely on the nature of the ground on which it is fought; hence it will often be the main object of a general's strategy to compel or induce the enemy to fight on ground which decisively favours one method of fighting or fatally handicaps another.

The best examples which history offers of this are the great struggles in ancient or medieval times between East and West. Here as a rule the opposing armies differ entirely in character. The Western nation is apt to rely on solid masses of heavy-armed warriors, the Eastern on cavalry and archers skirmishing in open order. This contrast is nowhere better seen than in the Persian War, but something like the same difference meets us again in later history, in the wars of Rome with Parthia, or in the Crusades, though in them, while the Orientals still trust to light horse and archers, the men of the West rely no longer solely or mainly on infantry, but on heavy-armed horsemen, supported by infantry armed with missiles. But the conditions of victory and defeat as outlined by Sir C. Oman<sup>1</sup> are highly significant. He notes that 'against the Turk the Crusaders were generally successful if they took care (1) to combine their cavalry with a solid body of infantry armed with missile weapons, (2) to fight on ground where the infidel could not employ his usual Parthian tactics of surrounding and harassing the enemy' (e.g. at the battle of Antioch, A.D. 1098). 'If, on the other hand, the Frank chose to advance recklessly into unknown ground in desolate regions, where he could be surrounded, harassed, and finally worn out' (as at Carrhae, A.D. 1104), 'he was liable to suffer terrible disasters.' Yet more instructive are the wars between Rome and Parthia. The Parthians relied in the main on cavalry,

<sup>1</sup> History of the Art of War i. 296.

their infantry being practically worthless. But they had not only mounted archers, but also heavy cavalry, armed with lances and protected, both man and horse, with coats of mail.<sup>1</sup> The strength of Rome, at least till Diocletian, was the legionary infantry, which, though it was far more mobile than the hoplite-phalanx and possessed in the *pilum* some means of reply to attack from a distance, was yet quite unable to close with a cavalry force on open ground. The legion remained invincible in the hilly and broken country suitable for its arms and tactics, but on the sandy plains of Mesopotamia it was at a hopeless disadvantage. The Parthian horse-archers could swarm round the Romans, shooting them down from a safe distance; then, if the Roman horse and light-armed were ordered to drive them off, they would retreat before them, and as soon as the Roman horse and auxiliaries got separated from the legions, they were again harassed and shot down by the Parthian horse-bowmen and finally overwhelmed by the mail-clad lancers. Such was the fate of young Crassus near Carrhae; and after his fall the main body of infantry was a yet more helpless prey to the encircling foe. No doubt the ineptitude of the Roman commander contributed to the appalling disaster of Carrhae; but even Antony, a leader of great resolution and resource in adversity, seems to have been only saved from a similar fate in 36 B. C. during his retreat from Media because he was able to reach in time the shelter of the hills.

In this dependence of the relative efficiency of the two armies on the nature of the ground the Persian War resembles the Parthian campaigns of the Romans. Indeed, though neither army is so well equipped, the contrast between the two is even greater. The Roman legion was far more mobile than the hoplite-phalanx; it had a missile, though but of short range, in the *pilum*, and was better, though still inadequately, supported by light troops and horse. And, on the other side, the Parthian had efficient heavy cavalry, fit for a decisive charge, while the Persian eschewed shock tactics and relied entirely on shooting or throwing missiles. In consequence, the unsupported Greek hoplite is even more helpless than the legionary on the plain, the Persian cavalry far less fitted than the Parthian to engage in hand-to-hand fighting.

It may perhaps seem that an even closer parallel might be found in the campaigns and battles of Alexander. But further examination does not confirm this view. For in these battles both sides possessed efficient cavalry and a hoplite-phalanx. Darius and his lieutenants strove to make good their acknowledged deficiency in solid infantry by enlisting large numbers of Greek mercenaries. At Issus he is said to have mustered 30,000, a number greater than that of the heavy-armed infantry on the other side, and both at the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dio Cass. xl. 15; Plutarch, Crass. 24 f.

Granicus and at Arbela the Persians put great faith in these foreign mercenaries. And, on the other side, though the Macedonian phalanx proved itself a strong tower of defence, superior in quality to the hoplites opposed to it, its notorious defects as an attacking force, so fatal to it when opposed to the legion at Cynoscephalae and Pydna, might already have been discerned at Issus and Arbela. In point of fact Alexander always used his heavy cavalry to make the decisive attack, and it was in this arm even more than in infantry that he excelled the Persians, who still failed to grasp the superiority of shock tactics. His task might have been rendered more difficult had Darius understood how to use the open plain of Arbela to the best advantage. He should have exhausted the Western army by surrounding and harassing it with swarms of archers and light horsemen, instead of trying to crush it by mere weight of numbers. The incompetence of the Persian king and the inferiority of his troops make these battles resemble rather 'the early English battles in India, where the few striking boldly at the many were so often victorious in spite of every disadvantage'. As the Crusading knights were certain to defeat the undisciplined masses of Egyptian lancers, 'provided they had infantry with them to serve as a support and rallying point for the cavalry',<sup>1</sup> so Alexander's Macedonian horsemen, supported by the phalanx, could face with confidence the hosts of Darius. His victories are essentially the triumph of quality over quantity, not of infantry over cavalry.

Now doubtless the Persian War too was in a sense a triumph of the same kind, nor do I mean to deny that the greatest lesson of the struggle is the superiority of the ordered and disciplined freedom of the city state to the vast but amorphous empires of the East. But from a purely military point of view the superiority is not altogether on one side. The grossly exaggerated numbers given by Herodotus,<sup>2</sup> and his vivid picture of all the peoples, nations, and languages believed by him to have been mustered under the banners of Xerxes,<sup>3</sup> have made an ineffaceable but rather misleading impression on history. I do not doubt that the Persian fleet and army was immensely superior in numbers,<sup>4</sup> but its inferiority in quality is largely a question of the particular circumstances of the fighting. In organization and in the technical side of war there is some ground for believing that the Persian was actually superior. Although Dr. Delbrück's<sup>5</sup> contrast between the Persians as 'professional soldiers' (*Berufskrieger*) and the Greeks as a citizen militia (*Bürgeraufgebote*) is exaggerated, yet the proportion of professional soldiers on the Greek side (the Spartiates) must have been smaller than that on the Persian, where at least the Immortals, and probably the other Persians, the Medes, the Assyrians, and the Egyptians were regular

<sup>1</sup> Oman, *loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Cf. App. XIX.

<sup>2</sup> vii. 184-6.

<sup>3</sup> vii. 61-99.

<sup>5</sup> Geschichte der Kriegskunst, i<sup>2</sup>, p. 48.



## THE PERSIAN WAR

soldiers. Again, there is good evidence<sup>1</sup> of a complete system of officering and organization on a decimal basis in the Persian army, while it may well be doubted if the citizen militia of the ordinary Greek state were as well found in this respect. Clearly even in 418 B. C. the elaborate Spartan system of officers remained a bright exception to the general lack of organization in Greek armies.<sup>2</sup> Further, the technical branches in the army of Xerxes seem to have been excellent. If we take engineering, the royal road through Thrace inspired the barbarous tribes with awe<sup>3</sup> and remained in use for at least two centuries,<sup>4</sup> while the bridge over the Hellespont<sup>5</sup> and the canal through the Athos<sup>6</sup> peninsula have served ever since 'to point a moral and adorn a tale'. Yet we should not allow the fertile imaginations or the perverse misinterpretations of Greek and Roman writers to blind us to the boldness of design and skill in execution shown in these great engineering works. Again, the extensive and successful commissariat of the Persian host appears in Herodotus (vii. 118 f.) disguised in the garb of the ruinous cost of feeding the great king. Yet the foresight shown in accumulating large stores of provisions at various points on the route,<sup>7</sup> and the fact that there is no hint of a failure in the commissariat at least during the advance of Xerxes, surely indicate considerable prudence and power of organization in the higher command of the army. Lastly, if the use of fire-signals is as familiar to the Greek as to the Persian,<sup>8</sup> the care taken by the Persians to mark a dangerous reef<sup>9</sup> or, again, the appliances used by them in the treatment of wounds,<sup>10</sup> evidently excite the surprise as well as the admiration of the Greek historian.

We must now consider more in detail the arms and tactics of the forces which confronted each other at Marathon, Thermopylae, and Plataea. The Greek army admits of a simple description; it was throughout a hoplite-phalanx composed of infantry heavily armed with helmet, shield, cuirass, and greaves, having short swords, but trusting for offensive purposes most to the thrusting spear (seven to eight feet long) and to the weight and solidity of their serried ranks of shields and breastplates. In no battle had the Greeks any cavalry; indeed at Plataea the best horsemen in Greece, the Boeotians and Thessalians, were fighting in the Persian ranks.<sup>11</sup> Light-armed men were present in large numbers at Plataea<sup>12</sup> (and possibly at Marathon and Thermopylae<sup>13</sup>), but their military value must have been small, since the only corps to whom effective service

<sup>1</sup> P. 367 and H. vii. 81.

<sup>3</sup> H. vii. 115.

<sup>6</sup> Ib. vii. 22 f., 37.

<sup>8</sup> Ib. vii. 183; ix. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Ib. vii. 181.

<sup>12</sup> Ib. ix. 28, 29.

<sup>2</sup> Thuc. v. 66.

<sup>4</sup> Liv. xxxix. 27.

<sup>5</sup> H. vii. 36.

<sup>7</sup> Ib. vii. 25.

<sup>9</sup> Ib. vii. 183.

<sup>11</sup> Ib. ix. 31, 68.

<sup>13</sup> Ib. vii. 229 n.; viii. 25.

## APPENDIX XXIII

is ascribed, or of whom it is expected, is that of Athenian archers.<sup>1</sup> It may be that the Greeks still looked with contempt on light troops. Instances of their effective use are practically unknown before the Peloponnesian War, and even then light troops can only defeat hoplites when the ground is too rough and broken for the hoplite-phalanx, as in Aetolia<sup>2</sup> or on Sphacteria,<sup>3</sup> or when working in combination with cavalry, as before Spartolus,<sup>4</sup> Amphipolis,<sup>5</sup> and Syracuse.<sup>6</sup> Probably, however, none of the loyal Greek states possessed as early as 480 B.C. any organized force of peltasts, so that the absence of effective light troops at Plataea was not due to choice but, like that of cavalry, to necessity.

The hoplite-phalanx advanced into battle in close order. Not only was it of supreme importance to keep the line unbroken, but, further, each man naturally tried to shelter his unprotected right side under the shield of the man next him.<sup>7</sup> Hence the Greeks fought in compact masses without marked intervals. The desire to throw the full weight of their force into the first charge led them to neglect the use of reserves. The depth of their formation varied, but I think we are justified in taking eight as the normal depth in the fifth century. It is true that Xenophon (*Anab.* i. 2. 4) calls a depth of four the 'customary order' of the Ten Thousand, 401 B.C., but this is clearly a minimum.<sup>8</sup> It was the depth of the English dismounted men-at-arms at Agincourt, where their numbers were scanty. Even the thin red British line was never less than two deep, nor could such a line hope to resist the shock of cavalry or the weight of a column before the days of fire-arms. Indeed it may well be doubted whether a formation only four deep, possible though it was for the practised mercenaries of Cyrus, could have been successfully employed by the citizen militias of the fifth century. At any rate the Athenians are eight deep at Delium<sup>9</sup> in 424 B.C., and again at Peiraeus<sup>10</sup> in 403 B.C., while before Syracuse, in 415 B.C., they fight in two divisions, each of which is eight deep.<sup>11</sup> Again, the average though not the uniform depth of the Spartans at Mantinea in 418 B.C. is eight,<sup>12</sup> and Dercyllidas marshals the rather mixed force with which in 397 B.C. he faced Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus eight deep.<sup>13</sup> And even when an army is drawn up in deeper formation there seems to be some tendency to keep to a multiple of four or eight; for instance, the Spartans at Leuctra

<sup>1</sup> H. ix. 22, 60.

<sup>2</sup> Thuc. iii. 97 f.

<sup>3</sup> Ib. iv. 33 f.

<sup>4</sup> Ib. ii. 79.

<sup>5</sup> Ib. v. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Ib. vii. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ib. v. 71.

<sup>8</sup> The story that the Spartans fought at Dipaea in a single unsupported line (*Isocr.* *Archid.* § 99) may be confidently regarded as a fiction of rhetoric.

<sup>9</sup> Thuc. iv. 94.

<sup>10</sup> Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4, 34.

<sup>11</sup> Thuc. vi. 67.

<sup>12</sup> Ib. v. 68.

<sup>13</sup> Xen. *Hell.* iii. 2, 16.

## THE PERSIAN WAR

were twelve deep,<sup>1</sup> and the Syracusans before Syracuse sixteen.<sup>2</sup> Most significant, too, is the agreement among the allies in the Corinthian War in 394 B.C. that no contingent should be drawn up more than sixteen deep,<sup>3</sup> since it shows that the Greeks were well aware that each state might selfishly try to secure for its own contingent the advantages of depth and weight in a column, even at the cost of allowing the enemy to outflank the allied forces. It is even more significant that it was the Boeotians who in the battle of Corinth broke this agreement and deepened their column,<sup>4</sup> since the deep column was characteristic of Theban tactics<sup>5</sup> long before its supreme development by Epaminondas, whose ranks at Leuctra were fifty deep.<sup>6</sup> Such a depth in any other Greek force is always due to lack of space to deploy, as when the troops of the Thirty Tyrants form in a column fifty deep on the road to Munychia.<sup>7</sup> Possibly these high figures are round numbers and really represent depths of twenty-four and forty-eight; in any case we are justified in regarding eight as the normal depth of a Greek phalanx, and probably in taking a depth of four as the irreducible minimum and one of twelve or sixteen as the deepened or double phalanx.

The tactics of the hoplite-phalanx were of the simplest kind. It advanced in a compact mass and relied for success on the weight of its onset, the thrust of its spears, and the push of its shields.<sup>8</sup> Where both sides fought with determination superior weight triumphed, as at Sellasia.<sup>9</sup> But the Greek leaders had to face a new problem in the Persian War. The phalanx, whether Greek or Macedonian, could only act to the best advantage on level ground<sup>10</sup> and was apt to lose cohesion in rough and broken country, as at Cynoscephalae.<sup>11</sup> But to risk envelopment by the Persian cavalry on the open plain was manifestly absurd for a purely hoplite force. Alexander could do so, because his phalanx was flanked and covered by light troops and cavalry. But in the Persian War the Greek leaders needed a position easily defensible against cavalry, which yet allowed them, if opportunity offered, to turn defence into attack. The mere blocking of passes might be useful, as at Thermopylae, for defence, but gave no opportunity of counter-attack. What was needed was a line of hills looking down upon a plain, as at Marathon and Plataea. If the Persian could only be induced to attack the Greek army while its flanks and rear were securely covered by the hills, the superiority of the hoplite in hand-

<sup>1</sup> Ib. vi. 4, 12.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Hell. iv. 2, 13 and 18.

<sup>5</sup> The Thebans were twenty-five deep at Delium in 424 B.C. (Thuc. iv. 93).

<sup>6</sup> Xen. Hell. vi. 4, 12.

<sup>8</sup> H. vii. 225; ix. 62. Thuc. iv. 96.

<sup>10</sup> Thuc. iv. 33 f.

<sup>2</sup> Thuc. vi. 67.

<sup>4</sup> Ib. iv. 2, 18.

<sup>7</sup> Ib. ii. 4, 11.

<sup>9</sup> Polyb. ii. 69.

<sup>11</sup> Polyb. xviii. 14.

## APPENDIX XXIII

to-hand fighting would ensure his victory. And even if the barbarian avoided this error, some happy chance, such as the temporary absence of the Persian horse, might enable the Greek general to leave the shelter of the hills and strike a decisive blow without any serious risk of being outflanked and encircled. In any case such a position, difficult enough to find, offered the Greek leaders their one and only chance of combining secure defence with the hope of a victorious and decisive counter-offensive.

It is much more difficult to form any clear and consistent idea of Persian arms and tactics. In the great host so vividly pictured by Herodotus (vii. 61-99) there are some seventeen styles of armament.<sup>1</sup> Even if we disregard the picturesque but utterly useless outlying barbarians, such as the Indians, Ethiopians, Libyans, and Arabians, we must recognize at least four widely divergent types. These are—

1. The light-armed footmen from Anatolia, whose characteristic weapons are the small round targe and the javelin.<sup>2</sup>

2. The heavy-armed infantry, with metal helmets, large shields, and some form of cuirass, and for offence spear and sword or dagger. To this type belong the Asiatic Greeks and their neighbours, the Lydians,<sup>3</sup> Carians, Pamphylians, and Cypriots,<sup>4</sup> and with minor variations, the Assyrians,<sup>5</sup> Egyptians, and Phoenicians.<sup>6</sup> It should, however, be noted that all of these except the Lydians and Assyrians fight exclusively or principally as marines.

In broad contrast with these two types are the nations who fight both on foot and on horseback and who rely principally or exclusively on the bow.

3. The pure Iranian type, if we may believe Herodotus (vii. 64-8), had no defensive armour, and for hand-to-hand work relied mainly on the dagger, though the Bactrians have short spears and the Scyths axes.

4. The Medo-Persic,<sup>7</sup> which besides the bow and dagger includes a spear, a wicker shield, and in some cases a corselet.<sup>8</sup>

It is obvious that the proper use of such very diverse forces is a far more difficult problem than that of a hoplite-phalanx. Possibly if the Persian king had been a military genius, he might have perceived that his chief need was to develop and improve his heavy infantry so as to hold the Greek hoplites in front, while his archers, javelin-men, and horsemen assailed their flanks and rear. The English combination of dismounted men-at-arms with flanking forces of archers proved just as fatal to the solid columns of Scottish spearmen from the days of Dupplin Muir and Halidon Hill<sup>9</sup> (A.D.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 151 and Macan, H. vii-ix, vol. ii, pp. 167-76.

<sup>2</sup> H. vii. 72-9, 91-2.

<sup>4</sup> Ib. vii. 90, 93-5.

<sup>6</sup> Ib. vii. 89.

<sup>8</sup> Ib. viii. 113; ix. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Ib. vii. 74.

<sup>5</sup> Ib. vii. 63.

<sup>7</sup> Ib. vii. 61-2.

<sup>9</sup> Oman, *op. cit.* ii. 101-8.

## THE PERSIAN WAR

1332-3) to the more famous field of Flodden (A.D. 1513) as it did to the chivalry of France at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. But in 480 B. C. the heavy infantry were mainly used as marines; and the Persian vainly trusted to overwhelm the hoplite with horsemen and archers only, on ground little suited to them. As things were, the masses of inferior infantry proved rather a hindrance than a help, since their comparative immobility made it possible for the Greeks to close with them, whereas the cavalry unhampered might perhaps have pursued with success the Parthian tactics of drawing the enemy on to open ground, where he could be surrounded, harassed, and finally worn out.

On their side the Greeks must surely have realized the decisive advantages they possessed for fighting hand to hand in their longer spears and more complete panoply. These are the simple military lessons drawn from Thermopylae and Plataea by Herodotus (vii. 211; ix. 62-3). Whether they had been anticipated by Aristagoras<sup>1</sup> may well be doubted; but Marathon at least had demonstrated the superiority of the Greek hoplite on his own ground to the best warriors of the East. I cannot, however, take Marathon as an instance of my thesis that tactics dominate strategy, because I still hold that the strategy of that campaign was dictated by political motives.<sup>2</sup> On this theory the Persians were anxious to draw the field army as far as possible from Athens, so that their partisans within the walls might have a chance of betraying the city to them; while Miltiades felt bound to face them in the field, because to remain within the walls would have been to forfeit any claim on the succour of Sparta<sup>3</sup> and to expose Athens to the fate of Eretria.<sup>4</sup> But so long as the whole Persian force lay inactive at Marathon he could safely remain on the defensive; when a part was re-embarked to sail round to Athens and stir up sedition there he seized the chance of attacking the remnant left at Marathon, probably in the absence of their formidable cavalry.<sup>5</sup>

The tactics of course depend on the weapons of the two armies. The whole object of the Athenian charge is to get to close quarters with as little loss as possible from the Persian archers. It is worth observing that a charge at the double when within bowshot of the enemy, preceded by a steady slow advance, is exactly the manoeuvre attributed to Clearchus at Cunaxa both by Diodorus (xiv. 23. 1) and by Polyænus (ii. 2. 3). The statement is probably untrue, since it contradicts the eye-witness Xenophon (Anab. i. 8. 18), but as it would appear to come from Ephorus, it shows that in the fourth century this was recognized as the proper way to attack archers.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H. v. 49 and 97.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 358 f., 419, and Munro in J. H. S. xix. 188 f.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. J. H. S. xxxix. 53.

<sup>4</sup> H. vi. 109; cf. 100-1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Suidas, *χαρὶς ἰππέως*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. C. Q. xiii. 42.



## APPENDIX XXIII

The other noticeable point in the tactics of Miltiades, the weakening of the centre<sup>1</sup> while the wings are kept strong, admits of a simple explanation. No doubt he may have been taking advantage of accidental peculiarities in the ground, but this hypothesis is not necessary. The fear of being outflanked would lead him to diminish the depth of his centre, perhaps from eight to four, so as to increase perhaps to double its length; while he would keep his wings in deeper formation, probably the normal eight deep, so that if after all he was outflanked, he might be strong at the exposed points. Miltiades was certainly not anticipating the tactics of Epaminondas, since the essence of that general's dispositions was to attack in heavy column on the one wing, his own left, while he refused battle with the other; Miltiades, on the other hand, was strong on both wings, weak only in the centre. Finally, we may remark that bold as was Miltiades' advance, it was not, assuming the absence of cavalry, rash or ill-advised. Owing to the smallness of the plain at Marathon, it was impossible for the Persians to avoid the shock of the charging hoplites, even if they wished to do so, because they were pinned between the mountains, the marshes, and the sea. Probably they did not yet recognize the superiority of the hoplite in close fighting; indeed on this occasion their best troops broke the thin Greek lines in the centre. It was only the triumph of the united Greek wings over the Persian centre which finally decided the fate of the battle.<sup>2</sup>

The Greeks who had to face the hosts of Xerxes must have learnt from Marathon their superiority to the Persians at close quarters; but they must also have been aware of the weakness of their heavy infantry on open ground, where the archers and horsemen of the enemy could evade the shock of the hoplites' charge and assail the unprotected flanks and rear of the phalanx. Even if they still despised light troops (cf. *sup.*), they would have feared to face the cavalry. Thessalian horsemen had some thirty years before cut up Spartan infantry on the plain near Athens,<sup>3</sup> just as thirty years later they were able to confine an invading Athenian army to the immediate neighbourhood of its camp.<sup>4</sup> The later experiences of the Athenians before Syracuse<sup>5</sup> do but confirm the rather obvious lesson of the effectiveness of cavalry both in cutting off stragglers and in a flank attack on hoplites. On an open plain the hoplites, unable to come to close quarters, with cavalry sweeping round their flanks and archers shooting them down from a distance, would have been in a desperate position. One case quoted to the contrary, the successful retreat of the Ten Thousand, does not, I think, hold good. The Greek leaders were at first utterly depressed by their lack of

<sup>1</sup> H. vi. 111 n. and Munro in C. A. H. iv. 246-7.

<sup>2</sup> H. vi. 113.

<sup>4</sup> Thuc. i. 111.

<sup>3</sup> Ib. v. 63.

<sup>5</sup> Ib. vii. 4, 6, 13.

## THE PERSIAN WAR

horsemen and the inferiority of the Cretan archers to the Persian.<sup>1</sup> They meet their difficulties partially by improvising a little troop of horse and by discovering some two hundred Rhodian slingers whose range exceeded that of their opponents. Clearly unsupported hoplites would have been a helpless prey. For once I think Dr. Delbrück<sup>2</sup> is right in suggesting that Tissaphernes was not really bent on the immediate destruction of the Ten Thousand, a feat which must have cost much Persian blood, but was content to shepherd them into the Carduchian mountains, in the belief that the fierce tribesmen and severe winters of that inhospitable region would surely make an end of them. It is also true that on one later occasion the Ten Thousand venture to attack the cavalry of Pharnabazus with only infantry supports,<sup>3</sup> their own few horsemen being on the other wing ;<sup>4</sup> but this is just the exception that proves the rule, since Xenophon's chief reason for attacking was that to retreat with the enemy so close at hand was to court disaster.<sup>5</sup> At any rate his hero Agesilaus fully recognized in 395 B.C. that without cavalry he could not venture to meet the Persians on the plains, and set to work to raise an adequate force.<sup>6</sup>

We may be absolutely certain that a feat to which the trained mercenaries of the fourth century were unequal could not have been attempted by the citizen militia a century earlier. This at once rules out the suggestion that the Greeks might have used the ranges round Thessaly as would a modern strategist, i. e. have made no attempt to hold the numerous actual passes, but concentrated a strong force behind, to fall on the enemy's isolated columns as they straggled down from the passes.<sup>7</sup> For if once the Persians got down into the plain, the Greeks must have known they would lose their tactical superiority, unless they were under the delusion that the Thessalian horse was strong enough to meet the Persian. On the other hand, in a narrow pass the well-armed hoplites, trained to act in masses, could and did repulse large numbers of enemies less fully armed and not accustomed to shock tactics. Thus the occupation in succession of Tempe and Thermopylae was clearly the best measure possible. This is true even if their hope and purpose was absolutely to repel the invading host ; but if their immediate object, as is probable, was to fight a delaying action which might give their fleet time and opportunity to strike a decisive blow, then obviously it was better to block the actual passes. And if the utmost that the Peloponnesians in 480 B.C. would attempt north of the Isthmus was to hold up the Persian army for a time and give the Greek fleet a chance, we may understand how they came to entrust the defence of Thermopylae to a really insignificant number of hoplites. In any

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Anab. iii. 3 and 4.

<sup>2</sup> Gesch. der Kriegskunst, i<sup>2</sup>, p. 144.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Anab. vi. 5, 30; cf. § 9.

<sup>4</sup> *loc. cit.* § 28.

<sup>5</sup> *loc. cit.* § 14 f.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. Hell. iii. 4, 15.

<sup>7</sup> Delbrück, *op. cit.* p. 73.

## APPENDIX XXIII

case, till the Persian fleet lost the command of the sea the Greeks limited themselves on land to the most passive form of defence, the holding of the passes and the fortifying of the Isthmus.

But the effect of arms and tactics on strategy comes out most clearly after the defeat of the Persian navy in the campaign of Plataea. The Greeks were now by no means overwhelmingly outnumbered.<sup>1</sup> Indeed if we include in the reckoning the ineffective light-armed Greeks, the totals may have been approximately equal, though the number of hoplites was but a third at most of Mardonius' forces. Yet the Peloponnesians were only driven into action by the open threats of the Athenians,<sup>2</sup> and when they come in contact with the enemy remain at first strictly on the defensive on the bastions of Mount Cithaeron. Pausanias had strong motives for taking the offensive. The need for freeing Greek soil from the barbarian by driving Mardonius from Central Greece was urgent. The Greek citizen militias, like the feudal levies of the Middle Ages, were at all times ill-fitted for a prolonged campaign, forty days being regarded as almost a limit.<sup>3</sup> In this case the difficulty of keeping them together for any length of time was increased by the composition of the Greek army. In its ranks there were contingents from some two dozen states, eight of whom contributed substantial forces, a thousand or more hoplites.<sup>4</sup> Since Pausanias resisted these inducements to attack, he must have been convinced of the necessity of avoiding action on ground suitable for the operations of cavalry. Mardonius on his side was eager to fight, since he must have known that the advance of the Greek fleet across the Aegean might cause Xerxes to recall him to defend Ionia. But Mardonius too, after the first repulse of his cavalry,<sup>5</sup> was only willing to fight on ground of his own choosing. The position was almost a stalemate. Both sides were in the strongest position for defence. Pausanias, well posted on the slopes of Mount Cithaeron, covered the ways to the Isthmus, from which he drew his supplies, and from which reinforcements were coming in<sup>6</sup> or might still be expected.<sup>7</sup> Mardonius similarly covered his fortified camp and his base of supplies, Thebes, while the plain of the Asopus furnished him with a suitable field for the action of horsemen. These clear facts explain the intelligent (and probably inspired) advice given by the soothsayers on both sides, that the omens were favourable for a defensive battle, unfavourable for attack.<sup>8</sup> It may seem fantastic to say that some of the best of our modern critics have shown in this matter less grasp

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 298 f., 364, 368 and Munro in J. H. S. xxiv. 144, 152 and in C. A. H. iv. 317, 323-4.

<sup>2</sup> H. ix. 6 f.

<sup>3</sup> Thuc. ii. 57; cf. i. 141.

<sup>4</sup> H. ix. 28.

<sup>5</sup> Ib. ix. 20 f.

<sup>6</sup> Ib. ix. 41.

<sup>7</sup> e.g. the men of Elis and Mantinea (H. ix. 77).

<sup>8</sup> H. ix. 36-8.

## THE PERSIAN WAR

of the military situation than these ancient seers; yet it is to me utterly incredible that even after his success in repulsing the Persian cavalry and killing their leader Masistius, Pausanias can ever have conceived the idea of turning the Persian right and marching ten miles across the open plain to Thebes. Every one admits that this striking manœuvre was never carried out; in my opinion it is the child of the imagination of critics dominated by modern notions of strategy. No one can value more highly than I do the contributions of Dr. Grundy and Professor Woodhouse to the understanding of the Persian War, but here their reconstruction<sup>1</sup> is based on an unsound theory. Any such movement must have inevitably and immediately transferred the whole of the tactical advantages to the enemy. The Persian cavalry, which even on the Asopus ridge harassed the Greeks beyond all bearing,<sup>2</sup> would have assailed them on the open plain at an overwhelming advantage. Nor does it seem in the least likely that the Greeks can have hoped with their slow-moving, heavy-armed infantry to take their far more mobile enemies by surprise. Indeed in this matter modern experience confirms ancient; the futility of any such movement, unless made by horsemen only, against the Boer mounted infantry, is a crucial example. It is surely far more probable that Pausanias deliberately advanced to the Asopus ridge and no farther, because his object was to provoke Mardonius to attack him there. He saw that the Persian had become too wary again to assail unbroken hoplites on the bastions of Cithaeron, but hoped to induce him to attack them on the lower hills near the Asopus, which were far more open to assault.<sup>3</sup> Strategically, he has taken the offensive, and throughout his object is to fight, but only on his own terms, that is, on ground more favourable to hoplites than to cavalry. Tactically, his object is to tempt the enemy to attack him in a strong defensive position, as Bruce drew on the English at Bannockburn.

Mardonius was too prudent to fall into the trap and preferred to make the position of the Greeks untenable by cutting off their supplies<sup>4</sup> and reinforcements, and eventually by sending his cavalry to sweep through the trough in the hills and seize the spring, Gargaphia.<sup>5</sup> The inevitable retreat by night with its chapter of accidents brought about the desired result where elaborate design had failed. When Mardonius saw the Greeks in full retreat, split up into three separate corps, he naturally thought the moment had come for a decisive blow. At the head of the best Persian troops he dashed across the Asopus straight at the Spartans.<sup>6</sup> Pausanias, despite the hail of darts and arrows, kept his men well in hand till

<sup>1</sup> Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 473. Woodhouse in *J. H. S.* xviii.

41, 45.

<sup>2</sup> *H. ix.* 40, 49.

<sup>4</sup> *H. ix.* 39.

<sup>3</sup> Macan, *H. vii-ix*, vol. ii, p. 379.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib. ix.* 49.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib. ix.* 59.

the Persian infantry was irretrievably committed; <sup>1</sup> then at last the Tegean and Spartan hoplites charged, and after crashing through the shield wall, naturally had all the best of the hand-to-hand combat that followed.<sup>2</sup> Superior arms, discipline, and tactics brilliantly redeemed the strategic failure of the Greek retreat.

It may be thought that in thus tracing the influence of arms on tactics and of tactics on strategy in land warfare I have been traversing ground already too familiar. I shall now try to show that in the naval warfare, too, the same rule holds good.

In the naval tactics of the rowing ships of antiquity there were of necessity only two different modes of attack :

(1) Boarding, preceded by the use of missiles ; the men on board are the attacking force.

(2) Ramming, the prow of the ship itself being the weapon of offence.

Either method may be facilitated or modified by some new invention, such as the specially strengthened beak and prow-to-prow attack used by the Corinthians and Syracusans,<sup>3</sup> or the *corvus* employed by Duilius at Mylae against the Carthaginians,<sup>4</sup> but these do not concern us, as we hear of no such devices in the Persian War.

It may be well to illustrate briefly the two methods from Thucydides, whose accounts of sea-fights are far clearer than those in Herodotus. He scorns as out of date the boarding tactics still used in 433 B.C. by the Corinthians and Corcyreans,<sup>5</sup> and holds up to admiration the bold manœuvres of Phormio in the Corinthian Gulf.<sup>6</sup> But he never clearly states the conditions necessary for the successful employment of the *διέκπλους* and *περίπλους*. These were : (1) as the efficient cause, great superiority on the part of the Athenian triremes both in speed and handiness. Such superiority could only be won and kept by building lighter ships and by a more thorough and efficient system of training for the crews. (2) As a necessary condition, plenty of sea-room in which to manœuvre. Inadequate sea-room, indeed, nearly cost Phormio his second victory,<sup>7</sup> just as later it fatally handicapped the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse.<sup>8</sup> Indeed in the final battle there the Athenians are obliged to fight the old-fashioned land-battle on shipboard, using archers, javelin-men, and boarders,<sup>9</sup> and naturally fail in this unaccustomed form of warfare.<sup>10</sup>

In the Persian War it is, I think, clear that the Greeks of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the tactics of Richard Cœur de Lion at the battle of Arsouf, A. D. 1191 (Oman, *op. cit.* i. 311 f.).

<sup>2</sup> H. ix. 61-3.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. i. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Ib. ii. 83, 84.

<sup>5</sup> Ib. vii. 36-41, 52, 70.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Grundy, Thucydides, p. 308.

<sup>7</sup> Thuc. vii. 34, 36.

<sup>8</sup> Thuc. i. 49.

<sup>9</sup> Ib. ii. 90.

<sup>10</sup> Ib. vii. 60, 62, 67.



## THE PERSIAN WAR

mother-country had no such superiority in seamanship as would have enabled them to make effective use of the *διέκπλους*, still less of the *περίπλους*. It is true that Herodotus (viii. 9) ascribes to them at least the intention to use the former before the battle of Artemisium, and more definitely describes the Ionians as practising the manœuvre before the battle of Lade (vi. 12). He may mean that the Chians employed it in the actual fighting (vi. 15), but the large numbers of marines carried on their ships<sup>1</sup> and their *capture* of many ships from the enemy point rather to the use of boarding tactics. Most probably, then, Herodotus was guilty of an anachronism, but if this be not so, then it is most likely that the Ionians had learnt the manœuvre from the best sailors of the East, the Phoenicians. It is certain that the Carthaginians used it against the Romans, and Sosylus, Hannibal's Greek tutor, alleges that Heraclides of Mylasa at Artemisium foiled the *Phoenician* device of *διέκπλους* by keeping a second line in reserve ready to attack them when they had penetrated the first line.<sup>2</sup> The objection that this story cannot be fitted into Herodotus' narrative of the engagements is not necessarily fatal to its truth. In any case the Greeks of the mother-country cannot have been in a position to use the manœuvre. Not only were they outnumbered, but their ships were heavier in build and worse sailers than those of the enemy.<sup>3</sup>

No doubt Plutarch (Them. 14) differs on this point from Herodotus, but Plutarch's notices of the development of the Athenian fleet do not carry conviction. His main point at Salamis is that the Eastern ships were loftier and less handy than the lower and lighter Greek vessels, a trait that he may have erroneously transferred from some later battle, such as Actium. And when he comes to Cimon (ch. 12), he makes that admiral widen the light ships built by Themistocles and join the fore and aft decks with gangways, plainly with a view to boarding tactics. This tradition about Cimon seems the most authentic record in Plutarch's story, and yet it is most unlikely that he would have gone back to heavier ships and boarding tactics if the Athenians had already adopted ramming with light and handy vessels. I think, then, we may fairly regard the light ships ascribed to Themistocles as an anachronism,<sup>4</sup> and place the evolution of the new tactics in the years of the empire of Athens, when her fleet had become a standing force, not as early as the Persian War.

<sup>1</sup> Forty on each ship (H. vi. 15), while ten was the normal number on Athenian ships in the Peloponnesian War. Cf. Thuc. ii. 23; iii. 94, 95; iv. 76 compared with iv. 101.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Wilcken in *Hermes* xli. 103 f.; Tarn in *J. H. S.* xxviii. 216; Munro in *C. A. H.* iv. 289; and for a like precaution Xen. *Hell.* i. 6, 29-31.

<sup>3</sup> H. viii. 10 and 60.

<sup>4</sup> Perhaps a mistaken inference from the fact that these early triremes had not decks all over (Thuc. i. 14).

to Xerxes?<sup>1</sup> Even after reading and hearing Sir Reginald Custance's arguments, I still feel it is the only adequate explanation of the fatal advance within the straits of Salamis. It would be presumptuous to criticize the crucial importance attached by the Admiral to the flanking position held by the Greek fleet if Xerxes attempted to advance to the Isthmus.<sup>2</sup> But one may well doubt if the Greek leaders were aware of the strength of their position, or if even a Themistocles could have kept the Peloponnesians together, had Xerxes dispatched a force across the Saronic Gulf to the Argolid, where it might reasonably expect a friendly reception.<sup>3</sup> As he had advanced without apparent difficulty from Therma to Thermopylae unsupported by his fleet, it does not appear that he was so immediately dependent on his ships for supplies as to make it impossible to detach them on a separate mission. Again, Xerxes in his attack on Thermopylae was in advance of his fleet at Aphetæ almost as much as he would have been had he marched to the Isthmus, while the fleets still lay off Salamis. No doubt Xerxes may have been led to attack merely by overweening confidence in his own strength, but is it not more likely that he was enticed into the trap by the craft of Themistocles?

Whatever be the view taken on this minor question, I hope I have made my main thesis clear and acceptable. It is that, where the armament of two opposing forces differs radically in character, arms determine tactics and tactics strategy. This axiom holds in the Persian War both on sea and on land, at Artemisium and Salamis, as well as at Thermopylae and Plataea. Finally, while it invalidates some of the theories taken from modern strategists by recent critics and historians of the Persian War, in the main it confirms as well as elucidates the ancient authorities.

<sup>1</sup> Aesch. Pers. 355 f. H. viii. 75.

<sup>2</sup> Custance, *War at Sea*, pp. 26, 27.

<sup>3</sup> H. vii. 150-2.

## ADDITIONAL NOTES

P. 17. Niese (Hermes, xlii (1907), pp. 419 f.) argues that Dorieus was not a mere adventurer, and that his attempts at colonization were sanctioned by the state. Cf. αἰτῆσας λεῶν (ch. 42) and συνέκτισται (ch. 46).

P. 21 f. Calder (C.R. xxxix (1925), pp. 7 f.) argues that the Royal Road of Herodotus is a confused compound of the route followed by Croesus, Cyrus (i. 75-9), and Xerxes (vii. 26 n.), which went from Sardis by Ancyra north of the Anatolian desert, and then, after crossing the Halys, east to Pteria, and the true Royal Road, which went south of the desert and the Halys by Laodicea and Cibystra to the Cilician gates and Zeugma. His main argument is that the *total* given by H. to the Euphrates agrees with the real distance by this route (740-50 miles), while the northern route must add at least 100 miles.

P. 30. For full discussion of the Tagi of Thessaly cf. E. Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, pp. 237 f. and Beloch i<sup>2</sup>. 2. 197 f., and on the constitution of Thessaly in general cf. E. Meyer, *op. cit.* 219 f.; Busolt, Griech. Staats. ii. 1478 f.

P. 61. Gardner (Hist. Coinage, pp. 91 f.) has revised and republished his article, while Caspari (Cary) has traced the history of the league and its activities (J. H. S. xxxv. 173 f., xxxvii. 174 f.).

P. 62. The use of war chariots at Cyrene, even after the time of Alexander (cf. Diod. xviii. 19, xx. 41; Collitz, G.D.I. iii. 4833), may also be connected with the barbarian intermixture in that colony.

P. 109. Soteriades has identified Marathon in a small fortified site with good water-supply on a spur of Mt. Agrieliki, a mile south-west of the Soros, and would place the Athenian camp close by (J. H. S. xlvii (1927), pp. 253-4).

P. 116. An interesting fragment of a history of Sicyon (Oxyrr. Pap. 1365), perhaps by Ephorus, shows that Andreas was the father of Orthagoras, but does not clear up the other difficulties in the genealogy (Oxyrr. Pap. xi, pp. 104-11).

P. 135. A. Struck (Chalkidike, pp. 67-70), while agreeing that the shortest distance across is about 2,500 yards, points out that the canal does not take that line and curves a little, so that along its course the distance is nearly 2,700 yards. He says that, while the existing remains do not prove that the canal was finished, it would not have been difficult to complete it, and the traces might easily disappear.

## ADDITIONAL NOTES

P. 137. Calder (C. R. xxxix (1925), p. 9) would place Critalla near Sebasteia (Sivas) and make Xerxes follow the route of Cyrus across the Halys and over the plateau to Sardis, but Ramsay now holds (J. H. S. xl (1920), pp. 89 f.) that Herodotus knew nothing of Xerxes' route from Critalla to Celaenae, and inserted the Halys merely as the boundary between Phrygia and Cappadocia. He believes that Xerxes must have come through the Cilician gates, and places Critalla near Cybistra. He holds that the necessary and unavoidable line of march for a large army thence to Celaenae is the southern or Pisidian route along the southern edge of Lycaonia by Laranda, and so past the lakes Trogitis, Karalis, and Limnae to Celaenae.

P. 140. Leaf (Troy, pp. 368-9, 402; Strabo on the Troad, p. 122), denying the possibility of erosion on any large scale, holds that Herodotus, having rightly stated (iv. 85) that the Hellespont is only seven stades in width at its narrowest point, i. e. between Chanak and Kilid Bahr, here (vii. 34) fell into the natural error of supposing that the bridge was at the narrowest point.

P. 147. Leaf (Strabo, p. 264) says Xerxes must have gone by a path up the spur which forms the eastern boundary of Antandrus to a col 4,560 ft. high over the eastern shoulder of Mt. Ida, and must have passed through the artificial cuttings through two rock barriers known as the Portai.

P. 153. γέρρα. Pausanias (x. 19. 4) says the shields dedicated at Delphi from the spoils of the Gauls under Brennus resembled the Persian. Now on a colonnade built by Eumenes II at Pergamum there are several representations of Galatian shields oval in shape (Baumeister, figs. 1432-5), so those at Delphi were presumably oval. If so the Gerrha may well be such shields as are carried by some Persepolis guards (Perrot, Persia (E. T.), p. 423, fig. 203).

φαρετρεῶνες. A warrior was equipped with a bow and thirty arrows (Vendidad xiv. 9 A). Large quivers worn on the back are prominent in the sculptures of warriors at Susa (cf. p. 153), Behistun, and Persepolis. A combined bow and arrow case worn at the side in one Persepolis relief (Perrot, *op. cit.* p. 402, fig. 192) may explain ὑπό, 'worn low down'. Cf. A. V. W. Jackson on Ancient Persian armour in classical studies in honour of H. Drisler, pp. 95-125.

P. 157. In vii. 76 Toynbee (C. R. (1910) xxiv. 236-8) would put in Σιγύνναι (cf. v. 9 n.). He argues that their arms, the oxhide shields, wolf-hunting javelins (reading λυκοεργέας), horned bronze helmets, and coloured puttees are northern, not Anatolian, as is the worship of a *god* of war. So in iii. 90 he would read Ὑγεννέων with the better manuscripts and regard Ὑγένναι as a variant of Σιγύνναι.

P. 261. Munro now (C. A. H. iv. 305 f.) adopts Blakesley's view on Ceos and Cynosura. He holds that the Pontic or Hellespontine

squadron, originally left behind at Abydos, had now been ordered up, and that its divisions had reached Ceos and Cynosura (near Marathon), but were too late for the battle of Salamis.

P. 301. Gardiner (*Olympia*, pp. 303-6) gives the order as foot-race, jump, throwing the discus, throwing the javelin, and wrestling, and suggests a method of eliminating competitors. He holds that it was necessary to *win* three falls in wrestling (*op. cit.* p. 309).

P. 327. Obst (*op. cit.* pp. 211-13), while rejecting Lehmann-Haupt's theory of the decisive influence on Persian strategy of a contemporary revolt of Babylon (*Klio* vii. 447, &c.), would account for Artabazus' retention of Xerxes' favour (*Thuc.* i. 129) in spite of his failure to save Sestos by supposing that he had been ordered to march with all speed to Babylon.

P. 363. I have shown the untrustworthiness of Ephorus' account of Marathon (*J. H. S.* xxxix. 48 f.). Lehmann-Haupt (*Klio* xviii. 65 f., 309-35) rightly rejects Delbrück's renewed attempt (*Klio* xvii. 221-9) to justify his view of the battle, as well as Kromayer's strange suggestion that the Persian cavalry was stationed in the centre (*Antike Schlachtfelder* iv, pp. 1 f., &c.). But he does not reach any new conclusions of value from his elaborate but arbitrary analysis of Herodotus. I cannot accept Munro's new hypothesis (*C. A. H.* iv. 235-8) that Miltiades was marching to aid Eretria, as the evidence is very slight, and I cannot believe that a fact so much to the credit of Athens would have so completely disappeared from the traditions, or that the Athenians would have ventured to send their small fleet to guard the passage to Euboea.

P. 377. Munro thinks that the Phocians were posted to guard, and the Peloponnesians detached to hold, not so much the Anopaea path as the route round Mt. Callidromus by Doris to Phocis (*C. A. H.* iv. 293 f.). Hence Hydarnes, by taking the shorter Anopaea path, eluded the retiring Peloponnesians and surprised Leonidas. Kromayer (*op. cit.* iv, p. 53) posts the Phocians above old Drakospilia, and holds that Leonidas was aware of the approach of Hydarnes by the Anopaea, and intended to fight a rear-guard action in defence of his allies, but was prevented from withdrawing in time by the narrowness of the pass (pp. 60 f.).





# INDEX

*The references are to the pages.*

## A

- Abae, i. 72; temple of, ii. 244.  
 Abaris, story of, i. 316.  
 Abdera, founding of, i. 129, ii. 81;  
   site of, 167; reputation of, i. 129.  
 Abydos, bridge of Xerxes at, ii.  
   142-3.  
 Acanthus, ii. 80, 170.  
 Aces, river, H.'s tale of, i. 294.  
 Achaea Demeter, ii. 28.  
 Achaeans (in Peloponnese, original  
   home of Ionians), i. 121, ii. 259;  
   Cleomenes claims to be A., ii. 40.  
   — (in Thessaly), ii. 177, 220.  
 Achaemenidae, genealogy of, i. 386;  
   Darius of younger branch of, 397.  
 Achelous, i. 165.  
 Acheron, ii. 54.  
 Achilles, course of, i. 325.  
 Acropolis, approach to, ii. 252; de-  
   fence of, 251-2; serpent in, 247-8.  
 'Acte', meaning of, i. 31.  
 Adimantus, H. unfair to, i. 39;  
   supposed bribery of, ii. 236; sup-  
   posed cowardice of, 267.  
 Admirals, Persian, ii. 278.  
 Adrastus (of Phrygia), i. 71-2.  
   — (of Argos), cult of, at Sicyon, ii.  
   34; story of, 297.  
 Adria, early navigation of, i. 127;  
   amber route down, 314.  
 Aeaces, tyrant of Samos, i. 344.  
 Aeacidae, summoned to Salamis,  
   ii. 256.  
 Aeacus, shrine of, ii. 50.  
 Aegidae, a clan at Sparta, priests of  
   Apollo, i. 350.  
 Aegina, wealth of, ii. 45, 321;  
   weights and measures, 118; corn  
   trade of, 147.  
 Aeginetan marbles, i. 272.  
 Aeginetans in Egypt, i. 254; rivalry  
   with Samos, 272; wars with  
   Athens, date of, ii. 48-9, 101-2;  
   expelled from island, 100-1; con-  
   tingent of ships, 249; at Salamis,  
   266, 386; Athenian prejudice  
   against, 45, 321.  
 Aegis, origin of, i. 364.  
 Aeolians, origin of, ii. 162; migra-  
   tion of, i. 123-4; meanings of  
   'Aeolis', 124.  
 Aeschironian tribe (Samian), i. 263.  
 Aeschylus, H. borrows from Persae  
   of, i. 21; corrects as to a myth,  
   245; H. and A. on numbers of  
   Greek and Persian fleets, ii. 363-4;  
   on Salamis, 379, 384-5; on strata-  
   gem of Themistocles, 380; on  
   Xerxes' retreat, 274.  
 Aesop, fables of, i. 118; death of,  
   232-3.  
 Aetiological legends, i. 346, ii. 48, 94.  
 Africa, geography of, i. 317, 360;  
   boundaries of, 317; circumnavi-  
   gation of, 318; accuracy of H.  
   on fauna of, 365-7.  
 Agamemnon, claimed by Spartans,  
   ii. 197.  
 Agathyrsi, luxury of, i. 339; gold  
   mines of, 431; promiscuity among,  
   339.  
 Aglaurus, myth of, ii. 252.  
 Agrarian troubles, i. 354.  
 Alalia, in Corsica, i. 128.  
 Alarodii, i. 286.  
 Alcaeus, quoted by H., i. 21; mistake  
   of H. as to date of, ii. 56.  
 Alcaeus, supposed son of Heracles,  
   i. 56.  
 Alcmaeonidae, descent of, ii. 28;

- wealth of, 29, 116; restoration of Delphic temple by, 29; disloyalty of, 40, 116, 359-60; H.'s prejudice for, i. 42; ii. 38, 40, 119; H.'s defence of, in 490 B.C., 359; alleged hatred of tyranny, 115.
- Alea, temple of Athena, i. 90.
- Aleuadae, position of, in Thessaly, ii. 126; Medism of, 126, 287.
- Alexander (of Macedon), Hellenic lineage of, ii. 8, 282; conquests of, 7, at Greek games 8; friendship of, for Athens, 307; murder of Persian ambassadors, 7.
- Alilat, Arabian goddess, i. 258.
- Alpeni, ii. 226.
- Alphabet, Phoenician, i. 117; relation to Greek, ii. 26.
- Alus, in Thessaly, ii. 217.
- Alyattes, conquests of, i. 62, 66; eastern war of, 63; friend of Periander, 63, ii. 341; tomb of, i. 101.
- Amasis, head of native reaction, i. 244; inconsistent policy of, 253; reliance on Greek mercenaries, 244; friendship with Greeks, 253; prosperity of Egypt under, 253; tomb of, 251, 260; character and stories of, 252.
- Amazons, in Scythia, i. 340-1; attack Attica, ii. 398.
- Amber route, i. 314.
- Ameinias of Pallene, ii. 264.
- Ameinocles, the Thessalian, ii. 215.
- Amenemhêt III, called Moeris, i. 217; statue in Ashmolean, 242; makes Labyrinth and Lake Moeris, 240-2, 417; date of, 440.
- Amenhotep III (Amenophis), i. 419.
- IV (Akhnaton), i. 419.
- Amestris, ii. 169.
- Ammonians, oracle of, i. 176; ram-headed god of, 187; attack of Cambyses on, 263, 395.
- Amompharetus at Plataea, ii. 311-12.
- Amon, god of Thebes, i. 156, 186; called Zeus by Greeks, 186; festival of, 187.
- Amphiarus, temple and oracle of, ii. 280-1.
- Amphicrates of Samos, i. 272.
- Amphictyonic Council, meetings of, ii. 224; proscribes Ephialtes, 225.
- Amphitryon, father of Heracles, ii. 27, i. 438.
- Amyntas, King of Macedon, ii. 7.
- Amyrtaeus, Egyptian king, date of, i. 235, 260.
- Anacharsis, story of, i. 329.
- Anachronisms in H., ii. 19 (Aristagoras), 49, 68 (on naval tactics), 110 (as to lot at Athens).
- Anacreon, i. 295.
- Anaitis, worship of, i. 112, 410.
- Anaxandrides, i. 90, ii. 16.
- Anaxilaus, tyrant of Rhegium, ii. 73, 205; and Zancle, 199.
- Androcrates, shrine of, ii. 296.
- Androphagi, i. 339.
- Andros, worship of Dionysus at, i. 315; Themistocles at Andros, ii. 271.
- Aneristus, ii. 180.
- Animal worship, varieties of, in Egypt, i. 199; explanation of, 204.
- Animism, offerings to spirits of dead, i. 328-9, ii. 54, cf. i. 326, ii. 2; messages to unseen world, i. 335; expulsion of spirits, 133; fighting with unseen, 335, cf. 358.
- Anopaea, ii. 226, 376.
- Ant gold, i. 289.
- Anthropology, four criteria of, used by H., i. 311; H.'s marriage customs, types, 154; value of H.'s contributions to in Bk. IV, 302. *See* Animism, Blood-drinking, Burial Customs, Cannibalism, Divination, Hair, Marriage Customs.
- Antidorus, ii. 238.
- Ansîs, King of Egypt, i. 234.
- Aparyti, i. 283.
- Apaturia, festival of, i. 123, 119.
- Aphetae, ii. 216.
- Aphrodite, foreign equivalents of, i. 113; foreign origin of, in Greece, 113; corresponds to Hathor, 186; her temple at Cythera, 106.

- Apis, cult of, i. 184; marks of, 184, 263; and Cambyses, 264.  
 Apollo, grotto and worship of at Athens, ii. 108; in Scythia, i. 325; *Δοφίης*, 99; *Λυκείος*, 86, 133; *Παρπώος*, 119; cf. also Branchidae, Delphi, Horus.  
 Apollonia, on Adriatic, Corinthian colony, ii. 328.  
 Apries, i. 248, 424; daughter of, 256.  
 Apsinthii, ii. 75.  
 Aqueduct, at Samos, i. 272; at Athens, ii. 123.  
 Arabia, H. extends to Mediterranean, i. 257; furthest land to south, 290; land of spices, ib.; fidelity of Arabians, 257; their relations to Persia, 280; and to Assyria, 236.  
 Araxes, river, H. on, i. 152.  
 Arbitration in civil disputes, i. 354, ii. 11; by Periander, 56; by Corinth, 110, 193.  
 Arcadians, primitive race, i. 89; made Pelasgic, 443; coins of and federation of, ii. 93; wars with Lacedaemonians, i. 89-90; at Plataea, ii. 299; as mercenaries, 241-2.  
 Arcesilaus II, murder of, i. 354.  
 Archers, Athenian, at Plataea, ii. 295, 300, 313.  
 Archias, informant of H., i. 29, 270-1.  
 Archilochus, i. 59.  
 Archons, used for dating, i. 438, ii. 251; and presidents of the Naucraries, 38. Cf. Polemarch.  
 Ardericca, in Babylonia, i. 144; in Persia, ii. 114.  
 Areopagus, hill of, ii. 251; Council of, prominent in Persian war, 248.  
 Ares; identified with Set, i. 198; in Scythia, 325-6; in Thrace, ii. 3.  
 Argades, tribe at Athens, ii. 33; in Ionia, i. 119.  
 Arganthonius, longevity of, i. 128.  
 Argippaei, race of, i. 310, 428; sacredness of, 311; limit of H.'s knowledge, 309.  
 Argives, name of, used for Greeks, ii. 34; cf. also Pheidon.  
 Argonauts, i. 55, ii. 216; at Lemnos, i. 347; in Libya, 360.  
 Argos, legendary history of, and claims to hegemony, i. 54, ii. 188; descent of Macedonian kings from, 282; power of kings at, 189; early wars with Lacedaemonians, i. 96, 269; war as to Thyrea, 96-7; Cleomenes' attack on, ii. 94-6; date of this attack, 352-3; depopulated, 96; relations with Sicyon, 34, 101; Medism of, 187-91, 289-91; negotiations of, with Lacedaemonians in 480 B.C., 188-9; wars of, with Lacedaemonians circ. 470 B.C., 303; destroys Mycenae, 97; democratic constitution of, 303; later relations of, with Lacedaemonians, i. 196, ii. 188, 191; Heraeum at, i. 69, ii. 96.  
 Arians, Asiatic tribe, i. 285, ii. 153.  
 Arians, old name of Medes, ii. 153.  
 Arimaspi, legend of, i. 307.  
 Arimnestus, of Sparta, ii. 314; of Plataea, 317-18.  
 Arion, story of, i. 63; dithyramb of, 64.  
 Aristagoras, career and character of, ii. 65; attempt on Myrcinus, date of, 66.  
 Aristetas, poem of, i. 306; story of, 308.  
 Aristeia, for Salamis, ii. 122; for Plataea, 317.  
 Aristides, character of, ii. 263; ostracism of, 184; return to Athens of, 262; as general in 480 B.C., 262, 267; glorified by Plutarch, 306, 308.  
 Aristodemus, ii. 231.  
 Aristophanes, parodies of H., i. 55. Also 171 (as to rise of Nile), ii. 40 (as to Cleomenes).  
 Aristotle, criticizes H.'s natural history, i. 213, 291; on the Ephorate, 89; on tyrants, 273, ii. 340, 346; on constitutional revolutions, i. 355.

Arithmetic, palpable, i. 336.  
 Armenians, coming of, i. 61; racial connexion of, ii. 157; region of, i. 286, ii. 23.  
 Armour, Greek, i. 132, 360; Asiatic, ii. 152-3; different types of in Xerxes' army, 151-2; superiority of Greek to Persian, 224.  
 Artabanus, warning to Darius, i. 331; to Xerxes, ii. 148.  
 Artabazus, prudent advice of, ii. 306; retreat of, 315, 327; descendants of, 276-7.  
 Artachaees, height of, ii. 170.  
 Artaphrenes, name of, ii. 9; appoints generals, i. 403; reorganizes Ionia, ii. 79.  
 Artaxerxes, meaning of name, ii. 105; and Mascames, 166.  
 Artayctes, governor of Sestos, ii. 335; execution of, 336.  
 Artemis, at Ephesus, i. 100; in Thrace, ii. 3; A. Orthia, i. 333.  
 Artemisia, at Salamis, ii. 265; consulted by Xerxes, 270; dynasty of, i. 1, 3, ii. 164.  
 Artemisium, its connexion with Thermopylae, ii. 206-7, 371-2; Greek forces at, 235; battles of, 239, 375-6; retreat from, 240.  
 Arthmius, of Zelea, ii. 287.  
 Aryandes, revolt of, i. 356.  
 Aryans, original home of, ii. 156; rule in Asia, i. 381.  
 Asclepius, worship of, ii. 164.  
 Asia, origin and first use of name, i. 320; boundaries of, 284; rivalry of, with Europe, 271; Persian claim to, ii. 335.  
 — Minor, geographical importance of, i. 370; breadth of, 93; primitive peoples of, 131, 371; features of myths of, 70, 371, 375; Hittite empire in, 57.  
 Asine, site of, ii. 260.  
 Asopus (in Boeotia), Persian camp on, ii. 292; H.'s use of name, 300.  
 — (in Trachis), defile of, ii. 221; Persians use road, 243; guarded by Trachis, 376.  
 Ass, an Eastern animal, i. 342;

horned, 366; that does not drink, 367; wild asses in chariots, ii. 159.  
 Assurbanipal, library of, i. 378; inscription of, 149; cylinder of, 57, 61, 243; and Gyges, 57, 61; and Egypt, 243-4.  
 Assyrians, character of, i. 377; chronology of, 439; and Cimmerians, 61, 106; conquer Egypt, 234, 243, 378; empire of, 377; fall of 105, 107, 378; H.'s ignorance of, 136, 234, 378, 380; and Lydians, 59; and Medes, 383. Name of, 56; satrapy, size of, 136, 284; weapons of, ii. 155; writing, i. 333.  
 Assyrian 'history' of H., i. 379.  
 Astrabacus, shrine of, ii. 91.  
 Astrology, in Egypt, i. 208.  
 Asyages, dream of, i. 107; character of, 383; fall of, 385.  
 Atarneus, i. 124.  
 Athamas, legend of, ii. 218-20.  
 Athena, identified with Neith, i. 196; of Ilion, ii. 147; Polias and her snake, 248, cf. i. 126; Pronaia at Delphi, ii. 246; Scirias, 267; in N. Africa, i. 365. Treasures of, at Athens, ii. 251; her shrine, 39, 46; contest of, with Poseidon, i. 95, ii. 253; story of sham, i. 83.  
 Athens:  
     *Site, buildings, and constitution:*  
     walls, ii. 31; Acropolis, 32, 252; buildings of Pisistratus, 343, cf. 123. Tribes, 33-4, 111; *βουλή*, 39; knights, 112; *στρατηγοί*, 106, 357; lot, 110; number of citizens, 57, 256.  
     *Internal history:*  
     claim to be autochthonous, ii. 198; early legends, 247, 249; Pelasgians, i. 444; revolution of Cylon, ii. 37; factions, i. 81, ii. 33; Solon's work, i. 67, 253; under Pisistratus, 80, ii. 342-5; overthrow of Pisistratidae, 24; constitution of Cleisthenes, 36; factions, 500-490 B.C., 60; traitors at, in 490 B.C., 359-61.



## *External history:*

- wars with Mitylene, ii. 56; wars with Aegina, 48, 101-2; foreign policy of Pisistratus, 344 f.; appeal to Persia, 40; Lacedaemonian jealousy, 110, 351; alliance with Lacedaemonians and recognition of their hegemony, 107, 353, cf. 236; Marathon campaign, 358; number of fleet, 100; at Plataea, 312, 391, 394-5; policy in 479 B.C., 389; relations of with West, 256; peace with Persia, 189-91. Cf. also Herodotus, Ionians.
- Athletics, importance of, ii. 19, i. 298; boat races, ii. 99; foot-race, 8; pancratium, 332; pentathlum, 301; records in, 250; Greek idea of sportsmanship, i. 248.
- Atlantic, first use of name, i. 153.
- Atlas, Mount, i. 363.
- Atossa, daughter of Cyrus, i. 264; influence of, 265, 297, 430, ii. 125.
- Attaginus, banquet of, ii. 293; Medizing of, 326.
- Attica, passes from, ii. 291.
- Atys, cult of, i. 70; self-mutilation, 58; corresponds to Tammuz, 206.
- Augila, H.'s accurate description of, i. 357.

## B

- Babylon, authorities for, i. 135; size of, 137; walls of, 136; gates of, 301; palaces and temples of, 140; hanging gardens, 141; capture by Cyrus, 146, 379; Aristotle's account of capture, 146-7; revolts of, 299-301, 398; dress of people of, 150; was H. at Babylon? 140.
- Babylonia, Appendix II; confused by H. with Assyria, i. 136, 283; taxation of, 147; plain of, 147; canals in, 143, 148; fertility of, 149; climate of, 148; boats of, 149-50.
- Bacchiadae, at Corinth, ii. 52, 249.
- Bacis, oracles of, ii. 240, 261, 262.
- Bactria, i. 284.
- Bald men. *See* Argippaei.
- Bamboo, H.'s knowledge of, i. 288.

- Barathrum, at Athens, ii. 179.
- Barbary sheep, i. 292.
- Barca, foundation of, i. 354; transplantation of people of, 369.
- Bardiya. *See* Smerdis.
- Baths, vapour, i. 329.
- Battus, meaning of name, i. 352.
- Beans, aversion from (in Egypt), i. 183.
- Bekbs*, meaning of, i. 156.
- Belbina, ii. 276.
- Belus, the sun-god, i. 56; temples of, 140-1; feasts and amours of, 141; statue of, its importance, 142.
- Behistun Inscription, i. 392.
- Benefactors of Persian king, ii. 264.
- Bessi, oracle of, ii. 168.
- Bias, one of 'the Seven Wise Men', i. 65-6; and the West, 129.
- Bitumen, for mortar, i. 139; springs of at Is (Hit), ib.
- Black race, primitive in India, i. 285 (Eastern Ethiopians).
- Black Sea (Pontus), size of, i. 332; account of, 334; Greek feeling towards, 331.
- Blood, in covenants, among Arabs, i. 258; among Lydians, 94; among Scyths, 327, cf. 259; poured on sacred objects, 326; blood-drinking generally, 327.
- Boats, on Euphrates, i. 149; on Nile, 213-14.
- Boeotarchs, ii. 292.
- Boeotia, Phoenicians in, i. 349. *See also* Thebes.
- Boges, self-devotion, i. 98. ii. 166.
- Bones of heroes as charms, i. 90; used as fuel, 326.
- Boreas, legend of, ii. 215.
- Borysthenes, mart of (Olbia), i. 308; river (Dnieper), 323-4.
- Bosporus, dimensions of, i. 332; bridge over, 334.
- Bowls, at Delphi, i. 74, ii. 276; Lacedaemonian, i. 92, 269; Scythian, 331; of Colaesus, 352.
- Bows, Ethiopian, i. 262; Scythian, 305, 343; Greek, ii. 156; in proverb of Amasis, i. 252.
- Branchidae, temple of, at Didyma,

# INDEX

- i. 72 ; Croesus' dedication at, 101 ;  
Necho's dedication, 247 ; sack of,  
ii. 71.  
Branding, a mark of slaves, ii. 141,  
232.  
Brauron, site of, ii. 123 ; connexion  
of Pelasgi with, i. 445.  
Bribery, of Delphi, ii. 30 ; of Spartans,  
92 ; of Themistocles, 237 ; sug-  
gested of Greek leaders, 287.  
Brickwork, Babylonian, i. 139.  
Bridges, over Hellespont, ii. 141-2 ;  
over Ister, i. 334 ; over Strymon,  
ii. 169.  
Brygians, ii. 80, i. 371.  
Bubastis, site of, i. 195 ; festival at,  
196 ; cat cemetery at, 200 ; temple  
at, 234-5.  
Budini, i. 339-40.  
Burial customs, of Athens, i. 68, 325 ;  
at Babylon, 151 ; in Delos, 316 ;  
among Libyans, 365 ; among Per-  
sians, 118 ; among Scyths, 328-9.  
Burning bodies of victims, i. 185 (in  
Egypt), ii. 202 (at Carthage) ;  
burying alive, i. 265, ii. 169.  
Busiris, story of, i. 188 ; town of, 196.  
Buto (in Delta), site of, i. 197 ;  
oracle of, 244, 274 ; (near Arabia),  
i. 204.  
Byzantium, foundation of, i. 344 ;  
revolt of, *ib.*, ii. 10 ; monuments  
at, i. 333.

## C

- Cabiri, origin and worship of, i. 192.  
Cadmean victory, i. 128.  
Cadmeans, migration of, i. 349, ii.  
78.  
Cadmus (the Phoenician), a real  
person? i. 347 ; genealogy of, 188,  
438 ; grandfather of Dionysus, 240.  
Cadmus (of Cos) and Zancle, ii.  
199-200.  
Cadytis (Gaza), i. 247 ; captured by  
Necho, *ib.*  
Calasiries, i. 249.  
Calchedon, foundation of, i. 344 ;  
revolt of, ii. 10.  
Calendar, Greek systems of, i. 158 ;  
Egyptian, 158-9, 415.

- Callias, story of, ii. 115.  
—, 'Peace' of, ii. 189-91.  
Callidromus, Mount, ii. 208.  
Camarina, ii. 194.  
Cambyzes III, King of Persia,  
mother of, i. 256 ; in Babylon,  
385, 394 ; receives submission of  
Phoenicians, 262 ; kills Smerdis,  
264-5, 392, 396 ; in Egypt, 260,  
264, 266, 394 ; Ethiopian cam-  
paign of, 261, 394 ; madness of,  
266, 394 ; death of, 274, 393 ;  
length of reign of, 274 ; traditions  
as to, 393.  
Camel, description of, i. 289 ; speed  
of, ii. 159.  
Canal of Corinth, ii. 342 ; of Darius,  
i. 246 ; of Xerxes, ii. 135.  
Candaules, name of, i. 56 ; story of,  
58.  
Cannibalism, its motives, i. 311, *cf.*  
357 ; in India, 288 ; in S. Russia,  
339.  
Canobus, i. 167.  
'Canopic jars', i. 209.  
Cappadocian. *See* Syrian.  
Carcinitis, i. 337.  
Cardia, ii. 75-6.  
Carians, akin to Mysians and  
Lydians, i. 370 ; how far Indo-  
European? 131 ; in Asia, 130 ; in  
the islands and Greece, 131 ; at  
Athens, ii. 32 ; in Egypt, i. 196 ;  
defeat of, ii. 64 ; armour of, i.  
132-3.  
Carneia, festival of, ii. 223.  
Carthage, H.'s ignorance of position  
of, i. 361 ; voyage of Hanno, 319 ;  
exclusive trade policy of, 293 ;  
wars with Greeks in Western  
Mediterranean, 127, ii. 196 ;  
treaties with Rome and with  
Etruscans, i. 128 ; relations with  
Persia, 262, ii. 201 ; mercenary  
army of, 200.  
Carystus, position of, ii. 105 ; sub-  
dued by Athens, 332.  
Caspian Sea, size of and H.'s know-  
ledge of, i. 153.  
Cassia, how and where obtained, i.  
291.

- Cassiterides, name of and position of, i. 293.
- Caste system, in Egypt, i. 249; in early Athens (?), ii. 33; not at Sparta, 88.
- Cats, habits of, i. 199; mummies of, 200.
- Caucasus, H.'s knowledge of, i. 153; passes through, 106.
- Caucones, in Peloponnese, i. 350.
- Caunus, i. 133.
- Cauterization in Libya, i. 364.
- Cavalry, Lydian, i. 62, 95, 126; Persian, at Plataea, ii. 304; Persian horse bowmen, 309; late development of, at Athens, i. 85.
- Cecrops, ii. 249; 'border' of, 183.
- Census, in Egypt, i. 253; primitive, in Scythia, 331.
- Celaenae, site and rivers of, ii. 137.
- Ceos, ii. 261.
- Cephenes, ii. 153.
- Cercina, i. 368.
- Cercopes, ii. 226.
- Chalcedon. *See* Calchedon.
- Chalcis, colonies in the Chersonese, ii. 277; aristocracy of, 42; war with Eretria, 58; Athenian cleruchy at, 42.
- Chaldaeans, original home of, i. 142; a priestly caste, 142, 378.
- Charaxus, brother of Sappho, i. 233.
- Chariots, borrowed from Libya (?), i. 365; use of, in war, ii. 62; set up as trophy, 43-4; given as a reward, 276; chariot racing a mark of wealth, 76.
- Chemmis (in Upper Egypt), i. 211; (in Delta), floating island of, 245.
- Cheops, pyramid of, i. 228, 416; H.'s account of, 227.
- Chephren, pyramid of, i. 230; statue of, 227.
- Chersonese, Thracian, inhabitants of, ii. 75; measurements of, 76; Miltiades in, 76; commands corn route, 335, 344.
- Chios, altar of, at Delphi, i. 233; great population of, 160; ally of Miletus, 63, 128, ii. 67; at Lade, 69; disaster of, 74; revolts from Persia 479 B. C., 279, 327.
- Children, Greek love of, ii. 53, 74.
- Chilon, the ephor, one of 'Seven Wise Men', i. 81; and the Lycurgæan ἀγωγή, 87; puts down tyrants, 81, ii. 346.
- Choaspes, water of, sacred, i. 146.
- Chronology, Appendix XIV. Early, in H., ii. 104; of Pheidon, 117; of Pisistratidae, i. 84; of Themistocles, ii. 184; of 499-480 B. C., 12, 133.
- Cilicia, extent of, i. 282; ruled by native princes, 94; Greek satrap (?) of, ii. 333; connexion with Phoenicia, 161; H.'s confusion as to 'Cilician gates', 22.
- Cimmerians, invasion of, i. 60-2, 106; and Sinope, 306; survivals of name of, 306; tombs of, 306.
- Cimon, genealogy of, ii. 77.
- Cinnamon, i. 291.
- Cinyps, fertility of, i. 368; Greek attempt on, ii. 17.
- Circumcision, as a test of race, i. 218; in Egypt, 181, 218, 414; in Palestine, 219.
- Cithæron, line of defence against Persians in 480 B. C., ii. 370; Greek position on in 479 B. C., 294, 370, 391.
- Clazomenae, position of, i. 62.
- Cleisthenes (of Athens), descent of, ii. 36; reforms of, 37; H.'s view of reforms, 34; probable end of, 40.
- Cleisthenes (of Sicily), ii. 339; relations with Delphi, 34; tribal names given by, 35.
- Cleobis (and Bito), story of and statues of, i. 68-9.
- Cleombrotus, ii. 290.
- Cleomenes, *cf.* Appendix XVII. Relations with Demaratus, ii. 41; fails to take Argos, 96; at Aegina, 82; madness of, 16; death of, 93.
- Cleruchy, meaning of, ii. 42.
- Climate, Greek views of effect of, i. 119, ii. 337.
- Cnidus, i. 134.

# INDEX

Coinage, invention by Lydians, i. 102; Persian, 282, 356; Euboic, 281; of Samos and Cyrene, 355; of Zancle and Rhegium, ii. 199-200; proving alliance, 72, 255.

Colaesus, i. 351.

Colchis, linen of, i. 219; connexion with Egypt? 218; satrapy of, 286; arms of, ii. 151; trade route to, 158.

Colias, Cape, ii. 268.

Colonization, fifth-century ideas of, i. 345, cf. 122, ii. 17; decree of Thera as to, i. 352; relations of colony and mother city, 262; relations of Greeks and natives, 353; intermarriage with natives, 363; of Cypselidae, ii. 341.

Colossae, ii. 139.

Colossi, Egyptian, i. 221, 242, 253.

Compass, points of the (ancient), i. 148.

Conduits, water, i. 258. *See also* Aqueducts.

Continents, origin of names of, i. 320; boundaries of, 436.

Corcyra, and Corinth, i. 269; and Samos, 268; neutrality of, in Persian war, ii. 203.

Corinth, site of, ii. 53; early history of, 52; tyranny at, 340-2; relations with Chalcis, i. 272, ii. 58; early relations with Athens, 51, 55, 56; loan of ships to Athens, 100; later hostility to Athens, i. 39; at Salamis, ii. 267, 386; at Plataea, 299. Cf. also Periander.

Corn trade of Pontus, i. 309, ii. 56, 187.

Corycian cave, ii. 245.

Cos, story of woman of, ii. 319-20.

Cotton, first mention of, i. 290.

Councils of war at Salamis, ii. 254.

Couriers, speed of, ii. 291, i. 93.

Cranai, old name for Athenians, ii. 248.

Crathis, river, in Achaia, i. 121; at Sybaris, ii. 18.

Crestonia, ii. 2, 173; Creston (town of), i. 79.

Crests, invention of, i. 132.

Crete, early inhabitants of, ii. 204; Dorians in, i. 78; institutions of, compared with Spartan, 88, 91; Aegina and, 272; neutrality of, ii. 203. Cf. also Minos.

Crews, number of, i. 259, ii. 212.

Crimea, H.'s mistake as to shape of, i. 303; origin of name of, 60.

Critalla, ii. 137.

Crocodile, description of, in H., i. 200-2, and in Aristotle, 201; stories as to, 201; worshipped, 201; supposed to be peculiar to Nile, 177.

Croesus, alliances of, i. 72; offerings at Delphi, 73, at Branchidae, 101; pyre of, 98-9; as adviser of Cyrus, 125, 153; and Solon, 66-9.

Crucifixion, by Greeks, ii. 336; (impaling) by Persians, i. 302.

Ctesias, critic of H., i. 36; his Median chronology, 384; as to Cyrus, 389; as to Magian conspiracy, 275; as to marvels of East, 288, 289; as to siege of Babylon, 300; as to Zopyrus, 302.

Cubit, length of, i. 138.

Curse of unfruitfulness, i. 274, ii. 124.

Cyanean rocks, i. 331.

Cyaxares, empire of, i. 94, 382; date, 94, 107, 383.

Cyclades, geological formation of, ii. 12; not conquered by Cyrus, i. 129; ships from, in Xerxes' fleet, ii. 162.

Cydonia, i. 272.

Cydrara, ii. 139.

Cylon, conspiracy of, ii. 37-9.

Cyme (in Aeolis), i. 124; tyrants of, ii. 217.

Cynegirus, ii. 113.

Cynurians, ii. 260.

Cynosura, ii. 261.

Cypria, authorship of, i. 224.

Cyprus, strategic importance of, ii. 61; Greek colonization of, 62, 160; conquest of, by Assyria, 161, by Egypt, i. 255; Phoenician element in, ii. 61; recovered by Persians in Ionic revolt, 63.

# INDEX

Cypselidae, H.'s account of, i. 270; greatness of, ii. 340-2.  
 Cypselus, childhood of, ii. 51; chest of, 53; rule of, 340.  
 Cyrauis. *See* Cercina.  
 Cyrene, date of founding of, i. 353; stories of founding of, 346, 351; constitutional changes at, 354; Amasis' alliance with, 255; spring of Apollo at, 353; fertility of, 369.  
 Cyrsilus, lynching of, ii. 288.  
 Cyrus (the Great), an Achaemenid, i. 387; importance in history of, 390; birth of, 107, 389; miraculous preservation of, 108, 389; beginning of reign of, 154; King of Anshan, 386; conquers Medes, 111; dates of wars of, 125; and Croesus, 98; conquers Babylon, 146-7, 390; wars of, in extreme East, 135; death of, 153, 389-90; tomb of, 110; religious policy of, 391; Persian reverence for, 279, 302; Greek accounts of, 389.  
 Cyrus Cylinder, i. 386.  
 Cythera, ii. 233, i. 9.

## D

Damia and Auxesia, worship of, ii. 46.  
 Danauna, attack Egypt, i. 420.  
 Danaus, myth of, i. 212.  
 Danube, source and course of, i. 178, 336; tributaries of, 322; absence of floods on, 323.  
 Daphnae, mercenary camps at, i. 175.  
 Daric, first coined, i. 356; value of, 282; cf. also 405.  
 Darius, meaning of name, ii. 105; claim to throne of, i. 397, 279; length of reign of, ii. 125; importance of in history, i. 398; suppresses Magian conspiracy, 397; names of confederates of, 275-6; difficulties at accession, 294 f.; siege of Babylon, 300; Thracian campaign, 334-5; Scythian expedition, 430; conciliatory policy of, 222, ii. 128;

canal of, i. 246, ii. 135; Behistun Inscription of, i. 392; Darius Vase, ii. 128.  
 Dascyleum, i. 58; satraps of, ii. 277.  
 Datum, Athenian disaster in, ii. 319.  
 Decelea, position of, ii. 291; spared in Peloponnesian war, 318-19; cf. i. 12.  
 Dedications of ships, &c., ii. 275.  
 Deioces, Greek features in story of, i. 104; date of, 383; a real person, 381, 384.  
 Delos, description, ii. 103; date of visit of H. to, i. 251; pool of, 251; sacred way to, 315; Hyperboreans and, 315; tyrants' policy to, 267, ii. 345; earthquake at, 104.  
 Delphi:  
     *Temple of:*  
     position of, ii. 246; roads to, 245; burning of, i. 74; collection for, 255; rebuilding of, ii. 29; H.'s familiarity with, i. 74; French exploration at, 69, ii. 30.  
     *History of:*  
     connexion with Lacedaemonians, ii. 86, cf. i. 87, Lycurgean institutions; hostility to tyrants, ii. 34; bribery of, 30; Medism of, 247; urges submission to Persia, 199; Persian expedition to, 246-7; spared by Persians in 479 B. C., 306-7.  
     *Oracle:*  
     procedure of, i. 73, ii. 182-3, 185, 209; privileges at, i. 75.  
     *Policy of:*  
     colonization, i. 128, ii. 17; interferes to end strife, i. 354, and to promote unification of states, 90; moral influence of, 129, 233, ii. 98.  
     *Famous oracles:*  
     to Arcesilaus, i. 355; to Argos before invasion of Xerxes, ii. 188; to Athens in 480 B. C., 181, 183; to Battus, i. 352-3; to Cretans in 480 B. C., ii. 203; to Croesus, i. 73, 75; as to Leonidas, ii. 228; to Lycurgus, i. 87.



Delphi (*continued*):

*Famous offerings at*:

of Alyattes, i. 65; of Chians (the 'altar'), 233; of Croesus, 74; of Cypselus, 59; of Greeks in 479 B. C. (the 'Tripod'), ii. 322; of Gyges, i. 59; of Rhodopis, 233; of Siphnians (? Cnidiars), 271.

Delta, H.'s knowledge of, i. 412; thought by Greeks to be Egypt, 166.

Demaratus, deposition of, ii. 90; receives cities from Xerxes, 91; warning sent to Sparta, 234; conversations with Xerxes, 165.

Demes, number of, at Athens, ii. 37.

Demeter, worship of, ii. 257; cf. also Achaea.

Democedes, i. 297.

Democracy, marks of, i. 278; democracies in Ionia, ii. 80; harsh treatment of by Gelo, 195; democratic movement in Peloponnese after 479 B. C., 303.

Democritus, ii. 250.

Demonax, constitution of, i. 355.

'Deserters' in Egypt, i. 174-5.

Dialects, in Ionia, i. 120; in Cyprus, ii. 161.

Diaries, parallel, of Xerxes' fleet and army, ii. 371-2, 373-5.

Dice, Egyptian fondness for, i. 225.

Dieklous, use of, among Ionians, ii. 65, 68. Cf. Tactics, naval.

Diolcus, at Corinth, ii. 136.

Dionysius of Phocaea, naval manoeuvres of, ii. 68.

Dionysus, a late element in Greek Pantheon, i. 191; date of introduction of, 239; connected with Thrace, ii. 3; by some with Osiris, i. 186; worship favoured by tyrants, 340-1, 344.

Dioscuri, emblems of, ii. 41; stars dedicated to, 275; and Helen, 318.

Dipaea, battle of, ii. 303-4.

Divination, various kinds of, i. 195; in Scythia (by twigs), 327; in North Africa (among the tombs), 358; at Thebes, ii. 280.

Divine origin. *See* Kings.

Division of money, among citizens, i. 271, ii. 186.

Dnieper, course of, i. 321, 324; wooded banks of, 307; liman of, 323.

Doberus, ii. 169.

Dodecarchy, Egyptian, i. 240, 378.

Dodona, Pelasgian, i. 443; oracle of, founded, i. 193-4; priestesses of, 29, 194; methods of, 195; consulted by people of Apollonia, ii. 328.

Dogs, Babylonian, i. 147; Egyptian, 199, 200; Paeonian, ii. 1; in Persia sacred, i. 108, 118.

Dolonci, ii. 76.

Dolopes, ii. 177.

Dolphin stories, i. 64.

Dorians, only real Hellenes to H., i. 76; migration of, 76-7; connexion with Macedonians, 78; colonies in Asia Minor, 121, ii. 162; expeditions against Attica, 42; take no part in Ionic revolt, 67.

Dorieus, ii. 17, 196, 348.

Doriscus, ii. 58, 150, 166.

Dreams, H.'s belief in, ii. 25; explanation of, 132; warnings in, i. 264; men held responsible for their action in dreams, 154; dream oracle (of Amphiaraus), ii. 200; dream motive borrowed by H. from Homer, 131.

Dreams of Agariste, ii. 119; Artabanus, 132; Astyages, i. 107, 390; Cambyses, 264; Croesus, 70; Cyrus, 154; Hipparchus, ii. 25; Hippias, 109; Xerxes, 131.

Dress, Babylonian, i. 150; Egyptian, 182, 231; Greek, ii. 48, 49; Libyan, i. 364; Persian, 116; Scythian, 340-1.

Drinking, in Persia, i. 115; in Scythian fashion, ii. 98.

Dryopians, region of, i. 79.

Dryoscephalae, pass of, ii. 304-5.

## E

Earth, Persian respect for, i. 118, 413.

Earthquake, at Delos, ii. 104; attributed to Poseidon, i. 33, ii. 176; rare in S. Russia, i. 313.

Ecbatana (in Media), site of, i. 104; treasures at, ii. 21; (in Syria), i. 274.

Echemus, ii. 297.

Echinades, i. 165.

Eclipse, battle (585 B. C.), i. 93; of 481 B. C., ii. 144-5; of 480 B. C., 290.

Edonians, ii. 5.

Egypt:

*Land of:*

meaning of name, i. 156; native name for, 166; Greeks thought Delta only to be E., 167; size of, 160-1; boundaries of, 168; soil of, 160; mountains of, 162; climate of, 205; distinction between Upper and Lower, 159; African or Asiatic? 317, 437.

*History of:*

App. X; antiquity of, i. 236; lists of kings, 216; records, 236; early raids against, 224; E. and Assyria, 234, 240, 243; under Saite kings, 240.

*H. and Egypt:*

character of H.'s account, i. 179; Strabo's, compared, 241; folk-tales in H.'s history, 222, 224, 230, 232, 243; derives Greek religion from E., 191, 239; H. and religion of, 157, 179, 413.

*Greeks and Egypt:*

early relations of, i. 212; Greeks in Delta, 167; E. dislike of Greeks, 253, 423.

*Egypt under Persia:*

App. V. 3, IX. 1; Persian garrisons in E., i. 175; Cambyes in, 264; tribute from, 243; satrapy of E., 283; E. at Artemisium, ii. 239, 376; at Salamis, 383-4, 386; at Plataea, 300.

*Egyptian religion:*

Pantheon of, i. 238; temples of, 217; sacrifices of, 184-5, 189; no heroes in, 192; festivals of, 195 f.; worship of animals in, 199.

*Egyptian people:*

colour of, i. 218; circumcised, 181; cleanliness of, 183; dress of, 182; writing of, 182; embalming, 208; physicians, 208; priests, 184, 249; soldiers, 249; weapons of, ii. 160.

Eion, capture of, ii. 166.

Eleans, story of Eleans in Egypt, i. 248; allies of Lacedaemonians, 269; conquer Triphylia, 350; constitution of, ii. 303; on tripod at Delphi, 320; diviners, i. 297, ii. 301.

Electrum, Lydian, i. 74.

Elephant in N. Africa, i. 366.

Elephantine, site of, i. 172-3; Nile at, 172; gate of Egypt, 175.

Eleusis, war of Athens and, i. 67; description of plain of, ii. 256; temple of Demeter at, burned, 315; procession to, and cult at, 257; portent at, 256.

Ellopia, ii. 241.

Embalming, methods of, in Egypt, i. 208-10.

Enarees, nature of disease, i. 107; meaning of word, 327.

Encheleis, ii. 307.

Eneti, ii. 4, i. 150.

Enneacrounus, position and description of, ii. 123.

Ennea Hodoi, ii. 169.

Ephesus, site of, ii. 58; starting-place of Royal Road, 24, 270; Asiatic character of, i. 65, 123; temple of Artemis at, 100; reduced by Croesus, 65; takes no part in Ionic revolt, ii. 70.

Ephialtes, ii. 225.

Ephors at Sparta, origin of, i. 88; maintain Lyncrgean discipline, ii. 16; with Spartan king in field, 320; growth of power of, 350.

Ephorus, on Pelasgians, i. 444; on Marathon, ii. 355-6; on Parian expedition, 120-1; on Mycale, 332.

Epidaurus, ii. 46.

Epigoni, ii. 25; poem of, i. 314.

Epilepsy, divine character of, i. 265.

Epizelus, vision of, ii. 114.

Erasinus, river, ii. 94.

Erechtheus, story of, ii. 253; not an Egyptian, i. 212; temple of, ii. 251, 253; trophy at temple of, 295.  
 Eretria, war with Chalcis, i. 272, ii. 58; treason at, 105; destruction of, by Persians, 106, 358.  
 Erichthonius, story of, ii. 247.  
 Eridanus, river, i. 292.  
 Erinys, a personified curse, i. 350.  
 Erythea, i. 305.  
 Erythrae (in Boeotia), ii. 292.  
 Erythraean Sea, i. 54.  
 Etesian winds, ii. 202; and Nile, i. 169.  
 Ethiopians (African), Egyptian influence on, i. 175; conquer Egypt, 234; attacked by Cambyeses, 394; marvels in H.'s account of, 261; gifts to Persia, 395; in Persian army, ii. 156.  
 — (Asiatic), i. 284.  
 Etruscans, Lydian origin of, i. 103, 376; wars with Phocaeans, 128.  
 Euboeans, alleged bribery by, ii. 237.  
 Euboic standard, i. 281.  
 Euclithon of Cyprus, ii. 60.  
 Euenius, the seer, ii. 328.  
 Euphemus, i. 347.  
 Euphrates, navigable to Babylon, i. 139; windings of, 144; diversion of, 146, 390; floods on, 148; boats on, 149.  
 Euripus, ii. 374.  
 Europe, origin of name of, i. 320; boundaries of, 436; enormous size of, 318.  
 Euryanax, son of Dorieus, ii. 290.  
 Eurybiades, Spartan admiral, ii. 254, 271.  
 Euryptidae, kings at Sparta, origin of, ii. 83; genealogy of, 278-9.  
 Exampaeus, H. at, i. 323, 331; meaning of name, 323.  
 Exploration, voyages, and travels, of Colaeus, i. 351; Nasamones, 176; Phocaeans, 127; Phoenicians, 318, 348; Sataspes, 319; Scylax, 320.  
 'Eyes' of Great King, i. 108.

## F

Fayûm, H. in, i. 412; reservoir of, 242, 413.  
 Federal government, anticipation of (by Thales), i. 130.  
 Females, kinship through, i. 134.  
 Festivals, Greek and Egyptian compared, i. 195.  
 Fig-trees, fertilization of, i. 149.  
 Final causes, argument from, i. 291.  
 Fire, Persian reverence for, i. 98, 261, 409.  
 Fire-signals, ii. 287.  
 Fleets, strength of, ii. 363-6. *See also* Navies.  
 — speed of ancient, ii. 211.  
 Flint knives in embalming, i. 208.  
 Flutes, various kinds of, i. 62.  
 Folk-tales in Egyptian history, i. 422; of Two Thieves, 224-5; of Rhodopis, 232; of Polycrates, 267; of younger brother, 304.  
 Footprints, sacred, i. 211, 331.  
 Founder, honours to, i. 354, ii. 19, 77.  
 Funeral orations, ii. 297.  
 Future life, belief in, i. 226, 327-8, 335, ii. 2.

## G

Gadatas, Darius' letter to, i. 401, ii. 104, 264.  
 Gaeson, ii. 330.  
 Galepsus, ii. 172.  
 Gamoroi, aristocracy of Syracuse, ii. 194.  
 Gandarii, an Indian tribe, i. 283.  
 Garamantes, African tribe, i. 358.  
 Gargaphia, site of, ii. 296.  
 Gaumata, conspiracy of, i. 273, 392; death of, 277.  
 Gaza. *See* Cadytis.  
 Gebeleizis, Thracian god, i. 335.  
 Gela, ii. 192.  
 Gelo, family of, ii. 191-2; reign of, 195; saluted as 'king', 197; early wars of, 196; negotiations of Greeks with, 195; forces of, 197; victory of, at Himera, 202.  
 Gelonus, i. 340.  
 Geography, App. XIII; general

- sketch of, i. 316; of Scythia, 426;  
 of W. Asia, 316; of N. Africa, 361;  
 cf. also Exploration.  
 Geometry, invention of, in Egypt,  
 i. 222.  
 Gephyraeans, connexion with Phoe-  
 nicians, i. 349, ii. 25-6.  
 Gergithes, ii. 147.  
 Gerrhus, river, i. 325.  
 — place (also called Gerrhi, IV. 71),  
 i. 324.  
 Getae, a Thracian tribe, believe in  
 immortality, i. 335; Salmoxis,  
 god of, ib.  
 Glaucus (of Chios), bowl of, i. 65.  
 — (of Lycia), i. 134.  
 — (of Sparta), story of, ii. 98.  
 Gnomon, invention of, i. 221.  
 Gods, twelve, altar of, at Athens,  
 ii. 110, i. 162.  
 Gold, in Central Asia, i. 307; in  
 India, 287, 289, 290; in Libya,  
 368; in Lydia, 101; among  
 Massagetæ, 154; in Siphnos, 271;  
 in Thasos, ii. 81; in Thrace (Da-  
 tum), 319; guarded treasure of, i.  
 289, 305, 307.  
 Gonnus, ii. 175.  
 Gorillas, i. 366.  
 Griffins, various types of, i. 307;  
 guard gold, 307; as decorations,  
 330, 352.  
 Gyges, various traditions as to, i.  
 374; founds Mermnad dynasty,  
 58, 374; and Delphi, 59; cam-  
 paigns of, 60; vassal of Assyria,  
 57, 61; ally of Egypt, 244.  
 Gyndes, river, lowered by Cyrus, i.  
 146, ii. 23.

H

- Hair, cut in sign of grief, i. 97  
 (Argos), ii. 295; for dedication,  
 (in Egypt) i. 199, (among Arabs)  
 258, (at Delos) 315; methods of  
 dressing, in Libya, 358.  
 Haliacmon, river, ii. 174.  
 Halicarnassus, foundation of, ii.  
 164; mixture of race at, i. 121;  
 inscriptions from, 2. *See also*  
 Artemisia, Herodotus.  
 Halieis, capture of, ii. 180.  
 Halys, river, crossed by Royal Road,  
 ii. 22; dividing line of races, i.  
 92, 370, cf. 75.  
 Hamilcar, at Himera, ii. 201; wor-  
 shipped, 202.  
 Handicraft, Greek prejudice against,  
 i. 250.  
 Harpagus and Astyages, i. 109;  
 attacks Phocæa, 126, 128;  
 satrap of Lycia, 135; traditions  
 of house of, in H., 383.  
 Hawk, sacred in Egypt, i. 200.  
 Hecataeus, Introduction, pp. 24-6;  
 cf. also supposed borrowings from,  
 i. 108 (Media), 160 (distances in  
 Egypt), 163 (shape of Egypt), 223  
 (story of Helen), 282 (list of  
 satrapies), 440 (chronological  
 system); supposed criticisms of,  
 156 (story of Psammetichus), 321,  
 436 (boundaries of Europe and  
 Asia).  
 Helen, in Egypt, i. 223-4; wrongly  
 identified by H. with Aphrodite,  
 ii. 89.  
 Heliopolis, site and religious im-  
 portance, i. 157.  
 Helle, tomb of, ii. 150.  
 Hellenes, origin of name, i. 76;  
 identified with Dorians, ib.; 'gods  
 of', 254; cf. League of.  
 Hellenion, at Naucratis, i. 254.  
 Hellenism, assertion of, ii. 286.  
 Hellespont, H.'s use of name, i.  
 317; breadth of, 333, ii. 140;  
 currents in, 143; bridges over,  
 140 f.; scourging and chaining of,  
 141; Athens and, 56.  
 Helorus, river, ii. 193.  
 Helots, attend Spartan warriors, ii.  
 231, 298; serve as army service  
 corps, 298, 364; allowance to,  
 213; mourning for Spartan kings,  
 87; danger to Spartan state, 389.  
 Heraclea, in Trachis, ii. 221.  
 Heracleides, at Artemisium, ii. 65.  
 Heraclea, Minoa, ii. 17, 19.  
 Heracles, H. thinks there were two,  
 i. 187; an Egyptian god, 187,  
 239; identified with Bel, 56; with

- Melcart, 188, ii. 17; in Scythia, i. 305, 325; genealogy of, 56; used for chronology, 438; death of, ii. 221; connected with Thermopylae, i. 79, ii. 208; colonization, i. 129, ii. 17; pillars of, i. 178; footprint of, 331.
- Heraclidae, leaders of Dorian invasion, i. 79, ii. 297; genealogy of, 83; encounter with Eurystheus, 297.
- Heraeum (of Argos), i. 68, ii. 96; (of Samos), i. 329, 333; source of H., 30; of Hera Teleia at Plataea, ii. 310.
- Hermes, at Athens, i. 192; in Egypt, 235; in Thrace, ii. 3.
- Herodotus [where references are collected in the Introduction, they generally are not repeated here]:
- Life of:*
- at Athens, i. 6, 8; birth of, 1-2; death of, 9, ii. 204; ignorance of foreign languages, i. 27; personal details as to, 188; political views of, 7, ii. 44, 57; recitations by, i. 6; religious views of, 48 f., 99, 157; travels of, 5 f.; and tyrants of Halicarnassus, 4; veracity of H., 5, 220.
- Work of:*
- accuracy of, i. 345, 369, 413.
- anachronisms in, ii. 19, 49, 68, 107, 110, 111, 117, 118, 355; cf. i. 441.
- causes, failure to appreciate real, i. 45.
- comparative method in, i. 250.
- compilation, is H.'s work a? i. 277.
- constitutional points, weakness on, ii. 36, 82, 110.
- cosmography, i. 316.
- credulity hoaxed? i. 137, 144, 229.
- criticism of Greeks, i. 188, 335.
- date of composition of, i. 9 f., ii. 104.
- evidence, use of, i. 32 f.
- exaggerations of, i. 44, ii. 112, 279, 355.
- flippancy in, i. 55, 341.
- inaccuracies, in facts, i. 93, 337; in calculations, 70, 236-8, ii. 213.
- inconsistencies, i. 44, 165.
- incredulity in, i. 34, 366, ii. 47.
- informants, i. 29, ii. 293, 295, 387 f.
- marks of time, i. 362.
- military ignorance, ii. 64, 296.
- official documents in, i. 27, ii. 152.
- order of composition, i. 15, 135.
- partiality in, i. 41 f., ii. 243, 321, 378-9.
- poets, knowledge of, i. 21.
- rationalism in, i. 32.
- science in, i. 434; ii. 324 (anatomy); i. 290, ii. 51 (shape of earth); i. 165, ii. 176 (geology); i. 435 (maps); ii. 169, 208, 291 (points of compass).
- set speeches in, i. 278, ii. 243.
- Hero worship, ii. 19; at Athens, 34; unknown in Egypt, i. 192, and in Phoenicia, ii. 202; transference of remains, i. 90.
- Hesiod, date of, i. 193; with Homer makes Greek theology, ib.; quoted, ii. 99, 205.
- Hestia, worship of, in Scythia, i. 325.
- Hierophant, position of, ii. 192.
- Himera, battle of, ii. 196-7.
- Hipparchus, patron of poets, ii. 127; fate of, 24-5. Cf. Pisistratidae.
- Hippias, ii. 24-5; death of, at Marathon, 355. Cf. Pisistratidae.
- Hippocleides, ii. 119.
- Hippocrates (of Cos), wrote in Ionic, i. 2; on diseases, 107, 265, 340; on 'four humours', 364; on climate of Scythia, 312; on the Scyths, 428; on the effect of climate, ii. 336.
- Hippocrates (of Sicily), ii. 73, 199, 200.
- Histiaeus, choice of Myrcinus, ii. 5; message of, 14; character of, 66; death of, 74.



History, H.'s conception of, i. 53.  
 Hittites, empire of, i. 56-7, 220;  
 capital of, 95; wars with Egypt,  
 419-21; dress of, 219.  
 Homer, H.'s use of, i. 34; belief in  
 historic value of, 223; *Iliad* not  
 divided into present books, 224;  
 imitations of, 259, 309, 317, ii.  
 131, 197, 214; and Argos, i. 54,  
 ii. 34; and Egypt, i. 223; on  
 Idomeneus, ii. 205; on Ocean,  
 i. 170; effect of on theology of  
 Greeks, 193.  
 Homeric customs at Sparta, ii. 85.  
 Hoplites, as fighting force, ii. 224;  
 attended by Helots, 214; number  
 of, at Plataea, 299, 300.  
 Horses, sacred to Mithra, i. 282;  
 sacrifices of, 329; transport of, ii.  
 103; Nesaeon, 145.  
 Horus, identified with Apollo, i.  
 238; son of Osiris, 197.  
 Human sacrifices, in Egypt, i. 189;  
 among Getae, 335; in Greece, 259,  
 ii. 218-19; among Persians, 169,  
 210; among Scythians, i. 326,  
 329; among Tauri, 336.  
 Hyacinthia, festival of, ii. 288-9.  
 Hybla, three in Sicily, ii. 194.  
 Hydarnes, one of 'seven conspira-  
 tors', i. 275; his son, ii. 120;  
 commander of 'Immortals', 367.  
 Hydrea, island purchased by  
 Samians, i. 271.  
 Hyksos, conquer Egypt, i. 418;  
 possible tradition of, 230.  
 Hypanis, i. 323.  
 Hyperboreans, myth of, i. 313;  
 H.'s arguments against, 316.  
 Hyrcania, i. 284.  
 Hysiae, site of, ii. 292.  
 Hystaspes, i. 387; satrap of Parthia,  
 276.

I

Iacchus, procession of, ii. 257.  
 Iamidae, ii. 300.  
 Iason, in N. Africa, i. 360.  
 Iberia, meaning of, i. 127.  
 Ibis, sacred and common, i. 204-5.

Ida, Mount, ii. 147.  
 Ienysus, position of, i. 257.  
 Imbros, ii. 10, 122.  
 Immortality, belief in, in Egypt, i.  
 226; among Getae, 335; among  
 Trausi, ii. 2. Cf. Future Life.  
 Impaling. *See* Crucifixion.  
 Inaros, rebellion of, i. 259-60.  
 Incense, whence obtained, i. 290.  
 Indians, H.'s knowledge of, i. 286;  
 relations of, with Persia, 287-8;  
 gold of, 287, 289, 290; climate  
 of, 290; Brahman hermits of, 288.  
 Ino, story of, ii. 219.  
 Inscriptions, bilingual, used by Per-  
 sians, i. 333; of Behistun, 392;  
 concealed in H., ii. 273, 319-20;  
 found on the Acropolis, 43; on  
 Delphic tripod, 321 f.; of Micy-  
 thus, 205; of Pantares, 193; as to  
 Peace of Callias, 190.  
 Intaphrenes, one of the Seven, i. 275,  
 294; story of wife of, 294-5.  
 Interpolations in H., ii. 115, 198,  
 233-4, 270.  
 Io, legend on, i. 54-5; distinguished  
 by H. from Isis, 185.  
 Ion, legends of, i. 119, ii. 249.  
 Ionians, origin of name of, i. 119;  
 Greeks called in the East, 118,  
 ii. 129; colonies of, in Asia Minor  
 and the Islands, i. 119, ii. 162;  
 in the Peloponnese, i. 121; lack of  
 unity among, 129; weakness of,  
 in sixth century, 120; luxury of,  
 125; tribute paid to Persia, ii.  
 78-9; private wars of checked,  
 78; proposed transplantation of  
 in 479 B.C., 332-3. List of Ionian  
 despots, i. 344; catalogue of  
 ships, ii. 67; H.'s prejudice  
 against, i. 120, ii. 36; dialect of,  
 i. 2; varieties, 120.  
 Ionians and Athens, connexion of  
 Ionians with Attica, i. 122; four  
 tribes common to both, 119, ii.  
 33; Athens as head of Ionians, i.  
 57; contempt of Athens for  
 Ionians, 120, ii. 69.  
 Ionic Revolt, Grundy's theory of, ii.  
 14; withdrawal of Athens from,

59-60; depreciated by H., 65-6;  
 chronology of, 12-13.  
 Iphigenia, i. 338.  
 Iren, meaning of, ii. 325.  
 Isagoras, ii. 32.  
 Ishtar, Oriental love goddess, i. 113,  
 380.  
 Isis, worshipped all over Egypt, i.  
 186; cow the symbol of, 185,  
 231; cow sacred to, 168, 363.  
 Issedones, i. 310.  
 Ister. *See* Danube.  
 Isthmus of Corinth, wall across, ii.  
 259; canal proposed, 342;  
 council at, 327.  
 Italy, H.'s knowledge of, ii. 4, i.  
 79, 337; meaning of, to H., ii. 17.  
 Ithome, siege of, ii. 304.

## K

Karabel, monument at, i. 219.  
 King, Divine origin of, i. 142, 238  
 (in Egypt); double kingship,  
 123, ii. 83; king as priest, i. 351,  
 355, ii. 85; powers of Spartan,  
 349-51; survival of kingship in  
 Ionia, i. 123.  
 'King of Kings', i. 399.  
 Kinship through females, Aegina,  
 ii. 45; Lycia, i. 134, cf. 347 n.  
 Kouloba, tomb at, i. 328.  
 Kybebe (Cybele), Great Mother  
 Goddess, ii. 59.

## L

Labyrinth, i. 379.  
 Labyrinth, description of, i. 240, 241.  
 Lacedaemon, Lacedaemonians. *See*  
 Sparta, Spartans.  
 Lade, importance of, ii. 67.  
 Ladice, story and statue of, i. 255.  
 Laius, oracles of, ii. 17; genealogy  
 of, 27, i. 438.  
 Lake-dwellings, earliest description  
 of, ii. 6.  
 Lampon, of Athens, ii. 295.  
 — of Aegina, ii. 321.  
 Lampsacus, ii. 76, cf. i. 24.  
 Laphystius, title of Zeus and  
 Dionysus, ii. 218.

Lapiths, ii. 52.  
 Lasso, use of, ii. 159.  
 Lasus, poet, ii. 127.  
 Latona (Leto), i. 315, ii. 48, 104.  
 Laurium, mines of, ii. 185 f.  
 Leagrus, family of, ii. 319.  
 League, Greek, against Persia, ii.  
 187; admission of the islanders,  
 333.  
 — Peloponnesian, ii. 50, 351, 353.  
 Lebadeia, site of, ii. 280.  
 Leleges, in Asia Minor, i. 130; in  
 Greece proper, 131.  
 Lemnos, Argonauts at, i. 347; con-  
 quered by Persians, ii. 10; by  
 Miltiades, 122 f.; volcano in, 127.  
 Leonidas, genealogy of, ii. 223;  
 deserted by his allies, 228; devo-  
 tion of, 228; tomb of, 230; treat-  
 ment of body of, 233; last stand  
 of and its purpose, 376 f.  
 Leotyichides, expedition to Thessaly,  
 ii. 92; exile of, 92; genealogy of,  
 278.  
 Leprosy among Persians, i. 116 f.  
 Lesbos, colonization of, i. 124.  
 Libya, Persian expedition against,  
 i. 345; influence on Greece, 364,  
 365. Cf. Africa and Geography.  
 Libyans, precursors of Berbers, i.  
 356; healthiness of, 364.  
 Lie, an abomination to Persians, i.  
 116, 396, ii. 130; sophistry as to,  
 i. 276.  
 Ligurians, ii. 5, 200.  
 Ligyans identified, ii. 156.  
 Linen, Colchian, i. 219; Egyptian,  
 183, 209, 255, 269.  
 Linus, i. 206.  
 Lion, in Europe, ii. 174; sacred to  
 Sandon, i. 74, 97; on Lydian  
 coins, 74, 102; as a symbol, ii.  
 52, 119, 230.  
 Locrians, ii. 222, 230.  
 Locust-eating, i. 357.  
 λόγος, meaning of, in H., i. 28.  
 Lot, use of at Athens, ii. 110, 111, 357;  
 a mark of democracy, i. 278.  
 Lotus, as symbol of immortality, i.  
 212; varieties of, 359; lotus  
 eaters, 359.

Lycians, origin of, i. 133; explanation of name, 134; attack Egypt, 421, ii. 161.

Lycurgus, reality of, discussed, i. 85-6; H.'s account of, 87; variations in accounts of, ib.; worship of, 89.

Lycus, river, ii. 138.

Lydians, akin to Greeks in customs, i. 372; akin to Mysians and Phrygians, 370; alliance against Cyrus, 95; attack Greeks, 56, 62, 65, 374; boundaries of, 55; chronology of kings of, 58, 375; customs of, 101; and Etruscans, 103, 376; immigrants probably from Europe, 371; importance in Greek history, 375; Indo-European element among, 372; once called Maeonians, 57, 373; a mixed race, 372; primitive element among, 371; sources of H.'s history of, 376; once war-like, 95, 372.

Lygdamis, i. 84, ii. 346.

## M

Macedonia, meanings of, ii. 173, 174.

Macedonian kings, H.'s partiality for, ii. 7, 8; origin of, 282, 283; legends of, 282, 283; growth of their power, 7, 282, 284.

Macedonians, connexion with Dorians, i. 78; home of, ii. 174.

Maecander, source of, ii. 137.

Maeandrius, i. 299.

Maeonians, i. 57.

Magi, a Median tribe, i. 105; functions of, 408, 409, ii. 132, 169, 216; slaughter of, i. 277; conspiracy of, 393, 396 f.

Magic, of names, i. 362, 363; and sacrifices, ii. 216.

Magophonia, meaning of, i. 277.

Maetis or Maeotis Palus, meaning of name, i. 333; size, 333; position and shape, 341, 425.

Maneros, myth of, i. 206.

Manes, dynasty of, i. 57.

Manetho, i. 414, 415.

Mantineia, i. 355, ii. 303, 320.

Map of Anaximander, i. 316, ii. 20.

Marathon, plain of, ii. 106; date of battle, 108; topography of, 109; command of Athenians at, 111, 357; order of the tribes at, 111; Athenian tactics at, 112, 362; picture of, 113, 353; distance from Athens, 113; number of combatants and of slain, 114; absence of Persian horse, 355, 361 f.; the victory and its effects, 362 f.

Mardonius, supposed establishment of democracies in Ionia, ii. 80; campaign in Thrace and Macedon, ib.; its objects and failure, 81; winters in Thessaly, 273; story of, ib.; retires from Attica, 291; fort and camp of, 292; strategy of, at Plataea, 304, 388 f., 392; death of, 314, 395; grave of, 325; army of, 368.

Marea, garrison at, i. 175.

Marines, number of, on a ship, ii. 69, 212.

Marriage customs, by capture, ii. 90, 123; by purchase, i. 150, ii. 2, 95; communal marriage, i. 154; with aliens at Athens, ii. 55, 119. In Egypt, i. 212; at Sparta, ii. 16; among Sauromatae, i. 341. 'Droit du seigneur', 356; exogamy, 122; polyandry, 154, 358, ii. 16; promiscuity, i. 339, 360; prostitution ritual (at Babylon), 151, in Lydia (?), 101; unchastity before marriage, 101, 359, ii. 2.

Marsyas, satyr, inventor of the flute, ii. 138; river in Caria, 64; river in Phrygia, 137 f.

Mascames, ii. 166.

Masistius, ii. 295.

Matieni, meanings of the name, i. 92 f.

Matriarchy, supposed traces of, i. 312, 347, 376.

Mazdeism. *See* Zoroastrianism.

Measures of capacity, ancient, ii. 85, 86.

- Medes, and Assyria, i. 381 f.; chronology of, 383; dress of, 116, ii. 113; empire of, under Cyaxares, i. 382; fall of, 383; geographical position of, 104, 381; Greek legend of, ii. 154; independence, beginnings of, i. 381, 384; position under Persians, 383, 400, ii. 102; revolt of, against Darius, i. 111; rule of, 115; tribes among, 105.
- Median wall, i. 379.
- Medicine, in Egypt, i. 208; early endowment of, 297.
- τὰ Μηδικά*, meaning of, i. 16.
- Medism, in Thessaly and Northern Greece, i. 40, ii. 177, 178, 332; of Argos, i. 40, ii. 187-9, 289, 291; of Thebes, i. 40, ii. 326; suspicion of, at Delphi, 246 f.; at Elis and Mantinea, 289, 320; proposals to punish, 178, 332.
- Megabates, ii. 13.
- Megabazus, i. 302.
- Megara, wars with Athens, i. 82; conquest of, by Dorians, ii. 42; tyranny at, 340.
- Megarians, at Plataea, station of, ii. 294; number of, 299; honours to the fallen, 316.
- Megiddo, battle of, i. 247.
- Megistias, ii. 228.
- Melampus, i. 190 f., ii. 302.
- Melissa, ii. 54.
- Melos, ii. 250.
- Membliareos, i. 347.
- Memnon, i. 220.
- Memphis, meaning of name, i. 156; founded by Menes, *ib.*; temple of Ptah at, *ib.*, 422; lakes and dyke at, 216.
- Menelaus, human sacrifice in Egypt, i. 224.
- Menes, first king of Egypt, i. 156; historical reality of, 216, 416.
- Menkaura, piety of, i. 231.
- Mercenaries, Greek, under the Saite kings in Egypt, i. 244; under the tyrants in Sicily, ii. 197; western, in Carthaginian armies, 200; Arcadian, 242.
- Mermnadae, rise of, i. 374; chronology of, 375.
- Meroe, island, i. 174; capital of Ethiopia, 395.
- Messenian wars, i. 269.
- Metapontum, H. at, i. 308.
- Metempsychosis, doctrine of, i. 226.
- Micythus, ii. 205.
- Midas, i. 373, ii. 284.
- Miletus, attacked by Gyges, i. 60; allied with Chios, 63; thalassocracy of, ii. 11; factions at, 11; fall of, 70 f.; Milesians at Mycale, 330, 332.
- Miltiades, at the bridge over the Danube, i. 343, ii. 78; driven from the Chersonese, 77; Parian expedition of, 120 f.; supposed transgression of, 121; trial of, 122; conquest of Lemnos, 122; position at Marathon, 357 f.; strategy and tactics of, 360 f.
- Milyas, i. 134.
- Mines, near Mount Pangaeum and the Strymon, i. 85, ii. 5, 7, 319, 345; in Thrace, i. 85, ii. 81; in Siphnos, i. 271; in Thasos, ii. 81; at Laurium, 185 f.
- Minoa in Sicily, origin of, ii. 19.
- Minos, traditions of, i. 295, ii. 203 f.
- Minyans in Asia Minor, i. 121.
- Mithra, worship of, i. 112 f., 408, ii. 149.
- Mitylene, wars of, against Athens, ii. 56.
- Mnesiphilus, ii. 254.
- Moeris, lake of, i. 217, 242; king, *see* Amenemhêt III.
- Momemphis, battle of, i. 248, 250.
- Mossynoeci, ii. 158.
- Mourning, for Spartan kings, ii. 87; restricted at Sparta and Athens, *ib.*; Persian, 295.
- Mule, birth from, i. 301.
- Mummies, i. 209 f.; mummy at Egyptian feasts, 205.
- Murghab, tomb of Cyrus at, i. 110.
- Murmex, danger signal on, ii. 210.
- Musaeus, ii. 127.
- Music, Lydian and Phrygian, i. 62.

Mutilations by Persians, i. 275;  
mutilation, self, of Atys, 58, 70.  
Mycalé, battle of, rumour at, ii. 331;  
traditional synchronism with  
Plataea, *ib.*; description of,  
331 f., 396.  
Mycenae, fall of, ii. 97.  
Mycerinus, reign of, i. 231; mummy  
and coffin of, 232.  
Mylitta, i. 113.  
Myrsus, i. 295.  
Mysians, migration of, ii. 133 f.  
Mysteries, Egyptian, i. 251; Greek,  
*ib.*, ii. 28, 46 f., 256 f., 344.  
Myth, indicating a racial struggle,  
i. 95, ii. 253 f.; rationalization  
of, i. 156, 224; misunderstood,  
261; used to justify a claim to a  
country, 305, ii. 17; for political  
purposes, 34, 45; aetiological, 48,  
95, i. 346.

## N

Nabonidus, last king of Babylon, i.  
146.  
Nabonidus, annals of, i. 376, 385.  
Names, absence of, for early gods, i.  
193; play on, ii. 82; omens from,  
210.  
Naophorus of Vatican, i. 260.  
Napata, i. 174.  
Nasamonés, story of, i. 176; on  
Greater Syrtis, 357.  
Nationality, criteria of, ii. 286.  
Naucraris, meaning of, ii. 38;  
Prytanies of, *ib.*  
Naucratis, Greek settlement at,  
253 f.; founded by Miletus, 254;  
treaty port, 255; Hellenion at  
site of, 254.  
Navies, Phocæan and Samian, i.  
127; Athenian strength of, in  
490 B. C., ii. 100; great increase  
of, 185 f.; strength of, in 480 B. C.,  
186, 364 n.  
Naxian ships at Salamis, ii. 250.  
Naxos, island, prosperity of, ii. 11 f.;  
thalassocracy of, 12; expedition  
against, 13 f.; subjugation of, 103.  
Naxos, first Greek colony in Sicily,  
ii. 193.

Nebuchadnezzar, unknown to H., i.  
143; builds Median wall, 144;  
his victories, 248; his greatness,  
379.  
Necho, third king of Saite dynasty,  
i. 243, 244.  
Necho, Pharaoh, naval projects of,  
i. 245 f.; canal of, 246; fleet of,  
*ib.*; campaigns of, 247.  
Nelidae, i. 122.  
Nemesis, doctrine of, i. 49, 50, 69;  
illustrations of, 266 f., ii. 180, 387.  
Nesean, or Nisæan, horses, ii. 145;  
plain, 146.  
Neuri become were-wolves, i. 339.  
Nile, H.'s geography of the valley,  
i. 163 f.; his journey up the Nile,  
164 f.; branches of, 168; rise of,  
169 f.; theories of Thales and  
Anaxagoras, 169; of H., 170 f.;  
name of, 171; source of, theories  
about, 171 f., 177; cataracts of,  
173; upper course of, 173 f., 176;  
compared with Danube, 176 f.;  
confused with Niger, 177, 319.  
Nilometer, i. 166.  
Nineveh, fall of, i. 107, 378.  
Nitocris, Babylonian queen, name  
not found on inscriptions, i. 143;  
confusion and uncertainty about,  
143 f.; supposed tomb of, 145 f.  
Nitocris, Egyptian queen, story of,  
i. 216; her existence doubtful,  
216, 417.  
'Noble savage', theory of his virtues,  
i. 303; rejected by H., 321.  
Nomes, Egyptian, i. 249 f.  
Novel, beginnings of Greek, i. 35, 270.  
Nymphodorus, ii. 180.  
Nysa, i. 288.

## O

Oarus, river, i. 310, 342.  
Oasis, of Khargeh, i. 262, 361; of  
Siwah, 263, 361; meaning of,  
263; nature of, 361.  
Oaths, Greek observance of, ii. 89;  
by water of Styx, 93; divine  
punishment for breach of, 99; of  
Greeks to punish Medism, 177 f.



# INDEX

- Oebares, i. 280.  
 Oenoe, demes named, ii. 41.  
 Oenone, ii. 250.  
 Oeroe, ii. 309 f.  
 Olbia, mart of the Borysthenites, i. 308; coins of, 324; authority of the Scythian king in, 330.  
 Old age, respect for, in Egypt and Sparta, i. 207.  
 Olen, i. 315.  
 Oligarchies, resting on wealth, ii. 11, 195; of landed proprietors, 42, 194; narrow, resting on birth, 52, 326.  
 Olive, the, in Attica, ii. 46; the sacred, of Athena, 253.  
 Olorus, ii. 77.  
 Olympia, famous offerings at, of Cypselus, ii. 53, 341; of Micythus, 205; statue of Zeus at, 322 f.  
 Olympic games, date of, ii. 223, 242; prizes for, 242; rules of, 254. Cf. Athletics.  
 Olympiodorus, ii. 295.  
 Omens, from birds, i. 276; from words, 296; from statues and temples, ii. 182; from names, 210; of rumour, 331.  
 Omphale, connexion with Heracles, i. 58.  
 Onomacritus, ii. 127.  
 Opis, i. 146.  
 Oracles, collections of, i. 31; ascribed to Laius, ii. 17; to Musaeus and Orpheus, 127; to Bacis, 240; made by Onomacritus, 127; possessed by Pisistratids, 344 n.  
 Oracles, methods of consultation, i. 72, 75, ii. 182, 280; moral teaching of, i. 126, 129, ii. 98, 99; ambiguity of, i. 129, 274, ii. 94; difference between Greek and Egyptian, i. 194; double, ii. 70, 94; priests of, 168; H.'s faith in, 261 f. *See also* Ammon, Delphi, Dodona.  
 Ordeal, in Libyan worship of Athena, i. 360; by water of Styx, ii. 93.  
 Oreithyia, myth of, ii. 215.  
 Orestes, myth of, i. 90.  
 Orestheion, or Oresthasion, ii. 290.  
 Ormazd, representation and worship of, i. 112, 407 f.  
 Orneatae, ii. 260.  
 Oroetes, i. 296.  
 Orotalt, i. 258.  
 Orphic doctrines and rites, i. 207, ii. 344.  
 Orthagoridae, anti-Dorian, ii. 35, 339 f.; genealogy of, 117.  
 Osiris, H.'s reserve about, i. 158; widespread cult of, 186, 251; resembles Dionysus, 186; incarnate in goat, 189; feast of lamps to, 196; story of, 197; lord of the world of the dead, 209.  
 Ostrich, i. 358.  
 Otanes, one of the seven conspirators, position of, i. 275, 279; speech of, 278, ii. 80; part in the conspiracy, i. 397; his relationships, ii. 154, 158.  
 Oxen, wild, ii. 173.

## P

- Pactyice, i. 289, 319.  
 Paeonians, ii. 1, 6, 133.  
 Pale, men of, at Plataea, ii. 299.  
 Palermo stone, i. 415.  
 Palm-tree, uses of, i. 149.  
 Pamphylia, Greek settlements in, ii. 161.  
 Pan, i. 239, ii. 108.  
 Panathenaea, ii. 25, 344.  
 Pan-Ionium, site of, i. 123; Pan-Ionic Council, ib., ii. 61.  
 Panticapes, river, i. 324.  
 Panyasis, i. 1, 4.  
 Papaeus, i. 325.  
 Paphos, ii. 217.  
 Papremis, site of, i. 197.  
 Papyrus, growth of, i. 213; use of, ii. 27.  
 Parapotamii, ii. 245.  
 Parasang, i. 161, ii. 23.  
 Parian marble, first used, i. 271; used in restoring the temple at Delphi, ii. 30.  
 Parnassus, Mount, ii. 245.  
 Paros, prosperity of, ii. 120; expedition against, 120 f.  
 Pasargadae, site of, i. 109.

- Pataeci, i. 265.  
 Patara, i. 142.  
 Patumos, i. 246.  
 Pausanias, treachery of, ii. 12; supposed messages of, 313, 315; tactical skill of, 314, 395; sentences on Thebans, 326 f.; strategy of, 392.  
 Pedasa, stories of, i. 135, ii. 170; site of, 65.  
 Pelargicon, or Pelasgicon, ii. 32.  
 Pelasgi, H.'s theory on, i. 78 f., 444 f.; language of, 80; in Attica, 192, 445, ii. 123; sacrifices of, i. 193; Pelasgi, real, 442 f.; in Lemnos, ii. 122; Pelasgic theory, i. 443; developed by Ephorus, 444; Pelasgi and Tyrseni, 445; Ridgeway on, 446.  
 Peloponnesian. *See* League.  
 Pelusium, i. 167, 197.  
 Pentathlum, events in, ii. 301.  
 Penteconters, i. 127, 267, 268.  
 'Peoples of the Sea', i. 419-21.  
 Periander, mediation of, i. 63, ii. 56; tyranny of, i. 270, ii. 54, 340-2.  
 Pericles, birth of, ii. 119; simile of, 198.  
 Perinthus, ii. 1.  
 Perseidae, connexion with Egypt, i. 211 f.  
 Perseus, identified with Chem, i. 211; descent of, ii. 83; Persian story of, 84.  
 Perseus, watch-tower of, i. 166.  
 Persians, arms of, ii. 20, 153; council of, 128; dress of, i. 116, ii. 152; judges, royal, i. 259, 400; kings of, their marriage, 256; and their powers, 399, 400; manners and customs of, 115-18; names of, 117, ii. 105; punishments of, 9, 10, 141, 145; religion of, i. 112 f., 407 f.; revenue of, 281 f., 404; satrapies, 281; list of, 405; in Asia Minor, ii. 9; satraps, i. 281; powers and duties of, 401 f.; checks on, 402 f.; tribes of, 109 f.  
 Phallic worship, i. 190, 192.  
 Phanes, story and coin of, i. 256.  
 Phayllus, leap of, ii. 250.  
 Phegeus, ii. 297.  
 Pheidippides, story of, ii. 108. *See* Philippides.  
 Pheidon, date of, ii. 117 f.  
 Pheretime, i. 369.  
 Pheros, meaning of, i. 222, 423.  
 Phigaleia, ii. 97.  
 Philaidae, genealogy of, ii. 76 f.  
 Philippides, ii. 107 f.  
 Phocaea, founded by Phocians, i. 122; coins of, 127; navy of, 127.  
 Phocaeans, western voyages of, i. 126 f.  
 Phocians, extended to and fortified Thermopylae, ii. 208 f.; posted above Thermopylae, 226 f.; retire, 227; defeat Thessalians, 242; join the Persians, 293.  
 Phoenicians, origin of, i. 53 f.; conquest of, by Persians, 262; in Greece, 347 f.; in Boeotia, 349; lines of influence on Greeks, 349; in Sicily, ii. 19; in Cyprus, 60; at Salamis, 385 f.; alphabet of, 26.  
 Phoenix, myth of, i. 203.  
 Phoenix, river, ii. 221.  
 Phraortes, i. 105, 382.  
 Phrygia, conquest of, by Lydia, i. 71; Phrygian kingdom, date and fall of, 373; Phrygian influence on Greece, i. 373.  
 Phrynichus, dramas of, ii. 72.  
 Pieria, ii. 168, 176.  
 Pindar, quoted on natural law, i. 266.  
 Piracy, i. 127, ii. 70.  
 Pirene, fountain of, ii. 53.  
 Pisistratidae, chronology of, i. 84; connexion with oracles and religion, 85, ii. 344; popular errors about, 24; foreign relations of, 30, 55 f.; patronize art and literature, 343 f.  
 Pisistratus, rise of, i. 80 f.; sons of, ii. 55; social and economic policy, 342 f.; foreign policy of, 344 f.  
 Pitanate, λόχος evidence for, ii. 311.  
 Pittacus, i. 65.  
 Pixodarus, i. 64.  
 Plataea, alliance of, with Athens, ii. 109 f.; surprise of, by Thebans, 232; number of inhabitants, 299; alleged conspiracy at, 306.

Plataea, campaign of, ii. 294 f., 390 f.;  
 numbers of armies in, 300, 364,  
 368; chronology of, 305, 391 f.;  
 losses in, 317.  
 Plutarch, de Maliginitate Herodoti,  
 i. 38; on Marathon, ii. 356; on  
 Plataea, 396.  
 Polemarch (Athenian), duties of, ii.  
 110; at Marathon, 357 f.  
 Polemarchs, Spartan officers, ii. 206.  
 Political philosophy, beginnings of,  
 i. 278, ii. 44.  
 πόλος, invention of, i. 221.  
 Polyandry. *See* Marriage Customs.  
 Polycrates, story and date of, i. 266 f.;  
 ring of, 268; power and policy of,  
 ii. 345.  
 Polycritus, ii. 266.  
 Population, of Athens, ii. 57; of  
 Sparta, 232; and of various Greek  
 states as estimated from their con-  
 tingents at Plataea, 298 f.  
 Poseideium, i. 283.  
 Poseidon, worship of, in Libya, i.  
 364; earthquakes ascribed to, ii.  
 176; contest with Athena, 253.  
 Post, Persian, ii. 268 f.  
 Potidaea, ii. 277, 299.  
 Praesus, ii. 204.  
 Prasias, lake, ii. 6.  
 Prexaspes, i. 276.  
 Probouloi, ii. 206.  
 Propontis, i. 333.  
 Propylaea, at Athens, i. 8, ii. 43 f.  
 Promiscuity. *See* Marriage Customs.  
 Protesilaus, ii. 335.  
 Proteus, myth of, i. 222; temple of,  
 223.  
 Providence, kindness of divine, i. 291.  
 Proxenus, meaning of, ii. 86; duties  
 of, 281; as an honorary title, 282.  
 Prytaneum, at Athens, ii. 107.  
 Psammetichus, experiment with early  
 speech, i. 156; meaning of name,  
 243; reign of, 244 f.  
 Psammis, i. 247.  
 Psylli, i. 358.  
 Psyttaleia, ii. 261, 382, 384, 386.  
 Ptah, temple of, i. 216; connected  
 with Pataeci, 265.  
 Pteria, i. 95.

Ptolemy, canon of, i. 378.  
 Punishments, oriental, ii. 132, 134;  
 of inanimate or irrational things,  
 141. *See also* Persian.  
 Purification, rites of, i. 71.  
 Pygmies, i. 177.  
 Pythagorae, ii. 224.  
 Pyramids, builders of, i. 226, 416;  
 meaning of word, 227; built by  
 forced labour, ib.; measurements,  
 of, 228; method of building, 229;  
 inscription on, ib.  
 Pythagoras, i. 226, 253, 298, 335.  
 Pythius, ii. 138, 145.  
 Pythons, i. 366.

R

Rain, in Babylonia, i. 148; in  
 Egypt, 259.  
 Rameses II, monuments of, i. 219;  
 colossal statues of, 222; reign of,  
 420 f.  
 Rationalization of myths, i. 32 f.,  
 54, 108, 191, 194, 307.  
 Red Sea ('Arabian Gulf'), i. 154;  
 dimensions of, 165.  
 Rhegium, ii. 199, 206.  
 Rhipaeae mountains, i. 312, 314,  
 321, 435 n.  
 Rhodopis, pyramid of, i. 232; story  
 of, 233.  
 Rhoecus, i. 273.  
 Rivers, Persian respect for, i. 117;  
 geological action of, 160, 165; of  
 S. Russia, 321; worship of, ii.  
 169.  
 Road, along north coast of Aegean,  
 ii. 5, 170; Royal, to Susa, 21 f.;  
 sacred way, 75.

S

Sabacos, i. 234, 421.  
 Sacae, ii. 155, 159.  
 Sacrifices, Persian, compared with  
 Greek, i. 114, ii. 169; Scyth,  
 ritual of, i. 325 f.; sacrifice and  
 magic, ii. 216. Cf. Human Sacri-  
 fices.  
 Sagaris, i. 154.  
 Sagartians, i. 284.  
 Sages, seven, i. 65 f., 270.

- Sais, priest of, i. 172; worship of Neith at, 196.
- Saite dynasty, and Assyria, i. 243; naval policy of, 248; greatness and alliances of, 423.
- Salamis in Cyprus, ii. 60, 160.
- Salamis, battle of, number of ships at, ii. 248 f., 363 f.; position of fleets, 264, 381 f.; account of, 265, 384 f.; councils of war at, 378.
- Salmoxis, i. 335.
- Salt, houses of, i. 363.
- Samos, H. familiar with, i. 3, 299; situation of, 270; great works at, 272 f., ii. 345; conquered by Persians, i. 298 f.; Samians betray Ionians at Lade, ii. 69; at Zancle, 199 f.
- Sane, ii. 135.
- Sardanapallus, i. 243.
- Sardinia, i. 129, ii. 61.
- Sardis, topography of, i. 96 f.; excavations at, 97; date of capture of, 98; Sardis official name of first satrapy, 282, 295.
- Saspeires, i. 286.
- Satrap, coinage of, i. 356, 402; often hereditary, 402; and the Persian army, 403; in Asia Minor, ii. 9. *See also* Persian.
- Satrapy, meaning, origin, and divisions of, i. 281; description of, 283 f.; list of, 405 f.
- Sauromatae, i. 310, 340 f.
- Scalp-hunting of Scyths, i. 326.
- Scapegoat at Thargelia, ii. 219.
- σχοῖνος, length of, i. 160.
- Sciron, footpath of, ii. 259.
- Scius, i. 322.
- Scolopoeis, ii. 330.
- Scoloti, i. 304.
- Scolus, ii. 292.
- Scylax, voyage of, i. 319 f.
- Scyllias, ii. 238.
- Scyros, ii. 210.
- Scythes, ii. 73, 198 f.
- Scythia, geography of, i. 308 f., 336; H.'s geography of, 309 f.; boundaries and shape of, 338, 425; rivers of, 321, 426.
- Scythian bow, i. 305; disease, 107.
- Scythian expedition, date of, i. 429; motives of, 430 f.; results of, 431; disasters of Darius in, 432 f.; difficulties in H.'s account of, 342, 432 f.; supposed inconsistencies in H., 341, 433.
- Scyths, origin of, i. 304; ethnology of, 310, 424, 428; meaning of name, 331, 427; blood-pledge among, 259; nomadic life of, 321; customs of, 338 f., 427; religion of, 325, 427; kings, origin of, 305; tombs of, 432; raids of, 60 f., 106; attack Miltiades, ii. 78.
- Seals, in Babylon, i. 150; Persian, royal, 296.
- Semiramis, i. 143, 380; gate of, 301.
- Sennacherib, i. 236, 421.
- Sepeia, ii. 95.
- Sepias, ii. 210 f.
- Serfs, at Argos, ii. 97; in Greece and Sicily, 194.
- Serpent column, ii. 322 f.
- Sesostris, i. 217 f., 417.
- Sestos, ii. 335 f.
- Sethos, i. 235.
- Seven princes of Persia, i. 276.
- Shadouf, i. 148.
- Shardana, i. 420.
- Shepherd kings in Egypt, i. 230, 418.
- Sicans, origin of, ii. 203.
- Sicily, Greek colonies in, ii. 17 f., 72 f., 192 f.; mercenaries in, 197, 200.
- Sicinnus, ii. 260, 272.
- Sicyon, ii. 34 f., 339 f.; Sicyonians, numbers of, at Plataea, 299.
- Sidon, ii. 164.
- Siege-work of Spartans and Athenians, ii. 316.
- Sigeum, ii. 56.
- Sigynnae, ii. 4.
- Silenus, ii. 284, cf. 138.
- Silphium, i. 357.
- Simoon, i. 263.
- Sinope, i. 306.
- Siphnos, i. 271.
- Siris, ii. 255.

# INDEX

- Sitalces, i. 330, ii. 180.  
 Slave-born class, dangerous to the state, i. 303.  
 Slaves, early use of, ii. 123; branding of, 141, 232.  
 Smerdis, i. 264.  
 Smindyrides, luxury of, ii. 117.  
 Smyrna, i. 62, 124.  
 Snakes, in Egypt, H. mistaken about, i. 203; winged, 204, 291.  
 Solon, and Croesus, i. 66 f.; visits Egypt, 67; laws of, 67; law against idleness, 253; visits Soli, ii. 63.  
 Solymi, i. 134.  
 Sophocles and Herodotus, i. 7, 50, 294.  
 Sothic period, i. 159, 415.  
 Sparta, citizens, number of, ii. 232 f.; citizenship, admission to, 302 f.; constitution of, i. 88 f., 268, ii. 332, 349 f. (*see also* Ephors); exclusiveness of, i. 87, 347; festivals at, ii. 90, 288 f.; foreign policy of, 98, 351 f., 389; hegemony of, i. 87-9, ii. 235, 351, 353 (*see also* League); hippeis at, i. 91; monarchy, dual, at, 82 f.; land system of, 92; movement against in Peloponnese, ii. 303; opposition to tyrants, 51, 346 f.  
 Spartan kings, not Dorian, ii. 40; honours of, 84 f.; powers of, in foreign affairs, 84, 349 f.; in war, 31, 41, 85, 206; succession of, 125.  
 Spartan women, character of, ii. 91.  
 Sphinx, i. 252, 330.  
 Spices, where obtained, i. 290.  
 Stade, length of, i. 243.  
 Strategy, Persian, in 490 B.C., ii. 358 f.; in 480 B.C., 369; of Miltiades, 360 f.; Greek, in 480 B.C., 369 f.; in 479 B.C., 389; of Mar-donius, 388 f.; of Pausanias, 392 f.  
 Strymon, ii. 169.  
 Sturgeon, i. 324.  
 Stymphalus, ii. 93 f.  
 Styx, ii. 93.  
 Suez, Isthmus of, i. 246.  
 Suffetes, ii. 201.  
 Sundial, i. 221.  
 Super-foetation, i. 291.  
 Susa, ii. 20 f.  
 Suttee, ii. 2.  
 Swine, Egyptian dislike of, i. 190; feeding on, a criterion of race, 363.  
 Sword worship, i. 326.  
 Sybaris, ii. 18, 71 f.  
 Syene, i. 172.  
 Syennesis, i. 94, ii. 333.  
 Symmetry, argument from, in geography, i. 178, 316, 437.  
 Syracuse, ii. 193 f.  
 Syrian = Cappadocian, i. 56, 282; in Palestine, 257.  
 Syrtis, the Greater, i. 357.

## T

- Tachompsos, i. 173.  
 Tactics, naval, ii. 65, 68 f., 212, 238, 255, 375 f., 385; of Miltiades, 112, 362; of Pausanias, 314, 394.  
 Taharka, i. 244.  
 Talthybius, ii. 179 f.  
 Tammuz, i. 206.  
 Tanagra, battle of, ii. 304.  
 Tanais, i. 325.  
 Tarentum, i. 298.  
 Targitaus, i. 304.  
 Tartessus, i. 127.  
 Tattooing, ii. 3.  
 Tauri, i. 338; Tauric Chersonese, 337.  
 Tearus, i. 334.  
 Tegea, site of, i. 89; temple of, 90; battle of, ii. 97, 303; panegyric of, 297.  
 Telesilla, ii. 94.  
 Tell-el-Amarna tablets, i. 419.  
 Tellus, i. 68.  
 Telmessus, i. 95.  
 Telys, ii. 18.  
 Tempe, ii. 174 f., 370 f.  
 Temples, size of Greek, i. 273; in Persia, 397. *See also* Introduction, p. 30 f.



- Tenians, ii. 263, 322.  
 Teos, i. 130.  
 Teucrians, ii. 133 f.  
 Thales, i. 94, 130, 171.  
 Thalassocracy, i. 295, ii. 11, 12, 58.  
 Thasos, ii. 81.  
 Thebes (Egyptian), i. 157; visited by H., 237; cf. Appendix IX.  
 Thebes (Boeotian), attacked by H., i. 40, ii. 229; parties at, 229, 326; territory of, 292; used as Persian base, 306; constitution of, 326.  
 Themistocles, character of, i. 42, ii. 272; charges against, i. 42, ii. 236 f., 263, 272; chronology of his life, 184; naval policy of, 186 f.; favours westward expansion, 256; banishment of, 272; message of, to Xerxes, ib.; honours to, 276; stratagem of, 379 f.; position and policy in 479 B.C., 390.  
 Theodorus of Samos, bowl of, i. 74; ring of, 268; vine and plane-tree of, ii. 138.  
 Thera, colonization of, i. 345 f.  
 Therapne, ii. 88.  
 Therma, ii. 171.  
 Thermopylae, description of, ii. 206 f.; number killed at, 241; purpose in holding, 371, 376; purpose of Leonidas' last stand at, 377.  
 Thero, ii. 200.  
 Theseus, legends of, ii. 297.  
 Thesmophoria, i. 251.  
 Thespians, losses of, at Thermopylae, ii. 260, 377.  
 Thessaly, chiefs and constitution of, ii. 30, 126; expedition of Leontychides against, 92; passes into, 174 f.; rivers of, 176 f., 217; submission of, to Xerxes, 176; tribes of, 177; enmity to Phocis, 242.  
 Thetis, ii. 216.  
 Thoas, ii. 124.  
 Thothmes III, i. 419.  
 Thrace, size of, ii. 1; tribes of, 1, 6, 167 f.; identified with Phrygians, 133; priests in, 168.  
 Thracian shield and dress, ii. 157.  
 Thriasian plain, ii. 256.  
 Thucydides criticizes and differs from H., i. 7, 36 n., 287, ii. 232, 335.  
 Thuia, ii. 209.  
 Thyrea, i. 96.  
 Thyssagetae, i. 310.  
 Tibareni, i. 286.  
 Tiryns, fall of, ii. 97.  
 Tisamenus, ii. 301 f.  
 Tithe of booty, ii. 178.  
 Tithorea, ii. 244.  
 Toleration, religious, in Greece, i. 266; of Cyrus, 391; of Darius, ii. 104.  
 Torch-bearers in the Spartan army, ii. 237.  
 Torch-races, ii. 269.  
 Torone, ii. 172.  
 'Towers of Silence', i. 118, 409.  
 Trachis, ii. 207 f., 222 f.  
 Trade leagues, rivalry of, i. 128, 272, ii. 58, 71 f.  
 Trade routes, by Rhodes, to Egypt, i. 255; in South Russia, 309 f.; of amber, 314; from Miletus to Sybaris, ii. 72; from Sybaris overland to Laus, ib.; from Siris to Pyxus, 255. *See also* Corn Trade.  
 Traitors, doom of, ii. 178  
 Transplantation, of conquered tribes, i. 285, ii. 5, 66; of inhabitants of conquered cities, 195.  
 Trausi, ii. 2.  
 'Treasures' at Delphi and Olympia, i. 59.  
 Trierarch, duties of, ii. 240.  
 Tripod, struggle of Apollo and Heracles for, ii. 243; at Delphi, 322.  
 Tritonis lake, i. 359.  
 Troglodytes, i. 362.  
 Trophonius, ii. 280.  
 Tumuli in South Russia, i. 328.  
 Turin papyrus, i. 415.  
 Tymnes, informant of H., i. 330.  
 — Carian despot, ii. 15.  
 Typhon, i. 257.  
 Tyrants, building policy of, i. 273; evil deeds of, 278; as saviours of society, 279; anti-Dorian, ii.

# INDEX

52, 339; called king as a compliment, 18, 197; used as a term of reproach for king, 285.  
*See also* Appendix XVI.  
 Tyre, temple at, i. 188.  
 Tyrodiza, ii. 136.  
 Tyrseni, i. 445.

U

Uria, ii. 204.

V

Vassal-kings, i. 259 f., ii. 163.  
 Vines, growth of, in Egypt, i. 183.  
 Volcanic islands, ii. 127.

W

War-chariots, ii. 159.  
 Well, of tar in Zacynthus, i. 368; of salt water on the Acropolis, ii. 253.  
 Were-wolves, i. 339.  
 Wine, use of, in Egypt, i. 183; dilution of, in Greece, ii. 98.  
 Winged snakes, i. 204, 291.  
 Women, Greek contempt for, i. 320; at Sparta, ii. 91; used as a taunt, 258, 267.  
 Wounds, treatment of, ii. 210.


X

Xanthippus, ii. 279.  
 Xenagoras, ii. 333.

Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* of, i. 399.  
 Xerxes, dream of, ii. 131; canal of, 135 f.; route of, 137, 146, 147, 170-3, 243 f.; bridge of, 140 f., 274, 333; chronology of his expedition, 144; entertainment of, 171; treatment of spies, 187; throne of, 266; mole of, 268; retreat of, 273 f., 387.  
 Xerxes' army, description of, ii. 151 f.; numbers of, 211 f., 366 f.; organization of, 367; diary of, 372 f.  
 Xerxes' fleet, losses of, ii. 188, 257; numbers and organization of, 364 f.; diary of, 372 f.  
 Xuthus, ii. 162.

## Z

Zacynthus, i. 368.  
 Zancle, ii. 73, 199.  
 Zeus, identified with Ormazd, i. 112; Ammon, 176; Carian, temples and worships of, ii. 64; Laphystius, 218.  
 Ziggurat, i. 141.  
 Zopyrus, the elder, i. 300, 319.  
 — the younger, probable informant of H., i. 8, 300; death of, 302.  
 Zoroastrianism, i. 407-10, ii. 148, 149.  
 Zoster, ii. 271.









## Hdt. & Chronology.

F. Mitchell, Phoenix 1956, 48H. 'H's use of Gen. Chron.

H. has no overall picture. ✓

Some earlier gen.ists may have tried to equat diff. stemmata  
but H. doesn't. His history is episodic, the data in each  
episode are those of that authority.

Hell. may have inv. the '3 gen. to 1000 y's'; ∴ the earlier is Hellas  
Hellas 'H. to 1000 y's' is wrong.

Hellandus was returned (F&H 3238, F&H 19: Thesaur & Helland)



